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ABSTRACT 
Scholars of Boris Yeltsin’s Russia argue that it was a period of demilitarisation. Research 
largely focuses on militarisation in terms of its physical dimensions and by investigating 
subjects, individuals and institutions with a direct link to the military.  These scholars 
instead attribute the success of Russian militarism in the post-Soviet period to Vladimir 
Putin. However, this is not entirely the case. This thesis challenges the assumption that 
the collapse of the Soviet Union constituted a break in the militarisation of society, 
arguing that the focus of current literature is too narrow to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of Russian militarism at this time. Instead, the research investigates 
Russian militarisation during the 1990s through a cultural lens by examining the 
prominent discourses across four societal domains: media, education; social welfare; and 
commemoration. Two discourses of a militaristic nature prevailed, including the moral 
obligation and civic duty of Russian people to protect the fatherland, and Russia as a 
besieged fortress. These narratives underpin Russian identity and have contributed 
towards the survival of Russian militarism beyond regime change. The thesis examines 
political documents, including laws, notes and letters, from the State Archive of the 
Russian Federation and the Yeltsin Centre, Russian newspapers and Russian school 
historical textbooks from the Russian State Library to answer the following questions: 
what top-down mechanisms militarise society? What discourses are prominent in the four 
societal domains and in what way do they contribute towards the militarisation of society? 
How do the discourses within the different societal domains fit into (and add to) current 
literature on the state of militarism and militarisation in Post-Soviet Russia? The thesis 
found that the rituals of the Putin era were rooted in Yeltsin’s Russia, and that through a 
cultural lens, societal militarisation can be seen to persist without a strong military 
apparatus. 
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DEDOVSHCHINA: Hazing; the process in which a senior military officialbullies a 
younger recruit 
GLASNOST: The policy initiated by leader Mikhail Gorbachev, pushing for more 
transparency between the government and society 
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economic and political system of the Soviet Union 
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unique destiny; a specific Russian way of living; and the messianic role of the Russian 
people. 
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SUBBOTNIK: Subbotnik and Voskresnik are days of unpaid work on weekends, most 
commonly associated with the Soviet period. The origin of the word comes from the 
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Russian Federation 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
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KGB: Rus: Comitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Eng: Committee for State Security 
MERF: Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
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  On the 24th June 2020, Russia celebrated the 75th anniversary of the Great Patriotic 
War.1 While parades usually take place on the 9th May, quarantine measures imposed by 
COVID-19 forced the Russian government to postpone the Victory Day. Instead, they 
celebrated the 75th anniversary of the first Victory Day parade, which took place on June 
24th, 1945. The parade emphasised the historical, with 14,000 soldiers taking to Red 
Square in Soviet uniform alongside military hardware from the Great Patriotic War and 
the current military inventory. Russia Today (RT) used headlines such as “Victorious 
then, as now: WW2 and Latest Tech alongside each other” to highlight a connection 
between the past and present, with the notion of victory bridging the eras. In his speech 
President Vladimir Putin emphasised the temporal dimensions between past and present, 
stating his fear of where the world would be today “had it not been for the Red Army.” 
His speech focused on three elements: the Soviet Union’s role in the Great Patriotic War; 
Russia’s obligation to perpetuate the memory of those who forged the victory over 
Nazism; and Russia’s desire to collaborate with countries on existing and emerging 
threats.2 Two main discourses underpin Russian identity today: 1) the moral obligation 
and civic duty of Russian people to sacrifice themselves to protect the fatherland; and 2) 
Russia as a besieged fortress.  
These discourses form the foundations of Russian militarism and their current 
success is often attributed to Putin’s leadership, with the preceding Yeltsin era being 
characterised as one of demilitarisation. Yet, this is not entirely the case. Rather, these 
discourses were revived in the Yeltsin era and enabled the militarisation of society when 
the physical dimensions of the military were in decay. To this end, this thesis disputes the 
general assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union constituted a break in the 
militarisation of society.3 It argues that militarism persisted in the newly formed Russian 
 
1 The Great Patriotic War (1941-1944) refers specifically to the Soviet Union’s conflict 
with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.  
2 “Putin’s Victory Day Parade Speech.” 
3  For scholarship on Russian demilitarisation in the 1990s, please see: Leon Aron, 
“Russia’s New Foreign Policy,” American Enterprise Institute, (1998), accessed 14 
December 2019, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/russias-new-foreign-
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Federation despite mass cuts to military budgets and efforts to reduce the size of, and 
funding for, the Armed Forces. The argument is foregrounded on the basis that militarised 
narratives remained salient in the discourse among four important societal domains and 
spheres of cultural activity: in the media; in Russia’s historical education; in the realm of 
social welfare; and the country’s commemorative practices. The prominence sustained 
cultural militarisation without the presence of a strong military.  
 
AIMS OF THE THESIS 
 
 The thesis aims to locate which mechanisms drove processes of latent 
militarisation in 1990s Russia. To further current understanding of militarisation under 
Yeltsin, the thesis answers three overarching questions, including: 1) what top-down 
mechanisms militarise society?; 2) What discourses and narratives are prominent across 
the four societal domains, and in what way do they contribute towards the militarisation 
of society?; 3) How do these discourses fit into (and add to) current literature on the state 
of militarism and militarisation in Post-Soviet Russia? In the process, the thesis also 
identifies militarised foundations, which Vladimir Putin has been able to build his own 
militarisation project. 
 Through the examination of the sources, and by answering these questions, the 
thesis argues that there were militarised continuities between Imperial Russia, the Soviet 
regime, and the formative years of the Russian Federation. The resilience of military 
tradition from Peter I through to the Yeltsin period was a product of two discourses that 
have gained relevance under each of the regimes since 1682, specifically Russia as a 
besieged fortress and of the honour and heroism attached to sacrifice at war. The thesis 
 
policy/; Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military,” Foreign Affairs 95, No. 3 
(2016) http://foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military; 
Dale Herspring, “Dedovshchina in the Russian Army: The Problem that won’t go away,” 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 18, No. 4 (2005): 609-610; Dale Herspring, 
“Undermining Combat Readiness in the Russian Military, 1992-2005,” Armed Forces & 
Society 32, No. 4 (2006): 515-516; Dale Herspring, “Vladimir Putin and Military Reform 
in Russia,” European Security 14, No. 1 (2005): 140; Catherine J. Danks, Russian Politics 
and Society: An Introduction (Essex: Pearson Education, 2001), 174-176; Rodric 
Braithwaite, “Dedovshchina: Bullying in the Russian Army,” Open Democracy, (2010), 
accessed 14 November 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/dedovshchina-
bullying-in-russian-army/; Maya Eichler, Militarising Men: Gender, Conscription and 
War in Post-Soviet Russia (California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 63. 
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does not outwardly dispute current literature arguing that a process of physical 
demilitarisation took place during the 1990s. However, it does contest the viewpoint that 
the Yeltsin period was one of demilitarisation as a whole, as in many ways, seen through 
the prism of culture, it was also a period of maintained militarisation. This cultural 
dimension (beyond the barracks) is vastly overlooked in contemporary literature on this 
topic and is the primary focus of this thesis. Therefore, the thesis argues that a process of 
militarisation continued to exist in Russia, despite cuts to the military budget and Russia’s 
military failure in the Chechen region, due to the prominence of militarised narratives and 
rituals that continued and were revived under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin.  
This thesis conceptualises the process of militarisation through a cultural lens, and 
builds on the work of Joanna Waley-Cohen, who examines cultural militarisation as the 
“pervasive injection of military themes and references into the cultural arena.”4 During 
the 1980s and 1990s, economic constraints meant that Russia needed to rein in the 
physical dimensions of its military due to financial cutbacks. Scholars of the Yeltsin 
period have linked the physical decay of the military to the demilitarisation of Russian 
society. A closer look at Yeltin’s tenure reveals that the 1990s was more militarised that 
originally accepted.  
 
 
YELTSIN ON A TANK 
 
 Boris Yeltsin was Russia’s President from June 12th 1991 until 31st December 
1999. His premiership began on top of a tank, as he spoke against the August Putschists 
in 1991. It was at this defining moment that Yeltsin’s popularity dramatically rose and 
when he became seriously considered as an appropriate leader that would guide Russia 
on its path towards democracy. This democracy resulted in the physical demilitarisation 
of society. Yeltsin, like Gorbachev, was a civilian leader. Like Gorbachev, Russia’s 
demilitarisation was attributed to Yeltsin’s lack of experience in the military. It was 
Yeltsin’s worldviews and his democratic principles that were deemed as the roots of the 
 
4  Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Militarisation of culture in eighteenth-century China,” in 
Military Culture in Imperial China, ed. by Robin D. S. Yates and Ralph D. Sawyer 
(Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 279. 
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failure of Russia’s Armed Forces in the 1990s. Yet, even without a military background, 
Yeltsin’s time in office was characterised by war.  
His autobiographical account Midnight Diaries showcased his tenure as one 
characterised by conflicts. From 1990 to 1996 for example, he was convinced that the 
danger of a “civil war hung over Russia.”5 As an example to explain a potential military 
threat to Russian domestic politics, Yeltsin used the growth of the general-politician caste, 
with actors such as Alexander Lebed becoming increasingly prominent in bureaucracy.6 
The 1997 Svyazinvest auction was also characterised within a militarised frame. Yeltsin 
considered the “bank wars” a “harsh warfare without rules inside the business elite [that] 
not only threatened to topple the whole economy but took hold of politics and undermined 
the stability of the entire political system.”7 Vladimir Potonin won the “bank wars” of 
1997. 8  Potonin’s opponent, Pavel Gusinsky started a campaign within the media, 
accusing the state of taking bribes from Potonin.9 The miners’ strikes of 1998 were also 
defined through a military lens. The 1998 financial crisis led to miners’ strikes, in which 
the “coal workers’ union staged a rail war.”10 The “famous rail wars” of 1998 began after 
miners of the Kuzbass region had not received pay for a number of months. In retaliation 
the miners obstructed railroad lines, which acted as an internal blockade as many of 
Russia’s regions were dependent on railroad links.11  
While the focus remains on conflict within an economic setting, Jack Hirshleifer 
acknowledges that warfare serves as an appropriate metaphor for nonmilitary topics that 
include issues of ‘strife and contention.’12 It was contentious issues, such as the miners’ 
strike and the Svyazinvest auction that deserved the name “Rail wars” and “Bank Wars,” 
 
5 Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries (Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000), 53. 
6  Alexander Lebed (1950-2002) was a Soviet and Russian military officer turned 
politician who competed for the Russian Presidency in 1996. He served as Secretary of 
the Security Council under Boris Yeltsin in 1996 and was Governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai 
region between 1998 and 2002.   
7 Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 95. 
Svyazinvest is a Russian telecommunications holding company. 
8 Ibid, 193. Background information of the ‘Bank wars’ noted in footnote 13 alongside 
information on the Svyazinvest auction. 
9 Ibid, 95. 
10 Ibid, 169. 
11 Ibid, 169-171. 
I. S. Solovenko, “’Rel’sovye Voiny’ v Rossii v 1998 g.: k Postanovke Problemy,” Istoriia 
3, No. 11 (2010): 206. 
12  Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-2. 
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which were commonly used by the media.13 Izvestiia, for example, reported, “Miners start 
‘rail war’” [Rel’sovoi voiny] with 1,500 miners blocking the Moscow-Vorkuta line.14 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta and Krasnaia Zvezda are other media outlets that commented on 
the impact of the “Rail wars” on Russian life.15 Alongside domestic “wars,” Yeltsin was 
also dealing with wars in the near abroad and in Chechnya. He wrote extensively about 
the First Chechen War (1994-1996) in his autobiography, justifying Russian intervention 
on the basis that, “Dudaev threatened Russia, blackmailing it with terrorist acts and 
explosions at military bases and nuclear plants. On principle, a person who proclaims 
such things should not and cannot be negotiated with.”16 Russia’s second invasion of 
Chechnya in 1999 was underpinned by the notion of the Chechen terrorist. The apartment 
block bombings of 1999, in which three buildings in the suburbs of Moscow were blown 
up, led to Russia's second invasion of the region. As Yeltsin wrote, “The terrorists’ 
calculation was exact. They had already used this tactic once before in 1995 in 
Budyonnovsk. But now their intent was even more diabolical. They didn’t just want to 
take a district hospital hostage, as they had in Budyonnovsk. They wanted to take the 
whole country hostage.”17 Russia was involved in a war with Chechnya from 1994 to 
 
13  The Russian Government established the Svyazinvest telecommunications holding 
company in 1994 and remained a state-owned company until the late 1990s. In 1997, 25% 
of shares plus one was placed on sale by the government. The phrase ‘bank wars’ 
originated from the battle that ensued between banks including, the Cypriot Consortium 
Mustcom Ltd and Dutch company Telefam BV. The Mustcom Ltd group included 
Vladimir Potanin’s ONESKSIMbank, while the Telefam BV group included Vladimir 
Gusinsky, Alfa-Bank and Boris Berezovsky. The Mustcom Ltd group presented the 
highest bid, winning the auction. Competitors of Vladimir Potanin threatened an 
‘information war,’ with Gusinsky and Berezovsky utilising their media outlets to state 
their position. A history of the auction can be found here: “Bor’ba oligarkhov za 
‘Sviaz’invest.’ Spravka,” RIA Novosti, published 25 July 2011, 
https://ria.ru/20110725/406846261.html.  
Vladimir Potanin (1961- present) is a Russian billionaire, former First Deputy Prime 
Minister of the Russian Federation (August 1996- March 1997) and part owner of the 
company ‘Norilsk Nickel.’ Vladimir Gusinsky (1952- present) is founder of the Media-
Most Company that includes news channel ‘NTV,’ newspaper ‘Sevodnya,’ and radio 
station ‘Echo of Moscow.’ Boris Berezovsky (1946-2013) was a Russian oligarch with 
ties to the government. He was owner of ‘Channel One,’ and served as Deputy Secretary 
of Russia’s Security Council (October 1996 - November 1997) 
14 “Shakhtry Nachali ‘Rel’sovoi voiny,’” Izvestiia, 16 May 1998. 
15 “Rel’sovaia Voina,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 27 May 1998. 
Valerii Gromok, “Zalukhniki Rel’sovoi voiny,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 10 February 1998. 
16 Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 55. 
17 Ibid, 337. 
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1996 and then again in 1999, but it is clear that the Chechen problem did not remain 
within the tight confines of the dates above and oscillated between periods of resolution 
and aggravation.  
 For a country undergoing a physical demilitarisation, Russia was overwhelmed 
by conflict on many fronts. The sheer militarisation of society is showcased by the 
media’s militarisation of non-military issues through language use. It was the media that 
characterised the Svyazinvest auction and miners’ strikes of 1998 as war and used 
statements of hostage taking and Russia’s battle against issues of corruption, for example, 
as an appropriate metaphor to describe the events. Yeltsin referred to these events as wars, 
showcasing the success of the media in cultivating and promoting discourses through 
repetition and reproduction. This dominance was furthered by the fact that the Yeltsin era 
was one of attempted coups (1991 and 1993), military conflicts in its near abroad, and 
domestic crises that were framed militaristically. These are elements that must be taken 
into consideration when assessing Russian militarism in the 1990s.  
 In addition, we could consider Yeltsin as a mechanism of militarisation on the 
basis that he re-established and founded a set of rituals or trends, which Putin adopted 
and used as foundations for his own militarisation project. First, Yeltsin placed a number 
of ex-military personnel in elite political positions. Literature suggests that leaders with 
a background in the military or security sector shape their foreign and domestic policies 
around militarised worldviews. While not a member of the Soviet or Russian military, 
Yeltsin was socialised in a militarised society – the Soviet Union – and made a number 
of moves in support of the military institution. He differed from a leader with a military 
background in the sense that he was critical of the military’s ineffectiveness and 
prioritised social institutions in terms of the state budget, for example. However, he did 
(initially) appreciate Alexander Lebed’s role in the administration. He found Lebed to be 
a “very strong fellow,” and started to consider a career general as the best future leader 
for Russia. He had a particular type of general in mind. Yeltsin claimed:  
 
“At some point in 1993, I first thought to myself that something was wrong with 
some of our generals. They were missing something important, perhaps a certain 
nobility, sophistication, or some sort of inner resolve…I was waiting for a new 
general to appear, unlike any other. Or rather, a general who was like the generals 
I read about in books when I was young. I was waiting… Time passed, and such 
a general appeared. And soon after his arrival, it became obvious to our whole 
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society how really courageous and highly professional our military people were. 
The ‘general’ was named Colonel Vladimir Putin.”18  
 
 
A number of former military personnel tried to gain the presidency in 1996 with 
the view of influencing the Duma towards pro-military policies, including Alexander 
Lebed.19 Yeltsin passed the baton to Putin, essentially inserting an ex-security elite into a 
prime political position. Second, he reproduced the symbolisms and rituals of the Soviet 
Victory Day parades, copying the choreography, order, design and music of previous 
parades. He added to the Soviet ritual by establishing new traditions, for example, the use 
of military hardware and establishing the parade and Victory Day celebrations as annual 
events. Putin too, adopted this basic structure and order of the parades, but also added 
new elements from the beginning of his premiership. As indicated in chapter three, the 
de-ideologicisation of the history textbooks was actually about de-communisation. 
Therefore the communist ideology was replaced with patriotic militarism, symbolised in 
the way Yeltsin changed Post Number One from Lenin’s mausoleum to the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier.20 Yeltsin wrote, “Now the guards march here, at the symbolic grave 
of all our soldiers who have died for the motherland.”21 On December 8th 1997 Yeltsin 
signed a Presidential Decree, which assigned a permanent Guard of Honor post at the 
Tomb.22 The tradition established during the Yeltsin period still exists today. 
 Through a closer examination of Yeltsin and his presidency, it is clear that there 
was an underlying process of militarisation of everyday life. It was subtle but visible. Yet 
current literature argues that the Yeltsin era was one of demilitarisation. Scholarship on 
1990s Russia focuses largely on the physical aspects of militarisation, including military 
funding and conscription problems. Those that do consider the cultural aspects of the 
military, do so within the confines of the Armed Forces.23 The Militarisation school, in 
 
18 Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 69-70. 
19 Robert V. Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics, 1988-1996: Duty, Dictatorship 
and Democracy under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1998), 335. 
20 The postal code for Moscow starts with number one. Therefore Post Number One is 
the first postal code of the Russian state. Placing the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier under 
Post Number One signified its prominent position of importance to the government.  
21 Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 73. 
22 Yeltsin Centre, f. 8, op. 1, d. 7, l. 33-35, [Undated]. 
23  For example, please see: Julian Cooper, “Demilitarising the Russian Defence 
Economy: A Commentary,” Security Dialogue 26, No. 1 (1995): 38; Herspring, 
“Dedovshchina in the Russian Army,” 609-610; Herspring, “Undermining Combat 
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contrast, argues that Russia has been and is currently highly militarised. However, the 
Yeltsin period is largely overlooked, with a jump from the Gorbachev era to militarisation 




Conducting Archival Research 
 The research required three trips to Moscow, and more specifically to the Russian 
State Library (RSL) and the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF). In 
preparation for the first three-month field trip, months were spent collating a list of 
potential sources for examination – the online catalogues of the State Archive and Library 
allowed online viewing only for a small portion of their documents. The Yeltsin Centre, 
situated in Yekaterinburg, holds a larger selection of available online primary sources.  
Source acquisition at the State Archive was difficult at times, especially on the 
availability of archival materials on contentious topics – for example, the Chechen War. 
In addition, much of the archival materials on topics needed for the thesis were within the 
30-year declassification boundary. Therefore, many of the documents on the Chechen 
War were, for the most part, closed. While the relationship between Russia and Chechnya 
is currently somewhat stable, it remains problematic. Under the supervision of archivists 
on the sixth floor of building five at GARF, I was able to access open documents of the 
same files that included closed documents.  
 To overcome such limitations, the project largely focuses on discourses accessible 
to the public in educational textbooks, laws, speeches, and the media. In addition, topics 
of contention, such as the Chechen War, were found through channels not directly linked 
to the military or government – for example, the reports in the media. The thesis would 
benefit from those materials that remain tightly sealed in the brown envelopes of the 
Russian archives to understand the state’s handling of the conflict. However, the media 
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was able to show the discussions available for public view, and in some cases, society’s 
response to the crisis.  
The thesis examined eight different Russian newspapers and magazines between 
the years 1991 and 1999: Pravda; Izvestiia, Argumenty i Fakty; Krasnaia Zvezda; 
Ogoniok; Sovetskaia Rossiia; Kommersant; and Novaia Gazeta. The newspapers and 
magazines are of different nature. Newspapers were located in the Russian State Library 
(RSL) and articles were searched by year to identify dominant discourses. Once 
prominent stories were identified, like Chechnya, NATO and Russia’s peacekeeping 
missions, the later searches became more specific. Since these sources were identified via 
a database at RSL, there was no ability to focus specifically on letters to the editor, 
editorials or front-page news, with little indication of page numbers. Comparing the news 
outlets against one another in depth was not possible, as I was unable cross-reference how 
often these particular stories made front-page news across the different news outlets, for 
example. Despite this limitation, I was instead able to focus on what the discourses were 
and identify how they differed across the various newspapers.  
 Pravda (created in 1912) was originally a workers’ daily and eventually became 
the main voice of the Bolshevik movement, emerging as the official party paper under 
each Soviet government. In 1992, the paper was sold to a Greek investor, who 
transformed Pravda into a paper that became the voice of the conservative-nationalist 
opposition. Later in 1997, it became the chief paper of the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation. This was the only print-edition of pravda, but other versions of 
Pravda (for example, the website pravda.ru) appeared and offered a Russian nationalist 
perspective, which was not controlled by the Communist party. Traditionally, the 
newspaper was not the same as traditional printing press outlets – it did not sensationalise 
news or promote scandal – rather, it was used to promote unity within the Soviet Union. 
100,000 copies were in circulation by 1994.25   
Izvestiia (founded in 1917) is characterised as a “newspaper of record,” which is 
undefined by a set structure. Its initial purpose was to popularise the views of the 
Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary Parties. Similar to Pravda, it became the official 
mouthpiece of the Soviet government, and changed following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. It is now described as a national newspaper of the Russian Federation. Researchers 
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like Katrin Voltmer and Svetlana Juskevits found by conducting a comparative study on 
front-page news of Izvestiia between 1988 and 1996 that there was a ‘coexistence of old 
and new journalistic norms when news became more factual, more timely and broader in 
the selection of topics and the same time there are traces of a high degreee of journalistic 
subjective evaluations.”26 800,000 copies of Izvestiia were in circulation by 1994.27  
Established in 1978, Argumenty i Fakty is a weekly newspaper based in Moscow. 
Founded by an All-Union organisation “Knowledge” [Znaniye], a propagandist 
organisation, it served as a mouthpiece of the Soviet government and was one of the 
leading publications during Glasnost. At the start of the 1990s, 33.2 million copies of 
Argumenty i Fakty were in circulation; by 1994 the newspaper was printing 3.5 million 
copies a week. 28  In 1995 it was awarded “The best newspaper of the Year” at the 
International Press Festival, and in 1996 it was awarded “Best editor and newspaper of 
the year” by the Russian Journalists’ Union.”29 According to Argumenty i Fakty, the 
newspaper was run with little control of the state. Argumenty i Fakty’s website notes, 
“From this position it was able to put forward the views of the general population and 
was a key mechanism for collecting and dissemintating unbiased news and opinion.”30  
Krasnaia Zvezda is the newspaper of the Ministry of Defence.31 First published 
in 1924, the newspaper was particularly popular during the Great Patriotic War and was 
awarded numerous awards, such as the Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution. In 
1992, the newspaper became the central mouthpiece of the Ministry of Defence of the 
Russian Federation. As of 1998, Nikolai Nikolayevich Efimov has edited it.32 While 
established under Soviet leadership, the newspaper’s loyalty has remained with the 
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Armed forces. Despite the collapse of communism, journalists promoted Russia’s 
military cause and defended the image of the Russian soldier.33  
Ogoniok is the oldest weekly magazine printed in Russia. First published in 1899, 
it has undergone many changes to suit the needs of the different regimes that have 
collapsed and grown since its creation. The magazine was particularly popular during the 
Perestroika years, selling 4.6 million copies in 1990. In the 1990s, Ogoniok magazine was 
owned by Boris Berezovsky and seen as a mouthpiece of the Russian government, 
considering Berezovsky’s close relationship with Yeltsin.34 The magazine became less 
popular under his ownership. A member of Ogoniok’s editorial office confirmed that the 
magazine printed 300,000 copies in 1993. However, she remarked, “one should bear in 
mind the studies that show that one copy of the magazine is read by an average of 2 to 7 
people.” The economic hardships stopped state funding of many media outlets, which led 
to the decline in readership figures, as people could not afford subscription costs. This 
should be taken into consideration for every print-media during this time.35  
The newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia (first published in 1956) is characterised as 
political in nature. During the Perestroika years, the newspaper tried to “warn” its 
readership of the dangers of Gorbachev and his policies.36 The newspaper is passionately 
defined on its website as loyal to the regime it was established under. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the newspaper kept its name. While it has redefined itself 
as an independent leftist paper, it has close ties to the Communist Party.37  
Kommersant is a predominantly business-political newspaper. In 1992, it moved 
from publishing weekly to daily, serving the liberal-business community.38  Vladimir 
Egorovich Yakovlev founded the newspaper in 1989 and was recognised for his role in 
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the organisation of the election of the President of the Russian Federation by Boris Yeltsin 
in 1996. Its name derives from the newspaper ‘Kommersant’ that existed in Russia from 
1909 and before the Russian Revolution of 1917. Katya Koikkalainen notes that while 
print-press in the 1990s lost much of its audience to television, “the demand for special 
area information such as business information has grown with the rise of the economy in 
Russia.”39 According to Andrei G. Richter, Kommersant was one of the few publications 
to reject state help in the post-Soviet period, to remain free.40  
Novaia Gazeta is known for its critical and investigative journalism. Formed in 
1993 by a group of Komsomolskaya Pravda journalists, the newspaper is the only one in 
this thesis to be established after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev 
helped found the newspaper by using funds from his 1990s Nobel Peace Prize.41 While 
circulation figures are not available for the 1990s, Laura Belin notes Novaya Gazeta had 
a small circulation and was mostly available in Moscow.42 The newspaper has gained 
popularity since the 1990s for its critical stance of the government. It has been the topic 
of international news outlets numerous times, as a result of the assassination of a number 
of its journalists, especially in the early 2000s. The media outlets discuss a number of 
topics from various viewpoints and together represent a diverse set of opinions, although 
it is interesting to see which discourses garner agreement among the different outlets.  
The thesis also examined a mixture of political documents from within the State 
Duma. The State Duma makes up the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation, with the Federation Council being the upper house.  These 
documents include laws, draft of laws, recommendations, open letters, decrees and 
memorandums. President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and State 
Duma chairman Ivan Rubkin are key figures within the documents shared. Communist 
Party leader Gennady Zyuganov and separate Committees like the Committee on 
Disability, Veterans of War and Labour, Social Protection of Military Personnel and 
Members of their families and Committee of Public Unions and Religious Organisations 
and organisations such as the Veteran Organisation of Novosibirsk also played a 
significant role in producing some of the documentation examined in the thesis. The 
documents examined at GARF do not explicitly concern contentious issues such as the 
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War in Chechnya. These documents are still unavailable for public view. Searching the 
catalogue in GARF by date, I found folders with a significant amount of documentation 
on the topic of the 50th anniversary parade and on the welfare rights of Russia’s veteran 
and military community. These are topics that remain understudied and deserve attention. 
The laws and decrees demonstrated government action on a chosen subject and were 
signed off, usually with immediate effect, by Boris Yeltsin. Whereas draft of laws, 
memorandums, letters, explanatory notes and appeals documented the discussions and 
plans that underpinned some of the laws adopted and published in the 1990s. Some of the 
documents in GARF did not include the authorship or date, which posed some difficulty 
with interpretation. Efforts were made to group documents under topics or themes, which 
helped when understanding the background and context that these documents were 
created.  
In addition, the thesis consulted 25 Russian historical school textbooks published 
during the 1990s, located at the Russian State Library. Textbook context is addressed 
directly in chapter 3  This section takes a closer look at the main publishers of the 1990s. 
Similar to the media sector, the collapse of the Soviet Union alongside economic and 
educative decentralisation led to the emergence of new publishers that catered to the 
educational sector. Defined as a period of “policy of no policy,” there was little reform in 
the area of educational studies. Schools were forced to create their own educational policy 
and strategy.43 Schools had greater autonomy over the choice of textbooks with a larger 
collection to choose from. This section will provide an overview of the different 
publishers, creating the textbooks used in this thesis, including DROFA, Vlados and 
Terra.    
DROFA (established in 1991) is a publishing house that specialises in educational 
literature. Characterised as “one of the largest [publishers] in Russia,” in 1994 the 
publishing house signed an agreement with the Ministry of General and Professional 
Education of Russia for resources used in the 1995/1996 academic year.44 While schools 
were able to choose textbooks, between 1991 and 1994 the federal government introduced 
 
43 Isak Froumin and Igor Remorenko, “From the ‘Best-in-the World’ Soviet school to a 
Modern Globally Competitive School System,” in Audacious Education Purposes: How 
Governments Transform the Goals of Education Systems, ed. by Fernando M. Reimers   
(Switzerland: Springer Open, 2020), 234. 
44 “The Deputy Director of the DROFA publishing house was killed,” Kommersant, 16 
November 1996, No. 196, accessed 11 December 2020, 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/243221. 
 24 
a Training and Methodology Complex [UMK] for “History of Russia” which aimed to 
create a “historical and cultural standard.”45 The UMK provided a set of documentation, 
teaching and control tools, including guides for structuring work for all disciplines and 
also offers guides for other areas of the former Soviet Union.46 The introduction of the 
UMK system demonstrates increased governmental control over compulsory education.  
Vlados was also founded in 1991. As noted on its website “Most of the books 
have passed the state examination and are recommended by the Ministry of Education 
and Science of the Russian Federation, Educational-methodical associations and 
Scientific-methodological councils as textbooks and teaching aids.”47 Characterised as a 
“Leading publishing house,” Vlados also specialises in educational textbooks and 
reference materials for teachers and students. Having also adhered to the UMK, as noted 
in the quote above, the publishing house adopted similar controls to DROFA. 
Izdatel’stvo Terra was established in 1989 and is situated in Moscow. It was partly 
funded by German Publishing firm Bertelsmann, helping overcome some of the economic 
issues facing other publishing firms. Publishing around 600 books a year by 1997 with a 
10,000 print-run roughly per book, Terra is characterised as a smaller publishing firm but 
of great popularity.48 Infra-M (founded in 1992) is a Moscow-based publishing company 
uniting “eight Russian publishing houses; specialising in the publication of scientific and 
educational literature.”49 Nestor publishing house was established in 1997 and is situated 
in Moscow. It specialises in educational and foreign literature.50 “Most” authors of books 
published by Nestor have degrees and work in universities. 51  Bratiia Gruniny is a 
publisher based in Volgograd. One of the few publishers outside of the Moscow region, 
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textbooks published by this publisher and used in this thesis reach a smaller audience. 
The publisher is still active today. In 1994, Ves Mir publishing company was established. 
As noted on its website, “Although university textbooks are not our priority, some of the 
IVM books have become one of the most widely read among students…Every year, IVM 
publishes about 50 titles of books with a total circulation of over 100,000 copies.”52 
The textbooks used for this project span various grades and levels and cover 
different periods of Russian history. Search criteria used to locate these resources at the 
Russian State Library included the dates between 1991 and 1999 and the search terms 
“Istoriia Rossii” and “Istoriia Rossiisskaia.” The decision to focus on historical textbooks 
specifically on Russian history was purposeful. Russia regularly draws upon its history 
to inform current and future state goals – as demonstrated at the start and throughout this 
thesis. The project therefore examines how the prominent themes in Russia’s historical 
textbooks provided an understanding of the goals and aims of the state, since education 
provides a basis for identity formation. Many of the textbooks used in the thesis were 
under the recommendation of the Ministry of Education, therefore highlighting 
governmental interference in the education of society and showcasing again a state-led 
effort to reproduce and build on pre-existing militarised discourses that spoke of Russian 
youth’s civic duty and Russia’s historical vulnerability against hostile neighbours.  
 The thesis fills a large gap. First, it draws upon a multitude of Russian sources not 
currently available in the UK. Second, it aims to create a more holistic understanding of 
the state of militarisation in Yeltsin’s Russia, focusing on militarisation from a cultural 
perspective. Scholars of the Tsarist, Soviet and Putin era have examined militarisation 
through a cultural lens, yet this same level of examination has not been afforded to the 
Yeltsin era. Finally, the thesis highlights the different discourses that the public were 
confronted with at various stages of their lives. The thesis creates a foundation upon 
which further study should be pursued. The next section introduces the structure of the 
thesis, outlining the scope of the thesis and the ways that each chapter interlink. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 The thesis adopts the process of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Scholars of 
CDA are interested in texts and discursive interactions and how they link to social life, 
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especially in terms of power relations.53 This thesis is focusing on prominent militarised 
discourses across four societal domains as representative of the state and its associating 
institutions to militarise society. In doing so, the thesis engages with the context that such 
discourses arise and how the discourse fits into the wider scope and aims of the Yeltsin 
administration.   
 CDA is an especially useful tool of analysis because the main discourses identified 
in this thesis are an outcome of statements, narratives, images, symbols and signs that are 
connected under a shared premise and collectively contribute towards a larger 
discourse.54 For example, the notion that defence of the fatherland is an integral part of 
civic duty is embedded in the statements of the political elite, in the topics of the 
educational textbooks, and in the symbolisms of historical monuments and 
commemorative collectables. This thesis utilises the collection of different sub-narratives 
from various discursive spaces and examines their contribution towards a greater 
discourse. Since the creation of a discourse implies a process of power relations, where 
one discourse will prevail over another, the thesis seeks to understand how the greater 
discourses facilitate and promote militarisation.55  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the most appropriate form of analysis over 
alternatives such as content analysis (CA), narrative analysis (NA), and discourse analysis 
(DA). Although CA provides a means of coding verbal text to generalise trends and 
patterns - and is readily replicable - it nevertheless processes text prima facie and lacks 
the capacity to capture nuance. 56  By contrast, CDA offers improved prospects for 
comprehending context, including how text is constructed more broadly.  NA has good 
suitability for processing verbal or textual data such as interview transcripts because its 
primary focus is on texts taken in isolated or specific instances, for example semi-
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structured interviews. 57  CDA offers improved utility over narrative analysis because it 
permits the collation and processing of a broader range of constitutive elements of the 
broader discourse, including statements, narratives, signs, symbols, and events.  Where 
NA’s singular focus limits its capacity to process these dissimilar sources, CDA offers a 
means to analyse them as part of the broader panoply.   Finally, discourse analysis (DA) 
– by its nature – is concerned with a shallower comprehension of discourse without 
context.  Focusing on what is being communicated, discourse analysis has limited utility 
for comprehending why discourse exists.  By contrast, CDA permits analysis of 
discursive outputs in the context of state, institutional, and political ideology.  Compared 
with DA, a critical approach facilitates placing discourse within wider considerations of 
militarised values through the (re)production of narratives and statements in a political or 
ideological context.   
Having considered the alternatives above, critical discourse analysis offers the 
most appropriate methodology for tracking the existence of cultural militarisation 
throughout this thesis.  Moreover, it enables the systematic analysis of the process of 
militarisation by examining the wider discourse across four distinct but related societal 
domains. As areas of pedagogy, the authors and creators of discourses within these 
domains are characterised as dominant voices – those who have the ability to popularise 
certain topics and raise awareness through production, reproduction and repetition of 
discourses because as communicators to the masses, they have a sense of power. The 
discourses of these domains propagate particular values and belief systems to the public. 
In the case of this thesis, two primary discourses exist: 1) That a vulnerable Russia is 
living in a hostile world; and 2) ancestral sacrifice in war deserves respect and 
remembrance. The prominent use and reproduction of such discourses, altered to suit the 
needs of the issue under debate, demonstrate the adaptability and importance of such 
discourses to fostering militaristic sentiments and demonstrates a clear state and 
institutional led effort to project certain militarised belief systems onto society.  
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Chapter one of this thesis provides an overview of the current and existing 
historiographical debates on the conceptual differences between the terms militarisation 
and militarism. It then outlines and analyses literature on Russian militarism from two 
respective viewpoints - the militarisation school and demilitarisation school. Structured 
chronologically, scholars of the militarisation school show that militarism is historically 
embedded in Russian society through emphasis on external threats and ancestral sacrifice. 
The demilitarisation school, which emerged during the years of Perestroika and Glasnost, 
outlines the general decay of Russia’s military power and suggests that Russia was not as 
deeply militarised as previously thought. However, its scholarship shows that the physical 
demise of the Russian Armed Forces only showcased Russia’s reliance on its military 
institution and motivated a deeper mission and effort for restoration of the military’s 
prestige. The chapter argues that discourses of external threat and ancestral sacrifice 
underpinned the identity of Russia’s many regimes and provided militarism with the 
resilience it needed to survive regime change.  
Chapter two examines prominent discourses in the media. Investigating the main 
discourses of eight newspapers and magazines published in the 1990s, the chapter shows 
that journalists used militarisation tactics to mobilise society. The topics of Chechnya and 
NATO, especially, emphasised rising threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. NATO was 
presented in the media as the returning threat of a former adversary, playing an integral 
role in the establishment and formation of a siege mentality. This concern in the media of 
emerging threats affected members of society, who boycotted American goods and sent 
letters to the editor which noted the Russian State’s naive response to NATO 
expansionism.  
Chapter three focuses on the militarisation of Russia’s education in the 1990s. It 
adopts the structure of Robert Sutherland’s “Hidden Persuaders: Political Ideologies in 
Literature for Children.” The chapter examines the main discourses of 25 historical 
textbooks on the history of Russia. The chapter argues that authors of these textbooks 
created pro-patriotic discourses by adopting militarising tactics that glorified the actions 
of Russian heroes against evil enemies. The textbooks also underscored Russia’s 
extensive love affair with conflict, underlining Russia’s need to continuously defend 
itself.  
 29 
Chapter four surveys changes made to veteran and military social welfare policies 
during the 1990s. The chapter argues that militarisation in this sense can be captured 
through the concept of sponsorship, with the act of providing exclusive pensions and 
benefits being a form of sponsorship that elevated the position of the veteran and military 
in society. The concept of sponsorship in the case of veteran and military social welfare 
acknowledged the government’s desire to push certain militarised values and worldviews 
onto society.  
The penultimate chapter of this thesis engages with the Victory Day of 1995 and 
the preparations for the event by examining political discussions within the State Duma 
in the lead up to the celebratory day. The chapter also studies the symbolisms and 
discourses associated within the celebration by analysing the parades, the Great Patriotic 
War Museum (opened on the anniversary date), monuments and commemorative 
timepieces created for the celebration. It argues that Yeltsin established a debt ideology, 
whereby emphasis on the sacrificial deeds of the current generations’ ancestors meant 
they were obligated to show gratitude for such sacrifice. They were to do this through 
their participation in commemorative events and own loyalty to the state. The different 
sources showcase a state-led effort to mythologise the event and thus militarise society. 





A (DE)MILITARISED RUSSIA 
 
 
 As one Russian textbook author put it, “The following geopolitical conditions 
usually affect the specifics of Russian history: a vast, sparsely populated territory, a 
border unprotected by natural barriers, isolation from almost the whole of history from 
the seas and sea trade, a river network conducive to the territorial unity of Russia, an 
immediate position between Europe and Asia.” 1  This 1990s educational textbook 
highlighted Russia’s vulnerability to outside invasion. The “border unprotected by natural 
barriers” (especially on the western borders of Russia) easily explains why so many 
Western countries have tried to conquer the vast space. The geography also accounts for 
the failure of invasions, as the inability to sustain supply lines, and the weather, forced 
many invaders to retreat.2 On the Eastern front the geography hinders conquest, with 
hostile weather and change in terrain acting as a natural barrier. This, however, does not 
stop Russia from worrying about external enemies and potential invasion – in fact, 
Russian history is presented in such a way to legitimate it.3 Since 862, external danger 
plagued Russia, threatening its territorial integrity for at least the last 500 years, where 
Russia has hosted frequent warfare. The besieged fortress mentality found its roots in 
these invasions – with court poet Vasili Petrov detailing the alliance of European 
countries conspiring against Russia.4 His ode on the declaration of war, went as follows: 
From the South, West and East 
From the gates of Mecca and Cairo 
Where the name of the false prophet is praised,  
Where the Nile splashes, and the Tigris and Euphrates, 
The enemies of Russia, 
Are already gathering towards Byzantium, 
The Troops in from crowd above the Danube, 
But their rear edge, 
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Still moves in Istanbul.5 
 
He used the growing power of European countries and their global aspirations as 
evidence of Russia’s increasing vulnerability to external hostility. This approach was 
similar to that of Russian 1990s history textbooks, which referred to the growing power 
and colonial ambitions of Japan, the US and Germany at the start of the twentieth century 
as a reason for Russia’s war with Japan between 1904 and 1905 and Russia’s involvement 
in the First World War.6 These discourses find roots and usability in other historical 
events and begin to display a trend within Russian politics, reflecting a hostile, 
imperialistic and militaristic world.  
This worldview found its place in each of the regimes that have existed since its 
first mention in the 18th century and has permeated state and societal discourses – from 
the speeches of state officials, the media, to the educational textbooks read by Russia’s 
future generation. It is a process that, to date, continued to circulate and underpin Russia’s 
identity and is one aspect that has sewn the different regimes together.  A notable solution 
for such threats has been the military. A series of Russian defeats at the end of the 17th 
century drove Peter I to introduce comprehensive military reforms. Similarly, Soviet 
military leader M. V. Frunze saw the military success of the Soviet Union as rooted in 
the total mobilisation of society.7 Even scholars of post-Soviet Russia, like Dmitri Trenin, 
considered military reform and military-technological development as a prerequisite for 
rebuilding Russia’s great power status. Contemporary use of the besieged fortress 
mentality has been largely attributed to Putin. Yet this is not entirely accurate. Its use in 
the post-Soviet period originated in the subtle state and societal discourses of the Yeltsin 
era. Rooted in Russia’s historical past, it maintained the cultural militarisation of society, 
as physical military power continued to decay.  
Scholars of the post-Soviet period, for example, Dale Herspring and Leon Aron, 
largely argue that 1990s Russia was demilitarised. They claim that the deterioration in 
 
5 Andrei Zorin, By Fables Alone: Literature and State ideology in late eighteenth - early-
nineteenth- century Russia (United States: Academic Studies Press, 2019), Chapter 1, 
Section 3. 
6  G. A. Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv. Uchebnoe pospobie v dvukh tamakh 
(Moscow: Infra-M, 1998), 440-441. 
7 E. V. Anisimov and A. B. Kamenskiy, Istoriia Rossii, 1682-1861 (Moscow: Terra, 
1996), 20-21. 
 William Odom, “The Militarization of Soviet Society,” Problems of Communism 25, No. 
5 (1976): 34-35. 
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military power constituted a break in the militarisation of society. 8  However, 
historiography and the research of the thesis shows that militarism was so deeply 
entrenched in Russian society, politics and culture that the physical dimensions of 
demilitarisation during the tumultuous post-Soviet era did very little to challenge the 
cultural militarisations that persisted during this period. In fact, the image of a depleted 
military served the ‘siege mentality’ discourse that was cultivated across numerous 
societal domains of the former communist state. This is because it highlighted weaknesses 
within Russia when external countries were growing in power. First, this chapter will 
define militarisation, and then explore the different scholarly perspectives of the opposing 
militarisation and demilitarisation schools in the context of Russian history.  
 
MILITARISM AND MILITARISATION 
 
 Linda Åhäll notes that the terms militarisation and militarism are different.9 For 
one, militarisation is generally used as a verb, whereas militarism is classed as a noun.10 
The distinction was first made during the 19th century, during France’s Second Empire 
(1852-1870), then in Britain after 1864 and in Germany from 1870.11 Alfred Vagts and 
John R. Gillis defined militarism as the “domination of the military man over the civilian, 
an undue preponderance of military demands, and emphasis on military considerations, 
spirit, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states.” 12  In comparison, they 
conceptualised militarisation as a process that does not indicate the dominance of the 
military or power of one particular ideology.13 Scholars accept that there are ideological 
or value-driven aspects to both, with militarism leading to an acceptance or unprotested 
 
8 For example, please see: Julian Cooper, “Demilitarising the Russian Defence Economy: 
A Commentary,” Security Dialogue 26, No. 1 (1995): 38; Herspring, “Dedovshchina in 
the Russian Army,” 609-610; Herspring, “Undermining Combat Readiness,” 515-516; 
Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military,” 23-24; Aron, “Russia’s New Foreign 
Policy.” 
9 Linda Åhäll, “The Dance of Militarisation: A Feminist Security Studies Take on ‘the 
political,’” Critical Studies on Security 4, No. 2 (2016): 8-9. 
10 Åhäll, “The Dance of Militarisation,” 8. 
11 Alfred Vagts, The History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (New York: The Free 
Press, 1959), 14. 
12 Vagts, The History of Militarism, 14. 
John R. Gillis, The Militarization of the Western World (London: Rutgers University 
Press, 1989), 1. 
13 Ibid, 1. 
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use of the military to solve non-military problems, in the same way that to militarise 
something is not only a physical process, but one which can lead to the acquisition of a 
military character. Some scholars use the terms interchangeably. J. A. Mangan, for 
example, uses militarism and militarisation in an equivalent manner, claiming that 
militarism, just like militarisation “embraces attitudes as well as systems.”14 In addition 
to Mangan, Stephen Webber extends the boundaries of militarism including the 
ideological scope and its impact on beliefs and worldviews.15 A majority of scholars 
accept that militarisation is not a straightforward process, but one that fluctuates 
depending on political, economic and social conditions.16 Linda Åhäll best conceptualises 
militarism and militarisation. She sees both militarism and militarisation as processes 
which prepare society for war, but argues that militarism is more overt, visible “and a 
conscious display of, and belief in, militaristic ideology,” whereas she understands 
militarisation as a much more understated and pervasive process, normalising the military 
character of society.17 The following section works to understand the terms of militarism 
and militarisation.  
 
Understanding  Militarism  
Militarism is most commonly defined as the belief or desire of the government or 
its people that a state should maintain a strong military capability and to use it 
aggressively to expand national interests or values.18 Other scholars like Vagts, Cynthia 
Enloe and Michael Mann define militarism as the state where the demands of the military 
supersede the needs of society, the dominance of former military personnel in 
bureaucracy or governmental roles, where the military is both physically and emotionally 
present in society and is used and called upon as a solution to non-military problems.19 A 
 
14 J. A. Mangan, “Prologue: Combative Sports and Combative Societies,” in Militarism, 
Sport, Europe: War without Weapons, ed. by J. A. Mangan (London: Routledge, 2004), 
2-3. 
15  Stephen L. Webber, “Introduction: The Society-Military Interface in Russia,” in 
Military and Society in post-Soviet Russia, ed. by Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer G. 
Mathers (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 10-11. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Åhäll, “The Dance of Militarisation,” 12-13. 
18  Lexico.com, s.v. “Militarism,” accessed 12 June 2020, 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/militarism. 
19 For definitions of Militarism; please see Vagts, A History of militarism, 13; Anna 
Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, “Militarism and international relations in the twenty-first 
century,” in Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security and 
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feminist perspective argues that studies on militarism should focus on the people, since 
the process is also within social practices and not just the values driven by prominent 
societal figures that prepare people for war.20 Scholars like Enloe, John Keep, Richelle 
Bernazzoli and Colin Flint offer the conceptual characteristics of militarism as a set of 
functions in a checklist.21 These checklists have been placed in a table below. 
 
Checklists for identifying militarism 
 
Cynthia Enloe22 John Keep23 Richelle Bernazzoli and 
Colin Flint24 
Armed Force is the 
ultimate resolver of 
tensions. 
An Excessive emphasis of 
the military ceremonial. 
Soldiers possess certain 
values and qualities that 
are desirable in civil 
society. 
Human nature is prone to 
conflict. 
An ideology supportive of 
military ideals. 
Military superiority is a 
source of national pride. 
Having enemies is a 
natural condition. 
Regular inculcation of such 
ideals through the 
educational system. 
Those who do not support 
military actions are 
unpatriotic. 
 
Theory, ed. by Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby (New York: Routledge, 2002), 3-18, 
Cynthia Enloe, Globalisation and Militarism: Feminists made the link (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 11; Robert Kohl as quoted in Roberto J. Gonzales, Hugh 
Gusterson and Gustaaf Houfman, Militarisation: A Reader (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2019), Kindle Edition, 389; Michael Mann, “The Roots and 
Contradictions of Modern Militarism,” New Left Review 1, No. 162 (1987): 35-50.  
20 Åhäll, “The Dance of Militarisation,” 10. 
21 It should be noted that John Keep adopted a checklist created in the 1950s, whereas 
Enloe’s checklist was created in 2004. Bernazzoli and Flint created their list in 2009, but 
still have reservations about using the term ‘militarism,’ arguing that militarism could 
easily be changed to security. Some aspects of Keep’s ideas remain prominent in studies 
on militarisation, however, what Enloe, Bernazzoli and Flint introduce is the more 
invisible aspects of militarism – the effect of militarisation on values, attitudes, 
behaviours and mindsets.  
22 Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a new age of Empire 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2004), 219. 
23 John Keep, “The Origins of Russian Militarism,” Cahiers du Monde russe et sovietique 
26, No. 1 (1985): 7. 
24  Richelle Bernazzoli and Colin Flint. “Power, Place and Militarism: Toward a 




produce effective action. 
Disproportionately heavy 
state expenditure on 
military ends. 
Those who do not support 
military actions are anti-
soldier. 
That a state without a 
military is naïve, scarcely 
modern, and barely 
legitimate. 
Willingness to bear 
inordinately high casualties 
in warfare (or war-induced 
social catastrophes). 
For the state to engage in 
armed conflict is to serve 
the will of God. 
In times of crisis those who 
are feminine needed armed 
protection 
Readiness to commit the 
armed forces in foreign and 
domestic conflicts. 
In times of crisis any man 
who refuses to engage in 
armed violent action is 
jeopardizing his own status 
as a manly man. 
Covert or overt 
intervention by the military 
in political decision-
making. 
Extensive controls over the 
life of society for military 
purposes. 
 
While the functions included in these checklists are present in militarised 
societies, the checklist itself simplifies a vastly complex process. The most important 
consideration that must be addressed here is the fact that not all functions need to be 
‘ticked off’ in order to show that a country is militarised. This is because the process of 
militarisation happens differently in each country based on that country’s historical, 
geographic, political and even economic background. Rather, it is more helpful to 
examine militarism in categories with an acceptance that while a country’s military may 
not possess a large and superior physical military presence, militarism can manifest in 
other ways. Researchers use four categories to define and understand militarism. These 
are ideological, physical, institutional and societal.  
 Scholars like Vagts and Enloe define militarism along the lines of its ideological 
boundaries. They largely consider militarism as a vehicle for the expansion of militarised 
values into society. As a consequence, militarism normalises the military’s prominent 
position in society and allows civilians to rank the needs of the military above their own.25 
 
25 Stavrianakis and Selby, “Militarism and International Relations,” 12-13. 
Victoria M. Basham discusses the need for ‘emotional energy in polity’ as a way of 
motivating civilians to volunteer to defend its country when under threat. Basham’s 
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Understanding militarism as an ideology shifts the focus towards the glorification of war 
and military institutions in society, shaping citizens’ views of the military. The 
ideological understanding of militarism emerged in Germany during World War Two, 
when it was considered a “basic cultural value.”26 In agreement with Vagts and Enloe, 
Mangan notes that society is instilled with values of sacrifice, heroism and military glory 
through cultural avenues, for example, the use of military history or the ‘memory of war’ 
in museums, war memorials and educational textbooks.27 Scholars of this approach view 
militarism as a process that underscores preparations for military activities.28 
Militarism is also conceptualised by the amount of material and manpower 
allocated for military purposes. This definition differs from Vagts and Enloe, instead 
focusing on the extent that the military physically dominated society. These definitions 
measure militarism by evaluating the size of the forces, and level of arms procurement 
and defence budget.29 Scholars using this definition usually emphasise the extensive costs 
of war, stressing the negative impact it had on the rest of society. John Keep, for example, 
highlighted the impact of militarism on Russian society in the 17th century, claiming the 
volume of resources allocated to the army burdened the agrarian population who were 
obligated to donate resources for the war effort.30 Similarly, Clifford G. Gaddy’s study, 
The Price of the Past, uses the economic burden of the Soviet Union’s militaristic 
ventures and its impact on Yeltsin’s Russia to communicate the wider persistence of 
militarisation during this period.31  Many of the scholars within this school measure 
militarism through a number of quantitative indicators. The “Global Militarisation Index” 
measures militarism by determining military spending of a country in comparison to its 
 
perception works well with the scholarship of Bernazzoli and Flint. Bernazzoli and Flint 
classify militarism as present when those who do not support military action are deemed 
unpatriotic and anti-soldier. For more, please see: Victoria M. Basham, “Gender, Race, 
Militarism and Remembrance: The Everyday Geopolitics of the Poppy,” Gender, Place 
and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 23, No. 6 (2016): 884; Bernazzoli and 
Flint, “Power, Place and Militarism,” 401. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Mangan, “Prologue: Combative Sports and Combative Societies,” 1. 
28 Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, “Introduction: Making Gender, Making War,” in 
Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices, ed. by 
Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg (New York: Routledge, 2011), 5. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Keep, “The Origins of Russian Militarism,” 6. 
31 Clifford G. Gaddy, The Price of the Past: Russia’s Struggle with the Legacy of a 
Militarised Economy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 1-6. 
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Gross Domestic Product, and assessing it against the amount dedicated by the country to 
its health spending.32  
Institutional definitions of militarism emerged in response to the ideological and 
physical definitions, with an emphasis on the relationship between civil society and 
military power. This school argues that militarism exists when the military institution is 
ranked above those of the civilians. Scholars of civil-military relations refer to dominance 
of ex-military personnel in high-ranking civilian roles and examine military coups. 
Militocracy is a key term used to describe the dominance of former soldiers in political 
roles. 33  Scholars of Russian militarism, such as Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen 
White, claim that a third of all deputy ministers appointed by Vladimir Putin between 
2000 and 2003 had a military or security background, with the view that their militarised 
backgrounds would inform (and thus militarise) political policies.34 In a different manner 
but still within the Russian context, scholar Brian D. Taylor uses military coups to 
understand civil military relations in Russian society between 1689 and 2000. He claims 
a lack of military intervention suggests a lack of militarism, linking little to no military 
coups as a sign of military subversion to civilian authorities.35 His book highlights a 
different perspective from those before him. However, he fails to recognise that military 
intervention in politics is not an integral aspect of militarism. Andrew Bacevich notes that 
America, for example, has not experienced military interventions, even during periods 
where the corporate interests of Officer Corps were compromised, but is still highly 
militarised.36 
Finally, militarism is interpreted as a condition whereby the military is called upon 
to solve non-military issues.37 This interpretation sits within the school of Civil-Military 
relations and has synergies with the ideological school as it references the role of ideology 
(especially in terms of security) in a society’s desire to use the military to ensure 
 
32 Åhäll, “The Dance of Militarisation,” 9. 
33 Webber, “Introduction,” 9. 
34 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs 
19, No. 4 (2003): 296. 
35 Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil Military Relations 1689-2000 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1, 154-164, 312. 
36 Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 55. 
37  Martin Shaw, “Twenty-First Century Militarism: A historical-sociological 
framework”, in Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, Militarism and International Relations: 
Political Economy, Security and Theory (New York: Routledge, 2002), 19. 
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international and domestic security.38 This was the case with America. It used American 
exceptionalism to justify foreign intervention. “It remained, according to [George W.] 
Bush, America’s ‘responsibility to lead in this great mission,’” wrote Andrew Bacevich.39 
The military has been used in a domestic policing role in numerous regions such as Latin 
America to bring order and stability to the different states and was even called upon by 
the Russian elite during the 1991 failed Soviet coup and 1993 Presidential crisis.40 In 
recent years, the military has been used in West Africa to hinder the proliferation of the 
Ebola virus, and is regularly called upon to assist clean up missions and to help aid 
convoys following national disasters.41 These last examples highlight militarism from a 
physical aspect also because they suggest that the military is utilised to handle these issues 
because they have the assets available to address the problems, whereas civil state 
apparatus does not. Scholars of the behavioural approach also show how militarism 
affected people’s behaviour. Cynthia Enloe, for example, examined how the 
militarisation of discursive spaces and its power altered the behaviours of society. For 
example, Enloe first demonstrates that militarism changes the behaviours of marketing 
and soup corporations of the 1980s, who marketed a ‘Star Wars’ tomato noodle soup in 
the view of increasing sales. Then, Enloe showed how the mother was ‘maneuvered’ by 
military power in her desire to provide her child with a healthy meal – seeing the space 
weapon shaped noodles as an appealing element that would convince the child to eat the 
soup.42 In Enloe’s conception, the mother has continued the process of militarisation, not 
only demonstrating a clear triumph of marketing by the soup corporations, but in bringing 
 
38 In this sense, we can consider security as an umbrella term not only for securing 
American’s borders from external threats, but for offering stability in other regions under 
the term ‘peacekeeping’ – this was an especially salient justification used by Russia to 
legitimise its military role in the near abroad, following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
39 Bacevich, The New American Militarism, 13. 
40 Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings, “From Political Armies to the ‘war against crime:’ The 
Transformation of Militarism in Latin America,” in Militarism and International 
Relations: Political economy, security and theory, ed. by Anna Stavrianakis and Jan 
Selby (New York: Routledge, 2002), 91-103. 
41 James Gallagher, “Ebola: British Military sent to tackle West Africa,” BBC News, 8 
September 2014, accessed 28 February 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
29113530. 
“Japan Tsunami: Military begins search for bodies,” 1 April 2011, BBC News, accessed 
28 February 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12931418. 
42 Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives 
(California: University of California Press, 2000), 1-2. 
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the militarised soup can into the home.43 Her account highlights the impact that militarism 
has on the behaviours of people, companies and industries.  
Vagts and Nancy Rosenblum document the growing relationship between 
militarism and notions of morality and justice. Vagts associates mass militarism with the 
romantic age, arguing that previous definitions of the soldier as the “drilled murderer” 
were replaced with “emotionalism” during the period of romanticism.44 According to 
Vagts, statesman Klemens Von Metternich argued that the military was ranked second 
only to the church, claiming, “labours through the word from the pulpit for the moral 
truth, and other on the battlefield by their deeds for right and justice. Church and army 
are serving order through the power of discipline and through hierarchical 
arrangement.”45 Expanding on the work of Vagts, Nancy Rosenblum claims that literature 
now focused on the war as a process of enacting justice, and righting the wrongs of the 
world.46 This is very similar to Bacevich’ interpretation of American militarism, which 
sees America’s role in the world, and through its military, as a value of instilling good.47 
It also aligns with the work of Bernazzoli and Flint. They claim that militarism should be 
studied through a patriotic, nationalistic and religious lens, in order to understand how 
the notion of moral obligation becomes an unprotested and natural justification in the 
process of war making. They add, “for a state to engage in armed conflicts is to serve the 
will of God” to their checklist of militarism.48 It is through the emotional and ideological 
dimensions of militarism that society accepts and normalises the use of the military.  
The four approaches listed above denote wider synergies between the different 
understandings of militarism and have a pressing influence on the strengths of each type 
of militarism. While there may be four approaches to understanding militarism, they 
cannot work in isolation – the physical will impact the behavioural, just as the ideological 
will affect the institutional. As there are sub-militarisms, there are also sub-
militarisations, and the subgroups are the reasons that no one accepted understanding of 
the concepts exists. The next section will aim to understand the different and competing 
conceptualisations of militarisation. 
 
43 Åhäll, “The Dance of Militarisation,”15. 
44 Vagts, The History of Militarism, 17. 
45 Ibid, 18. 
46 Nancy Rosenblum, “Romantic Militarism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 43, No. 2 
(1982): 249. 
47 Bacevich, The New American Militarism, 13. 




To militarise is to: 1) Equip or supply (a place or organisation) with soldiers and 
other military resources; and 2) Give (something) a military character.49 Reflecting back 
on the above definitions of militarism, militarism is the finished product of 
militarisation.50  For example, to measure whether militarism exists within a country 
through the counting of a military budget, weapon procurement and standing army, is to 
consider to what extent something has been militarised through the process of 
militarisation. Without some form of militarisation i.e. the physical equipping or supply 
of the military, there would be no resources to count. To understand whether militarism 
exists in a country based on its values is to examine what efforts are in place to militarise 
public consciousness. 51  It seems, that in an effort to distinguish militarism from 
militarisation, militarism has found domination in new scholarship and now the quest for 
an up-to-date conceptualisation of militarisation remains understudied.  
Those studies that exist on militarisation will rarely discuss the term in the same 
detail as militarism, or will use both terms interchangeably without a discussion. Only 
few scholars have made this distinction. For example, Åhäll attempts to re-establish our 
connection with militarisation, providing a clear distinction of militarism as an overt and 
open process, meanwhile militarisation is considered a more subtle process, which 
prepares society for the idea of war.52 She agrees that both militarism and militarisation 
 
49  Lexico.com, s.v. “Militarise,” accessed 14 June 2020, 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/militarise. 
50 Although this does not suggest that militarism is the goal of a state undergoing the 
process of militarisation. Cynthia Enloe subscribes to this viewpoint, claiming 
militarisation is a ‘step-by-step process (social, political and psychological) by which any 
person, any group, or any society absorbs ideas and resultant practices of militarism.” For 
example, please see: Enloe, Globalisation and Militarism, 11. 
51Andrew L. Ross quotes the World Council of Churches’ understanding of militarisation 
based on their 1977 report, in which they consider militarisation as the process in which 
‘military values, ideology and patterns of behaviour achieve a dominating influence on 
the political, social, economic and external affairs of the state” to which the state can then 
be considered as militarised. For more, please see: Andrew L. Ross, “The Dimensions of 
Militarisation in the Third World,” Armed Forces and Society 13, No. 4 (1987): 567. 
52 Åhäll’s views are in contrast with Michael Mann. Mann conceptualisation modern 
militarism [of 1987] as ‘not upfront, subtle and diverse.’ His work, however was 
published in 1987. Åhäll’s piece builds upon a new understanding of militarism as overt 
and open, in contrast to militarisation (which she claims is the new subtle process) in 
which she conceptualises as a dance, which delicately influences different sections of 
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are ideological and that both prepare society for war in one form or another.53 In both 
aspects it is also agreed that militarisation and militarism do not just impact on one social 
group or aspect of society, but make its values a central part of everyday life.54 Catherine 
Lutz is another scholar who aims to make a distinction. She attributes militarism to the 
martial values of war-making, where militarisation is considered a discursive process that 
works to shift societal belief and value systems to legitimise use of force, and the need 
for strong armies. Again, these functions overlap. Lutz does, however, make a very 
interesting statement, claiming that military institutional development and the 
glorification of militarised worldviews should not be considered to work in tandem. She 
claims that while the US military spending remained relatively low in the 19th and early 
20th centuries, “political culture glorified the war and the martial spirit,” therefore 
highlighting that the physical and cultural aspects of militarisation and not mutually 
exclusive.55  
Andrew Ross talks of specific militarisation, and the ‘second form of 
militarisation’ in understanding third-world militarisation, which relies on the physical 
aspects of militarisation and can be measured by arms imports, production and size of 
armed forces.56 The first form of militarisation, according to Ross is both behavioural (i.e. 
excess use of violence) and ‘militarism of the mind’ (i.e. militaristic values, ideologies 
and worldviews).57 In line with Åhäll and Lutz, this thesis considers militarisation as a 
subtle discursive process, whereby the domination of militarised discourses does not 
necessarily imply a sudden increase in army recruits, but a wider shift in societal belief 
that accepts (or at least allows a consideration of acceptance) the role of the military as a 
guarantor of security in Post-Soviet Russia. 
The definition of militarisation is a ‘moving target’ for many authors. For 
example, Ross claims the nature of militarisation in the third world is largely physical i.e. 
military build-up. In liberal democracies, militarism and the process of militarisation is 
 
society. For more, please see: Mann, “The Roots and Contradictions of Modern 
Militarism,” 35-50. 
53 Åhäll, “The Dance of Militarisation,” 12-13. 
54 Henry A. Giroux, “War on Terror: The Militarising of Public Space and Culture in the 
United States,” Third Text 18, No. 4 (2004): 211. 
55 Catherine Lutz, “Making war at home in the United States: Militarisation and the 
current crisis,” American Anthropologist 104, No. 3 (2002): 723-725. 
56 Ross, “The Dimensions of Militarisation in the Third World,” 568-570. 
57 Ibid. 
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shaped toward preparing society to support the waging of war – which has been 
conceptualised under the umbrella of culture, as a process which militarises ideologies, 
and values of the state.58 Militarisation in Russia has reflected both aspects, the physical 
and cultural. In Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, emphasis was placed on both the 
physical perimeters of militarisation and the cultural – with the ideological premises of 
“Russia as a besieged fortress” for example, playing a legitimising role for the increased 
physical militarisation of society.  
Under Tsarist rule, more emphasis was placed on the ideological – with physical 
war being considered the spoils of an army.59 Lack of military reform led to many losses 
under this regime, but Russia was still considered militarised because of the strength of 
cultural militarisation – a process that continued the military ceremonial and furthered 
the discourse of Russia surrounded by hostile neighbours. The discourse of a weak and 
vulnerable Russia, encircled by enemies, continued into the post-Soviet period as new 
security concerns engulfed the newly formed Russian Federation. While the physical 
dimensions of militarisation were in decay, the cultural dimensions of militarisation were 
sustained in the history textbooks of school children, the media and within political 
discourses. Commemorative practices told society of its moral obligation to celebrate and 
continue the victories of its ancestors, while education discourses told students to show 
their patriotism by protecting it from inevitable external enemies. The cultural aspect of 
militarisation receives vast attention from scholars researching Imperial, Soviet and 
Putin’s Russia. Yet the same attention has not been given to Russia under Yeltsin’s 
leadership. Building on the work of scholars like Catherine Lutz and Henry Giroux, this 
thesis hopes to pay larger attention to the nodes of cultural militarisation that simmered 
in the background during this transformative and chaotic period. 
This study focuses on the cultural militarisation of Russian society from a top-
down perspective. To this end, the thesis remains in dialogue with the conceptualisations 
of cultural militarisation by Henry Giroux, who examines militarisation through a cultural 
lens and considers it as a function of “public pedagogy,” enforcing pro-militaristic values 
and worldviews through the discourse of four societal domains: educational; media; 
social welfare; and commemorative practices (in Giroux’s account, these domains are 
 
58 Basham, “Gender, Race, Militarism and Remembrance,” 883. 
59 Vagts, A History of Militarism, 15. 
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considered pedagogical sites and cultural venues).60 The process is subtle (with exception 
of the case study chapter, which examines militarisation through the commemorative 
activities of 1995).61 This is why the thesis also remains in dialogue with Joanna Waley-
Cohen’s understanding of the process of militarisation, as the “pervasive injection of 
military themes and references into the cultural arena.”62 The discourses under review are 
those established by authority figures: political elites; journalists; educational authors 
under the ‘rekomendatsi’ of the Ministry of Education, with the different societal domains 
acting as discursive, pedagogical spaces where state-led processes of militarisation can 
take place.63 The understanding of militarisation in this sense will highlight that a society 
can still be militarised (and pinpoint where) without the physical presence of a strong 
military apparatus.  
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, the thesis explores two opposed 
historiographical schools, including the Militarisation School and Demilitarisation 
School. The focus of the Militarisation school remains on Imperial Russia, Soviet Russia 
and Putin’s Russia, with very little discussion of the Yeltsin period. In contrast, scholars 
of the demilitarisation school explore the Yeltsin period in depth and this is where this 
current work hopes to make a contribution. The next part of this chapter will examine the 
scholarship of the Militarisation School. It charts the historical roots of Russian militarism 
from Peter I through the Soviet period and its manifestations under Putin.  
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 Russian militarism emerged as a topic of scholarly interest in the 1970s. This 
literature, which argues that Russia was historically, and is presently militarised, finds its 
origins in the military reforms of Peter I. While aspects of Russian militarism existed 
during the fifteenth century, argue some historians, like Keep and Michael C. Paul, full-
scale militarism emerged in Russia during the reign of Peter I in the 18th century. It was 
motivated by the European military revolution of the late 17th and early 18th centuries and 
continuous warfare.64 In agreement, David Stone notes, “There is little in Peter’s eventful 
reign that can be meaningfully separated from war and the military.” The challenges from 
Sweden, Poland and Turkey led Peter towards a series of military reforms.65 
Richard Pipes and Dmitri K Simes claim that militarism under Peter I influenced 
society on a different and more intense level than under Muscovite rule, propelling Russia 
to a Great Power status.66 To Keep and Pipes, the allocation of resources to the military 
and the cultivation of human power from agriculture and towards the purposes of war, 
decreased the quality of civilian life. The checklist adopted by Keep included 
“disproportionately heavy state expenditure on military ends” and “extensive controls 
over the life of society for military purposes.”67 This chapter unpacks the different schools 
of thought, debating the existence (or lack of) and nature of Russian militarism. The first 
section examines the different aspects of Russian militarism which sit within the 
Militarisation School. It focuses on four key elements - physical, 
institutional/administrative, educational and cultural. It is structured chronologically, to 
demonstrate the continuities and resilience of militarism and the process of militarisation 
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 Scholars examining Russian militarism from a ‘military build-up’ perspective 
measure use of manpower, weapon procurement and military budgets. In their 
understanding of militarism, the military needs excessive access to manpower for military 
purposes. In Russia, this was driven by consistent warfare, war fatality and the geography 
of Russia. Scholars like Oliver Allen Ray and Ellen Jones focus on military service. They 
argue that Russia and subsequently the Soviet Union, introduced military service as a 
means to deal with conflict and societal issues (infrastructure building, for example). 
Under Muscovite leaders, military service began at the age of 15 and lasted for life, with 
the perimeters of conscription being reduced by Empress Ann from life to 25 years.68 
Jerome Blum claims that the implementation of an obligatory military service 
strengthened conscription significantly, with conscripts being picked based on their social 
standing.69 The introduction of a levy system also contributed towards increasing levels 
of manpower within the military. In 1705, Peter divided the country into blocks of twenty 
households, stating that one twenty-year-old was required from each block, per year. 
William C. Fuller notes that if a recruit died, fled or became ill, another eligible person 
from the block immediately replaced him.70 In this way, Peter I began to bureaucratise 
the process of conscription making it a duty of the twenty year old to perform military 
service. In addition, it highlighted that life was expendable, with the quick replacement 
of the injured or killed soldier highlighting a prioritisation of the Russian elite to preserve 
a well-manned Russian military over the lives of young men. Blum and Fuller’s claims 
sit in line with those made by Ray and Jones, which showed that Russian militarism 
prioritised the military apparatus over the needs of the civilian population. 
In 1707, serf owners unable to serve in the military were asked to provide one in 
five of their household serfs. If this demand was not satisfied, the owner had to pay fifteen 
roubles. This price was increased in 1711 to 30 roubles per man.71 These initial efforts 
did not provide Peter with the sufficient amount of manpower, leading to additional levies 
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that not only targeted individuals but social groups. Fuller claims that in 1721, levies for 
clerical estate including the drafting of priests and deacons, “depleted the Russian clergy 
by almost two-thirds of its numbers,” again highlighting the burden that the prioritisation 
of the military placed on other aspects of society.72 By 1700, Russia required 40,000 
additional soldiers, and by 1725, this number rose to 90,000.73 During the course of his 
reign, Peter initiated 59 recruitment calls to make up for disease, combat fatalities and 
desertion.74 Keep and Richard Pipes note that as a result of Peter’s reforms, the “military 
participation ratio” was at 4.4%, a number “high by international standards” with this 
percentage being “three times higher” than its Western counterparts. 75  The scholars 
focusing on conscription policy highlight a greater level of manpower in the Russian 
Armed Forces than other countries during this time, noting the unique nature of Russian 
militarism. It shows a clear prioritisation of the military over the needs of Russian 
civilians, who were burdened by these policies.  Some of these reforms were developed 
under subsequent leaders.  
Under the reign of Anna Ioannova (1730-1740), for example, the starting age for 
military service was moved from the age of fifteen to twenty.76 She created the Minnikh 
commission that limited the regular field army to 90,000, distributed across three guards 
infantry regiments, 36 regular infantry regiments, one Guards cuirassier regiment, 25 
regular dragoon and cuirassier regiments. A mixture of garrison regiments, militia and 
Cossacks regulars alongside 33,500 troops assigned to the ‘lower corps,’ raised the 
wartime ground force to around 230,000 men.77 Bruce Menning documents an increase 
under Peter II’s reign (1727-1730). He shows that between 1726 and 1759, annual 
military recruitment calls led to the recruitment of over 700,000 men from the peasant 
population. 78  The military’s acceptance of peasant recruits, and not just nobility, 
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showcased the all-encompassing role of the military in Russian society during this period, 
highlighting the state’s desire for quantity in lieu of quality (in hereditary terms). Mass 
mobilisation continued beyond the reign of Peter II. On the eve of Catherine II’s first 
Turkish War (1768-1774), the number of infantry alone had reached 135,404, with an 
increase to 279,575 within a thirty-year period.  
Although the age and period of service had decreased since the reign of Peter I, 
soldiers were required to remain in service if there was a war. Elise Kimerling 
Wirtschafter shows that from 1796 to 1815 Russia was involved in continuous warfare.79 
In this case, the Russian elite continued to recruit for war. Menning notes that by 1805, 
the size of the regular army had grown to 400,000 men.80 The Russian Army during the 
reign of Alexander I (1801-1825) defeated Napoleon as a result of its excessive 
manpower.81 In contrast to Alexander, Napoleon did not have the ability to replenish his 
army, whereas Russian conscripts were dispatched to Kutuzov continuously. 
Furthermore, Fuller claims that three levies in 1812 alone produced 400,000 soldiers for 
service in the Russian Army.82 The number of Russia’s population included in the army 
rose from 292,000 in 1762, to 446,000 in 1797, to 1,118,000 in 1850.83  
These numbers highlight the excessive cultivation of manpower to serve purposes 
of war. Each Imperial leader played a role in ensuring a large standing army. From Peter’s 
reign until the 1860s, an estimated six million men were recruited into the army at 
different times.84 As noted by Wirtschafter, between 1796 and 1855, Russia amassed one 
of the largest Armies in Europe.85 Universal conscription was introduced in 1874, and 
while efforts have been made to professionalise the Russian army, economic constraints 
mean that compulsory military service still exists in Russia today.86   
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Jones and Ulrich Albrecht show that the tradition of conscription remained an 
important part of Soviet society. During the formative years of the Soviet Union, new 
leaders experimented with a voluntary system, but abandoned it almost immediately in 
favour of a system that enforced military service, under the conditions of the civil war.87 
The Bolsheviks enforced conscription in May 1918 and their methods extensively 
increased the amount of manpower within the military establishment.88 In agreement, 
Jacob W. Kipp shows that by 1921, Lenin rounded up an army of 5.5 million men in the 
Red Army’s battle against the White Army.89 Even during peacetime, in 1924, an army 
of 562,000 was maintained. 90  These policies are particularly interesting, since the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism are anti-war and consider war an outcome of the 
imperialistic goals of capitalist nations. It shows that Russian militarism formed an 
important foundation of Russian society since the communist Soviet Union did not 
remain true to such principles, with the maintenance and prioritisation of a large standing 
army. By measuring the force ratio of 32 countries, James L. Payne found that established 
Marxist countries displayed a higher force ratio than countries that were new to Marxism 
or partly Marxist.91 Payne attributes the higher force ratio to ideology, with the capitalist 
classes consistently threatening socialism, and to dictatorship. The dictatorship 
hypothesis surrounds the notion that bureaucracies want to expand, like military 
organisations and that they adopt similar strategies for increasing in size and have an 
ability to suppress dissent. In Payne’s understanding of this hypothesis, class warfare and 
Marxist bureaucracy go hand in hand with militarism.92 In addition, leaders of the Soviet 
Union, like Joseph Stalin, were increasingly paranoid about external threats to the 
communist state and used the maintenance of a strong military apparatus to curb outside 
threats to the USSR’s sovereignty. Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, for example, note 
that towards the end of World War Two, Russia committed six million men from the Red 
Army to defend the border from Leningrad to the Ukraine.93 During periods in which the 
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number of those reaching the draft age was disproportionately larger than the required 
number, the extras were drafted and trained as reservists.94 Army conscription was not 
limited to the barracks; at one point an extra 600,000 men were recruited to complete both 
military and infrastructural building projects.95 
A large standing army was necessary for Russia, not only to globally demonstrate 
its military might, but to accommodate the excessive casualties experienced during wars 
from the time of Peter I to date. From 1789 to 1814, battle and disease accounted for 
600,000 fatalities. This number approximates to nearly half of the army’s maximum force 
within that timeframe.96 Calculations based on World War One estimated Russia’s total 
fatality figure for the military as 1,660,000. This number includes those killed by disease, 
in captivity or those who were missing. This estimate brings the number of casualties in 
war from 7.2 million to 8.5 million. However, Abbott Gleason suggests these estimations 
are problematic with recent calculations increasing the fatality count from 1.7 million to 
over 3.37 million.97 Ellen Jones asserts that the Soviet Union lost twenty million people 
during World War Two, with fourteen percent of its total population perishing during the 
war years.98  A lack of certainty over the number of fatalities within the military is 
problematic, however the existing data support the notion that a large number of fatalities 
occurred as a result of war.  
Conscription during the Tsarist era has been characterised as burdensome, not 
only for households who faced potential loss of a breadwinner, but for the country. As 
noted by M. M. Speransky, conscription threatened the division of families, a life in 
poverty and harmed the other industrial prospects of society.99 The demands of military 
service highlight the lack of consideration of Imperial leaders towards civilian society, in 
their quests to meet their militaristic desires. To this end, through conscription we can 
identify a prioritisation of the military over society, which was often attributed to Russia’s 
low living standards and acts as a defining divide between militarism in Russia and 
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militarism in other countries. Keep, Jones and Gleason highlighted the necessity of 
conscription for Russia as a way to cope with the extreme and devastating fatalities that 
Russia experienced from the late 18th and 19th centuries (without accounting for casualties 
in the surrounding period). The Soviet Union adopted conscription, with little room for 
changes to be made before a war broke out. In the Post-Soviet period, efforts were made 
to professionalise the Armed Forces, but the economic situation in Russia forced it to rely 
on a two-year conscription. In addition to manpower, and adding to the burdens of 
society, the Russian/ Soviet Armed Forces devoured a significant amount of state 
resources.  
 
The prioritisation of the state budget for military needs is another example of 
militarism in Russian history. Keep, William Pinter and Gaddy  argue that Imperial and 
Soviet Russia committed a vast amount of monetary resources to the military institution 
and to factories producing equipment for war. From 1701 to 1708, the military consumed 
circa 80% of the annual state budget.100 In 1705, the Navy alone cost 179,469 roubles, 
while education took just 3,786 roubles of the state fund. The navy received a remarkable 
percentage of the state budget; however what they received was nothing in comparison 
to the army. The high level of funding dedicated to the different branches of the Armed 
Forces demonstrated a clear prioritisation of the military over other aspects of society, 
and in this case, the education sector. This highlighted a clear state commitment to the 
fostering and development of the Armed Forces, while other sectors of society were left 
to struggle with minimal resources. In 1705, 264,274 roubles were dedicated towards 
artillery costs. In 1724, army regiments and Don Cossacks claimed 1,237,240 roubles 
from the state funds, with an extra 137,187 roubles of the budget cultivated for artillery 
costs. These figures declined, and from 1725 to 1914, the total percentage distribution of 
state budget on the army and navy dropped from 64.5% in 1725 to 25.2% between 1910 
and 1914. This is surprising, since the Russian military was still recruiting excessive 
manpower, and participating in wars. Pinter links the decline from 1910 to 1914 to 
economic, population and industrial growth within the 1890s and from 1907 to 1914.101 
Furthermore, he claims that the government turned to new important functions, such as 
funding the railway. From 1885, the ministry of transport absorbed 2.5% of the total 
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budget. By 1908, it reached 20%.102 It must also be noted that war expenses for the 
periods between 1800 and 1884 and from 1900 to 1909 are excluded.  
According to Max Raeff, the military establishment burdened the lives of others 
in Russian society because it consumed a large per cent of the state budget. The middle 
classes of society were obligated to support the military through taxation, while the rural 
population was bound to give food resources to the military institution. Raeff claims, 
“The urban population were bound to tax duties.”103 This system was already evident 
under Muscovite rule. The obligations of the people within Russia were towards the state; 
therefore the military endeavours and funding of them, which were not new, were adopted 
by Peter’s predecessors.  
The military continued to enjoy a substantial percentage of the annual state funds 
into the Soviet period. During the civil war, the Soviet Union imposed War Communism 
– which centralised and nationalised all means of production for the purposes of war.104 
David Stone notes that following the end of the Civil War, Lenin abandoned the economic 
structure and introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP introduced the 
Soviet Union to a mixed economy and allowed the existence of small entrepreneurs.105 P. 
P. Karatugin suggested the Soviet Union should introduce the process of “military 
assimilation,” which would bring the civilian and military industries together. He claimed 
that industry should have the elements and core functions available to produce munitions, 
even during peacetime.106 The maintenance of a militarised economy and industry during 
peacetime demonstrated the all-encompassing nature of Russian militarism beyond war. 
It also highlighted underlying anxieties of the Soviet state with external threat 
underpinning its desire to maintain a level of mobilisation. Altering civilian industry to 
support the production of military equipment denotes the wider pervasion of the military 
into all aspects of Soviet life. Stone shows that from 1923 to 1926, the money spent on 
defence ranged from 330 million roubles to 600 million roubles per year. Even during 
periods of economic crisis, the Soviet defence sector received 410 million roubles of the 
state fund. 107  This again, outlines the prioritisation of the military sector, and the 
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commitment of the state in the development of military technology and defence even 
when other elements of Soviet society were in decline and to the detriment of its people. 
In the early years of his leadership, Stalin embarked on a comprehensive military build-
up.108 Stalin’s five-year plans aimed to accelerate Soviet rearmament. The rapid period 
of industrialisation flourished under Stalin’s desire to build a strong military. Stone claims 
that the Stalin era was ‘undeniably military,’ with prominent narratives of fronts, attacks 
and shock brigades.109 During this period, the Soviet Union reverted back to life under a 
war economy. The leadership even reintroduced rationing.110  
Isaacs and Downing note that Stalin launched a new five-year plan in the 1940s, 
concentrating on the atomic bomb’s production. Following the detonation of the bomb 
by America, Stalin trebled the science budget for the fiscal year of 1946. He also 
increased the salaries of those working on the bomb project.111 The provision of enhanced 
salaries emphasised the importance of those working on the bomb project, making the 
statement that their service to the state (in a military-scientific capacity) was one worthy 
of a higher salary than those in a civilian role. In the 1980s, the dominant role that defence 
played in society was exposed to Soviet civilians. Julian Cooper notes that in 1989, 
Mikhail Gorbachev claimed he was making a 14% cut to the defence budget, which at 
that point stood at 77.3 billion roubles.112 John P. Moran emphasised the shock felt among 
Soviet citizens and Western onlookers who learnt of the expensive price tag of the 
military, especially since the general state of the Soviet economy was in decline.113 This 
burden was confirmed by a number of scholars such as Keep, Pipes and Gaddy. 
Gorbachev asked, how could a country accomplish military superiority and the creation 
of nuclear weapons but deliver subpar and low quality civilian appliances?114  
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 Russia’s defence industry enjoyed extensive funding from the different regimes 
of the Russian/ Soviet sphere. The volume of state funds allocated for purposes of the 
military, especially in comparison to the civilian sectors, highlights the great extent to 
which the various administrations prioritised the military institution over other societal 
factions. This prioritisation stemmed from Russia’s insecurity due to the many external 
threats that plagued the country. As Keep notes, Russian militarism formed in the 18th 
century, alongside the militarisation efforts of Prussia, Austria and Sweden who 
“developed similar responses to the challenge that a hostile and competitive international 
environment posed to their survival.” 115  During the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
maintained a strong military capability through the excessive funding of the defence 
sector to maintain a conventional and nuclear parity with America. It was therefore, 
through procuring Mutually Assured Destruction that the Soviet Union was able to 
confirm its security against the threats of the Cold War. As noted by Jones, “The Soviets 
are careful not to say that they will start a war; but they insist they are prepared to emerge 
victorious in the event war does occur.”116  
Gaddy claims that during the demise of the Soviet Union, it was clear to 
Gorbachev that the defence industry would not be able to continue to make such a high 
demand on the state budget.117 However, in his assessment, Gorbachev aimed to convert 
the defence industry so that it was creating tools for civilian use. Gaddy made the 
interesting point that through such a conversion, the defence industry would gain even 
more importance.118 Richard Sakwa asserts that even after budget cuts, as of 1996, the 
Russian Federation still had one of the most militarised economies in the world.119 The 
military character of the economy seeped into other aspects of society, militarising the 
administrative structures of Russian/ Soviet society. 
 The majority of scholarship about Russian militarism focused on or attempted to 
explain militarism in Russia by focusing on manpower, money and resources as a measure 
of militarism. The explanations presented in this section focused on the vast amount of 
manpower dedicated to war by Tsarist and Soviet leaders through the policy of 
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conscription. Some scholars, like Gaddy, noted the prioritisation of the state budget for 
the needs of the military, and the demand of industry to create products needed for war 
(including armaments). Both approaches noticed that these prioritisations became an 
issue for subsequent regimes. In the instance of military conscription, the Soviet regime 
found that it was unable to cope with the demands of the civil war without readopting 
military service. Scholars of the post-soviet era established that the tradition of military 
service and the economic demands of the country had an impact on the country’s ability 
to professionalise its Armed Forces. Therefore, military service remains an important part 
of Russian citizenship today. Gaddy found that the burden of the military-industrial 
complex established in the Soviet period contributed towards the high percentage of state 
funds that the military continued to receive in the wake of the Union’s collapse. Even in 
the Gorbachev era, the MIC sought to receive even greater amounts of money in exchange 
that they create common household goods. The military still dominates a large proportion 
of the state budget. 
 
Military bureaucracy 
According to scholars of the militarisation school, Russia’s military institution has 
remained closely entwined with the administrative structures of society. This involves the 
use of the Armed Forces to carry out infrastructure work, and for more senior members 
of the military to play governing roles in regional and federal governments. Scholars like 
James Hassell, Stephen White and Olga Kryshtanovskaya and John Keep claim that the 
extended role militarisation of administration has wider implications for the militarisation 
of society, through the transfer of values and worldviews closely associated with the 
structure being implemented or the person implementing them.  
In the 16th century, a military administration of some sort existed, known as the 
‘Razriad,’ a system whereby a hierarchy based on authority and a system of role 
assignment was established, it served as a ‘pace-maker’ for Russia bureaucracy. Keep 
notes that while the Razriad system brought about a semblance of order, it was woefully 
inefficient.120 In 1722, Peter I established the ‘Table of Ranks.’ The table created a system 
of promotion, whereby commoners could achieve nobility status through services they 
had performed for the state.121 The nobles listed under the Table of Ranks lived like 
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ordinary soldiers and at times, a commoner who had progressed through the system might 
instruct a noble.122 The Tables of Ranks was a really important factor in the militarisation 
of society as it placed those who performed military acts at the top of a hierarchical 
system. James Hassell supports this observation claiming that the word ‘rank’ stipulated 
a man’s status.123 Those working within a civilian role would not experience the same 
promotion possibilities. Furthermore, legislation was adjusted to impede the possibility 
of civilian progression in the rank more rapidly than its military counterpart.124 The Table 
of ranks created a hierarchy whereby those performing a role of a militaristic nature 
trumped those within the civilian sector; it also underscored a new understanding of 
worthiness, with the quicker promotion of the military counterpart being based on their 
service to the state. It glorified the military career, placing civilian roles at the bottom of 
societal order. In addition, under Peter I, a shortage of civilian personnel meant that 
soldiers were called upon to carry out administrative duties. This was abandoned after his 
death; however a different and more established type of militarised bureaucracy 
emerged.125  
It was during Paul I’s reign that Russia first experienced the excesses of 
bureaucratic rule that was to become a trait of the age of Nicholas I.126 Keep claims that 
Paul I established a militarised bureaucracy in three ways; by allocating the military 
definitive roles in civil administration; removing power from the aristocratic elites and 
assigning it to professional administrators; and by altering the character of public service 
by militarising it. 127  Voennye Gubernatory (military governors), Komendanty 
(commanders) and Plats-Maiory (town majors) were established in major cities. The 
military governors militarised the main centres, creating barracks and leading 
infrastructure-building projects.128 The militaristic character of the administrative system 
was not only cultivated through the increased visibility of the military man in prominent 
bureaucratic roles, but also in the leadership of major cities. This was particularly salient 
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in the Soviet period, whereby military personnel were given the authority to impose 
martial law and even sentence people to death.129  
In 1940, the role of the commissar changed substantially and those who recently 
held that role were now replaced with deputy commanders for political work.130 Dmitri 
Simes states that within the Soviet Armed Forces there were no roles for civilians. “There 
are no civilian filters between the military and political leadership that could completely 
challenge the professional judgements of the top command,” he wrote.131 In agreement, 
Alexander Golts and Tanya Putnam claim that the Soviet military held an excessive 
amount of administrative and operational independence that subsequently hindered 
military reform in the Post-Soviet period. Supporting the views of Simes and Pipes, who 
claimed that the military was involved in low-level bureaus of the CPSU (Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union) and that they maintained a strong relationship with top state 
authorities, Putnam and Golts acknowledge that this relationship began to erode in the 
1980s, when the military failed to accept responsibility for attempting to suppress 
nationalist movements. However, there remained a strong emphasis on the influence of 
the military on administrational structures of the CPSU.132 
 From Peter I to the present date, the Russian and Soviet leaders played a 
significant role within the military. Paul I, Alexander II and Nicholas II had militaristic 
upbringings. Nicholas II, for example, served in the military from 1887 and regularly 
participated in military-led summer camps. Vladimir N. Dezhnev, for example, notes that 
Nicholas II’s participation within the military structures formed his great understanding 
of the system before gaining power.133 The militaristic upbringing of the Romanov rulers 
has been the topic of many studies, by John Keep for example, who claimed their 
childhood had an effect on the relationship they maintained with the military when in 
power, and their foreign and domestic policies. Thus, it was the worldviews that were 
cultivated in their early childhood that influenced their prioritisation of the military 
economically and administratively.  
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During the Soviet era, a number of top Soviet officials had a career within the 
national security or military sector. Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev 
and Konstantin Chernenko enjoyed military careers, while Yuri Andropov had a career 
within the KGB. The physical demilitarisation of the Gorbachev years has been attributed 
to his civilian background, with the manifestations of military power under Stalin and the 
cult of the Great Patriotic War under Brezhnev characterised as an outcome of their 
militarised worldviews. Scholars largely agree that leaders with a background in the 
military are more likely to lead a government with a militaristic character. Yet, when re-
examining Yeltsin (with a civilian background) and his leadership, there is clear evidence 
his presidency was more militarised than previously thought. His period of leadership 
was characterised by warfare (internationally and domestically), he led the Russian army 
into a number of neighbouring conflicts under the guise of “peacekeeping” and ordered 
troops into Chechnya. He issued a military response to domestic issues and appreciated 
the general-political figure for their pragmatic and commanding nature.  
Extensive literature has emerged within recent years focusing on the number of 
ex-military personnel in high-ranking political positions of the Putin regime. Pioneers 
Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White published a highly innovative study outlining 
the emergence of a Siloviki within the top positions of the Russian government under 
Putin. They claim that at least one out of four of the elite within the political hierarchy 
have a military background.134 David and Sharon Rivera, however, argue that there is an 
issue with data and that the definition of elite by White and Kryshtanovskaya is 
problematic. They state that data on the emergence of the Siloviki is actually much less 
than previously calculated and that the conceptual and empirical evidence presented by 
White and Kryshtanovskaya does not match. Rivera claim that a definitive answer about 
Russia as a militocracy is not possible and calls for further research that establishes a 
more accurate pool of data.135 Bettina Renz synthesises both accounts, arguing while the 
role of the Siloviki is more modest than explained by Kryshtanovskaya and White, its 
existence in Russian politics is problematic. She claims that the appointment of military 
and ex-military personnel within the political hierarchy was not purposeful, and based on 
institutional channels of elite recruitment established by previous leaders. Most 
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importantly, she pinpoints, and rightly so, that those recruited from military backgrounds 
had different “military mind-sets” and so placing these political and military figures under 
one label is a problem in itself. She states, “The individuals concerned are too different 
to be treated as one analytical unit.”136  
 Scholars claiming that Russia was militarised through its bureaucracy focus on 
the militaristic nature of Imperial Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet leaders. Many of these 
studies focus on the worldviews of the leaders as key to the militarisation of the 
administration, its domestic and foreign policies and its desire to pursue goals of a 
militaristic nature. This is certainly not unfounded, although Renz would argue that not 
all ex-servicemen would share the same experiences of war, and that the assumption that 
their worldviews would therefore be the same is an oversimplification. This topic is still 
under debate. On the other hand, and as noted in the literature, the militarisation of civilian 
sectors of society highlights clear prominence of militarisation in Russian society. Under 
Peter I, and built upon by Paul I, there was the creation of a hierarchical societal system 
which the military dominated. The Table of Ranks implemented a system whereby 
someone of a military rank was promoted at a much faster rate than their civilian 
counterpart, on the merit of their role in militaristic endeavours. The militarisation of the 
administrative landscape was achieved through the creation of military mayors, which 
also increased the image of military figures in high-ranking civilian roles. Both examples 
highlight an effort of the state to create a hierarchical system and to promote a career in 
the military over careers in the civilian sector. While the aims of the military were for 
security purposes, the above examples highlight the autonomous role of the military in 
administrative and organisational duties.  
 
Military culture 
Golts and Putnam convincingly argue that military reform failed in Post-Soviet 
Russia because of the accumulation of political and cultural attitudes that created a 
“defence-mindedness,” which they claim was created from the military’s influence on the 
discourse of social institutions.137 The creation of a militarised mentality is not something 
that happens overnight. Similar to siege mentality, a military mentality is built upon a 
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historical tradition of persecution in the case of Israel, and years of military invasions in 
the case of Russia. Dima Adamsky defines siege mentality as a sense of societal 
insecurity. This phrase is usually associated with Israel and the years of persecution its 
Jewish population had suffered, with the creation of a mentality in belief that the State of 
Israel remains under threat.138 The phrase ‘siege mentality’ finds its relevance in Russia’s 
feelings of insecurity, which generates the belief that the presence of a strong military 
would offer Russia the defence it needed. This not only translated into the creation of a 
mass army, but also the presence of the military in everyday society – taking us far beyond 
simple notions of Russia as a besieged fortress and seeing the military as a solution to a 
problem of paranoia. The prominent vision of military uniforms on the streets, the 
existence of a militarised media discourse, the creation of a military-educational complex 
and a concentration on the ceremonial aspects of the military all contributed to the 
creation of a strong and impenetrable military mentality. 
Alongside the promotion of stories of domestic and international threats in the 
media, the construction of a military mentality also relied on these pervasive processes of 
militarisation. On a societal level, the military played a significant role in the unification 
and socialisation of the masses. Education and training was provided to the offspring of 
serving soldiers, establishing a cohort of future generations readily prepared for war. 
Taylor and John Bushnell claim that Peter I united nobility and peasants for service not 
only by bringing together different classes under the conditions of war but also ensuring 
their different backgrounds would hinder a union that could and would challenge the rule 
of state actors.139 The notion that these ceremonial aspects of militarism allowed the 
leaders to exercise unquestioned control over the military is not new. According to Keep, 
the Tsars felt insecure on their thrones and therefore needed the military to support their 
autocratic leadership styles.140  In agreement, Bushnell claims it was the disciplinary 
nature of the military that made it responsible for civilising peasants, with the military 
drills and schooling being an important method of discipline in the ‘pre-technological 
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age.’141 Paul I commanded parades on a daily basis, which was considered beneficial to 
the soldiers who became familiar with the commands and could unite when necessary to 
perform them. Alexander I staged parades that would include 150,000 Russian troops.142 
The emphasis on the ceremonial was one aspect that separated Russian militarism from 
the conditions of militarism in other European countries. Russian military drills were 
known to strike fear among other nations. Vagts notes that real war was considered the 
‘spoils of the army,’ especially because loss in conflict would ruin the discipline and 
power cultivated in these ceremonial parades. These drills were an important aspect to 
Russian militarism under the Tsars as they created images of great military power that 
could not be achieved in any other form than outright war.   
 During the Soviet period, military parades took place on Red Square at a national 
level and locally within the different regions to commemorate the anniversary of the 
October Revolution and the victory of the Great Patriotic War.143 These parades included 
military drills, which demonstrated Russia’s colossal military power in the form of 
military technology, organised along Moscow’s Red Square. Webber asserts that the 
tanks and missile launchers “served to reinforce the perception of the threat that the Soviet 
Union posed, and in the USSR were presented as a symbol of the country’s might and 
international standing.” 144  Similar to the Tsars, the military-ceremonial became an 
important aspect of Russian militarism under the Soviet regime. Studies by Bushnell and 
Vagts reinforce points from Keep’s checklist, which noted an emphasis on the military-
ceremonial as an integral part of Russian militarism. 
 
Military Education 
A militarised education is an important factor for scholars of the militarisation 
school, arguing that the success of creating a patriotic society is rooted in the current and 
future generations receiving a military-patriotic education. During the 18th century, a 
military-educational system was established to prepare future generations for war. 
Considered a key form of socialisation, the pervasion of the educational sector with 
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militaristic-patriotic messages targeted youth at key points in their development. It 
ensured their worldviews were shaped with patriotic-militaristic messages at a young age, 
and that they were readily prepared (and trained) for military service upon their 
graduation. This system continued to develop under the reign of Anna Ivanova, when the 
Noble Cadet Corps were established. Roughly 1,500 of the gentry youth graduated from 
the Corps and studied a number of subjects, including arithmetic, military drill and 
theology. According to Menning, students also participated in fortification, drafting and 
history classes. Two-thirds of those, who graduated from the Corps were promoted to 
officer ranks.145 
The mixture of academic classes with physical training highlighted efforts of the 
state to ensure that students were not only mentally trained for war, but that they were 
knowlegable of the different defensive strategies of the state. Catherine II increased the 
Army Noble Cadet Corps in 1762. The curriculum was reorganised and broadened to 
include training for both military and civilian service. From 1762 to 1800, 2,000 cadets 
graduated from the corps, with 820 becoming officers.146 The Artillery and Engineer 
Noble Cadet Corps were established in 1762 and renamed in 1800 as the Second Noble 
Cadet Corps. The curriculum was based on mechanics, mathematics and engineering. 
From 1965 to 1800, 1,500 graduates from the Second Noble Cadet Corps entered Russia’s 
military service.147 Odom claims that by 1850, 30 percent of elementary school children 
were enrolled in a military education, and the number of Cadet Corps grew to nineteen 
by the mid-19th century.148 In parallel with the growth in the number of cadet corps and 
military academies, the establishment of military schools in 1863 greatly increased the 
amount of military graduates, with access to military school depending on whether the 
pupil had successfully completed secondary education.149 Graduating from a prestigious 
military school with a high grade determined where the officer was assigned. As noted 
by Ray, graduates of the School of Pages were, for the most part, assigned to the Guards 
Regiments. 150  Military service began as students graduated therefore the military-
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educational complex became a socialisation process that assisted the transition from 
boyhood to manhood. The Tsars used education as an avenue for militarisation, preparing 
society for the physical demands of the military while shaping their worldviews. Military 
educational systems increased in the Soviet period, not only building on the youth’s 
physical training but also instilling the younger generations with patriotism and military 
values.  
 Odom claims that numerous specialists participating in the military during the 
demise of the Tsarist regime belonged to the Imperial Army. Despite wanting to create a 
new cohort of Red Army leaders, in the wake of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks relied on 
the Imperial officers to train future military specialists.151 Unsurprisingly, the methods 
and curriculum adopted by the Soviet Union were based on those from the Imperial 
General Staff Training System. This changed in the 1920s. Taylor notes that the 
Bolsheviks made a number of changes, which led to a decrease in the number of officer 
corps and ex-Tsarist officers in teaching positions.152  Despite the fact that the army 
offered training upon entering military service, real efforts were made to introduce a 
military education to lower levels of society. For conscription to work effectively, it 
became necessary that the process of militarisation started from a young age. As the 
Commissar for Naval affairs, Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze stressed, military education 
was important at a primary level because it ensured the total preparation of society for 
war.153 This point is particularly important and underscores the existence of a siege 
mentality, whereby the Soviet Union felt its only opportunity to warn off external threat 
was through a readily mobilised military sector. In addition, Frunze’s statement also 
stressed that Soviet military victory depended on the mobilisation of the entire society, 
and the engrained patriotic beliefs that Soviet citizens should protect the motherland from 
any danger. From 1939, the number of military-education institutions increased from 123 
to 161, though this figure is conservative since it does not include institutions that trained 
those for the KGB.154  
In 1970, the Soviet Union introduced military departments in civilian ‘higher’ 
education institutions, making participation in military programmes an obligation.155 
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There was no civilian equivalent in military educational institutions. The insertion of 
military departments into higher education institutions demonstrated the pervasive nature 
of militarism. For the Soviet youth, the decision to adopt a patriotic stance was less 
afforded by opportunity. Rather, they were force-fed pro militaristic-nationalistic 
narratives through compulsory education. Norman M. Naimark et al., for example, notes 
that the Soviet youth were instilled with notions that “their country is always right, that it 
is worth fighting and dying for, and that they must learn and sharpen the skills needed to 
fight well on behalf of the motherland.”156 This was completed by instruction and through 
textbooks and manuals, which taught students that they needed to know how to defend 
the motherland.157 Odom notes that DOSAAF (Dobrovol’noye Obshchestvo Sodeystviia 
Armii, Aviatsii i Floti), a voluntary organisation that provided training to complement the 
secondary and higher military programmes, was established in 1951. From 1967 to 1971, 
the DOSAAF recruited a further 9 million members and 20,000 new primary 
organisations.158 Simes argues that while the organisation was seen as ‘voluntary,’ the 
DOSAAF required dues to be paid by every Soviet student and employee.159   
 As will be highlighted in chapter three, education is a popular tool of 
indoctrination and socialisation, utilised by many regimes in order to promote a certain 
ideology. States who have harnessed the means of education as a form of communication 
include Nazi Germany and post-World War Two France. It is evident that leaders of 
Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union wanted to use education to train and prepare its youth 
for military service. While on a physical level students were required to participate in drill 
performances and activities such as abseiling and parachuting, on a more ideological level 
the youth were also indoctrinated through the curriculum, which fed the students with 
historical myths of hostile neighbours. The militarisation of education was an important 
mechanism for ensuring the continued militarisation of society, especially since these 
students were the next generation of Russian/Soviet citizens. This literature documents a 
clear state-led initiative to create a military mentality among its youth, with the view they 
would continue the militaristic endeavours of the state. 
 
156 Norman M. Naimark, David E. Powell and Kurt M. Campbell, “Moscow’s Cult of 
Militarism,” The National Interest, No. 4 (1968): 54. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Odom, “The ‘Militarisation’ of Soviet Society,” 44-45. 
159 Simes, “The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society,” 140. 
 64 
 According to scholars of the militarisation school, Russian society is built on 
militarism. Those with a physical conceptualisation of militarisation document the 
militarisation of Russia from its excessive use of state resources and funding. The high 
percentage of monetary and material help to the military significantly burdened other 
aspects of society. They outline a historical tradition of the former regimes in dedicating 
a vast amount of its budget capacity to the military, with the obvious burden on citizens 
serving as an indicator of the prioritisation of the military sector and showing evidence 
of state militarism. The burden of the defence sector is clearly documented by Clifford 
G. Gaddy, who claims that the historical dominance of the economy by the defence 
industry proved a problem to Post-Soviet Russia as it aimed to pare down its defence 
budget. Writing in 1996, he suggested that the burden would be a problem that Russia 
would need to bear with for a long time.160  
The militarisation of bureaucracy from Peter I’s Table of Ranks highlighted a 
state-led initiative to raise the profile of the military and create a hierarchical system in 
which the military stood at the apex. Civilians were disadvantaged in comparison to their 
military counterparts, who were promoted through the ranks based on their service to the 
state. The creation of this informal hierarchy was aimed to popularise the Armed Forces 
and place military personnel on a pedestal. It demonstrated to other members of society 
that they too, could gain similar promotions, should they serve the country in the same 
way as their military colleague. It demonstrated another situation where the military 
sector was prioritised by the state and therefore, the existence of militarism in Russia.  
Scholars who focus on civil-military relations also examined the placement of ex-
military personnel into key areas of the political elite. Many of the Tsarist leaders, like 
Peter I, were obsessed with the military from a young age, which is used by scholars to 
underpin arguments that his childhood shaped his leadership style. Soviet leaders were 
also characterised in a similar way. Scholars such as Kryshtanovskaya and White claim 
that former soldiers in high ranking political positions would have an impact on the 
domestic and foreign policy goals of the state, as characterised through their worldviews. 
This claim is debatable, but sits within a wealth of scholarship with the dominant view 
that a militocracy is formed when an overwhelming amount of ex-military personnel take 
up key positions in the political administration. It must be noted, however, that countries 
such as America and some of the countries of Latin America have civilian leaders with 
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little to no experience in the military, and yet these countries are ranked high on the Global 
Militarisation Index.  
The ideological dimension of militarisation is a popular example that accounts for 
Russia’s historical relationship with militarism. Scholars focusing on the ideological 
dimension will examine the extent to which Russia’s educational system was militarised. 
First, researchers tend to focus on the development of a military-educational complex by 
focusing on the rise of military training schools. These schools were created in order to 
prepare the students for military service. An important aspect of this was considered by 
the Soviet Union. The growth of military education is demonstrated by its increasing 
presence not only in military academies, but also its place in civilian colleges. In addition 
to formal military education, the Soviet Union introduced a number of youth 
organisations that were established to teach students skills. These organisations 
established military-patriotic narratives, reshaping civic duty as one that the youth would 
serve to protect their fatherland. This discourse was furthered in educational textbooks, 
as the curriculum promoted the image of glorified Russian heroes against an evil enemy. 
Students grew up with narratives of a hostile world, which not only cultivated the well-
established Russian perception that Russia is within a vicious cycle of threat, but served 
as a form of legitimisation of a strong military and the need to prepare Russia’s youth in 
case they are called upon to defend the nation. This is a discourse that remains a 
significant part of Russia’s education in the Post-Soviet period. Golts and Putnam claim 
that the formation of social attitudes by the military institutions under the leadership of 
the Tsars and Soviets hindered significant military reforms (in particular, those reforms 
that would lead to the scaling back of Russia’s military) in the Post-Soviet period because 
of an underlying “defence-mindedness,” which facilitated the ongoing belief that Russia 
needed to maintain a strong military sector. 
Together, scholars of the militarisation school convincingly argue that Russia has 
a historical relationship with the military. Underpinning the different aspects of Russian 
militarism is this constant threat under which Russia sees itself. The physical aspects of 
militarisation were legitimated by the ideological narratives, which viewed Russia’s 
security as reliant on the military. Militarism found its foundations in Peter I’s reign and 
continued as an underlying ideology of Russian regimes since.161 This research forms the 
basis for the work carried out in this dissertation. Studies within the militarisation school 
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offer a thorough assessment of militarisation processes beyond its physical dimensions. 
The militarisation school also takes into account the cultural dimensions of militarisation 





The 1980s brought about a period of significant change for the Soviet Union. In 
an effort to revitalise the waning Empire, Gorbachev introduced a number of reforms 
aimed at bringing communism and democracy together.162 The two main reforms of the 
Gorbachev era were Perestroika and Glasnost. Perestroika took aim at the economic and 
political system of the Soviet Union, while Glasnost, which translates as “openness,” 
targeted the more ideological and societal beliefs of the Communist state as it began to 
unthread the tightly knitted narratives that underpinned Soviet life.  The relaxation of 
censorship laws under Glasnost proved fatal to the Soviet system. The declassifying of 
previously classified documents revealed the extent of Stalinist oppression, war-related 
death and the amount of money being pumped into militaristic endeavours of the state, as 
the Soviet economy continued to deteriorate. Such revelations delegitimised the system 
and led to greater efforts, especially by Soviet satellite states, to gain independence from 
the Empire. The relaxation of censorship laws under the policy of Glasnost led to the rise 
of new scholarship that not only took aim at the system, but also institutions associated 
with it – for example, the Armed Forces.163 Scholars of the late 1980s and 1990s formed 
a large part of the demilitarisation school. Unlike scholars of the militarisation school, 
these researchers offered a revisionist account, questioning the power of the military in 
contemporary Russia and arguing in some cases that militarism was not as deeply 
embedded in Russian society as previously thought. Scholars of this school focus largely 
on the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between democratisation and 
demilitarisation, on civil-military relations and military culture.  
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Scholars largely account for the demise of the Soviet/Russian Army at the hands 
of democratisation. Greater democratisation, which offered greater transparency between 
the political factions of society and the people, inevitably increased public discussion 
around controversial issues. Glasnost opened the government and associated institutions 
to criticism by attracting attention towards the more negative aspects of military service, 
including; corruption, dedovshchina and the high rates of suicides among conscripts. In 
addition, it raised concerns about the large amount of money being pumped into a waning 
institution when the Soviet economy was faltering. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
further exacerbated problems within the military. The collapse brought about a sense of 
unfamiliarity and lack of purpose. No longer were the Armed Forces fighting for the 
preservation of the Soviet Union or for the victory of Communism. Benjamin S. Lambeth 
notes that instead, and for some time, members of the new Russian Army needed to 
protect something that had not yet been fully defined.164 The financial issues of the 
Russian Federation meant soldiers regularly went without pay; loss of morale led to 
increasing use of drugs and alcohols, and the general loss of discipline led to increasing 
levels of corruption within the Armed Forces.165 The decaying prestige of the military has 
been accounted for as a result of the process of democratisation.  
 
Democratisation and Demilitarisation 
Scholars who focus most on the relationship between democratisation and 
demilitarisation within the context of Russia, include researchers such as David Holloway 
and Steven Fish. Unlike Harold D. Lasswell, who argued that a garrison state can exist 
alongside a democracy, Holloway argues that demilitarisation became a by-produce of 
democratisation efforts.166 The point of friction between the two scholars centres on the 
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issue of who controls the process of militarisation. According to Huntington, the 
maintenance of militarism in a democratic society is most successful when the views of 
the ruling elite are similar to those of the military.167 John P. Moran suggested, as of 2002, 
that the world was undergoing a shift in paradigm, where the ‘military mind accepts the 
radically different worldviews of military and democratic leaders.” He suggested this was 
the case in Russia.168 On the other hand, Holloway makes ample reference to the change 
in priorities under civilian leadership as the apex of transformation to civil-military 
relations in the late 1980s.  
This is an aspect argued above in the section on the Siloviki, as scholars such as 
White and Kryshtanovskaya claim that ex-military personnel in civilian roles equates to 
a more militarised society, since their worldviews will impact on their domestic and 
foreign policy goals. This claim, however, and the statements of Lasswell and Holloway 
were contradicted by Bettina Renz, who argued that former soldiers do not share the same 
experiences and that in some cases, their experiences in the military would not 
significantly shape their world views – suggesting that such a claim was too simplistic an 
explanation for the emergence of militarised domestic and foreign policies.169 To this end, 
we should pay more consideration to where else military power lies.  
Jennifer G. Mathers, for example, argued that while Gorbachev threatened the 
material interests of the Armed Forces, the policy of Perestroika actually increased the 
opportunity for greater participation of the military in domestic politics by relinquishing 
the controls that previously existed between the Soviet Union’s political and military 
leaders.170 As of 1995, a number of high-ranking military figures expressed interest in the 
Presidency. These figures included Alexander Lebed, Boris Gromov and Alexander 
Rutskoi. In addition, all of Russia’s political parties sought support from the Armed 
Forces by recruiting prominent ex-military figures onto their electoral campaign. 171 
According to Renz, rising threat to the military’s corporate interests, with Boris Yeltsin 
playing a considerable role in the criticism of the military’s leadership, equated to greater 
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visibility of prominent military figures on the political front.172 While civilian leadership 
and therefore, democracy, has been considered a mechanism of demilitarisation, it is also 
through the threat to the Armed Forces that former soldiers have used the aspects of 




Russia did not witness a military intervention in politics following the 1918 
revolution. Scholars, most notably Brian D. Taylor, argue that infrequent military 
interventions demonstrate a weak military power.173 Moran maintains there was a lack of 
military intervention because the relationship with political leaders had already digressed 
from that of a garrison state to a nation state. 174  Both investigate the impact of 
governmental decision-making on the military’s corporate interests, including the 
reconstruction of the Imperial forces into the Red Army, the purges carried out by Stalin 
and the various reforms introduced under Gorbachev. The literature identifies these points 
as possible catalysts for military intervention. In 1990s Russia, although the military’s 
corporate interests were under threat, the military remained subservient to the civilian 
leadership. Scholars argue that the absence of military action at these critical points poses 
the question as to whether Russia was actually militarised to begin with.  
During the 1930s, the Soviet Union changed considerably. From 1937 to 1938, 
Joseph Stalin launched a number of repressive reforms, which targeted former kulaks and 
ethnic minorities. These occurred alongside the purging of the Red Army and contributed 
to the establishment of a period of Great Terror.175 Stalin and Red Army leadership called 
for an extensive purge of the military to root out any conspirators, and arrests quickly 
spread throughout the officer corps.176  The purge affected most of those in higher levels 
of the Red Army, including 76 of the 85 members of the Military Soviet.177 Peter Kenez 
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refers to the “great purge trial,” which saw the elimination of high commanders within 
the military, as “the most self-destructive event.”178 During the purge, the military was 
criticized extensively. “Molotov criticized the army’s political organs for their 
insufficient vigilance both in unmasking enemies in the armed forces and in the Political 
Administration itself.”179  Taylor emphasises the “extraordinary methods” that Soviet 
authorities and the secret police (NKVD) used to extract ‘confessions.’180 Those involved 
in the purge were accused of conspiring to overthrow the Soviet government. These 
concerns were declared publicly as part of Stalin’s process to legitimise the purge. The 
purges not only threatened the military’s image, but they also terrorised its members. 
Taylor argues that a military coup did not occur because the purges intimidated those 
within the military, leaving them too afraid to act against Soviet authority.181  
The desire for the military to remain apolitical and concentrate on outside threats 
becomes another main point of discussion for Taylor. He claims that during the final years 
of Imperial Russia, the army’s corporate interests were compromised significantly. “From 
the middle of the nineteenth century until the outbreak of World War I... [there was a] 
steady decline in military, particularly army, spending.” Since the corporate interests of 
the Armed Forces were constantly under threat, it is surprising that a military coup did 
not occur until 1917. World War One, which began in 1914, distracted the military from 
inner state tensions and allowed them to prioritise the task of national defence.  From 
1945 to 1985, the military played a significant role in events, including Beria’s arrest, the 
rise of the anti-party group, the Zhukov affair and the fall of Khrushchev. While the 
military resolved many of these events, they did not seek political leadership. In the 
August coup of 1991, Commander of the 106th airborne troops, Alexander Lebed 
disobeyed orders to send his troops to storm the White House. He asked General Grachev, 
“Are we soldiers? Are we executioners? Are we policemen? What are we?” 182  His 
questions highlight his frustration with the Russia elite, who considered Russia’s Army 
within a role beyond national security. Lebed’s questions are parallel to Taylor’s 
observation that the military did not seek involvement in political situations. The army’s 
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‘subservient’ role to the political leaders supports the notion that Russia was not as 
militarised as previously suggested, as their role contradicts the argument from the 
Militarisation school that the military had great autonomy.  
Reforms, like Glasnost and Perestroika, also compromised the military’s 
corporate interest. “With all these attacks on the military’s corporate interests by Russia’s 
‘reformers,’ it seemed natural that career military men would feel disenfranchised from 
the democratic power game and nostalgic for the days of socialism,” wrote Moran.183 Yet, 
a military coup did not occur. The lack of support by the military paved the way for the 
failure of the coup in August 1991. The August Coup of 1991 was an intervention by 
communist hardliners, including Vladimir Kryuchkov and Dmitri Yazov, who wanted to 
resurrect Soviet structures. Again, it is surprising that the military failed to act on behalf 
of the communist hardliners who wanted to restore military prestige. However, C. J. 
Jacobsen notes that the military did not want to “prop up a now widely discredited 
ideology and largely delegitimized system.”184 The public protested against the coup, 
forming a human shield around the White House. If the military had acted with these 
hardliners, the prestige of the military might have faltered even further. A documentary 
written by Alex Ivankine and Tom Perlmutter substantiates this notion that the military 
became less likely to act alongside the coup after witnessing the massive support for 
Gorbachev and the democratic reforms by the public.185  In addition, it was uncertain that 
the hardliners would be successful. Taylor supports this, arguing that the military did not 
intervene for three reasons; they were uncertain if the coup would be successful and did 
not want to be punished, second the military wanted to remain apolitical; and third, there 
was the belief that a coup would further divide the armed forces.186 While this contradicts 
the notion that Russia was militarised, because the military played a subservient role to 
the political leaders, Andrew Bacevich reminds us that the two are not mutually exclusive. 
A country can remain militarised in instances whereby the military was subservient to the 
civilian elite.187  
 
Starving the Military Industrial Complex 
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Glasnost, however, had a greater impact on the decay of the Soviet Russian 
military apparatus. Glasnost brought previously classified information into the public 
sphere. The defence budget went public for the first time in 1989. Julian Cooper, for 
example, wrote, “This was a breakthrough, but the new figure, 77.3 billion roubles, 
immediately provoked controversy, starting a public debate which contributed towards 
the fall of the USSR.”188 Increased public participation, motivated by the realisation over 
the excessive scale at which the military consumed Soviet resources, contributed towards 
the process of demilitarisation. An influential group of Soviet civilian commentators 
openly re-examined national security measures and questioned the necessity of a large 
force, arguing that it should be reduced. 189  Consequently, opening government 
documents to the public influenced the announcement by Gorbachev to cut back on 
manpower and defence spending within and on the military.  
Gorbachev also grappled with the idea of using the defence sector for civilian 
needs, redefining the aim of the defence industry and implementing the policy of 
“conversion.”190 Conversion is defined as the “retooling of existing facilities and the 
retraining of employees for the purpose of producing alternative, civilian products.”191 
Gorbachev wanted to divert the mission of the defence industry to serve the public, rather 
than the military. In 1986, Gorbachev changed the nature of the threat, claiming that the 
Soviet Union was not surrounded by “invincible armies, but superior economies.”192 
Gaddy claims that Gorbachev’s plans did not come into fruition until 1989, when he 
announced at the United Nations a reduction of Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 and the 
withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and Asia.193 While Gorbachev 
made promises to divert defence spending into other areas of Soviet society, by 1996, the 
Russian economy remained one of the most militarised in the world, with the scale of 
Russia’s defence industry and the vast amount of money it garnered hindering attempts 
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to slow down the military-industrial complex.194 To this end, it is not surprising that 
Yeltsin made similar commitments to Gorbachev.  
In an aim to prioritise other aspects of the newly formed Russian State over the 
military, Yeltsin pledged extensive cuts to the military budgets and the manpower. 
Scholars of the demilitarisation school, like Herspring, Trenin and Aron, define these 
budget costs as the “starvation,” “neglect,” and the “rotting away” of the military.195 Aron 
shows this “starvation,” claiming, Russia’s military budget dropped dramatically in the 
formative years of the Russian Federation. Changes to Russia’s economy saw an 80% cut 
in the budget for defence procurement, whereas the military’s share of the Gross 
Domestic Product dropped from 20% to 5%.196 There is, however, a lack of agreement 
over the total figure of reduction to military spending. Although efforts were made. 
Herspring argues that defence spending increased by five billion dollars in 1994 to 74 
billion dollars, but dropped extensively between 1994 and 2000, with a defence budget 
of 30 billion in 2000.197 Similarly, Cooper states that military spending in 1998 was less 
than a third of that in 1991.198 As noted by Markus Heinrich, “most arms industries 
became antiquated,” showing the true impact of budget cuts on the physical conditions of 
the military.199  
The cut to the defence budget had a severe impact on the physical militarisation 
of society, as it threatened efforts to modernise weapons. The cuts also left little money 
for adequate training and for the social welfare of the servicemen. This had a profound 
effect on the combat readiness of Russia’s Army.200 These issues were exacerbated by 
localised conflicts in neighbouring and domestic regions of the Russian Federation. From 
1992 to 2000, there was a lack of training. Herspring notes, even in 2003 pilots only 
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received 6-8 hours of training per year. 201  Interestingly, Golts claims that such 
degradation of the Russian Military continued into the Putin era when the military budget 
was rising by 20% per year. He claimed, “Obviously, the problem was not only, and 
perhaps not at all, caused by a shortage of funds.”202 
 
Manning the Army 
Glasnost, as highlighted across a number of chapters in this thesis, also played a 
considerable role in the decaying prestige of the Soviet/Russian Armed Forces. Viktor 
Baranets, a prominent Russian military correspondent, stated that until 1991 the military 
was a “sacred cow” and that criticism of the military was not allowed unless given 
permission by the CPSU. 203  Glasnost loosened censorship on the media and other 
discursive landscapes of the Soviet state, which led to an increasing amount of negative 
portrayals of the Soviet military in the political landscape. An excerpt in the army 
newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda stated, “Today for a lot of Russian “liberal” newspapers, any 
attack on the army is a god send.”204 Furthermore Odom notes, the poor conditions for 
conscripts in the military were an open secret, but glasnost shed a light on the increasing 
hardships faced by new conscripts, especially the initiation ritual of Dedovshchina.205  
Dedovshchina (also known as Grandfather-rule) is the process by which a young 
conscript is bullied/hazed by older ranks of the military.206 The duration of conscription 
was split into four six-month terms. A soldier in the first six months of his conscription 
period was known as “spirit” [dukh] or “young” [molodoi]. Anton Oleynik notes the use 
of spirit as purposeful in representing the rights of soldiers at the start of their military 
service – which were non-existent. An initiation allowed the soldier to move onto the next 
phase of his conscription journey, where he was referred to as a “pheasant” [Fazan]. 
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During the third six-month term of the conscript’s journey, they are referred to as a 
“salabon” or “scoop” [cherpak]. This was the first stage the conscript is able to instruct 
their younger colleagues. In the final six-month term, the conscript was given the status 
of “old” [starik] or “grandfather” [ded].207 The molodoi was forced to do the ded’s menial 
tasks, like laundry or cleaning his boots, and instructed to perform the more difficult 
tasks.208 In some cases, the younger soldiers were subject to sexual assault and beatings, 
which at times, left the conscript severely disabled and even dead. Suicide, as a result of 
this process, was common.209 Dedovshchina was one of the main issues that led to a 
decrease in the number of conscripts serving in the military.210 Maya Eichler confirms 
this, quoting Vadim, a Chechen conscript, who claimed: 
 
I was afraid not just of the army, as much as of the fact that you have to suffer 
there. I was afraid of Dedovshchina [hazing] and hunger - there was no guarantee 
that I would return healthy and alive.211 
 
The quote highlights problems within the Russian military that influenced 
increasing pushback against obligatory military service. The issue of conscription and 
draft evasion emerged as a topic of interest in Russia in recent years, blaming futile 
conflicts in Afghanistan, poor living conditions and Dedovshchina within the armed 
forces as contributing factors towards the decisions to evade the draft.212 Eichler, in 
Militarizing Men, interviewed draft-evaders and the organisations helping them do so. 
She examines the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (CSM) organisation in Samara, citing 
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possible western influence over the organisations in St. Petersburg and Moscow. She 
claims that the organisation in Samara “shied away” from publicly opposing conflict but 
defended the rights of soldiers and draftees, whereas the organisations in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg publicly opposed war and lobbied “for the abolition of conscription.”213 The 
organisation also worked to abolish Dedovshchina and lobbied for the right to undertake 
an alternative service, and for draft exemptions for students in higher education.214 Julie 
Fedor notes that the committee aimed to achieve its goals through exposing and drawing 
public attention to the uncomfortable issue of systemic violence within military culture.215 
Valeria Zawilski agrees, claiming they would hold demonstrations and press conferences 
where the participation of mothers who lost sons during peacetime would play a 
significant role in highlighting a problem downplayed by the military. 216  The 
documenting of these issues led to a string of protests, including the conscription revolts 
of 1989 and 1990 and the assignment of conscripts to suppress nationalist uprisings in the 
Soviet satellite states.217 
The CSM movement picked up momentum during the First Chechen War, as 
mothers followed their sons to battle to beg for their release from the Russian military or 
to take them “from captivity.”218 They also staged hunger strikes, worked with local 
authorities to organise prisoner of war swaps with the Chechen military authorities and 
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raised criminal cases against the army and officers who headed units where there were 
deaths of military personnel.219 Brenda Vallance claims that for their efforts, the CSM 
won the Sean MacBride Peace Prize in 1995 and was nominated for the 1996 Nobel Peace 
Prize.220 In Russian society, the CSM played a salient role in the changing perceptions of 
the military in society. First, it motivated public interest in the military, towards military 
reform and the war in Chechnya. Second, it made an important contribution toward the 
increasing number of draft evasions, by highlighting the poor and violent conditions of 
military culture.221 
Glasnost played a particular role in the decay of Russia’s military prestige, by 
publicising the issue of Dedovshchina within the military. Dedovshchina and poor living 
conditions had long plagued the military, from the Tsarist Army and throughout the 
Soviet period. 222  Glasnost simply lifted the veil on these atrocities. The reality of 
Dedovshchina had an impact on the amount of conscripts evading the draft. This was to 
remain a feature of the Putin era, with conscripts either leaving home during the draft 
schedule (spring and fall), or by paying doctors to fake an illness.223 The CSM acted on 
the part of the soldiers, calling for better conditions within the military, for the end of 
obligatory military service, and for alternative service. The negative impact of 
Dedovshchina is best documented through figures in which 28% of officers committed 
suicide in 1996 alone, and 5,603 recruits evading the draft between 1998 and 1999.224 
This issue highlighted a downfall of military prestige from as early as the mid-1980s, and 
remains a topic of concern under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.  
To conclude, the above literature presented a revisionist viewpoint to that of the 
militarisation school. It acknowledges that the military had some control, especially under 
autocratic regimes. However, by emphasising the journey whereby Glasnost and 
Perestroika aided the process of democratization, which consequently revealed the poor 
living conditions and the existence of dedovshchina within the ranks, the scholars suggest 
that militarism in Russia was not as prevalent in daily life as suggested previously. The 
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lack of military interventions, highlighted by Taylor and Jacobsen, suggests the military’s 
subservient position in society. However, acknowledging that the military made its own 
decision to remain apolitical during the August 1991 crisis contradicts claims made by 
Taylor. In choosing to remain apolitical, the military acted autonomously. Furthermore, 
Bacevich outlines many instances in America where the army felt distanced from society. 
However he maintains that America is militarised by highlighting the amount of funding 
and resources dedicated to the military establishment. 225  Eichler, convincingly, 
emphasises the downfall of military prestige by highlighting the lack of desire family 
members had for their offspring or younger relatives to participate in the military 
sector.226  
 
 The militarisation school demonstrates the longstanding development of 
militarism in Russia. Focusing on the physical, educational, administrative and societal 
dimensions of militarisation, the literature highlights a clear trajectory of militarisation. 
This aim is most noticeable in the Russian and Soviet leaders’ dedication of excessive 
manpower, materials and funding for military purposes, at the cost of the civilian sector. 
Russian militarism is therefore most commonly characterised by the state’s prioritisation 
of the military over other factions of society. Driven by over glorified, pro-militaristic 
narratives, unequal bureaucratic structures and a consistently high percentage of the 
federal budget, the military institution sat at the apex of an informal societal hierarchy. 
This prioritisation, as noted by scholars like Kryshtanovskaya and White, for example, is 
driven, in some cases, by the militarised upbringing of the country’s rulers. In other cases, 
this commitment to the military institution was also motivated by the country’s deeply 
rooted issues of insecurity and paranoia, fuelled by its extensive history of invasions.
  
 The militarisation school shows that Russian militarism is incredibly resilient 
because it is grounded in myths and values that resonate within society. The maintenance 
of Russia’s siege mentality, for example, has enabled the militarisation of the Russian 
state to persist beyond the breakdown of regimes because it has been able to re-emerge 
under different leaders. Yet despite the persistence of these discourses in 1990s Russia, 
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the Yeltsin period is largely absent from discussions in the militarisation school. Instead, 
the Yeltsin era features heavily in the literature of scholars of the demilitarisation school.  
Scholars of the demilitarisation school typically argue that Russia demilitarised in 
the immediate Post-Soviet period. Topics of interest include the physical decay of Russia 
through manning and budget cuts, the neglect of the civilian leadership to bring about real 
military reform, the emergence of a corrupt military culture within the barracks and the 
relationship between democratisation and demilitarisation. Despite excessive budget cuts, 
the military still received a large percentage of the federal budget. In addition, while 
democratisation reforms like Glasnost lifted the veil of secrecy on issues such as military 
budget costs and Dedovschina, the reforms also removed barriers that hindered the 
military’s role in politics. Increasing discontent of military figures caused by the 
downgrading and ‘neglect’ of Russia’s military proved a motivating factor for their 
increased visibility in politics as a number of ex-and-current members of the military 
ended up campaigning in the 1996 Presidential election.  
 
 Scholars of the militarisation school essentially ignore the Yeltsin period, 
documenting militarisation in Russia from Peter I until the Gorbachev era and then 
remerging to discuss Putin’s role in the militarisation of contemporary Russian society. 
While the Yeltsin era is more widely publicised under the demilitarisation school, it 
should be noted that a majority of these studies focus on subjects, institutions and events 
closely linked to the military, with an emphasis on the physical aspects of militarisation. 
This raises two interesting questions. First, can a country with a deep historical 
relationship with the military demilitarise in ten years? And second, could Putin 
remilitarise so quickly without solid foundations in place? The Yeltsin period, of course, 
while politically and economically chaotic, was also home to a number of small 
neighbouring conflicts and two conflicts with Chechnya and faced a perceived threat from 
NATO expansionism. In addition, and more interestingly, some of the ‘demilitarising’ 
methods proved to strengthen the cause of the military in society, with discontent in the 
decay of the state’s handling of military affairs motivating the increasing role and 
visibility of the military in the political sphere. This thesis proposes a number of different 
mechanisms of militarisation that demonstrate the continued cultural militarisation of a 
society in lieu of its physical presence. 
By examining prominent discourses across the media, in Russian historical school 
textbooks, in the political discourses of the state and in commemorative activities, it is 
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clear that the militarisation of Russian society persisted culturally. This was achieved 
through the continued popularisation of two discourses that underpin Russian identity - 
Russia as a besieged fortress and Russian citizens’ moral obligation to sacrifice 
themselves to the state. These discourses had their roots in the 18th century and are values 
that have made Russian militarism so resilient to regime change. To answer the first 
question, Russian militarism was so embedded in society, not only physically but 
ideologically, that while the physical aspects of the military were in decay, the 
militarisation of society continued culturally. In fact, some of the discourses and rituals 
established in the Yeltsin period formed the foundations of increased militarisation under 
Putin. Therefore, in answer to the second question, without the cultural militarisation of 
the Yeltsin period, Putin would not have been able to militarise contemporary Russian 
society so easily. Through the examination of militarised discourses in the societal 
domains of Russia, this thesis will argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not 
constitute a break in the militarisation of society. Rather, the militarisation of society 
continued culturally as values and discourses of Russia as a besieged fortress and notions 








During the 1980s and 1990s, Russia’s media transformed. Glasnost, Gorbachev’s 
democratisation reforms, changed the way the media operated. The press had more 
freedom in their reporting and state documents showcasing the true extent of Stalinist 
terror, war fatality numbers and the amount of the state budget dedicated for war purposes 
were declassified. Inevitably, criticism of the government and other state institutions 
grew. Yet, while rising negative press coverage suggests increasing demilitarisation, the 
persisting militarised discourses in the media meant the public remained exposed and 
open to what Cynthia Enloe calls the militarised worldview.1 In addition, those critical of 
the military and war did very little to challenge the status quo. In fact, they strengthened 
notions that Russia remained vulnerable to internal and external threats by keeping these 
issues in public view.2 To this end, the 1990s Russian media preserved the militarisation 
of society in two ways: first, through the prominence of militarised narratives; and 
second, by adopting key militaristic discourses.  
This chapter analysed articles from eight newspapers located at the Russian State 
Library (RSL). It argues that the media sustained the militarisation of society in 1990s 
Russia.3 The research found that newspapers critical of the military did not deviate too 
 
1 Cynthia Enloe claims, “A less militarised military would be one less imbued with an 
institutional culture of masculinised violence. It would be a military less committed to a 
hierarchical, threat-filled worldview; having an enemy wouldn’t be so central to the 
military’s raison d’etre.” Since the ‘threat-filled worldview” was salient in the media and 
more generally in Yeltsin’s Russia, it supports the view that culturally, Russia was 
militarised. For more on this, please see: Enloe, Globalisation and Militarism, 79. 
2  As will be demonstrated more widely across this chapter, newspapers were not 
necessarily pro-war, but spoke about growing threats to Russia in terms of NATO’s 
eastward expansion and threat of terrorist attack from Islamic regions of the Russian 
Federation. 
3  In depth details of the newspapers analysed in this chapter are included in the 
Introduction to the thesis. The articles for this chapter were chosen randomly, and were 
searched for by year. As the prominence of one event became noticeable, a narrower 
search was used to gather more information. As the catalogue at the RSL did not indicate 
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far from dominant state discourses, and that even when critical these newspapers still 
adopted warmongering language. The prominence of the military in the media, despite 
positive or critical reception, was most important in developing the militarisation of 
society. Militarised discourses dominated the media landscape and offered the Russian 
readership little to no escape from the topic of war. To this end, Russia’s media in the 
1990s was a ‘tool of warfare’, bringing military action from far-flung regions to the 
forefront of public consciousness.4 A March 1999 article in Argumenty i Fakty, a general 
weekly newspaper, on the topic of the Yugoslav War (1991-2001) claimed, “Contrary to 
the impression of television reports, the capital of Yugoslavia lives a normal life.”5 The 
author noted, “The true horror of the bombing and missile strikes is known to the residents 
of Pristina and other settlements of Kosovo, where after NATO air raids, residential 
neighbourhoods blaze and people die. Ordinary citizens of Belgrade practically do not 
notice it. Well – so it was with us. The Chechen War claimed the lives of boy soldiers, 
but did it greatly affect the life of a calm and well-fed Moscow?” The reports showed that 
the media brought the war to the forefront of Yugoslav public consciousness, as was the 
case with the Chechen war.6  
This chapter argues that democratisation actually furthered the militarisation of 
the media, with the economic fallout of the early post-Soviet period forcing the press to 
prioritise contentious topics and seek governmental financial support. In addition, 
increased criticism of the state pushed the government to regain control of narratives in 
the media. To this end, militarism became a side note of the media, as it struggled to deal 
with the freedoms and constraints of democratisation efforts.  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis and the Media  
 
whether an article was on the front page, an editorial or letter to the editor (apart from 
with Argumenty i Fakty), the articles used in this chapter are varied. To interpret them, I 
used the theories of Cynthia Enloe, which suggested that the militarisation lives outside 
the military. These newspapers were circulated outside the military. When examining 
these articles, I examined dominant discourses across the newspapers collected in a 
random sample. These samples were collected randomly by year.   
4 Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, War and Media; The Emergence of a Diffused 
War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 6-8. 
5 Boris Muradov and Igor Popov, “Yugoslavskie Strasti,” Argumenty i Fakty, 30 March 
1999, No. 13. At this time, the capital of Yugoslavia was Belgrade, but the NATO 
airstrikes were taking place in Pristina, the now capital of Kosovo. 
6 Ibid. 
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The study of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in relation to the mass media is 
vast. Defined as a ‘multi-disiplinary approach,’ CDA adds value to the analysis of this 
chapter in its ability not only to consider the text and discourse, but also to place it within 
wider social and cultural contexts.7 As agreed among scholars of CDA, this form of 
analysis links the use of text to the popularisation and domination of certain power 
structures within society, as a result of unique social, political, economic and historical 
contexts.8 The media, as noted by Aaminah Hassan, has a ‘signifying power,’ which 
allows the press to build media frames that manipulate the audience, legitimate dominant 
powers and promote the interests of a certain social group/class.9 In this case, stories in 
the media are representations of an interpretation of reality, rather than as windows to 
reality.10 CDA, as noted by Deti Anitasari, simply ‘tries to illuminate ways in which 
dominant forces in society construct versions of reality that favour their interests.’11 
Referring to Van Dijk’s ideological square, Ramanatham highlights the ability of CDA 
to account for the ideological nature of the media.12 This is a particular issue in this 
chapter, as tactics of othering played a salient role in how events of the 1990s Russia were 
discussed in the news.  
‘Othering’ is a key militarising tactic, as it sets to unify one country/societal group 
against another. In this chapter, the newspapers report on an aggressive NATO, terrorist 
Chechens and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism to highlight internal and external threats 
to Russia and legitimise Russian military intervention in neighbouring regions. They add 
 
7 Renugah Ramanatham and Tan Bee Hoon, “Application of Critical Discourse Analysis 
in Media Discourse Studies,” The Southeast Journal of English Language Studies 21, No. 
2 (2015): 57-58. 
8  Ramanatham and Hoon, “Application of Critical Discourse Analysis in Media 
Discourse Studies,” 57-58; Pelegri Sancho Cremades, “An overview of Critical Discourse 
Analysis Approaches to Mass Communication,” in Critical Discourse Analysis of Media 
Texts, ed.  by Pelegri Sancho Cremades, Jose Maria Bernardo Paniagua, Guillermo Lopez 
Garcia and Enric Serra Alegre (Valencia: Los Autores, 2007), 17. 
9  Aaminah Hassan, “Language, Media and Ideology: Critical Discourse Analysis of 
Pakistani News Bulletin Headlines and its impact on viewers,” Humanities: SAGE Open 
8, No. 3 (2018): 1-3. 
10  Cremades, “An overview of Critical Discourse Analysis Approaches to Mass 
Communication,” in Critical Discourse in Media Texts, by Cremades et. al, 24. 
11 Deti Anitasari, “Critical Discourse Analysis: Mass Media,” INA-Rxiv, 1-9 (January 
2018) < doi: 10.31227/osf.io/a23y6> [Accessed 20 November 2020]. 
12  Ramanatham and Hoon, “Application of Critical Discourse Analysis in Media 
Discourse Studies,” 59-60. 
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to and reaffirm the larger societal discourse that Russia is a vulnerable country surrounded 
by hostile neighbours. 
  
 
DEMOCRACY, THE RUSSIAN MEDIA AND THE MILITARY 
In 1917, Vladimir Lenin claimed that, “Words are more dangerous than bombs 
and bullets,” owing to the powerful role of the media in the dissemination of messages.13 
He considered the press a vital “ideological weapon” available to the workers in their 
fight against Tsarism.14 As a result, the Communist Party adopted censorship. In 1985, 
Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the policy of Glasnost, which completely changed the role 
of the media.15 The media was to function as a fourth estate, facilitating a relationship 
between the state and society, to praise, criticise, and at times, educate.16 Whereas the 
purpose of the Soviet press was to educate the masses about the Soviet ideology, the new 
press of the post-Glasnost era was expected to raise issues of the state, advocate on behalf 
of the public and serve popular interests.17 As Gorbachev’s democratisation reforms were 
introduced, the Soviet Union was still involved in the Soviet-Afghanistan War. 
Journalists reported on Soviet military incompetency, criticising the heavy use of state 
funds on the conflict when the domestic economic situation was dire.18 It was during this 
 
13 Brian McNair, “Reforming and Restructuring in the Soviet media: Before and after the 
August 1991 coup,” in Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, ed. by John 
Eldridge (Oxford: Taylor and Francis, 2003), 66.  
14 McNair, “Reforming and Restructuring in the Soviet Media,” 55-66. 
15 Ivan Ivanovich Zassoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (Oxon: Routledge, 
2016), 3-4; Camille Jackson, “Legislation as an indicator of Free Press in Russia; Patterns 
of Change from Yeltsin to Putin,” Problems of Post-Communism, 63, No. 5-6 (2016): 1-
2; Olessia Koltsova, News Media and Power in Russia (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 29-30. 
16 Bettina Renz, “Media-military relations in Post-Soviet Russia,” 64; Tina Burrett, “The 
end of independent television? Elite Conflict and the reconstruction of the Russian 
television landscape,” in The Post-Soviet Russian Media: Conflicting Signals, ed. by 
Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutching and Natalia Rulyova (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 76; 
Jonathan Hassid, “Four Models of the Fourth Estate: A Typology of Contemporary 
Chinese Journalists,” The China Quarterly 208, (2011): 820. 
The term ‘fourth estate’ was created as a mediator of the other three branches of society, 
or as commonly known, the Estates of the realm (government, clergy and the people). For 
more, please see: Lucas A. Powe, The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of 
the Press in America (Berkley: University of California Press, 1991), 260-261. 
17 Renz, “Media-military relations in Post-Soviet Russia,” 64. 
18 Koltsova, News Media and Power in Russia, 29. 
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time that the prestige of the military institution became under threat. The military’s 
repressive role in the immediate Post-Soviet period did not help its cause. 
During the Soviet collapse, the military worked in a policing capacity to suppress 
popular uprisings in the non-Russian Soviet republics. The press challenged the military’s 
role. In February 1991 Georgii Rozhanov of Ogoniok, (a magazine owned by Boris 
Berezovsky, a close friend of Boris Yeltsin) asked why the military was suppressing 
disorder. He suggested that the military’s role in Baku and Riga was ironic since it aimed 
to “establish public order and protect citizens through automatic bursts and sapper 
blades.”19 He did, however, acknowledge the decision to apply a military solution as a 
call by the political elite and not the fault of the military itself.20  
The declassification of state documents also ignited fierce debate within the media 
about the military and the USSR. Having discovered the extent of corruption and horror 
embedded within the Soviet system, the press began to revise Soviet history, for example, 
the Great Patriotic War. Veterans were targets of this criticism, marginalised for their 
supposed role in the empowerment of the oppressive system.21 These revisionist accounts 
affected the prestige of the Armed Forces in society. However, while  media discourses 
largely criticised the media , increasing attention paid to the military kept the topic of the 
Armed Forces in public consciousness.  
In response, the Ministry of Defence sought to curb criticism by integrating 
military journalists into the civilian press, hindering the media’s role as a ‘watch dog.’22 
 
19 Georgii Rozhnov, “Voiska na Ulitsakh,” Ogoniok, February 1991, No. 7. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Anna Krylova, “Dancing on the Graves of the Dead: Building a World War Two 
Memorial in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Memory and the impact of political transformations 
in public space, ed. by Daniel J. Walkowitz and Lisa Maya Knauer (North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 87. 
22 Renz focuses on the discussion of dedovshchina in the media, and the reactions of such 
discussion by military and civilian leadership. She claims that media, which represented 
the official line of the government and military institutions (Krasnaia Zvezda and 
Rossiiskaia gazeta) did contain information about dedovshchina, including criticism of 
the mainstream media’s discussion of the topic. They, alongside military commentators 
criticised the mainstream media’s ‘biased and destructive’ approach to the issue, and for 
not offering solutions to the problem. Thus, military commentators undermined the 
efforts of the media to act out the role of a ‘watch dog’ by emphasising the bias and 
narrowness of the media’s story. Efforts to undermine the media went beyond military 
commentary. As noted by Jackson, Yeltsin signed a Federal Law in 1995 On Rules for 
Coverage by State Mass Media of the activity of Bodies of State Power, which obliged 
the media to include interviews and speeches in their entirety, claiming that the use of 
snippets from previous meetings [in relation to the Chechen war], portrayed the Chechen 
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The government was willing to sacrifice the media’s freedom to ensure their policies were 
protected from public scrutiny. In this sense, Yeltsin’s media policy was contradictory 
and inconsistent.23 Maria Lipman related this inconsistency to a tradition of Russian 
leaders undertaking westernising reforms, usually in the military and technological 
sphere, only to follow with an array of conservative, anti-western ones.24 Here Lipman 
links the changes in media policy to the ‘confusion and turmoil within Russia’ that were 
sparked by the reforms of the 1990s, with a number of economic issues threatening the 
liberty of the media.25  
Within the first term of his Presidency, Yeltsin introduced a number of radical 
economic reforms. Although successful in other Post-Communist countries, the results 
were vastly different for Russia. These reforms ultimately led to the return of a cosy 
relationship between the state and media. On 2 January 1992, the state introduced ‘price 
liberalisation,’ privatisation and eliminated state subsidies.26 Many media outlets either 
collapsed or moved to weekly publications.  In 1994 Yeltsin signed a presidential decree 
renewing financial benefits for state broadcasting but not for private broadcasters.27 The 
media brought issues of independence to meetings on state financial help. They 
 
counterpart in a positive light, when the full meeting shows that the Russian government 
also made a positive contribution. 
For more, please see: Renz, “Media-military relations in Post-Soviet Russia,” 63-66; 
Jackson, “Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia,” 5-6; Elisabeth Sieca-
Kozlowski, “From Controlling Military Information to Controlling Society: Political 
Interests Involved in the Transformation of the Military Media Under Putin,” Small Wars 
and Insurgencies 20, No. 2 (2009): 302. 
23 Ibid, 4. 
24  Maria Lipman, “Media Manipulation and Political Control in Russia: Russia and 
Eurasia Programme: REP PP 09/01,” Chatham House, (2009), accessed 7 February 2020, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20E
urasia/300109lipman.pdf, 3-4. 
25 Lipman, “Media Manipulation and Political Control in Russia,” 3-4. 
Elena Vartanova explains that the media system of Russia was influenced largely by the 
transition of Soviet society into the Post-socialist era. The highs and lows of the transition 
ran alongside and were intertwined with the complicated introduction of democratisation 
and market reforms. For more, please see: Elena Vartanova, “The Russian Media Model 
in the Context of Post-Soviet Dynamics,” in Comparing Media Systems Beyond the 
Western World, ed. by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139005098, 122.  
26 Robert Service, The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-
First Century, 4th edition (London: Penguin, 2015), 511-512. 
27 Zassoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, 17-18. 
Jackson, “Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press in Russia,” 5. 
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understood that they needed to give up their material independence but “[did] not want to 
lose their moral independence.”28 The government could not easily accept that they would 
be criticised by an outlet they were funding. Through financial help, Yeltsin began to 
retake control of the media.29 The economic crisis jeopardised the freedom of the press 
in other ways. First, it forced media outlets to find other sources of funding. As a result, 
several oligarchs took ownership of some of failing newspapers.  
The economic crisis in Russia not only pushed the media to seek governmental 
financial support, but also to rely on topics they believed would interest readership. As 
noted by Paul McCann, journalist of The Independent, “War sells serious newspapers.”30 
Josh Blackburn, when reporting on support from America’s war in Iraq, states, “CNN 
online offers its hungry public an opportunity to fly their favourite missiles and 
aircrafts… You never knew that war could be this fun.”31  The media’s ability to entertain 
was vital in shaping public opinion. As noted by Mehmet Evren Eken, the public should 
be “re-enchanted by war,” with Archibald MacLeish arguing that the main battleground 
took place in the minds of people. Stahl similarly declared, once the media captured the 
people’s minds and hearts that “souls would follow.”32  This re-enchantment would not 
only act as a tool of militarisation, but would draw in an audience, previously discouraged 
by expensive subscription costs. Blackburn ties together the sensationalist dimensions of 
war reporting and the economic aspect of the topic by arguing that it not only satisfied 
national strategy but also aided the economic growth of media outlets.33 In choosing to 
discuss, and sensationalise, war-related topics over other issues, the media purposely 
emphasised, erased and cherry-picked elements of different events and stories.34   
 
28 Zassoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, 17-18. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Paul McCann, “War Sells Serious Newspapers,” The Independent, 20 April 1999, 
accessed 20 January 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/war-sells-
serious-newspapers-1088456.html. 
31 Joshua Blackburn, “War Sells,” Provokateur, March 2003, accessed 20 January 2017, 
www.provokateur.com/war-sells-1. 
32  Roger Stahl, Militainment, Inc” War, Media and Popular Culture (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 10; Mehmet Evren Eken, “The Unscene effects of on-demand access 
to war,” in Understanding Popular Culture and world politics in the digital age, ed. by 
Laura J Shepherd and Caitlin Hamilton, (United States: Taylor and Francis, 2016), 140; 
Amil Kamar Singh, Military and Media (New Delhi, Lancer Publishers, 2006), 58. 
33 Ibid. 
34 In scholarship, this is referred to as framing theory. Derived from the work of Erving 
Goffman, who examines frameworks attached to interpretation of everyday events, 
framing theory relates to scholarship on media, which focuses on agenda setting and 
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The government took control over the press to hinder its criticism of the 
government’s military goals. This was clearly seen by the infiltration of the civilian press 
by military journalists. In another sense, the economic issues presented the government 
with an opportunity where they could take control over the media in a subtle way. In 
addition, journalists relied on the military to increase and attract readership, in an aim to 
overcome the financial issues of the post-Soviet period. They brought wars in far-flung 
areas to the forefront of society, when in fact these wars had very little impacton their 
lives, continued to show existing internal and external threats, which reaffirmed the 
discourse that Russia was a vulnerable country surrounded by hostile neighbours.  
 
Can we consider the Post-Soviet press as truly democratic? 
 David Wedgwood Benn notes, “it may fairly be said that the Russian media in the 
1990s have been more diverse, more outspoken and more influential than at any other 
previous time in the country’s history.”35 Writing in 1996, Benn’s article outlined the 
early threat 1990s new Russian media, concluding that its fight for freedom had not yet 
been won or lost. He considered the parlimentary crisis of 1993 a threat to journalistic 
freedom.36 Pravda and Sovetskaia Rossiia, for example, were banned for a period of time 
 
frames chosen specifically by journalists in their analysis and interpretation of events. As 
noted by Goffman, when an event takes place, a number of frameworks appear that the 
individual can use in order to understand and intepret the event that has just taken place. 
He labels this transaction as a primary framework, where aspects of the original event are 
‘rendered meaningless’ in the process of making the transaction meaningful. Similar to 
this individual’s process of meaning making through the application of the primary 
framework, journalists choose to frame stories in certain ways based on their own world 
views, journalistic routines, political means and even editorial policy. Since 
interpretations of events are already biased in the sense that attached to the stories are 
their own worldviews, their reporting is not ‘just holding a mirror to events” but also an 
interpretation of how they see events. In turning the event into a story, the journalist 
provides their own interpretation of the event, selecting certain points of emphasis over 
others. In doing so, certain messages are being transported into the consciousness of the 
reader. Please see: Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of 
Experience (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1996), 21-27; Dietram A. Scheufele, 
“Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of 
Political Communication,” Mass Communication and Society 3, No. 2-3 (2000): 307; 
Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy, 36. 
35 David Wedgewood Benn, “The Russian Media in Post-Soviet Conditions,” Europe-
Asia Studies 48, No. 3 (1996): 474.  
36 The Russian constitutional crisis (21 September 1993 - 4 October 1993) refers to the 
political deadlock between Boris Yeltsin and Russian parliament over the issue of 
dissolving the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin held a 
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in 1993.37 As mouthpieces of the former Soviet Union and the associating communist 
principles, their voices threatened Boris Yeltsin’ aims. In this sense, banning the 
newspapers was in clear disregrard of the media laws established 3 years prior and an 
indication that the press did not have the same freedom as other democratic countries. 
Favouring pro-government media was something that continued even in the Glasnost 
years. The ascension of pro-democracy editors within the press, as a result of Gorbachev 
demonstrated an effort of the Soviet government to continue to politicise the press and 
steer the discourses within the media toward the aims and goals of the government.38   
  Another consideration is the role of Soviet journalists. With the advent of 
glasnost, Soviet journalists did not cease to exist – rather they adapted to the new 
conditions presented to them in the era of democratisation. These journalists suffered 
from years of censorship laws, training that was ideological and equal pay based on word 
count, rather than quality. At the Sixth Congress of the Union of Journalists in March 
1987, chairman Viktor Afanasyev called for substantial changes to the Soviet mass media, 
in line with the issues presented above.39 Newspapers and magazines created prior and 
during the Soviet Union continued to exist also, for example, Ogoniok, Pravda and 
Izvestiia, while new newspapers emerged. Novaia Gazeta was a new newspaper entirely, 
whereas a team of journalists who formally worked for Komsomolskaia Pravda created 
Kommersant. The new media landscape of the 1990s consisted of Soviet journalists and 
Russian journalists. This is not to say that some of these publications and the journalists 
within were ideologically sworn to the socialist principles they previously upheld. 
Ogoniok for example, became a key publication in the Glasnost years.40 
Despite these issues, Russia’s media was the most free it had been in years. Benn, 
on the topic of media reporting during the First Chechen War, stated the “robust 
independence of Russian journalists greatly impressed the outside world.”41 The freedom 
of the press is best shown in the diverging views of the different media outlets under 
 
referendum in April 1993, which he used to make the changes. Military force was used 
by Yeltsin to storm the White house and the leaders of opposition were arrested. 
37 Benn, “The Russian Media in Post-Soviet Conditions,” 472. 
38 Richter, “The Russian Press after Perestroika.” 
39 Brian McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media (London: Routledge, 1991), 
93; Viktor Afanasyev (1922-1994) was a Soviet politician and former-editor of newpaper 
Pravda.  
40 Richter, “The Russian press after Perestroika.” 
41 Benn, “The Russian Media in Post-Soviet Conditions,” 471 
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review in this chapter. Krasnaia Zvezda journalists, for example, serving as a mouthpiece 
of the Russian Army, provided a more positive outlook on the position of the army in the 
1990s. In contrast, Novaia Gazeta, Ogoniok and Izvestiia were more critical of the 
Russian Army’s role in the Chechen region. At the same time, while Russia’s role in the 
Chechen conflict was largely criticised, the media remained largely united on some of the 
threats that Russia faced in this period. For example, while against the prospect of war, 
Argumenty i Fakty and Sovetskaia Rossiia were largely anti-NATO and documented 
extensively on the threat of NATO expansionism. Since Putin’s ascension to power, the 
role of the media in society has become more centralised. 
Russia’s media was not autocratic or democratic. Largely, it was anti-war, yet at 
times, especially regarding NATO, it understood Russia’s role in the conflict. In addition, 
while wanting to avoid war, and at times, critical of the governmental stance, the media 
would agree that there were real threats to Russia’s security in the post-Cold War world, 
in Chechnya, with NATO and in the former Soviet region. Generally, Russia’s media was 
the most free it had been in years. However, the continued role of Soviet journalists 
alongside the economic crisis and governmental restraints meant the Russian media never 
fully achieved the freedoms of other democratic countries. 
 
MILITARISED DISCOURSES AND THE MEDIA 
 
 The 1990s Russian media paid particular attention to two events; NATO 
expansion and the First Chechen War. Like those in Belgrade, Russian society was 
confronted with stories of an aggressive NATO and criminal Chechnya. The 
concentration on these topics within the media showcased the importance of these issues 
to Russian society, with the messages aimed at altering the perception of the reader 
towards NATO (and by extension America). The next section focuses on media narratives 
relating to Russia’s security in the post Cold-War world. It argues that a primarily anti-
war media played a particular role in the mobilisation of Russian society as it emphasised 
Russia’s loss of regional power in the Former Soviet Union, the evolution of a 
‘peacekeeping’ Russia in neighbouring conflicts and the threat of NATO in the region. 
 
Russia the peacekeeper 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s global influence plummeted. 
One key dimension of Russia’s demise was its loss of territory after the dissolution of the 
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USSR. This downfall began in 1989, when a wave of protests swept through regions of 
the Eastern bloc, initiated by independence movements. The Baltic States as well as 
Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Romania sought independence. The Warsaw pact 
ended while the Western-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) continued to 
flourish limiting the Soviet and Russian influence in the Eastern Bloc. In response to 
growing claims for independence, Gorbachev introduced the ‘Union of Sovereign States’ 
Treaty. This treaty aimed to devolve more powers to the regions seeking independence. 
In return these countries would remain part of the Union. Many of the regions rejected 
the treaty seeing their own journey for independence as their only option to gain 
sovereignty. 42  Gorbachev’s proposal led to an attempted coup d’etat by communist 
hardliners. The coup’s failure led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of the 
failed coup, the treaty was not ratified.  
Instead the countries were granted independence, the Union disintegrated and 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 
December 1991. This new union included former Soviet states, excluding the three Baltic 
States and Georgia. The CIS aimed to unify former Soviet states on issues such as the 
economy and security. Members of the CIS signed agreements on economic prospects 
and collective security. However, Alexander V. Kozheniakin and Roger E. Kanet note 
that the CIS became a synonym for Russian control in the former communist region.43 
For example, one agreement saw that nuclear weapons located across the former soviet 
space were returned to Russia, ensuring that Russia was the only country in the region 
with a nuclear capacity. In addition, Russia controlled the CIS with a high number of 
Russians in the commanding roles of the commonwealth’s defence sector. In this sense, 
the Russian government relied on the military alliances formed under the CIS to help 
maintain its control over the former Soviet regions. Russia’s desire to maintain control 
over the Eastern Bloc beyond the CIS was further demonstrated in Yeltsin’s call to the 
United Nations to allow Russia to play a stabilising role in conflict-ridden regions like 
Yugoslavia. In July 1995 Krasnaia Zvezda reported on the peacekeeping efforts of the 
 
42 Galina Starovoitova, “Democratisation and Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Society,” in 
Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, ed. by Leokadia 
Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoeller, Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Lee Walker (New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 151. 
43 Alexander V. Kozhemiakin and Roger E. Kanet, “Russia and its Western neighbours 
in the ‘Near Abroad,’” in The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, ed. by Robert E. 
Kanet and Alexander V. Kozheimiakin (London: Palgrave, 1997), 29. 
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CIS, quoted Andrey Kozurev in four speeches made during the week of the 8th July 
1995.44 Kozurev claimed, “Today, a more important task is strengthening the CIS... CIS 
countries will join the agreement on joint border protection.” Stressing that the 
commonwealth “is gaining experience and potential of independent peacekeeping” he 
called on the Federation Council to “continue support for operations in Abkhazia, 
Tajikistan and other ‘hot’ spots. Here the minister found the support and understanding 
of regional leaders, who themselves were well aware of the consequences of instability 
in the post-Soviet space.”45 Russia’s new role within the CIS as a peacekeeper helped 
legitimise Russia’s military policies. It showed that Russia relied on the military to 
stabilise and bring peace to neighbouring regions, which could threaten Russian stability. 
The media argued that independence brought a lot of instability to the region, which 
legitimised Russia/ CIS action. This instability was linked to rising ethnic tensions. 
Russia adopted a hard-line approach to suppress dissent in countries seeking 
independence. Tanks rolled onto the streets of Lithuania, with the Russian military also 
suppressing dissent in Central Asia.46 Russia legitimised military action on the basis it 
ensured the protection of ethnic Russians choosing to remain in those countries. As noted 
in the business-political newspaper Kommersant in February 1993, “All questions related 
to the status of Russians and social guarantees for its officers and soldiers will be 
stipulated in special intergovernmental agreements, which are being worked on by 
experts of the two military departments.”47 This was an issue later used to justify Russian 
military intervention in the Chechen region, with stories of violence against ethnic 
Russians legitimising its military stance. Russian military action in other neighbouring 
regions was also defended on the basis that these tensions and instability could spill into 
Russia. 
In February 1991 Ogoniok reporter, Vasily Selyunin acknowledged that new 
claims to sovereignty might affect the rights of ethnic minorities. However, he also argued 
that interethnic tensions already existed under the Soviet Union, yet the USSR did very 
little to protect ethnic minorities in the first place. He used the Nargorno-Karabakh 
conflict (1988-1994) as an example of this, claiming it would be hypocritical to link the 
 
44 In 1995, Andrey Kozurev was Russia’s foreign minister at the time. 
45  Alexander Golts, “Ukreplenie SNG – Vazneishaia Zadacha Nashei Diplomatii,” 
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rise of interethnic tensions to independence when these tensions already existed under 
previous leadership.48 He argued that the use of Russia’s military in the affairs of post-
soviet countries also allowed Russia to build up a collection of allies that would 
eventually owe Russia.  Russia’s involvement in the Tajikistan War (1992-1997) and the 
Yugoslav war illustrates this point perfectly.  
First, Russia supported both sitting governments in Tajikistan and Yugoslavia. 
This is an extremely important point to take into consideration, bearing in mind the 
internal threats facing Russia during this time. Yeltsin supported Rahmon Nabiyevich 
Nabiyev of Tajikistan and Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia’s government. This was not 
a coincidence. Yeltsin was also under threat from separatist movements within the 
Russian state. During this period, ethnic groups in Russia, including Tatars and Chechens, 
were seeking their own independence. While these movements did not peak until 1994, 
supporting separatist regimes would have endangered Russia’s own claims to territorial 
integrity. In addition, providing military support to both Tajikistan and Yugoslavia 
created an informal alliance, where Russia expected similar support in return. These 
countries were expected to support Russia’s territorial integrity and disapprove of 
Chechen separatism. The media acted as a vehicle of militarisation, showing that the 
government was willing to use its military to suppress separatist movements. It first 
showcased the separatist activity as a threat to Russian society, in terms of instability and 
presented military action as a necessary means of security. 
Second, in relation to the Tajikistan War, Russia’s involvement was motivated by 
border instability. Here, Russia’s military role was justified on the basis that it aimed to 
stabilise the borders and secure Russia against similar issues. As noted in Kommersant 
(February 1993), during a visit to Tajikistan in 1993, Pavel Grachev agreed to restore a 
unified air defence system in the Central Asian Region, and to strengthen the protection 
of the southern borders of Tajikistan. He argued that strengthening the Tajik southern 
border was integral “to prevent the spread of ‘aggressive’ Islamic fundamentalism, which 
could lead to war, including on the territory of Russia.” 49  Grachev’s statement 
surrounding securitisation was supported. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, not only 
in Russia, but also in other post-soviet societies became a real concern for the region. As 
 
48 Vasily Selunin, “Chto u Nas Poluchitsia?” Ogoniok, February 1991, No. 6, 1. 
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Pavel Grachev (1948-2012) was a Russian Army General and served as the Defence 
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conveyed in December 1992 in Kommersant, Uzbekistan feared that an Islamic republic 
would be established on its borders, and included information about an Uzbek train station 
and oil factory that were damaged by an Islamic attack.50 Since the situation in Tajikistan 
was following by that of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Gulf War, the narratives 
within Russia’s newspapers matched those presented in the global media. Russia relied 
on military action in neighbouring countries to bring peace to the region and to tackle 
upcoming danger. The media’s reporting of rising ‘aggressive’ Islamic fundamentalism 
showcased new and emerging threats to Russian security, reaffirming the military’s role 
as a guarantor of peace.  
However, at the same time, Russia’s involvement in these ‘peacekeeping’ 
operations was considered a mechanism that helped further war. In April 1992, Ogoniok 
journalist Alexander Bolotin claimed that while Russia was not actively involved in 
combat, the provision of weapons to both Armenian and Azerbaijani militants “provided 
mechanisms of another war in the region.”51 While Russia’s involvement in neighbouring 
conflicts was criticised greatly, there were moments whereby the content of the media 
was questioned. News outlet Vesti, for example, was criticised for its reporting on 
Russia’s role in the Tajikistan conflict. Kommersant insisted on sending in two of their 
own reporters to correct the “provocative disinformation” reported by Vesti.52 The article 
from December 1992 stated that information regarding reports suggesting an end to 
Russia’s neutrality in the Tajikistan conflict was incorrect. “[Russia] thank god, had not 
yet reached the point of declaring, at their discretion, war on the territory of a sovereign 
state.” This ‘misinformation’ subsequently led to a blackout in media communications 
with military personnel refusing to speak to journalists.53 As a result, the conflict in 
Tajikistan was counted as a “silent emergency,” for the lack of military coverage, and 
Kommersant’s report justified this through scrutinising the role of some press outlets, 
which they claimed reported incorrectly on unfolding events.54  
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Discourse outlining neighbouring instability added to the notion that Russia was 
surrounded by adversity. The victory of separatist regimes in the former Soviet Union 
was a threat to Russia, since it had potential to influence separatist movements and 
strategies in Russia. The use of narratives discussing the threat these movements, and for 
example, Islamic fundamentalism had on Russia’s security fed into the siege mentality, 
in which Russia remained paranoid to external and internal threat that could only be 
solved through the military.  
Media reports on the CIS and Russia’s ‘peacekeeping’ efforts in the FSU hinted 
at the larger aim of the Soviet Union to maintain power within Eurasia. First, Russia’s 
‘responsibility’ to monitor peace negotiations mirrored American exceptionalist claims 
that America’s god given role in the world is to instil its values in other countries. This 
was used as a basis to legitimise intervention.55 Russia adopted a similar tactic. Russia’s 
peacekeeping role suggested that it had the authority and the appropriate experience to 
meddle in peacekeeping efforts. Second, Russia’s peacekeeping role was a guise for 
Russian power in the region. Having aided another country with the provision of 
resources to certain regimes, Russia expected loyalty in return. It is hardly coincidental 
that Russia supported a united Yugoslavia over the breakdown of the country, when 
Russia was threatened by Chechen separatism.   
The media played a substantial role in the reporting of Russia’s involvement in 
conflicts and uprisings that erupted in the former Communist space. While Russia was no 
longer in a Cold War with the West or seeking to balance NATO, the topic of 
confrontation dominated the media. Discourses on conflict in neighbouring regions, and 
Russia’s peacekeeping role in the near abroad contributed towards the development of 
militarism during this period in a myriad of ways. First, Russian society remained 
exposed to stories of war. Second, Russia’s role as a ‘peacekeeper in the region’ was 
similar to America’s ‘divine right’ to pass its values onto another country. It emphasised 
the superiority of the Russian military, their strategy for implementing peace and in 
forming structures suitable for the maintenance of law and order. This was certainly the 
case during the demise of the Soviet Union.  These media discourses militarised society 
by reaffirming the two notions that 1) Russia was surrounded by internal and external 
dangers and 2) the military provided necessary means of security. 
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NATO: Only a Matter of Time  
Following the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. In contrast, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) continued to grow.56 In the absence of 
the Warsaw Pact, Yeltsin established the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
However, the CIS provided a platform through which Russia could maintain control in 
the former Communist region.57 This was most prominently showcased in Russia’s role 
in the former Soviet space justified as ‘peacekeeping.’58 Russia’s regional presence in the 
former communist sphere was seriously challenged by the expansion of NATO in the 
immediate Post-Cold War period.  
While initially open to the possibility of NATO membership, criticism from 
Russia’s parliament and military pushed Yeltsin to seek an equal partnership with 
America within the framework of NATO, and under the Partnership for Peace 
programme. He even prepared the foundations for an all-European organisation that 
would supersede NATO. NATO rejected this proposal. Discussions on the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation in the political arena spilled into public life. As a result, newspaper 
articles relating to NATO gained momentum from the mid 1990s. They debated the 
inclusion of Russia in NATO, criticised expansion of NATO eastwards and the role of 
NATO in the Yugoslav war (1991-2001). All issues were contentious. It not only led to 
the physical creation of a new alliance system (the CIS), but also resulted in the 
mobilisation of the media, which used militarisation methods to pit society against 
NATO. In the case of NATO, while not outwardly pro-war, the media fuelled anti-NATO 
sentiments further into society and mobilised society against potential threats to Russia’s 
sovereignty. By using ‘othering’ techniques, the media was a mechanism of 
militarisation. It promoted the actions of Russia against an aggressive NATO, 
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establishing anti-NATO rhetoric in the public sphere. It strengthened the discourse that 
Russia was vulnerable to external danger by outlining the reemerging threat of NATO, as 
it expanded eastwards. Together, the following discourses promoted anti-NATO 
sentiments, Russian nationalism and military preparedness.  
As Soviet leaders mourned over the loss of the Warsaw Pact, NATO saw an 
opportunity to expand. As noted in February 1994 by Ilia Milshtein in Ogoniok, 
“Yesterday’s friends rushed to flee the Warsaw pact. Yesterday’s enemies rushed to help 
the weakened “Empire of Evil.” 59  Gorbachev allowed Post-Soviet states to choose 
security agreements that suited their individual needs, and signed away Soviet/ Russian 
power within the region. Initially, Yeltsin welcomed the idea of Russia’s future inclusion 
in NATO.60 On a visit to former communist countries, Poland and the Czech Republic, 
Yeltsin accepted NATO’s first step towards expansion into central-eastern Europe. 
Discussions began regarding the accession of former Communist countries, like Poland, 
Czechslovakia and Hungary into NATO.  
However, following immediate criticism within Russia, Yeltsin changed his 
stance. He insisted that his acceptance of NATO expansion was to be completed within 
the context of European integration.61 Izvestiia (defined as the national newspaper of the 
Russian Federation) reported in February 1995, Yeltsin claimed the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact should have been succeeded by the dissolution of NATO and that “Any 
[new] defence body for security and cooperation in Europe should replace NATO.”62 Still 
in 1999, expansion of NATO to possibly include Ukraine, attracted similar responses 
from Russia. As noted in Izvestiia: 
 
The Russian leadership’s attitude to the issue of NATO’s eastward expansion 
remains the same. ‘This movement is in the wrong direction,’ said Russian 
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Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov… European countries should strive to create a 
system of pan-European security that will serve the interests not of a group of 
separate states, but of the states of Europe as a whole.63 
 
 Initial opposition from Russia towards NATO expansion came primarily from 
Russian politicians and the military. They resented the loss of territory following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the probable accession of former Soviet nations into an 
organisation that was once a former adversary. They also deemed NATO enlargement as 
a direct threat to Russia’s security.64 Russia’s military doctrine of 1993, published in the 
same year that NATO began to pursue new alliances, noted NATO expansion as a big 
threat facing Russia. 65  This narrative persisted throughout the 1990s. As echoed in 
December 1997 in Argumenty i Fakty, NATO expansion was placed within the top three 
threats facing Russian in 1997.66  
Martin A. Smith and Graham Thomas focus on Russian anxiety towards NATO 
enlargement in the 1990s, and bring particular attention to the ‘geopolitics of 
vulnerability.’ This was a term coined to acknowledge vulnerability on a spatial and 
territorial level and “also [the] ingrained fear of territorial assault and invasion.”67 They 
refer to Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman’s 1919 study, which claimed that 
the Heartland [Russia] was a pivotal state. Russia’s position has a profound impact on 
global security. Implicit in Mackinder and Spykman’s views, was the notion that Russia 
was a vulnerable state, with the view that whoever commanded Russia would ‘command 
the world.’68 The crux of Russia’s vulnerability lay in the notion that other countries 
wanted to control the area, also knowing the value of Russia’s position in terms of global 
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power. NATO’s eastward expansion affected Russia. It threatened Russia’s power status 
and control of the former Soviet region. The media even reported as one of the top three 
threats facing Russia in the 1990s, demonstrating the extent of Russian insecurity. It 
supported Russia’s military doctrine of 1993, which was shaped by the threat of NATO 
expansionism. These discourses came together to support the existing self-perception that 
Russia faced challenges by reemerging Cold War threats, leading to nostaligic notions of 
heightened nationalism. The media showcased Russia’s growing isolation at the expense 
of NATO’s increasing influence.   
As noted by Yevgeny Primakov, former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Russian Prime Minister, NATO expansion was widely exclusionary.69 This resulted in 
Russia advocating for a partnership with NATO similar to the Treaty of Paris (1815), 
rather than the Treaty of Versailles, which excluded powers from the process of 
cooperation.70 The “Partnership for Peace programme” discussed in 1995 allowed Russia 
to be somewhat involved in discussions with NATO on its expansionist goals, but it did 
not give Russia the equal stance it wanted. As noted in May 1995 in Izvestiia, hesitation 
of Russia to accept NATO expansion was “understandable.”71 It claimed that along with 
internal crises (economic, political), it faced an external crisis. Author, Alexander Sychov 
suggested that NATO expansion demoted Russia into a secondary position within the 
post-cold war world order. He claimed: 
 
A great power retreated to an unusual second role, and NATO’s eastward 
expansion would mean another concession to Washington’s political initiative. In 
addition there are strong fears that Russia, left behind the threshold of the alliance 
will expect political isolation in the future.72 
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  This was not a theme that solely resided in newspapers but was spoken by Yeltsin 
in a number of his political speeches.73  
Russia’s desire for equal partnership with NATO, or the creation of a new all-
European organisation highlighted Russia’s fear of being excluded from decision-making 
processes that would affect international affairs. Two noteworthy occasions legitimise 
Russia’s concerns. First, Bill Clinton’s claim that NATO would expand, with or without 
Russia’s blessing and finally, during the Yugoslav war.74 Foreign Minister Primakov 
warned NATO not to use force in peacekeeping projects without the authorisation of the 
United Nations. In October 1998, Russia repeated its view that NATO should not 
intervene in the Yugoslav war “without the sanction of the UN Security Council” and that 
“an excess of power will occur” if NATO was to do so.75 Russia’s downgraded global 
position from a superpower to a country secondary to the United States was confirmed in 
1999. In March of that year, America launched Operation Allied Force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia without U.N. approval.76  Argumenty i Fakty journalist Vitaly 
Tseplyaev showed his disdain. In 1999 he claimed: 
 
We have not met SUCH unceremoniousness of the USA and NATO in 
international politics for a long time. International law has been violated, the 
Security Council, the United Nations, even the UN Charter!... They showed 
Europe who the owner of the house is and they want to point out to her: even 
though you, Europe, are economically strong, politically, you are a dwarf. The 
Yugoslav tragedy is a cover for an even greater tragedy: the intention to impose 
US hegemony on the world.77 
 
Following NATO’s Operation Allied Force, Defence Minister Igor Sergeev 
questioned the point of the United Nations and NATO if Russian views were to be 
ignored.78 Russia’s isolation from world affairs through the expansion of NATO was not 
the only fear of political elites during this time. In March 1997, Dmitry Tasmanskiy, 
journalist of the investigative news outlet Novaia Gazeta, wrote; 
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The main trouble for the Russians lies in the desires of the Poles, Czechs and 
Hungarians to join the North Atlantic Treaty…[after discussing rise of anti-
NATO sentiments by State Duma officials] Yes, NATO expansion is an alarming 
bell. But the question is: why is the whole of Eastern Europe, including the 
Baltics, and now Ukraine, seeking to hide under the NATO umbrella? Is it enough 
for at least a short time to imagine yourself in the place of the Eastern Europeans 
and look at the West and East? Who would you like more? Moscow or Brussels? 
...The discussion with NATO highlighted one unpleasant truth – Russia did not 
have a single ally in the world. And soon, apparently quite a lot of enemies will 
form.79  
 
In the quote above, Novaia Gazeta confirmed Russia’s worst fear; that a new 
grand alliance was emerging, in which former ‘colonies’ were now in support of a former 
adversary. Russia’s feeling of isolation went beyond the formal institution of NATO and 
related to the creation of other alliances absent of a Russian counterpart. An article in 
June 1997 by Argumenty i Fakty confirmed the outlook of Novaia Gazeta. Entitled 
“Russia in a ring of enemies,” Vitaly Tseplyaev conducted an interview in 1997 with 
State Duma Deputy Nikolai Gonchar and member of the Presidential Council Andronik 
Migranyan on the question of Russia in Eurasia at the dawn on the new century.80 Both 
spoke of new alliances outside Russia. They hinted the creation of a Turkish “Islamic 
NATO” from an alliance of eight Asian countries, and the developing relationship 
between the Baltic States and Ukraine. Migranyan suggested that these alliances risked 
the isolation of Russia, claiming, “Instead of becoming a bridge between East and West, 
we run the risk of being peripheral.”81 Argumenty i Fakty added to the debate, noting 
Russian isolation and “separatism of some Russian subjects is rooted in the history of the 
Tatar-Mongol yoke.”82  They ended the interview by claiming, “It seems that history is 
repeating itself in a new spiral. And if so, then the revival of Russia should be repeated.”83 
It must be noted, however that despite agreement over NATO’s movement eastwards, the 
nature of the newspapers arguments differed. Novaia Gazeta was suggesting that issues 
in Russia and of the Soviet Union pushed countries of the FSU to seek help and 
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partnership with NATO. Therefore, suggesting that the West had something more 
attractive to offer. On the other hand, the piece in Argumenty i Fakty showcased NATO 
expansion as a form of encroachment. Despite these differences, Russia’s ‘isolation’ from 
international affairs in the shape of NATO and other developing alliances, raised two 
anxieties. First, the anxiety that Russia was being downgraded from superpower status to 
one that was secondary to the United States. Second, it increased anxieties that potential 
adversaries surrounded Russia. As noted in the title of the Argumenty i Fakty article 
above, the author proposed that “Russia [was] in a ring of enemies.”84 
The theme of Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’ existed centuries before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, underwritten by the large number of invasions Russia has endured 
since its existence. In this thesis, emphasis on the discourse of Russia as a ‘besieged 
fortress’ was also evident in educational textbooks and in the discourse and symbolisms 
of the 1995 Victory Day celebrations. In fact, it remains a key justification of Russian 
aggression today. Both the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and the conflict in Crimea 
(2014) were legitimised on the premise that NATO was threatening Russian security.85 
However, it was in the Russian media of the 1990s that NATO expansion was first 
characterised as a threat to Russian security in the post-Soviet period. NATO was 
depicted as aggressive and threatening, with media outlets justifying military action to 
ensure Russian security. An article in August 1994 by Communist news outlet Sovetskaia 
Rossiia, for example, claimed: 
 
Any expansion of NATO, and in particular the inclusion of the states that are 
former members of the Warsaw Treaty – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary – would undoubtedly mean a clear threat to the peace and security 
of both Russia and Europe as a whole… Obviously, this should be qualified as an 
act of aggression, as an act of preparing for war against Russia. Russia, like other 
republics belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States, should have 
taken all necessary measures for collective self-defence.86 
 
The nature of this article was provocative, written to provoke discontent and to 
mobilise its readership to adopt an anti-NATO stance. First, the author called upon 
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members of the CIS to mobilise in support of Russia against NATO aggression. Here the 
author was warning countries of the CIS that NATO could soon be encroaching on their 
borders. Second, it called for unity, suggesting that together the countries could overcome 
the growth and continued expansion of NATO. “Aggression” is a powerful word. The 
epithet of an aggressive NATO was established during the soviet era. Vladimir Nadein 
wrote for Izvestiia in February 1995 on NATO and Russia. He stated, “We have never 
loved the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” reminding the readership of that popular 
song of the 50s, which included lyrics of an “aggressive NATO” firing half of Europe.87 
He continued, stating, “Two generations grew up, not suspecting that the word “NATO” 
could be used without adding aloud, or mentally, the epithet “aggressive.” 88  While 
Izvestiia stopped serving as a mouthpiece for the Soviet government during its demise in 
1991, the background of the journalists writing for the newspaper were evidenced during 
NATO’s eastward expansion. As noted by Nadein, who wrote for multiple media outlets 
of different worldviews – the relationship between Russia and NATO was historical and 
mainly negative. While the new post-Soviet government was initally open to 
strengthening the relationship between the East and West, NATO’s expansionist goals in 
the 1990s acted as reminders of the formal rivalry between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 
CDA takes into account this important context, and pinpoints how and why such 
discourses are popularised over others. A negative image of NATO emerged in the media 
because the movements of NATO in this new era replicated those taken during the Cold 
War. The media framed NATO as a reemerging threat, using ‘othering’ techniques to 
legitimise military readiness, heightened nationalism and anti-NATO sentiments.  
This was most notable in an exchange that took place in Argumenty i Fakty. In 
November 1997, a “‘For’ or ‘Against’” expose on potential Russian affiliation with 
NATO depicted Russia as a “guardian angel.” NATO was portrayed as an “external 
threat” with a “heavy boot” drawing “arrows to the Volga.”89 A. Somov, in response to 
the editorial wrote, “Against who are you my friends? ‘Friend Bill,’ ‘Friend Helmut,’ 
‘Friend Jacques’… These phrases make me laugh. What friendships can we talk about 
 
87 The newspaper article refers to the song as a Chastushki. A chastushki is a traditional 
type of satirical folk song/ rhyme. They are more commonly popular in peasant culture 
and tend to be reflective of events taking place during the time of their creation. 
88 Nadein, “Budushchee NATO reshaetsia v Moskve.” 
89 Alexander Sargin and Vitali Tseplyaev, “‘Za’ I ‘protiv’ razoruzheniia. Kto seichas 
ugrozhaet Rossii,” Argumenty i Fakty, 19 November 1997. 
 104 
when these gentlemen are pushing their troops closer to our borders?”90 Here, Somov 
indicated that NATO was not only considered a threat to Russia’s regional power, but 
also to Russia itself. Newspaper articles claimed that once NATO has expanded its 
borders eastwards to Hungary, Poland and even Ukraine, it would start to look towards 
Russia. Russia’s decision to delay the ratification of START-2 became a topic of 
contention in the American press. In response, Krasnaia Zvezda (January 1997) author 
Gennady Obolensky claimed, “Recently in the American media a large number of 
publications appeared regarding the delayed ratification of the START-2 Treaty in the 
State Duma of the Russian Federation. What is not in these publications?! That these are 
threats to the Russians, and slammed allegations on NATO’s eastward expansion.”91 
NATO’s involvement in the Yugoslav war furthered anti-NATO literature in 
Russia’s media outlets. While openly against war, these newspapers justified a Russian 
response on the basis that they were dragged into the conflict. The newspapers also 
presented the viewpoint that the crisis on the Balkans was a practice for NATO 
involvement in Russian-Chechen affairs. In this context, the Russian media aimed to 
mobilise its citizens through emphasis on Russia’s vulnerability.  
First, reports on the Yugoslav war seemed to have had an impact on how Russians 
viewed NATO and more generally America. NATO was considered a synonym of 
American hegemony, and this sentiment changed Russia’s views towards America.92 As 
reported in April 1999 by Argumenty i Fakty, a poll held by Russia’s Public Opinion 
Research Centre VTsIOM in 1999 found that in response to the question, “How do you 
feel about the United States of America?” 53% of respondents claimed they felt “very 
bad” or “mostly bad.” This was quite different from the 1998 poll, in which 62% of 
Russian’s viewed America as a friend.93  
More direct use of force by NATO in Kosovo, under American consent, 
strengthened the link between rise of anti-NATO sentiments to rising discontent for 
America. For example, in 1999 Ogoniok journalist Aleksander Nikonov claimed, “I know 
a man who stopped riding his Ford in protest against ‘NATO aggression.’” 94  In a 
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discussion with Krasnaia Zvezda in October 1999, Colonel General of the Russia 
Ministry Defence spoke at length on the topic of American hegemonic goals, claiming 
that the imposition of a “puppet existence and suppression of independence… was clearly 
demonstrated by the aggression of the [NATO] bloc against Yugoslavia.”95 Similarly to 
the Argumenty i Fakty editorial on the issue of Russia’s potential accession into NATO, 
he emphasised that Russia wanted to improve relations with America in the name of 
collective security. He noted, however, that the “actions of the United States aimed at 
destroying the system of international norms and principles in the field of security, [and 
that] appropriating the right to decide for other states and entire regions” were limiting 
steps to improve relations. 96  Arguing for the creation of an all-European collective 
security organisation, he attributed blame to American hegemonic goals within the 
European region to the formation of a robust 21st century European security model. He 
claimed, “We reject the natocentric model, because we don’t agree that a military bloc 
that is constantly strengthening its potential and expanding throughout Europe, arrogating 
to itself the right to act uncontrollably, should play a major role in the European security 
system.”97  
The Yugoslav conflict, and NATO’s peacekeeping role within the region were 
characterised by many Russians as part of America’s goal to seek power within the 
region. This was confirmed by America’s decision to bomb Kosovo without consent from 
the UN Security Council. As acknowledged by A. Somov earlier on in this section, 
Russia’s approval of NATO’s eastward expansion could also result in NATO’s 
involvement in Russian affairs. This remained a salient view, especially in the newspaper 
Argumenty i Fakty. While this comment was made in view of the eastward expansion of 
the organisation, accusations started to arise regarding NATO’s role in the breakdown of 
the Russian Federation. In January 1998, Argumenty i Fakty noted: 
 
Information coming from Russian special services from a number of Arab 
countries suggest that after the collapse of the USSR, the United States and some 
other NATO countries, which for many years sought to destroy the Soviet Union 
and achieved this goal, now passed the baton onto their Muslim allies, especially 
 
As is noted further on in the chapter, NATO was considered a synomyn for American 
hegemony. This therefore explains the man’s refusal to drive the Ford. 
95 Vitaly Stugovets, “V oboronnoy Politike Rossiia iskhodit iz prioriteta mirnykh sredstv 




fundamentalists, who work in the former union and republics and autonomous 
republics of the Russia federation, traditionally considered to be Muslim. The 
current long-term goal of the fundamentalists is the complete separation of 
Muslim regions from Russia.98 
 
The statement promoted by Argumenty i Fakty suggested that NATO was 
supporting Chechen separatists in their desire for independence from Russia. This is 
particularly interesting. Since NATO was supporting separatist movements within 
Yugoslavia, the claim was not unreasonable but highlighted the level of distrust that the 
Russian public and media felt towards the organisation. This rumour clearly had strong 
currency within the public domain. In 1999 Aleksander Nikonov of Ogoniok, in 
confusion over Russia’s reaction towards NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia also 
contemplated the very same idea. He questioned “Perhaps they are afraid that following 
the restoration of order in Kosovo, NATO will climb out to sort out Chechnya and bomb 
Russia?”99 State Duma member Colonel General Edvard Vorobyev, when questioned by 
Argumenty i Fakty in March 1999 on whether Russia should have used force against 
NATO in the context of Yugoslavia, suggested that showing force would only provoke 
NATO. However, he did confirm that there existed serious rumours. He stated:  
They say that the Yugoslav [situation is a] training ground, [and that] NATO is 
working out a scenario of possible interference in Russia's internal affairs. But I 
still think that NATO will never allow itself to bomb Russia, for example, because 
of Chechnya, [in the same way that] today Yugoslavia is [being] bombed because 
of Kosovo. As long as we have nuclear weapons, aggression does not threaten us. 
It seems to me that Russia is now even more afraid than during the Cold War. 
Then they feared our strength, now unpredictability.100  
 
Vorobyev’s account showed that Russian militarism was not totally formed by 
insecurity on the basis of arms, and even exposed a deeper siege mentality beyond the 
physical state of the Armed Forces. Rather, it was through creating and perpetuating 
stories of threat. These stories encouraged continued cultural militarisations, even when 
Russia had weapons capable of fighting back. In March 1999 Sergei Kuznetsov and 
Lyudmila Proshak, of Argumenty i Fakty, noted that a positive outcome of NATO 
involvement in the Yugoslav conflict was that it would legitimise Russia’s need for a 
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strong military. They stated that, “It [would become] clear even to the most ardent 
pacifists that Americans can only respect force. Therefore, our people will now treat with 
understanding the additional hardships and will not regret the money for high-precision 
heavy-duty weapons.”101 The view that NATO would use Yugoslavia as a practice for 
later invasion of Russia was not only held in the minds of Russians. Only a month later, 
in April 1999, Igor Popov and Boris Muradov wrote of their experiences in Yugoslavia. 
They came across numerous café workers who gave them food for free and joked that 
Russia should give them weapons. They claimed: 
We tried to object: don’t you understand that if Russia provides military 
assistance, then a Third World War is inevitable?  
The answer was: "The NATO operation is a dress rehearsal of a strike against 
Russia, there is always a reason to take at least the same [approach to] Chechnya. 
If you don’t intervene now, they will make sure that you are afraid of them and 
will try to completely ruin and crush Russia! " Controversial, but very common 
in Yugoslavia judgment.102 
 
 The view that NATO was using Yugoslavia as a “dress rehearsal” for a future 
attack on Russia was a dominant theme in Russia’s media. First, it showed that Russia’s 
public deeply distrusted NATO. More importantly, however, it emphasised the narrative 
that Russia was continuously vulnerable to outside threat. The view was not held by all 
Russians as noted in articles of Ogoniok and by Edvard Vorobyev, but the discourse was 
out there, within the public sphere. These threats added to those already in circulation on 
neighbouring conflicts in the FSU and with the situation in Chechnya.103  
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 The media had an important role to play in sustaining the militarisation of public 
discourse. While not outwardly pro-war, or pro-military, it was in agreement that Russia 
was vulnerable to new threats in the post-Cold War world. NATO’s expansion caused 
concern for Russia as it encroached on its borders. Without assigning an equal voice to 
Russia in post-Cold War peace-building efforts, Russia felt largely isolated and 
threatened by its new secondary position in the world. The growth of NATO was seen as 
a growth of American hegemonic goals, with its denial of equal partnership with Russia, 
and ignorance towards UN approval in its role in Kosovo, confirming its powerful role in 
the new world order. Anti-NATO discourses in the media had a profound impact on 
public opinion during this period, as shown throughout the section, the public responded 
to NATO aggression with the boycotting of American goods and in letters to the editor, 
highlighting their discontent towards the organisation. Public opinion polls even 
confirmed a change in attitude towards Americans, especially after the bombing of 
Kosovo. Narratives on NATO’s role in Yugoslavia as a practice for intervention in 
Chechnya highlighted that Russia still deeply distrusted NATO, and felt threatened by its 
role in neighbouring countries. It did however, also allow the media to legitimise the use 
of public funds towards the maintenance of the military sector and for strengthening 
military capabilities and ties among the CIS. Most of all, the media sustained the topic of 
war in the public domain, and maintained the idea of external threats in public 
consciousness. 
 
The threat in Chechnya 
Chechnya dominated headlines in the 1990s Russian newspapers. This was 
expected, since Russia and Chechnya’s turbulent relationship reached a pinnacle, when 
the First Chechen War started in 1994. Russia and Chechnya’s volatile relationship was 
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historical. Tensions arose under Tsarist leadership and into the Soviet period when Stalin 
banished many ethnic Chechens to Kazakhstan, concerned they had collaborated with 
Nazi Germany during the war.104 The tension was caused by Chechnya’s desire to gain 
independence from Russia. Opportunity for independence arose during the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, when other Soviet satellite states sought autonomy. Chechnya lobbied 
for self-determination, establishing the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In retaliation, 
Yeltsin sent troops into Chechnya on the 10th November 1991, but his plans were quickly 
thwarted as pro-independent Chechen nationalists surrounded Russian troops in Grozny 
airport.105 Yeltsin decided to formally invade the region in 1994 to maintain the territorial 
integrity of Russia and combat Chechen lawlessness.  
Response to this war differed to previous conflicts, because a new ‘free’ media 
existed.106 Media coverage of the war was conflicting, as some media outlets held a more 
critical view to the official line of the state. Such criticism would resonate with a public 
that was still coming to terms with the disaster of Afghanistan. This contradiction, 
however, could also be considered a blessing to the government. Critical evaluations of 
the conflict were embedded within some of the boundaries and discourses established by 
the government. First, those against Russian intervention did acknowledge Chechen 
lawlessness and banditry. Second, government officials, for the most part, publicly 
advocated peace and emphasised their participation in the war as forced upon them and 
ultimately necessary – these discourses were reflected in a number of newspapers. 
Finally, the media helped promote an image of chaos and instability, showcased through 
depictions of harmed Russian and Chechen residents under Dudaev’s leadership and 
uncontrolled bandits and terrorists. The next section focuses on the chaotic and 
contradictory representation of the Chechen crisis in Russian newspapers. The remaining 
sections unpack and analyse two sub-narratives or in this case tactics of the media. This 
includes the actions of Russia’s power institutions (including the state and military) and 
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the demonisation of the enemy; with Chechens most commonly framed in the media as 
bandits and terrorists.  
When trying to understand events unfolding in Chechnya, Russia’s readership 
faced major challenges. First, media accounts of the war were contradictory. This chaos 
was rooted in the new freedoms the media gained during the period of democratisation, 
and the confusing situation in Chechnya. Glasnost liberated the media. Consequently, for 
the first time in decades, the media’s coverage was no longer limited to the government 
line. Instead the readership was actually offered a number of media accounts. While the 
conflicting accounts were largely a result of the newspaper’s standpoint, journalists were 
also trying to write about a conflict they considered just as confusing as the conflicting 
discourses. In November 1994 Pravda reporter, Nikolai Kozhanov, stated, “It is not easy 
for even the sophisticated reader to understand the kaleidoscope of controversial reports 
about the events in Chechnya.”107 Questions by key newspapers asked, “But did the 
troops invade Chechnya by orders?” and “With who [does Russia] fight in Chechnya?” 
highlighting little understanding of the initiation and development of the Chechen 
conflict.108 Even leaders from outside Russia struggled to comprehend a situation that 
they described as messy.109 Newspapers at the time, for example, Kommersant, decided 
to reserve sections of their newspapers to the situation in Chechnya. Other newspapers 
like Ogoniok dedicated segments of the magazine to the theme of the “Armiia,” providing 
a broader analysis of the Army’s actions. The main priority was to initially understand 
why Russia had decided to intervene in the region. 
According to the media, Russia’s desire to maintain power in the region was the 
most important factor leading to its intevention. Russia lost a lot of Soviet territory during 
the collapse of the Union – however, this separatist movement now threatened Russia’s 
borders. Chechen sovereignty had the ability to motivate more independence bids from 
other Russian regions like Tatarstan. The official reason for Russia’s intervention in the 
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region was as a necessary protection of its territorial integrity.110 In December 1994 
Yeltsin justified the militaristic venture by claiming the soldiers were “defending the 
integrity of Russia.”111 Government action on this basis was supported by other political 
figures, like Mayor Luzhkov. In August 1995, Luzhkov sent Yeltsin a telegram of 
support. The telegram said:  
The Moscow government received with great satisfaction the decision of the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, which confirmed the 
constitutionality of the decrees you adopted to stabilize the situation in the 
Chechen Republic. The decrees are the guarantor of the unity of our great Russia 
and warn [against] all kinds of adventurers to play the nationalist card to satisfy 
personal ambitions. Dear Boris Nikolayevich we assure you that multinational 
Moscow, as the capital of the Russian Federation - it will always do everything it 
can to ensure that there is always peace and prosperity in the vast expanses of our 
country.112 
Luzhkov backed the government’s decision to enter Chechnya. By offering his 
unwavering support to ensure “stability” and “peace” in all areas of Russia, Luzhkov 
indicated that there was instability and conflict currently in the region.  Second, Luzhkov 
also reaffirmed Russia’s position in the Chechen War - as the peacekeeper. Various media 
reports in this chapter outline Russia’s purpose in Chechnya, to establish law and order, 
bring about peace and stability; Luzhkov’s telegram supported this. In addition, and more 
subtle, Russia’s military role in Chechnya was a gesture. It acted as a symbol to other 
Russian regions hoping to achieve independence – Russia would use military force to 
ensure territorial integrity, stability and peace. Luzhkov’s statements were supported in 
the media.  
According to many Russian newspapers of the 1990s, and in political speeches, 
Chechens were lawless, criminals, terrorists and bandits. These reports moved society 
towards militarisation by helping fostering a ‘besieged fortress mentality’ through 
threatening images of conflict, instability and insecurity. They used ‘othering’ techniques 
to unite Russians under a common enemy. States and institutions commonly use 
‘othering’ techniques to produce and promote dangerous worldviews. In 1990s Russia, 
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territorial issues underscored the issues in Chechnya. At this point, Russia was in no 
position to lose more territory. When Chechnya first voted for independence in 1991, 
Russia attempted to oppress the separatist movement in order to defend its territorial 
integrity. However, this mission failed when Chechnya sent Russian soldiers out of the 
Chechen region on a bus to Vladikavkaz. Russian military operations were carried out 
without public knowledge. In order to overcome the humiliation of Russia’s first action 
and formally invade in 1994, society needed to be convinced that military action was 
necessary. While not pro-war, Russia’s media brought the Chechen issues to the forefront 
of public consciousness, reaffirming discourses outlining internal crises, instability and 
imminent threat. Similar to earlier accounts on the Yugoslav media’s reporting of the war 
in major cities, where society never really experienced the realities of war, the media 
ensured that Russians were subjected to these discourses. Russian society was therefore 
exposed to, what Åhäll calls, the idea of war.113 In addition, the media used ‘othering’ 
techniques to create particular images of the Chechen people, in an attempt to heighten 
aspects of the chaos in the region. It helped justify military action in the region, as it 
dehumanised the Chechen population and promoting Russia’s role as a cause for 
establishing law and order.  
While Chechen lawlessness and criminality was reported in the media, it was also 
a common attribute of political speeches concerning the conflict. For example, in 
December 1994, Yeltsin claimed:  
Russian troops and policemen are on the front lines of the fight with the most 
dangerous, powerful and rabid forces of Russian and international criminals and 
extremists. With lies, with playing on patriotic and religious feelings, with threats, 
those forces managed to drag a part of the local people into this fighting. Among 
those who offer resistance are professional terrorists and mercenaries from other 
states.114 
Numerous media outlets started a campaign against the Chechen people in an 
attempt to mobilise Russian society against Chechnya. First, they drew connections 
between the Chechen separatists and terrorists, lawless bandits and criminals. Not all 
Chechens were regarded this way, but generalisations did occur. The media and the state 
were careful to include representations of peaceful Chechens that the Russian government 
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was also protecting. An article in Pravda in September 1994 best demonstrated this 
boundary. It stated that an agreement to solve the Chechen problem in a democratic 
election was met by the “armed provocative actions” of the Chechen leader Dudaev who 
began using military equipment against “peaceful citizens.” 115  Pravda echoed this 
discourse in April 1995. The article confirmed: 
Of course, not only Russians, but also Chechens suffered from terror and 
lawlessness during the reign of Dudayev. Salambek Khadzhiev writes: “When on 
June 4, 1993, a peaceful demonstration in Grozny was shot at from Dudayev's 
cannons and 58 people were killed, we turned to many people for help, including 
Kovalev. When in August 1994 the militants killed about 260 people in [Urus] 
Martan, we also appealed to Moscow and to Sergei Adamovich. We did not hear 
[back]. "116 
Dudaev’s provocative actions, as displayed in the media, helped Russia legitimise 
using force in the region. The media’s depiction of Chechen lawlessness as an action 
promoted by higher-ranking officials of the Chechen region helped cement this image of 
an oppressor leading an oppressed nation. As noted by Gennady Selenev, for example, 
Chechen society was overwhelmed by Dudaev’s calls to mobilise against Russia and to 
send terrorists to Russia.117 
Other examples of the media’s depiction of lawlessness from high-ranking 
Chechen elites are documented here. Dudaev’s regime was described as a “criminal 
separatist regime,” “Criminal fraternity” and as “gangs.” 118  These phrases not only 
refered to Dudaev and his team but also to the gangs that formed to counter Russia’s “act 
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of aggression.”119 In an October 1995 article by Izvestiia, Dudaev confirmed that there 
was an increasing amount of rogue battalions. They were characterised in the media as 
“small, uncontrolled detachments of militants.” This played positively into the hands of 
the Russian government, since the recognition supported the view of the Russian state 
that militant activity and lawlessness in the region was increasing.120 In June 1995 Yuri 
Baturin, Presidential Aide for National Security, wrote for Izvestiia, stating that, “People 
are tired of chaos, devastation and criminal lawlessness.” 121  In April 1995 Igor 
Shafarevich, who documented his experiences of visiting Chechnya in a small delegation, 
illustrated further examples of Chechen lawlessness.122 He noted the mass expulsion and 
torture of the Russia population, using testimonies taken by witnesses in the region. In 
general accounts, Chechen bandits would “burst into Russian houses” pressuring the 
Russian occupants to sell their houses by beating them up and [sometimes] murdering 
family members. An individual testimony taken from a Chechen refugee, stated: 
According to a refugee from Grozny, at the end of December a group of Chechen 
fighters broke into the boarding school where she worked as a teacher. Both 
Russian and Chechen children were in the boarding school. The bandits raped all 
the children and the entire staff of the boarding school, including the storyteller.123 
Also in the same article was a letter from a Russian Cossack who confirmed the explusion 
and killing of Russian people. It said: 
 The killings of Russian people occur every day. Morgues in Grozny are 
overflowing with corpses, many of which have been disfigured. Identified corpses 
are taken by relatives, if found. The rest are buried without coffins in common 
trenches.124 
The media’s representation of Chechen lawlessness and brutality, to both the 
Russian and Chechen population, helped create a chaotic image of the conditions in 
Chechnya. While not promoting military action, the media fostered notions of insecurity 
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and threat to Russian livelihood by focusing on the lack of law and order, which formed 
the basis for Russian militarism during this time. Yet, while the Chechen population was 
mainly targeted in these discursive attacks, the Russian military did not escape criticism 
either. In October 1995, Izvestiia reported on the Samashki Massacre of 1994, which saw 
Russian paramilitary troops ambush and murder civilians in Samashki.125 The story was 
especially gruesome as it speculated that those who carried out the massacre did so under 
the influence of drugs and alcohol – highlighting the barbaric actions of the Russian 
military.126 Sergei Kovalev, of Memorial, addressed US congress.127 He outlined the 
details of the Samashki massacre. In May 1995 Izvestiia reported on his presentation, 
where Kovalev claimed: 
 
I have just returned from the Chechen Village of Samashki, where more than a 
hundred of its inhabitants were killed during the punitive expedition and many 
houses were burnt to the ground.128 
 
Claims of “punitive action” were echoed by refugees of Samashki, representatives 
of S. Kovalev’s group, and by State Duma deputies, who noted “real punitive action was 
carried out against Samashki.” 129  The phrase punitive, defined as cruel and severe, 
created an image of Russian federal troops using unjust force on the residents of 
Samashki.  
Further reports strengthened media discourses outlining the Russian forces 
unprofessionalism in the region. On the topic of Sergey Kovalev’s presentation to the US 
congress, America’s Congress was also in the possession of articles from The Sunday 
Times. Izvestiia (May 1995) reflected on the content in this article, entitled, the “Massacre 
in Samashki.” Samashki was a result of the “atrocities of the drunk, drug-filled soldiers 
who invaded the village. There were 3,000 armed men against the defenseless civilian 
population.”130 This was apparently not the first and only time that the Russian internal 
 
125 Rotar, “Chechniia: Davniaia smutab sobytiia.”  
126 Ibid. 
127 Memorial is a Non-Governmental Organisation aimed at protecting human rights. 
Founded in 1987 in Moscow, it is committed to sharing the experiences of those facing 
repression and protecting the Russian peoples human rights. They were opposed to the 
First Chechen War.  
128  Vladimir Nadein, “Sergey Kovalev – Kongressu SSHA: Chechenskaia Voyna 
Ozhestochla nashe obshchestvo,” Izvestiia, 4 May 1995, No. 81.  
129 Valery Yakov, “Samashki: Aktsiia na Ystrashenie,” Izvestiia, 18 April 1995, No. 71.  
130 Nadein, “Sergey Kovalev – Kongressu SSHA.” 
 116 
forces were accused of using force whilst inebriated. Local residents in Chechnya noted 
“drunken soldiers of the internal troops and riot police” when having fun, “fire in all 
directions as soon as they think [that] something [is] suspicious.”131 News of Russian 
Federal Forces using unnecessary force against the Chechen nation went beyond 
Samashki. Examples of barbaric actions by the Russian Armed Forces were emphasised 
by Alexei Chelnokov of Izvestiia in December 1994. After interviewing two female 
Ingush refugees, he found that Russian soldiers raped and killed Ingush in the Prigorodny 
district. He wrote: 
 
I was traveling from Karabulak with other fellow travelers - two Ingush 
women refugees from the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. 
- Why did the Russian soldiers come to Chechnya? Why are they trying to 
shoot at refugees, peaceful people, - the younger one is indignant. - We do 
not believe Yeltsin; we do not trust the Russian army, especially after what 
it did in the Prigorodny region. They are responsible for the raped and 
murdered Ingush.132 
  
These media discourses documented Russian brutality against the Chechen 
community. However, they were contradicted on many fronts. First, and in reference to 
the massacre in Samashki, media reports suggested that there was a media blackout, with 
journalists being unable to gain access to the village. Nikolay Gritchin of Izvestiia in April 
1995, noted, “At a post of Russian internal troops near the outskirts of Samaski, our car 
was stopped. The officer carefully examined my editorial card and stated that a special 
Grozny accreditation was needed to travel to this village… what caused the special travel 
conditions for journalists?”133 The journalist’s inability to gain access to Samashki was 
one problem. The second problem was the journalist’s ability to acquire information, 
which relates to the controversy and confusion over the timeline and happenings of the 
event. A journalist who visited the village of Samashki wanted to find answers to the 
following question, “What happened in the village after all – the bloody massacre or the 
pacification of the resisting Dudayev militants?” 134  Valery Yakov emphasised the 
difficult conditions presented to journalists wanting to gain more information. He stated, 
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“Every day the information about what actually happened in the Chechen village of 
Samashki, through which the fiery roller of the federal troops rolled, becomes more and 
more contradictory.”135  
In this sense, Russia’s free media lost opportunities because of Russian militarism. 
While the reports show that the media initially had some freedom over reporting, 
increasing criticism within the press pushed the state and military institution to restrict 
media access to key sites, like Samashki. It showcased a prioritisation of the 
government’s military goals and ambitions, over the democratic freedoms of the media. 
Krasnaia Zvezda journalists ultilised the contradictory claims and converging stories to 
establish key dominant discourses. These discourses echoed the state line. In April 1995, 
for example, Krasnaia Zvezda contradicted reports of Russian brutality in its aim to 
correct the “lightweight conclusions” of reporters on the issue of Samashki. They did this 
by highlighting the exaggerations of journalists and non-governmental organisations like 
Memorial. For example, they criticised the comparison made by reporters, which linked 
the devastation in Samashki to Coventry and the Katyn.136 The author of the article 
dismissed the comparison by referring to Samashki as an “unremarkable Chechen 
village,” and downplaying the comparison by noting that justification for such 
comparisions “was hardly worth mentioning.”137 Other media outlets also noted false and 
exaggerated reports in the field. Yaroslav Shimov noted that the devastation in Samashki 
was not as extensive as previously thought. He wrote: 
 
Before the war, about 12,000 people lived in Samashki. The village is large; there 
are more than a dozen streets in it. Several central ones were destroyed. These 
streets give about the same impression as the destroyed quarters of individual 
buildings in Grozny: there is practically not a single surviving building, there are 
traces of bullets on the walls, and several houses were left without roofs. 
Apparently it was on them that artillery fire was fired. There are very few such 
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Krasnaia Zvezda questioned the integrity of Memorial by associating them with 
Dudaev’s regime. On the topic of Stanislav Govorukhin’s desire to sue Memorial leader 
Sergey Kovalev, the author noted that those working for Memorial were sympathetic to 
the Dudaev regime.139 Finally, the actions taken in Samashki were justified as a result of 
militants not meeting an ultimatum deadline. In April 1995, Krasnaia Zvezda noted that 
militants in Samashki were given an ultimatum to “voluntarily surrender their 
weapons.”140Actions against the militants were considered a “success” by the newspaper. 
It claimed, “More than 130 Dudaevites were killed, 124 were taken prisoner.”141 In this 
sense, the actions that took place in Samashki were legitimised as a form of punishment 
delivered to militants that were warned in advance. 
  
While the media raised stories of Russian brutality, representations were within 
the boundaries of the First Chechen War. State and Military leaders were challenged 
about the military’s role in the region and Russian brutality was justified as a result of 
their suspicions of militant activity in region. In an expose on the Budennovsk crisis, for 
example, although the overall portrayal of Russian force in response to the hostage crisis 
was negative, questions were directed towards leaders like Federal Security Minister 
Sergei Stepashin. In contrast, general troops were described as those “whose nerves 
cannot withstand the strain…[who] start an assault without an order, spontaneously.”142 
In contrast, Chechen’s were portrayed as culturally criminal, as if their militancy was a 
way of Chechen tradition and heritage. Stories on blood feud and teip culture in Chechnya 
helped cement the notion that Chechnya’s militancy was further ingrained in its 
heritage.143 Shafarevich in April 1995, for example, while noting the woes of Chechen 
population at the hands of Dudaev, claimed they were “still protected by the support of 
their teip, by the threat of bloodshed.”144 In addition, difference in laws also drove media 
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discourses. For example, journalist Galina Kovalskaya documented implementation 
issues with the December 1994 peace agreement. She wrote: 
 
It is impossible to seize weapons from the Chechen population, for all the 
lawlessness of such a situation; it will have to be reconciled. It’s more important 
that there is no temptation to use these weapons again against Russian soldiers 
and against their fellow tribesmen, declared "collaborators." The symbolic acts of 
surrendering and burning weapons here play the role of a kind of ritual of 
reconciliation - about the way the Indians stuck their tomahawks into the 
ground.145 
Similar to previous descriptors, noting the tribal/ clan heritage and ritual of the 
Chechen population, this assessment by the author furthered the notion that militancy was 
central to a Chechen’s culture. Descriptions of Chechens as lawless and bandits also 
emphasised the division between the Russian and Chechen identities, and built on the 
idea that the Chechen people were the ‘other.’ Linda Colley argues that emphasising 
otherness in the British context, invoked exaggerated feelings of nationalism. In the 
Russian case, ‘othering’ helped mobilise and unify Russian citizens behind a feeling of 
“Russianness.”146 In doing so, it helped promote Russian militarism, by 1) establishing 
that there was an issue of Chechen lawlessness and militancy to deal with, and 2) internal 
chaos and crises threatened the stability of Russia. While Russian military leader’s actions 
were questioned, the troops’ role was legitimised by their nerves.    
CDA is of particular value in debates like the ones above, whereby the political 
and social orientations of the media outlets diverge. Vladimir Olegovich Potanin owned 
Izvestiia in the Post-soviet period and had close links with the government. Yet, even with 
these links Izvestiia still questioned the political decisions and events in Chechnya and 
reported on the brutality of Russian soldiers in the Chechen region. In contrast, Krasnaia 
Zvezda, the newspaper of the MOD, defended the actions of the military in Samashki. 
They framed the decisions taken by Russian soldiers as necessary and ones carried out 
with sufficient warning. CDA highlights the diverse representation of events in 
Chechnya, taking into consideration the ideological background of the media outlets. The 
news reports of Krasnaia Zvezda, as a mouthpiece of Russia’s military, worked towards 
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creating a positive image of the Armed Forces and legitimising their role in the Chechen 
War and in the broader Russian society.  
The descriptions above alongside increasing terrorist activities in Russia by 
Chechen militants further justified the case for a military response in the region. In the 
media, Chechens were widely depicted as terrorists, with attacks of an insurgent nature 
being blamed on the ethnic group. The actions of Chechen militants also became 
increasingly associated with professional terrorist groups beyond Russia’s borders. As 
noted in Yeltsin’s December 1994 speech, those working on Dudaev’s team were also 
“professional terrorists and mercenaries from other states.”147 In a number of newspapers, 
it was noted that terrorists from the Eastern World beyond Chechnya were joining the 
war in opposition to Russia. These stories only added to the pre-existing discourses that 
Russia remains vulnerable to numerous domestic and international threats. 
Increasing emphasis on the Chechen as a terrorist, and terrorist attacks at the hands 
of Chechens, allowed for generalisations to occur. An increasing number of terrorist 
attacks were reported in the media. In November 1994, Ogoniok reported on a terrorist 
attack that took place in Stavropol Krai in July 1994, whereby witnesses recounted stories 
of Caucasian men wearing black masks as the perpetrators.148 The Budennovsk hospital 
hostage crisis (another terrorist attack in Stavropol Krai in 1995) included an attack on a 
hospital, police station and government buildings in Budennovsk, which saw the taking 
of hostages in exchange for the withdrawal of Russian troops in Chechnya.149 The event 
was condemned by Dudaev, which reaffirmed notions of criminality and lawlessness in 
Chechnya beyond his regime. Emphasis on stories linked to terrorism went beyond the 
widely known events of Budennovsk and towards smaller attacks on transport vehicles 
on Russian soil.  
The increase in terrorist acts on Russian territory was addressed in the same 
October 1995 Ogoniok magazine, where Yeltsin released a report highlighting the 
increase in terrorist activity and provided potential strategies for the removal of such 
threats.  The report stated, “Various forms of violence are increasingly being used as a 
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means of gaining power, exerting political pressure and intimidation.”150 The report’s 
release was an extremely clever tactic utilised by the government as it provided a detailed 
and factual account of the numerous terrorist incidents that had taken place in Russia 
since the demise of the USSR. In addition, as experts wrote the report, any claims made 
by the government, which may have been seen previously as ideologically loaded, were 
strengthened. CDA affirms that the voices of powerful people are important in 
establishing and favouring certain discourses in society over others. In this case, the report 
added legitimacy to the statements made by the government, because it was a product of 
research conducted by specialists (or experts) and presented the data through the media.  
The representation of Chechens as terrorists, criminals and bandits was highly 
problematic. Writing for Ogoniok in December 1994, Elena Berezina discussed her 
experience on a bus in Stavropol Krai, titled “Don’t want to be Armenian!.”151 Berezina 
described the impact that blame had on the Chechen community as a whole. She stated 
that the mention of Chechnya and the Chechen people produced a change in expression 
and the statement “Chechens are not liked here.”152 Berezina used her voice to highlight 
the danger of generalisations. She questioned how easy it had been for the public to 
“indiscriminately condemn the whole [Chechen] people for the guilt of a handful of 
unbundled rifles?”153 The experiences of Berezina demonstrated only a small glimpse of 
the impact the media had on demonising the Chechen population. When questioned by 
Argumenty i Fakty journalist Natalya Zhelnorova in January 1996, Anatoly Pristavkin 
supported this notion.154 She questioned him on the image of a Chechen as a thief or 
bandit as painted by General Barsukov, head of the Federal Security Service of the 
Russian Federation (FSB). Asking whom Barsukov was referring too, Pristavkin stated: 
 
The image of the “evil Chechen” was created for a long time. But when I met 
these people, I was convinced that it seems impossible to break the stereotype and 
legend. And rarely does anyone try to analyse. There are few of them. I lived in 
Chechnya. And I met Victory Day in Kizlyar and made sure that they [the 
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Chechen people] are very worthy, proud people. In their blood – veneration of the 
elderly, amazing politeness, patriotism towards their homeland, history. Yes, 
there are Abreks there, but these are not Chechens.155 Abrek is an outcast of 
society, he was expelled from his land, and he became very dangerous for the 
Chechen population. In general, the Chechen’s image as assassins, bandits was 
cultivated throughout the last century, to morally justify the conquest of the 
Caucasus - so that people go to war, knowing that they are doing a holy work.156  
 
Pristavkin’s assessment is important for two reasons. First, he acknowledges that 
the Chechen nation has been generalised under the term “evil” and notes that the Chechen 
people he met did not reflect such a description – calling them polite and patriotic. The 
second interesting aspect of Pristavkin’s interview was his acceptance that there did exist 
an evil component of Chechen society, this being the Abrek. These stories, while not 
supporting that the Chechen population should be referred to as terrorists, indicate that 
the Chechen population was widely associated with terrorism and banditry. 
Acknowleding the Abrek’s existence helped strengthen militarised state discourses, 
which warned of internal instability, its threat to Russian livelihood and promoted a state 
of continued mobilisation. 
The association of Chechens as terrorists, and lawless bandits was further 
emphasised through the media’s investigation of Chechnya and its connection with the 
act of “blood feud.” Blood feud is the act of revenge, acted upon when a member of 
certain families or political faction is murdered. In relation to Chechnya, the war with 
Russia had created such a divide in society that even if Russian troops decided to 
withdraw, the fighting between the Dudaevites and “traitors” would continue (on the basis 
of “blood feud”).157 An article in Novaia Gazeta in June 1996, discussing the implications 
of war on children, emphasised the idea of “blood feud” by stating, 
 
With the outbreak of hostilities, the number of affected children is growing. There 
are disabled children, orphans, refugee children in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, 
Georgia, South Ossetia, Budennovsk, Chechnya ... Doctors from these long-
suffering places and physicians detect post-traumatic disorders [in children] 
associated with military operations. Children are afraid of loud noises, expecting 
bombing and shelling, experiencing the loss of loved ones or relatives or fear of 
the loss in their future. 
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Studies have shown that this category of children has a need for revenge. One 
report noted that children from refugee families were very upset by the inability 
to participate in the war themselves with their fathers or older brothers. Such 
children subsequently have an attitude to live and act according to the laws of evil 
and violence, according to which, in their opinion, the world around them lives 
and exists.158 
  
The article raised some important issues. Similar to scholarship on the rise of 
terrorism in the Middle East, it showed that there were deep-rooted issues associated with 
the invasion of Chechnya in Russia. For those children who lost family, it created an 
element of resentment, and as noted in the article, desire to seek revenge. While only 
occurring a short period after the First Chechen Conflict, another war erupted between 
Russia and the region in 1999 – showing that such invasions can set the scene for future 
conflict. It also notes that these children, who are suffering because of war, want to seek 
vengeance and will grow up “according to the laws of evil and violence,” which may 
contribute to continued instability in the region. As noted by Igor Rotar in October 1995, 
“disarming the Chechen population in the near future is unrealistic.”159  
The lawless, evil Chechen bandits were created by historical discourses, which 
underpinned Russia’s tumultuous relationship with the region. ‘Othering’ was an 
important tactic used to ensure society’s support for the war, whether financially or for 
the war to continue with little protest. One element of the demonising process is to 
dehumanise and vilify the enemy to such an extent that it reduces empathy towards 
them.160 Emphasis of lawlessness, violence and even acts of terrorism and its association 
with the Chechen people did that. It mobilised society against a common enemy, and 
helped justify what Russia was fighting for. It also played an integral role in strengthening 
the worthiness of the state’s official justification, which was based on the notion that 
Russia’s use of force would be carried out “to fulfil the objectives of restoring law and 
order.”161 These descriptions helped militarise society as they created a common enemy 
against which society should be pitted and fully mobilised. These tactics allowed for the 
 
158 “U detei voiny pal’tsy pokhozhi na kurok.” 
159 Ibid. 
160  Paul Fussel, Wartime: Understanding and behaviour in the Second World War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 116. 
Robert T. Tally, “Demonizing the Enemy, Literally: Tolkien, Orcs, and the Sense of the 
World Wars,” Humanities 8, No, 54 (2019): Introduction, 
https://doi.org/10.3390/h8010054. 
161 “Vmesto novgorodnikh podarkov v detskie ladoni lozhitsia smert.”.  
 124 
continued militarisation of society in the 1990s and was a method adopted again by 
Vladimir Putin at the start of his Presidency and the Second Chechen War in 1999.  With 
this in mind, and as highlighted above, the Russian government needed to guide its 
strategy towards ensuring peace and stability in the region and to nip lawless activity in 
the bud.  
Discussions on the decision to go to war and the consolidation of peace were 
another feature of the media, highlighting a clear reluctance by society to continue a war. 
Decisions to go to war, for the most part, were described in the media as forced. Efforts 
to consolidate peace were defined more positively on the Russian side. As the conflict 
unfolded, society was fed messages about positive peace negotiations which acted as 
snippets of reassurance that the war would soon be over. In addition, it highlighted that 
the Russian state was actively involved in these peace negotiations and that their 
continuation in the war was not desired on a state level – reemphasising the ideas that 
Russia’s involvement was forced and a last resort to the Chechen question. 
Scholarship on the origins of the First-Chechen conflict paid particular attention 
to the tricky relationship between Russia and Chechnya. They suggested Russia’s formal 
intervention in December 1994 was an outcome of tensions that began even before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. A November 1991 article in Ogoniok stated that Chechen’s 
were seen carrying weapons in case it was “attacked by Russia.”162 An interview with 
Dudaev confirmed the normalisation of weaponry in Chechnya’s everyday life. He stated, 
“I remembered a guy about seventeen or eighteen, who at a restaurant, waiting for dinner, 
turned a hand grenade on the table like a hard-boiled egg.”163 Dudaev acknowledged the 
rising tensions, claiming that threats to Chechen independence would force the 
redistribution of weapons, which were previously confiscated.164 By 1994 the tensions 
reached a tipping point, as Chechnya’s political status remained under deliberation.165  
In September 1994, Gennady Seleznev from Pravda stated, “All August there 
were peace talks held among senior officials, intellectuals and Chechen leaders,” with 
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reports two months later stating that Russian leadership was still investigating “peaceful 
ways out of the crisis.”166 In hindsight, Chechen surrender was the only possible (and 
peaceful) way to avoid war. As noted by Robert Kornetov in September 1994, Moscow 
was “ready to provide the broadest independence to Grozny, but only within the 
federation.”167 Approaching December 1994, the rhetoric changed, with the inevitability 
of military conflict being the main form of updates within the media. Yeltsin’s voice 
became stronger as he reassured the public. He claimed, “order and peace in Chechnya 
will soon be restored.” 168  In December 1994, Izvestiia confirmed Yeltsin’s rhetoric, 
stating, “Active military actions would end in a week.”169  
In retrospect, peace talks were not successful. In December 1994, Dmitry 
Kamyshev, of Kommersant, claimed that while a peaceful solution was still under debate, 
“only the military can affect the situation now.”170 Yet, alongside the war, which would 
continue for another two years, peace negotiations remained dominant within the media, 
as demonstrated in June 1995 by Albert Plutnik in Izvestiia in an article entitled “It would 
be a crime to miss the chance to end the war in Chechnya.”171 He discussed what the 
conclusion of peace could mean for Russia. He disclosed that supporters of the power 
ministries in Russia saw the conclusion of peace [not on Russian terms] as a defeat to 
Russia and “demonstration of the inability of the government to nip the terrible evil in the 
bud.”172  
While there remained a corpus of supporters for the Chechen War and those who 
saw surrender as a sign of weakness, negative assessments of the government’s desire to 
achieve peace were also in circulation. This was best demonstrated by key Russian 
officials like Arkady Volsky, who stated, “I am convinced that there is no sincere desire 
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[on Russia’s behalf] to find the perpetrators of the terrorist acts that provoked the 
breakdown of talks.”173  
Russia’s strategy did not escape criticism, as the media’s representation of the 
fighting called for further legitimisations beyond the restoration of law and order. While 
the negative portrayal of the Chechen population suggests that the media supported the 
government’s use of force, the press’s negative portrayal of the actions of the Armed 
Forces further confused readers. As noted in Izvestiia, Yeltsin was widely criticised for 
his commitment to the bombing of Grozny. The same article further highlighted that those 
supporting the war in Chechnya meant an “early end to a political career, since militarism 
in the eyes of the Russian electorate seems extremely unattractive.”174 The extent to 
which the media reported on opposition within the political sphere facilitated questions 
relating to who pushed for military action in Chechnya. Kommersant reporters Maksim 
Zhukov and Dmitry Kamishev associated the use of force in Chechnya with the 1996 
presidential election. They stated, “Having conquered Chechnya, the president will 
demonstrate he is in control of the situation.”175 Scholars of the Chechen War subscribe 
to this justification also, determining that the image of a quick and decisive victory would 
bolster Yeltsin’s popularity.176  
The military’s role in the initiation of the Chechen War was also discussed. In 
January 1996, Natalia Zhelnorova of Argumenty i Fakty questioned novelist and Chechen 
expert Anatoly Pristavkin on the War in Chechnya 
 
 
NZ - Who, from your point of view, can negotiate [peace]? 
AP - “Not the military.” Among them there are many people interested in 
continuing this war. The military flocked there like a holiday. Those who were 
driven out of the Baltic States, from Germany, found a "vent" there. What is a 
military in peacetime? This is a vegetative person that no one needs. And suddenly 
a springboard appears for the realization of all its capabilities. I saw there was one 
pilot-deputy, regiment commander, who flew there to shoot from a helicopter. He 
returned from flight, his eyes were on fire, he was happy. The generals will not 
voluntarily surrender this military site. They get orders there, titles - endless 
money.177 
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  In December 1994 Otto Latsis of Izvestiia paid extensive attention to the role of 
the military elite towards Chechnya, claiming that while some high-ranking officials 
sacrificed their career in opposition to the initiation of the conflict, others wanted the war. 
It ensured a “stronger voice of the military in the division of the budget pie.”178 Also in 
December 1994, another report in Izvestiia highlighted the conflict’s ability to write off 
the irrelevancy of the Armed Forces, and bolster the standings of power ministries.179 
This was extremely important, since Russia’s military was undergoing a period of low 
prestige. The Soviet Union’s role in Afghanistan was prominent in the public’s 
consciousness, and contributed towards the downfall of the Russian military - therefore, 
a quick and decisive victory in Chechnya could better the military’s position in society. 
Lev Gudkov pinpoints the roots of the Chechen War in the military’s desire to preserve 
and strengthen the military institution and to popularise support for Russia’s Armed 
Forces at a time of low prestige.180 As noted, the conflict did legitimise the need for a 
military in society, and allowed for the military to gain access to more funding, which 
projected their importance in society.  
Divisions within the military institution weakened Russia’s strategy in Chechnya. 
As mentioned previously, some of those in high-ranking positions opposed the war, and 
sacrificed their careers over their opposition. This was not the case for Major General 
Viktor Vorobyov, who perished in the first few months of the War. The obituary read; 
“Knowing Vorobyov, I am sure he did not approve of the senseless slaughter. But he was 
first of all a solider. And perished as he lived, on the front.”181 Even with these divisions, 
there were also reminders in the media of duty. In January and February 1995 Sovetskaia 
Rossia, for example, stated that the “assessment of the bloody events in 
Chechnya…underlined the direct responsibility of the President and his entourage” to 
serve and defend the fatherland, which was also emphasised by Sergey Kovalev as “a 
 
178 Otto Latsis, “Chechenskaia voyna proigrana v Moskve,” Izvestiia, 29 December 1994, 
No. 250. 
179 “Chechnya: Trudnyi vybor Kremlia.”  
180 Lev Gudkov, “The Army as an institutional model,” Translated by Jennifer G. Mathers 
in Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia, ed. by Jennifer G. Mathers and Stephen 
Webber (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 49. 
181 Viktor Artemenko, “Pogib, kak zhil, - na peredovoy,” Pravda, 10 January 1994, No. 
333; Viktor Artemenko “Pamiati general-mayora Viktora Vasil’evicha Vorob’eva,” 
Pravda, 10 January 1994, No. 333. 
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sacred duty of every young man.”182 These comments acted as small legitimisers for the 
role of the military in Chechnya, or at least to those who took part in the hostility. They 
were openly critical of the military; yet also justified the role of the soldier under the 
image of the protector and defender of the fatherland.  
The repetitive attachment of ideas linked to lawlessness to the Chechen populace 
further justified Russia’s role in Chechnya and the loss of life in the region. The use of 
anti-terrorist and anti-criminal narratives furthered reactive policies, which justified 
conflict in the region, as emphasised by Badyakina.183 What is seen here is the shifting of 
blame towards those who initiated the war in Chechnya, rather than those involved in the 
actual conflict. Patriarch Aleksei II, head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1990s, 
stated, “May God prevent that a shadow, which is caused by the politicians’ wrong 
actions, is cast on soldiers and officers who fulfil their duties to the fatherland with 
dignity. May service in the army- the duty of every son of the fatherland- become a truly 
heroic deed and a true honour and joy.”184 The acceptance of the military institution and 
the actions of those soldiers within the military, as shown here, highlights the persistence 
of cultural militarisation during this time. The stories emphasise an acceptance of the 
Armed Forces and its duty to protect and defend Russia’s border, whereas discontent is 
directed towards the government.  
As the media looked toward war responsibility, conclusions drawn from the 
debate suggested that demilitarisation and militarisation was happening simultaneously, 
with the failure to forge peace resulting in warfare.  This was best displayed in a July 
1995 interview between Argumenty i Fakty journalist Dmitry Makarov (DM) and 
Chairman of the Government of the National Revival of Chechnya, S. Khadzhiev (SK):  
 
 
182  Sergey Kovalev, “Elena Badyakina: ‘Opalennye Bedoy,’” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 
Moscow, 28 January 1995, No. 11. 
“Postanovlenie III Sezda KP RF “O bratoubiystvennoy voyne v Chechenskoi Respublike 
I merakh po vykhodu iz voznikshego krizisa,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, Moscow, 20 February 
1995, No. 13. 
183 Joseph T. Ripsberger, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Kerry G. Herron, “How Cultural 
Orientations Create Shifting National Security Coalitions on Nuclear Weapons and 
Terrorist Threats in the American Public,” PS: Political Science and Politics 44, No. 4 
(2011): 716. 
184 Katya Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and 
Greater Russia (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 62. 
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DM - Which side shows more rigidity in the [Peace] negotiations? 
SK - “I think both sides are striving to show goodwill.” However, the delegation 
headed by Imaev, if he shows goodwill and finds reasonable approaches, then, 
having talked with Dudaev, takes a tough position again ... And everything starts 
all over again.  
DM - How much does Dudaev influence the negotiations? 
SK - He still seeks to resolve the Chechen issue by force.185 
 
Khadzhiev acknowledged that both sides were engaged in the peace negotiations. 
However, based on Khadzhiev’s assessment the Chechen delegation was taking a “tough 
position” in the negotiations, suggesting that Dudaev’s desired outcome was through 
military conflict. This feeds into previous media discourses that noted Chechen surrender 
as the only route to Russian withdrawal. In this sense, Dudaev found his only route to 
independence through war. In Khadzhiev’s assessment, Russia comes across more 
positively, with Chechnya’s tough stance pushing both parties to restart peace 
negotiations. In this sense, the Chechen delegation was blocking potential peace 
agreements. This portrayed Russia’s involvement in the region as forced and seen as a 
last minute necessary tactic for the consolidation of peace. The discussions of peace 
negotiations, while conflicting, created a more positive image of Russia’s consistent 
efforts to bring the conflict in Chechnya to a peaceful end. While a peaceful end to the 
war would suggest demilitarisation, the continued struggle for peace showcased desires 
on both sides to take a military stance to achieve their goals. On the side of Chechnya, 
Dudaev wanted independence and to solve the issue through military means, while Russia 
saw Chechen surrender as the only means of establishing peace. The continued 
negotiations highlighted persistent issues related to stability and security. The Second 
Chechen War, only a few years later, confirmed this.  
 
In relation to Chechnya, the media demonised the enemy, analysed state 
institutions (including Yeltsin and the military) and focused on peace negotiations. 
‘Othering’ tactics are key elements of wartime propaganda, with the Chechen population 
branded as terrorists, bandits and criminals. Russia’s military did not escape disapproval 
either. The media highlighted the military’s incompetence and brutality but suggested 
that such behaviour took place specifically within the boundaries of the Chechen War. In 
 
185 Dmitri Makarov, “S. Khadzhiev ‘Ya ne marionetka,’” Argumenty i Fakty, 27 July 
1995, No. 30. 
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contrast, negative representations of the Chechen population as terrorists and bandits 
hinted at a criminality that was embedded in Chechen heritage. By linking ideas of 
criminality to the Chechen populace, notions of national security were brought to the 
forefront of Russian public consciousness. Issues of national security justified the 
soldiers’ actions in the North Caucasus region. This treatment was not unique to the Post-
Soviet period or even this region. Scholarship on demonising techniques spans 
geographic boundaries. The main aim of this demonising was to create an ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ discourse, an exaggerated emphasis of the other, and this emphasis was neither 
positive or at times, humane. In doing so, it legitimised force, sparking a sense of fear to 
mobilise society against an enemy.  
The actions of Russia’s state institutions were not always discussed in a positive 
way, with the military’s desire to prolong the war for their own needs being a major topic 
of criticism. It did demonstrate however, the important role of the military in society, and 
the weight they bore on the political decisions of the nation and therefore suggests an 
element of militarism as conceptualised alongside Brian Taylor’s argument, which 
suggests that the military’s autonomy is a reflection of militarism.186 While the military 
officers were depicted negatively, the military itself received some praise. Russia’s 
strategy during the war reinforced notions of citizenship, through the idea of a soldier’s 
duty. Differing opinions regarding the initiator of the war were contrasted by reports on 
the duty of the soldier. Shifting the responsibility or blame for the conflict onto the 
government took the focus away from the military, instead praising the military for 
fulfilling its duty in protecting the fatherland. It reinforced the notion that regardless of 
the public perception of war, the soldiers should still be supported.  
Although the government was discussed negatively in that aspect, the Russian 
state was also displayed in a positive manner in some of the discussions, especially in 
terms of the peace negotiations. Chechen leader Dudaev, a former military officer in the 
Soviet period, was represented as a warmongering militant, desiring that issues between 
Russia and Chechnya be solved through military means – therefore forcing a military 
response from Russia.  
As noted, such discussions do not suggest a promotion of militarisation, since we 
are discussing the topic of peace. Yet, they do very little to demilitarise society as it shows 
Russian efforts to consolidate peace, and emphasises the image of an aggressive 
 
186 Taylor, Politics and the Russia Army, 1, 154-164, 312. 
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Chechnya, forcing Russia’s hand. What can be taken away from these discussions is that 
militarisation was sustained during this period. Russia’s role in the Chechen war was 
legitimised through aspects of demonisation. This justified Russia’s aim of invading the 
regions to stamp out lawlessness, and their forced invasion is justified through an 
exaggeration of Dudaev’s militancy. 
The amalgamation of these different discourses played a significant role in the 
militarisation of Russia’s society during this period. The negative representations of 
Russia’s during role the Chechen war did not necessarily imply the demilitarisation of 
Russia’s society, in fact, the vast number of times in which stories of the military, military 
strategy and the war in Chechnya were discussed meant that the topic of war and 
Chechnya remained a constant aspect of public consciousness and aided the readership to 
“cruise down the ramp onto the militarisation highway.”187  
 
 The 1990s media was anti-war and contributed significantly to the military’s loss 
in prestige. It was critical of Russia’s role in the Chechen War and promoted caution 
when discussing Russia’s possible role in the Yugoslav conflict. Yet, at the same time, 
the media was a mechanism of militarisation. It mobilised society through emphasis of 
narratives on growing threats to Russia’s security. The media highlighted Russia’s role 
in peacekeeping projects within neighbouring countries and Russian disapproval of 
NATO expansion, which both underwrote the larger narrative, that Russia was 
surrounded by instability and threats that could seep over into its borders. To this end, the 
media militarised society through the manifestation of a siege mentality. NATO 
expansion eastward and Russia’s accession to the organisation was criticised heavily first 
by politicians, and second, within the media. Such narratives had an impact on how parts 
of the public perceived NATO, even going as far as to accuse NATO of using its role in 
Kosovo as a “dress rehearsal” for its eventual invasion of Russia, and aid in facilitating 
Chechen independence. The success of the media in shaping public opinion was 
confirmed in interviews, where the interviewer highlighted that the epithet of terrorist and 
criminal became the general Russian view of the Chechen population. It demonstrated 
that tactics such as “the demonisation of the enemy” were successful in shaping public 
attitudes towards an opposition. These descriptors are not positive, and therefore highlight 
a growing difference between the Russian people and the Chechen population. The media 
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managed to prevent demilitarisation through mobilising techniques. Even where 
narratives relating to the military were negative, society remained militarised. The general 
narrative of war and the armed forces remained salient in the discourse of the media, 
ensuring that Russia’s society remained exposed to a threat-filled worldview, and ensured 
the narrative of the military and war in everyday consciousness. Therefore, the media was 
an important mechanism of militarisation during the Yeltsin period, as it ensured public 
consciousness was militarised, even when the military was underfunded and in decline. 
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CHAPTER 3 




A period of crises underwrote the beginning of Peter I’s reign. E. V. Anisimov 
and A. B. Kamenskiy’s 1996 secondary school textbook, Istoriia Rossii 1682-1861, noted 
“The first and strong signals of the crisis came from the battlefields…Neither the Polish, 
or Turkish, not even the Tatar troops … were distinguished then with modern weapons 
and advanced combat techniques, and yet the Russian army either lost the battle to them, 
or – at best, she fought with varying success. All this painfully reflected on the 
international prestige of Russia, which was not [considered] in the “high society” of the 
European powers.”1 The quote demonstrates threat from the West, issues of military 
development, Russia’s ineffective (or at least inconsistent) military and Russia’s long 
historical relationship with conflict, showing that: 1) Russia was under threat by 
numerous enemies from various fronts; 2) Russia’s inability to defend itself demoted the 
country to a secondary position within the international order; and 3) progress and East-
West competition was linked to the military and militarisation. 
Even into the 19th century, invasions and military conquests shaped Russian 
society. As noted by Victor Shnirelman, Russian textbook author A. N. Bokhanov, 
writing in 1998, claimed that the entire world was against Russia. 2  According to 
 
1 E. V. Anisimov and A. B. Kamenskiy, Istoriia Rossii, 1682-1861 (Moscow: Terra, 
1996), 20-21. The print-run of this textbook was 40,000. Evgeny Viktorovich Anisimov 
(born 1947) is Soviet-Russian historian. He specialises in Russian history of the 17th, 18th 
and 19th centuries, especially on the leadership of Peter I. Alexander Borisovich 
Kamenskiy (born 1954) is a Soviet-Russian historian with special interest in 
historiography and the history of Russia in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. 
2 Aleksandr Nikolaevich Bokhanov (1944-2019) was a Soviet and Russian historian. As 
noted on a personal website to him: “Alexander Nikolaevich was the greatest Russian 
historian and artist. He possessed a bright research talent, created biographical portraits 
of Russian princes from Tsar Ivan the Terrible to Emperor Nicholas II. He devoted his 
whole life to free historical creativity, not engaged either by the communist authorities, 
or by wealthy customers, or by a liberal get-together.” For more, please see: “Vernut’sia 
v Rossiyu: Pamiati Aleksandra Nikolaevicha Bokhanova,” Bokhanov.ru, 14 January 
2021, accessed 12 February 2021, https://xn--80abe7bdc0c.xn--p1acf/. 
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Shnirelman, Bokhanov argued that Russian expansion in the 19th century was largely 
driven by its struggle to survive aggression from the South, West and East rather than by 
a desire for influence and access to key trade routes.3 These testimonies by Russian 
textbook authors represent only a snippet view of some of the content of historical 
textbooks in the 1990s. At times, the authors created lists of historical wars and invasions 
that Russia was subjected too. In other cases, they emphasised the atrocious actions of 
Russia’s opponents. The testimonies only highlight and add fuel to the pre-existing 
discourse that Russia is a vulnerable country surrounded by hostile neighbours. These 
notions and the turbulent, conflict-ridden landscape of 1990s Russia strengthened this 
discourse, allowing cultural forms of militarisation to persist. 
In 1990s Russia, the Polish, Turkish and Tatar troops were now the Chechen 
separatists, using guerrilla tactics against a military with better military technology and a 
bigger economy. The testimonies above may not have been a purposeful attempt to make 
Russia’s youth reflect on its current military situation. They did, however, highlight that 
through such crises, Peter I turned towards comprehensive military reforms to solve 
issues of Russia’s international prestige and to claim victory militarily. Do these passages 
confirm that Russia lives in a cycle of external threat, military conflict, military demise 
and reconsolidation of military power? In hindsight, and when considering 
remilitarisation efforts under Putin, especially since 2008, this is true. Education, like the 
media, is a forum in which such anxieties can be raised and patterns or trends become 
recognisable. To this end, Russian history textbooks of the 1990s were venues of 
militarisation. 
Beyond external danger, the educational textbooks highlighted glorious Russian 
victories over “insidious” and “evil” enemies [Vragi/ Protivniki]. They used methods of 
militarisation (like atrocity propaganda) to pit the reader against a historical opponent and 
create a view of the outside world as hostile and opportunistic. This method is typical in 
practices that utilise history to create meaning, like commemoration for example. 4 
Russia’s education system faced many challenges in the immediate Post-Soviet period. 
Documents found in GARF (including drafts of laws, laws, letters and speeches) revealed 
 
3 Victor Shnirelman, “Stigmatised by history or by historians? The people’s Russia in 
School history textbooks,” History and Memory 21, No. 2 (2009): 119-120. 
4  Mariana Achugar, “Critical Discourse Analysis and History,” in The Routledge 
handbook of Critical Discourse Studies, ed. by John Flowerdew and John F Richardson 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 298-300. 
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concerns among members of the State Duma and veteran organisations of the military-
patriotic spirit of the nation. Discussions within the State Duma showed a desire to re-
establish a patriotic-militaristic education. Political elites suggested including the youth 
in commemorative activities and memorial upkeep in order to bring them together with 
the veterans.  
 This chapter demonstrates that Russia’s historical education did not change 
fundamentally. It remained ideologically driven, and militaristic histories continued to 
underscore and dominate the different historical eras under discussion. Any changes were 
directed toward emphasising Russia’s new identity as a continuation of the Russia that 
existed prior to 1917.5 Discourses chosen, as evident in the scholarship on education, 
were largely picked to reflect the current and future aims of the Russian Federation as it 
set out to establish itself on the world stage.6  In historical education, students were 
reminded that to be a powerful state was to have a powerful army that would overcome 
hostile adversaries. To this end, Russia’s historical education was a vehicle of 
militarisation. These textbooks reminded Russia’s youth of military campaigns, persistent 
enemies, of glorious pursuits and Russian victories. Together they reaffirmed and 
strengthened Russia’s besieged fortress mentality.  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis and History Textbooks 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a powerful tool for analysing educational 
discourses. First, content within school textbooks is regarded as official and legitimate 
knowledge.7 That is, the information in the textbooks is gathered and reproduced to 
inform and educate. 8  Todd Nelson, on the issue of Russian High School historical 
textbooks, notes that textbooks “purport to represent the truth of historic events.” He also 
 
5 Hans Bagger, “The Study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet Identity Crisis, 
Scando-Slavica 53, No. 1, (2007): 110. 
6 As noted by Murod Ismailov and Nozima Ganieva, school textbooks are created not 
only to pass on uncontested knowledge but to also “play a powerful role in intepreting 
and giving meaning to the world.” For more, please see: Murod Ismailov and Nozima 
Ganieva, “In search for the Russian national identity: Do history textbooks hold the 
answer?” Journal of alternative perspectives in the social sciences 5, No. 2 (2013): 368. 
7 Ibid, 369. 
8 Yongbing Liu, “The construction of cultural values and beliefs in Chinese language 
textbooks: A Critical Discourse Analysis,” Discourse: Studies in the cultural politics of 
education 26, No.1 (2005): 17. 
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acknowledges that they have a certain authority, which makes it challenging to dispute 
the content.9  
Linked to this point is access to the educational discourses. This is a key 
consideration to scholars of CDA. The debates centre on identifying who has access to 
the discourses and at what level. For example, students have access to educational 
discourse only once it has been constructed. Even then, the information presented to them 
in the textbook is supplemented by the teacher who has planned a lesson and set a task 
on that topic from their own interpretation of the textbook’s information. Therefore, even 
before students read the textbook or attempt to complete any tasks, the information they 
receive will have already gone through two processes of interpretation and construction 
at the author and teacher level. Teachers control communication within the classrooms. 
They tell the student what to read, what to answer, correct their mistakes and control 
classroom discussion. According to Teun A Van Dijk, the ability to control 
communication within the classroom gives teachers special access to educational 
discourses.10 In Russia, the role of the teachers in the 1990s in controlling educational 
discourses was even more important. They had more autonomy than in the Soviet period 
to choose which textbooks they used in class.11 There was no official checklist when 
selecting textbooks. Russian textbooks that underwent expert examination were 
recommended or authorised by Russia’s Ministry of Education (MERF). MERF also 
outlined that a good textbook would not readily give students the answer, but would push 
them to think critically about a topic.12  Textbooks, however, became a luxury. The 
economic crisis and the chaos of school decentralisation meant that some state schools 
were as autonomous as private schools. In this sense, while MERF did recommend some 
textbooks, financial constraints and educational staff ultimately drove the choices made.13  
 
9 Todd Nelson, “History as Ideology: The Potrayal of Stalinism and the Great Patriotic 
War in Contemporary Russian High School books,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, No. 1, (2015): 
39. 
10 Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse, Power and Access,” in Text and Practices: Readings in 
Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. by Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm 
Coulthard (London: Routledge, 2015), 86. 
11 Bagger, “The Study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet Identity Crisis,” 120-
121. 
12 Tatyana Volodina, “Teaching History in Russia after the collapse of the USSR,” The 
History Teacher 38, No. 2 (2005): 183-186. 
Information about the Ministry of Education is outlined in footnote 64 on page 44. 
13 Bagger, “The Study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet Identity Crisis,” 120-
121. 
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Finally, while regarded as official knowledge, textbooks are also considered a 
“cultural product sitting within the educational domain.”14 Scholars of CDA agree that 
textbooks go beyond their role in disseminating knowledge. First, they argue that 
textbooks are underpinned by ideologies, values and attitudes that reflect the surrounding 
society.15 Felicitas Macgilchrist, for example, notes, “Textbooks are one of the few media 
which are explicitly aimed at shaping values, knowledge and the subjectivities of future 
generation.”16 Second, the role of textbook authors in the construction of the educational 
discourse is an important consideration to take. Mariana Achugar states that 
historiography is: 1) a construction of the past written by authors impacted by the present; 
and 2) a process that includes choices and interpretations “that are determined by the 
location of the historian.”17  This therefore emphasises the pervasiveness of cultural, 
social and ideological messages within the content of historical textbooks. In the case of 
Russia, one of these values and discourses had to do with militarisation. Since CDA is a 
methodology concerned with outlining dominant and minority discourses, taking into 
consideration the social, political and economic landscape in which these discourses are 
created are key for scholars conducting CDA. These reasons above are only some, which 
highlight the value of CDA in analysing school textbooks.  
The 25 textbooks discussed in this chapter are those focused on Russia’s national 
history from the 9th century until the end of the 20th century. They were randomly selected 
using search terms, “Istoriia Rossii” or “Rossiiskaia istoriia” and the timeframe “1990-
2000.” By randomly selecting the sources, the chapter was able to draw on a number of 
different history textbooks published during the 1990s. These textbooks targeted various 
school ages. They are uniquely structured and have different circulation figures. While 
the target ages of each textbook varied, the topics covered remained the same – they were 
nuanced to fit the needs of the different age groups. For example, Ishimova (1996) and 
Golovin’s (1992) books were established to provide a history of Russia in stories for 
 
14  Urip Sulistiyo, Supiani, Ahmad Kailiani and Rani Puspitasari Dewi Lestariyana, 
“Infusing moral content into Primary School English Textbooks: A Critical Discourse 
Analysis,” Indonesian Journal of Applied Linguistics 10, No. 1 (2020): 251. 
Liu, “The construction of cultural values and veliefs in Chinese language textbooks,” 16-
17. 
15 Sulistiyo et al. “Infusing moral content into Primary School English Textbooks,” 251. 
16 Felicitas Macgilchrist, “Textbooks,” in The Routledge handbook of Critical Discourse 
Studies, ed. by John Flowerdew and John F. Richardson (Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 525. 
17 Achugar, “Critical Discourse Analysis and History,” 298-300.  
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children. Their presentation of Russia’s history was more descriptive, to capture the 
interest of the youth that the books were aimed toward. This was a characteristic that was 
lacking in official history textbooks. That being said, authors of official history textbook 
accounted many of the stories in Ishimova and Golovin’s books – showing that the 
discourses remained the same but were altered to suit the needs and knowledge base of 
the different age groups.  
Most of the textbooks discussed in this chapter are structured to provide a 
chronology of events, ask questions at the end of chapter and recommend extra resources. 
However, some textbooks were structured differently. Georgieva and Georgiev (1995) 
and Zuev’s (1995) textbooks, for example, were structured in lists. While Georgieva and 
Georgiev’s book regularly set lists of conflicts or events that students needed to provide 
dates to, or match up, Zuev presented a chronological list of Russia’s history from its 
conception to the end of the 20th century. Kislitsyn’s 1999 textbook, on the other hand, 
presented Russia’s history in the form of questions and answers.  
The print-run of the textbooks examined in this thesis range from 100,000 to 100. 
Although it must be noted that some of these textbooks have earlier and later editions 
than those published in the 1990s with a much larger circulation.  This chapter was not 
focused on only examining popular textbooks – popular Russian history textbooks of the 
1990s like Istoriia Otechestva by V. P Ostrovskiy (1992) have already received a lot of 
attention.18 Rather, the purpose of this study was to identify dominant discourses across 
a range of textbooks published in the 1990s. CDA is of particular use here, as it also takes 
into consideration the persuasive value driven messages of privileged groups, which drive 
and construct the dominant narratives identified in this chapter.19 
 
LAST DAYS OF AN ERA PAST: HISTORY’S HISTORY AND EDUCATION 
REFORM 
 
History of Russia’s historical education system. 
Education under the Tsarist regime and in the Soviet period was highly 
militarised. Both regimes believed in the readiness of its youth to fight upon their 
 
18 Valeriy Petrovich Ostrovskiy is a Soviet-Russian historian and specialist of 20th century 
Russian history.  
19 Macgilchrist, “Textbooks,” 525. 
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conscription into the military. Therefore, under Tsarist leadership the number of 
institutions offering a military education or institutions solely providing a military 
education grew. In the 19th century in particular, Russia expanded its military-educational 
sector. By 1830, a fifth of Russia’s elementary school children were recipients of a 
militaristic education. By the 1850s, just under a third of Russia’s elementary students 
were receiving this type of education. Cadet-specific training facilities increased to 19 by 
the middle of the 19th century. 20 The Soviet Union, which promoted an ideology that was 
ironically against war, created a state education system aimed at educating a generation 
of “true sons of the [Soviet] motherland, steadfast ideological fighters.”21 The military-
educational complex expanded as new perceived dangers continued to threaten the 
communist state. The number of military colleges increased, and Soviet leaders even 
created military departments in civilian colleges. In 1939, the number of military-
education institutions increased by a third from 123 to 161. These figures were moderate, 
as they did not include institutions that trained the KGB, for example.22   
For both the Tsars and Soviets, the military was considered a form of education 
and socialisation. Peasants drafted into the Imperial Army were disciplined through 
military pageantry, for example. The peasants were moulded by repetition of military 
drills.23 Writing in 1998, Russian history textbook author G. A. Ammona noted that Peter 
I militarised bureaucracy to instil the same level of military discipline in the 
administrative structures of society as in the army and navy.24 Soviet leaders recruited the 
youth into voluntary extracurricular programs, such as the Dobrovol’noye Obshchestvo 
Sodeystviia Armii, Aviatsii i Floti (DOSAAF) or the All Union Pioneers. The youth were 
militarised not only through activities like parachuting and abseiling, but more subtly 
through uniforms, rank badging and their promise in the oath to “love and cherish my 
motherland.”25  
 
20 Odom, “The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society,” 40. 
For more information on the extent of military-educational institutional growth, please 
see page 61-64 of this thesis. 
21  James V. Wertsch, “Narratives as cultural tools in sociocultural analysis: Official 
History in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia,” Ethos 28, No. 4 (2001): 521. 
22 Odom, “The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society,” 37. 
23 Bushnell, “Peasants in Uniform,” 565. 
24 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv., 204. The print-run for this book was 3,000. G. A. 
Ammona was a historian who worked primarily on Russia’s navy.  
25  Odom, “The ‘militarisation’ of Soviet society,” 34-44; Simes, “The Military and 
militarism,” 140; Keep, “Military Style of the Romanov Rulers,” 62. 
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Throughout this thesis, a core discourse within the Russian cultural landscape was 
this need for Russia to defend itself against aggressive neighbours. Educational 
discourses added to this societal discourse. The Soviet Union’s retelling of the Great 
Patriotic War (for example) in both an educative setting and in political discourse 
mythologised the event. It became a historical epic that underlined Soviet military 
capabilities, and acted to justify continued military power. Yet, discourses promoting a 
military-patriotic society were under threat. 
 
Structural Changes 
The collapse of the Soviet Union took place over night. Political and economic 
changes transformed society, with the collapse of the totalitarian state paving the way for 
a new liberal, civic society.26  As noted by Joseph Zajda: 
 
It is difficult to imagine what any ex-soviet citizen felt during this process, let 
alone an alienated history teacher, all suffering from the crisis of identity, after 
decades of a totalitarian regime, one party rule and censorship.27 
 
Yeltsin’s first priority was to change education.28 In 1992, MERF developed a law 
On Education, while the Ministry of General and Professional Education (MGPE) 
undertook the revision of history texts and schooling curriculum throughout the 1990s.29 
There were, however, many elements that stifled these attempts. First, teachers and 
parents provided little support for reform. Second the economic issues of the 1990s posed 
a huge threat to the implementation of these changes.30 In addition, the rising volume of 
revisionist accounts rewriting Russia’s history threatened current policy objectives of the 
 
26  Joseph Zajda, “Russian History Textbooks: An Analysis of Historical Narratives 
depicting key events,” Curriculum and Teaching 28, No. 2 (2013): 73. 
27 Ibid. 
28  Ben Eklof, “Introduction – Russian Education: the Past and the Present,” in 
Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects, ed. by Ben Eklof, 
Larry E. Holmes and Vera Kaplan (Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005), 7; Yeltsin Center, f. 8 op. 
1 d. 1 l. 1-3 11th July 1991. 
29 Joseph Zajda, “Globalisation, Ideology and History School Textbooks: The Russian 
Federation,” in Nation-building and history education in a global culture, ed. by Joseph 
Zajda (New York: Springer, 2015), 5; Zajda, “Russian History Textbooks,” 75. 
The Ministry of General and Professional Education worked under the auspicies of 
MERF. 
Bagger, “The study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet Identity Crisis,” 120-121. 
30 Eklof, “Introduction – Russian Education,” 7. 
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Russian Federation (in Chechnya for example) and proved a liability to the legitimacy of 
their use of history in contemporary nation-building efforts. As early as 1995, State Duma 
representatives and veteran organisations called for the re-establishment of a military-
patriotic education and in 1998, the state began to officially retake control over textbooks. 
The number of textbooks approved for use in schools got smaller and smaller each year.31  
Gorbachev’s reforms turned Russia’s education system upside down. First, 
debates emerged questioning the truth behind the historical discourses presented in soviet 
textbooks.32 In 1988, school examinations were cancelled on the basis that what the 
students had learnt could not be considered real history.33 These claims however, were 
met with much public disagreement, especially in the media.34 Despite this disagreement, 
authorities moved to reform the educational system. The first textbooks of the post-Soviet 
era were published from 1991 onwards.35 Many historians making an effort to rewrite 
these histories faced criticism from the press.36  
While tasked with the job of creating new syllabi that reflected the new Russian 
system, teachers and textbook publishers lacked direction. Teachers were required to 
reject the previous Soviet model of teaching.37 While waiting for new textbooks to be 
published, they searched for alternatives.38 As a result, teachers often used translated 
foreign textbooks on the topic of the Soviet Union or simply continued to refer to old 
 
31 Natalia Potapova, “Normativity in Russian History Education: Political Patterns and 
National History Textbooks,” Journal of Social Sciences of Education 14, No. 1 (2015): 
49-50. 
32  Wertsch, “Narratives as cultural tools in sociocultural analysis,” 519; Volodina, 
“Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR,” 182; Nelson, “History as 
Ideology,” 58-59. 
33  Wertsch, “Narratives as cultural tools in sociocultural analysis,” 521; Volodina, 
“Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR,” 182; Vera Kaplan, “History 
teaching in Post-Soviet Russia: Coping with antithetical traditions,” in Educational 
Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects, ed. by Ben Eklof, Larry E. 
Holmes and Vera Kaplan (Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005), 247. 
34 Wertsch, “Narratives as cultural tools in sociocultural analysis,” 519. 
35 Ibid, 521-522. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Kaplan, “History teaching in Post-Soviet Russia,” 248-249. 
38 Nelson, “History as Ideology,” 59. 
 142 
Soviet History books.39 This was also the case for schools facing financial trouble. In 
some cases schools were unable to afford the newly available textbooks.40  
The financial issues facing schools also affected teachers. Teachers were often 
poorly paid and at risk of losing their jobs to school closures.41 The situation in higher 
education was also poor. As noted by Bagger, “In general the policy was to try and retain 
old teaching staff as far as possible.” Teachers were expected to adapt their previous 
specialisms to the new curriculars that were developed.42 There is no evidence to suggest 
that Soviet teachers were forcibly removed from their posts in favour of a new post-Soviet 
teaching cohort – in fact, it seems quite the opposite. However, teachers from the Soviet 
period needed to adapt (fairly quickly) to new conditions within Russia. These changes 
included transforming traditional teaching strategies and improving the diversity of their 
content within their classrooms. On 13 April 1992, a decree ‘On the development of 
humanities education’ suggested the retraining and advanced training of humanities 
teachers was put forward. It is unclear, however, if this training was mandatory.43 Some 
teachers faced abuse from former students who were not pleased by claims they had been 
deceived.  
Soviet educational practices continued in the formative period of the Russian 
federation because of economic issues, which stifled attempts to revolutionise Russian 
pedagogy. Teachers from the Soviet era, who were forced to adapt their specialisms with 
little to no additional training reverted back to the traditional pedagogical system that they 
had used in the Soviet period, recycling old textbooks and teaching methods. This enabled 
the continued presence of militarised discourses in post-Soviet educational discourses, as 
teachers adapted their traditional knowledge to the new Russian landscape – Soviet 
textbooks promoted patriotic-militarised discourses.  
 
39 Vyacheslav Karpov and Elena Lisovskaya, “Educational change in ta time of social 
revolution: The case of Post-Communist Russia in Comparative Perspective,” in 
Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects, ed. by Ben Eklof, 
Larry E. Holmes and Vera Kaplan (Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005), 24. 
40 Bagger, “The study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet identity crisis,” 120-
121. 
41  Catherine Merridale, “Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 38, No. 1 (2003): 21. 
42 Bagger, “The study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet identity crisis,” 121. 
43 G. Burbulis, “O razvitii gumanitarnogo obrazovaniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Pravo, 
13 April 1992, accessed 20 February 2021, 
http://ips.pravo.gov.ru/?doc_itself=&backlink=1&nd=102015761&page=1&rdk=1#I0. 
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As for textbook publishers, Viacheslav R. Leshchiner and David I. Poltorak note: 
 
Textbook publishers do not know what manuals to prepare for the market. They 
are no longer sure of permanent state orders for textbooks because the system for 
distributing textbooks by the state is still being questioned.44 
 
 Perestroika offset an era of pluralism in Russia’s education system. While 
teachers were given more autonomy over the materials they could employ in their classes, 
they also had more materials to work with. Several publishing houses emerged in the late 
Soviet/ early post-Soviet period, competing to penetrate the education market. 45 
Unfortunately, some textbooks got it wrong. Textbooks published by the SOROS 
foundation, for example, were criticised for its anti-Russian, pro-western stance.46 One 
example was Aleksander Kreder’s 1995 history textbook, Noveyshaia istoriia. XX vek.47 
As noted by Volodina, following her participation in a radio show where she 
complimented the work of educators associated with the SOROS foundation, like Kreder, 
she received a lot of criticism. She claimed that many people, especially older 
generations, “expressed intense hatred for Kreder’s book, characterising it as an “anti-
Russian zionist plot.”48 According to his critics, Kreder muted the role of the Soviet 
Union in the Second World War victory – who simply wanted to show students a history 
not already present in Russian history textbooks. 49  Such views led to some local 
governments prohibiting the adoption of Kreder’s book into schools. As noted in October 
1997 by Kommersant, Voronezh regional duma was one example of a local government 
that recommended against using Kreder’s book. 50 The article in Kommersant stated:  
 
Their decision notes that this textbook, being biased in the selection of historical 
facts, anti-Russian in its spirit and content, belittles the history of the Fatherland 
and gives a distorted idea of the history of Russia, does not instill in students a 
 
44 Viacheslav R. Leshchiner and David I. Poltorak, “The Standard for History Education 
in Russia’s Schools,” The History Teacher 27, No. 3 (1994): 317-318. 
45 Kaplan, “History teaching in post-Soviet Russia,” 247. 
46 Bagger, “The study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet identity crisis,” 120-
121. 
47 Aleksander Kreder (1947-2000) was a Russian historian. 
48 Volodina, “Teaching history in Russia after the collapse of the USSR,” 183. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Olga Rachkova and Vladimir Danshin, “Uchebnik noveyshey istorii popal v istoriyu,” 
Kommersant, 31 October 1997, No. 188, 4. 
Rachkova and Danshin’s article noted that MERF still placed Kreder’s 1995 textbook on 
its list of recommended textbooks.  
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sense of civic consciousness and patriotism. The deputies refer to the fact that 
only a few lines are devoted to the Great Patriotic War in Kreder's "Recent 
History", Lenin is mentioned only once, Stalin - twice.51 
 
Russia’s 1992 law On Education set a number of educational standards, in the aim 
that they be applied by 1994. These standards, in relation to history education, included: 
• The accumulation by students of the basics of the history of mankind from 
ancient to modern times, including mankind's social, spiritual and ethical 
experiences;  
• The development of students' ability to interpret events from present day life 
or from the past in terms of historical analysis (their uniqueness and/or unity 
with other historical phenomena);  
• Helping students to form their own ethical values through the study of the 
historical experience of mankind, the ideas of humanism, patriotism, human 
rights, and democracy; 
• Developing students' interest in and respect for the culture of their own and 
other countries, showing them the necessity to retain and multiply the cultural 
legacy of humanity.52 
 
The educational standards not only outlined the skills students would harness 
during their time in education but also highlighted key core values that would underscore 
Russian historical education.  Since history education is “often the prime curricular 
vehicle for official promotion of the national ‘self,’” the value-driven nature of the 
educational standards demonstrated a concerted effort of the state to use education as a 
nation/ identity-builder. 53  The values were driven by a number of key aims that 
underscored reforms made in the early 1990s. When developing the law, the Minister of 
Education for Russia between 1990 and 1992, Eduard Dneprov (1936-2015), promoted 











52 Leshchiner and Poltorak, “The standard for History Education in Russia’s schools,” 
318-320. 
53 Ismailov and Ganieva, “In search for the Russian national identity,” 269. 
54 Karpov and Lisovskaya, “Educational Change in the time of Social Revolution,” 27. 
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Regionalisation and De-ideologisation 
This section first focuses on the tenet of regionalisation. Then it outlines the 
process and (un) successful efforts taken to de-ideologise Russia’s educative landscape. 
During the Perestroika years, representation of Russia’s diverse ethnic landscape was a 
dominant topic of discussion. At an All-Union conference on historical education in 
Estonia in 1988, for example, delegates called for more classroom hours dedicated to the 
teaching of regional history. This proposal was in opposition to Russia’s state mandated 
history, known as “History of the Fatherland,” which centered largely on Russia’s history 
prior to the Soviet state, and then the Soviet Union – where the regional populations of 
both empires played a supportive role. Moscow rejected the proposals. 55  Upon the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the law On Education favoured a new history school 
curriculum that integrated both state and regional histories. As noted by Volodina, Russia 
was initially open to regionalising its history education. There was a suggestion that 
textbooks on history of the Soviet Union could be adapted to the specific histories of the 
national republics and Russia’s ethnic minorities.56 In Tatarstan, for example, regional 
political elites were able to direct the construction of textbooks that covered the local and 
distinctive regional history of the Tatar region.57 10-15 percent of the curriculum was 
meant to be dedicated to regional histories. As noted by Shnirelman, however, schools in 
Tartarstan “alloted as much as 25-50 percent of the course to the history of Tatarstan.”58  
Including ethnic and regional histories in Russia’s historical education system 
sparked much debate. Non-ethnic Russians in Russian regions wanted to dedicate more 
time to their regional history. However, MERF felt that the unequal growth of regional 
histories would pit non-ethnic Russians against ethnic Russians, in the non-ethnic Russian 
regions like Chechnya and Tatarstan. On the other hand, teachers and educators were 
worried that the exclusion of ethnic minorities from textbooks would further marginalise 
these non-ethnic Russian communities from ethnic Russian communities. This is a 
particularly important issue to deal with, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Gorbachev’s democratisation reforms, as documented in chapter two, influenced a 
number of independence movements. In 1991, Chechnya (a region within Russia) also 
 
55 Shnirelman, “Stigmatised by history or by historians?” 112. 
Kaplan, “History teaching in Post-Soviet Russia,” 250. 
56 Kaplan, “History teaching in Post-Soviet Russia,” 251. 
57 Volodina, “Teaching history in Russia after the collapse of the USSR,” 185-186. 
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claimed independence. Many media discourses justified Russia’s military intervention in 
the Chechen region on the basis that ethnic Russians were under threat. The debate 
surrounding the inclusion and exclusion of ethnic, regional histories in historical 
discourses (and the objectives surrounding these discussions) were focused on achieving 
a balance that would hinder conflict between ethnic and non-ethnic Russians wherever 
they were located. In the end, textbooks acted on the recommendations of the MERF, to 
include a balance of Universal, Russian and regional histories in a number of ways.59 This 
was completed to hinder conflict between different ethnicities, yet the continued use of 
“othering” techniques in educational textbooks ensured students remained open and 
exposed to discourses on external and internal threats, the need to remain alert and united 
against adversity, adding to cultural militarisation during this time. These changes 
occurred during the time of Glasnost, a period of relative openness.  
Glasnost provided a platform for people to speak freely about any topic. The term 
was first introduced to create a level of transparency between the state and its people. One 
of the main tasks of the Communist state in the 1980s was to de-ideologise the education 
system. 60  In 1994, the Minister of Education, A. M. Vodianskii wrote that the de-
ideologisation of the educational system was a failure, and merely a process that rid the 
educational system of communist tropes.61  In 1995, textbook authors A. A. Danilov and 
S. V. Leonov confirmed the de-communisation of Russian historical textbooks. In the 
foreword of their textbook, they acknowledged the process of de-ideologisation which 
began in 1985, and claimed, “Unlike previous textbooks on history of the USSR, which 
were reduced in many respects to the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), this course is free from the super-ideological “Marxist-Leninist” concept of 
history, the artificial training of the revolutionary movement and the Bolshevik party.”62 
 
59 Ibid, 112-114. 
60 Kaplan, “History Teaching in Post-Soviet Russia,” 248-249. 
61 Ibid, 254. 
62 A. A. Danilov and S. V. Leonov, Istoriia Rossii v XX veke: Teotricheskii kurs (Moscow 
University of Humanities, Moscow, 1995), 3-4. This book has a print run of 200. 
Alexander Anatolievich Danilov (born 1954) is a Soviet and Russian historian. He has 
written a number of school textbooks, is an award holder of the Honoured Scientist of the 
Russian Federation and has held a number of high-ranking posts in Russian society. For 
example, from 1993-2014, he was Deputy Chairman of the Scientific and Methodological 
Council of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation. Sergey Viktorovich 
Leonov (born 1961) is a soviet and Russian historian with a specialism in the History of 
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While Danilov and Leonov removed the communist ideology from their textbook, it did 
not go unnoticed that the removal of one ideology was replaced with another, militarism. 
Known as militaristic nationalism, the relationship between militarism and ideology in 
this sense “encourages polarisation in which one group is defined as being opposite to the 
‘other,’” whereby those who are not Russian or Soviet take on the role of the enemy. In 
doing so, this heightens a sense of nationalism amongst Russian students.63  
 Many of the textbooks under review in this chapter harboured pro-militaristic 
tendencies. They vilified the enemy, created images of a hostile world and campaigned 
for a strong military in the view that a weak Russia has always lost out in previous wars. 
Scholars of education widely accept ideology as an indispensable component of schooling 
and especially textbooks.64 With reference to Russian education, Natalia Potapova claims 
that, “textbooks enable expression of prejudice in a normative situation in which 
expression of prejudice is usually prohibited.”65 This is because these “expression[s] of 
prejudice” fulfill the state’s desired objective to produce a positive image of the country’s 
history. This ideology is part of a national identity building process to instil students with 
attributes desirable to the government and to inform the future policy aims of the Russian 
Federation.66  Scholars like Ben Eklof even claim that the government aimed to use 
schools as the main forum for changing society.67 Some changes to Russia’s historical 
education were vast. For one, Russia’s historical education, in an attempt to unite Post-
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Soviet Russia with pre-1917 Russia, saw a renewed interest in religious history.68 This 
was a noticeable phenomenon in a number of historical textbooks under review in this 
chapter. For example, Dvornichenko et al. 1999 school textbook emphasised the role of 
Christianity in the founding of the Kievan Rus state. 69  At the same time, Russia’s 
historical education mirrored that of the Soviet Union. From 1994, Russia’s government 
took a more “hands on” approach, especially in regards to youth patriotism. For example, 
Yeltsin stated that Russia’s youth should be familiar with the Russian constitution.70 In 
1998, the government sought more control over the narratives within the textbooks.71  
Democratisation threatened Russia’s pursuits in neighbouring regions. Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, conflicts broke out in the near abroad as inter-ethnic 
tensions within these countries peaked. Russia justified its role in the region as part of a 
“peacekeeping” mission and to ensure the security of Russia’s borders. Economic issues, 
as a result of shock therapy, alongside the revelation of Red Army atrocities during the 
Great Patriotic War, placed the military into a precarious position.72  How could the 
government justify diverting money towards the military when people could not afford 
basic foods, and an increasing number of people were unable to pay for housing? Russian 
historical educational textbooks, which for the most part emphasised the idea of Russia 
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as a historical besieged fortress, helped legitimise the necessity of a strong military and 
Russia’s justified role as a stabiliser in the Post-Soviet region.  
 
The downfall of prominent Soviet discourses. 
As noted by Leshchiner and Poltorak in 1994, Russia’s school system faced very 
serious difficulties in the initial post-Soviet period. The democratisation reforms of the 
Perestroika era, alongside the economic chaos of the 1990s propelled Russia’s education 
system into a state of unknown.73  Glasnost threatened conventional narratives of Russian 
history in history textbooks as it had done in the Soviet media. As information regarding 
the true extent of Stalinist and Soviet suppression arose, scholars began to revise 
dominant discourses of Soviet greatness.74 R. W. Davies highlighted a situation in 1987 
whereby student Dmitri Yurasov challenged a Lecturer of Stalinism, Yuri Borisov, with 
new and shocking evidence about the repressions. As a result, Borisov prepared a new 
textbook for publication in 1988 that included a section on Russia in the 1930s, which 
was “unambiguously anti-Stalinist.”75 Second, investigation into the numbers of deaths 
in the Great Patriotic War and subsequent wars initiated a debate around the nature of the 
victory of the Great Patriotic War. To what extent could it be considered a victory since 
so many people died?76 In their 1995 textbook, Danilov and Leonov outlined the war’s 
impact on loss of life. They also noted that the Great Patriotic War destroyed factories, 
villages and infrastructure, which had a profound impact on the national wealth of the 
country. The author asked at the end of the section, “Why, in your opinion, were human 
losses so great?”77 
Other authors like Viktor Suvorov wrote revisionist materials on Soviet strategy 
in the Second World War.78 In his 1987 piece, Icebreaker: Who started the Second World 
War? Suvorov argued that Joseph Stalin already had plans in place to stage an offensive 
attack against Nazi Germany in 1941. His work was met with both praise and criticism. 
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Authors like Yuri Gorkov and Valeri Danilov, who found new information in the 
archives, which documented similar ideas, supported him.79 While facing widespread 
criticism, these pieces of work inspired a canon of literature seeking to revisit Soviet 
strategy on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Their findings threatened the militarisation 
of society, as they reframed the history of the Great Patriotic War, which was previously 
shaped by military-patriotism and formed a basis of Soviet society and legitimacy.  
The initial wave of revisionist literature was naturally condemned by a number of 
veteran groups on the eve of the 1995 Victory Day Parade. In March 1995, a letter from 
the Novosibirsk Veteran Organisation, addressed to the “Young warriors of the Siberian 
Military District” [Novosibirsk], stated: 
 
Today there are some false teachings and the new appearance of ‘historians’ who 
are trying to rewrite the history of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World 
War as a whole. They falsify events, distort the course and outcome of the 
war…it’s a lie and a scoundrel!...The current youth should know not to be 
deceived. The truth of the history of the Great Patriotic War is that it’s the victory 
won by the Soviet people and its Armed Forces…this story cannot be blackened 
and crossed out. As you know, people who have lost respect for their past have 
no future.80 
 
A rise in revisionist publications and the 50th anniversary of the end of the Great 
Patriotic War furthered conversations about the general state of militarisation in Russian 
society and the youth’s role within it. Discussions within the State Duma on the issue of 
the military-patriotic spirit of the youth went far beyond the formal education setting. 
Discussion participants called for connections to be made between the youth and the 
veteran community, hoping it would reignite patriotic passion within Russia’s youth 
(many of whom were evading the draft in Chechnya). Russia’s youth, as the future 
generations of Russia, were considered the bridge between past and present. For some 
State Duma officials and veteran organisations, the repatriotisation of Russia’s youth 
ensured the continued popularisation of a patriotic identity, with the belief that it would 
restore national pride in Russia and the youth’s willingness to protect it. For example, in 
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80 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 29-30, March 1995. 
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June 1994 Russian Prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin outlined a draft programme for 
the preparation and conduct of the 50th anniversary celebrations.81 He noted that the 
anniversary should be used to “consolidate society, educate the younger generation of 
love for the motherland, a sense of responsibility for the fate of Russia.” 82 
Chernomyrdin’s statements of patriotism and the defense of Russia as a form of civic 
duty highlight concerted efforts to revive a military patriotic education in society. 
In February 1995, State Duma officials and veteran organisations discussed the 
topic of new historians “blackening the history of the Great Patriotic War.”83 Documents 
noted the ousting of “patriotic and military education from educational institutions” and 
called for new initiatives to counteract and challenge such accounts.84 In March 1995, the 
veterans’ organisation of Novosibirsk, for example, called on the youth to ignore this new 
history, claiming, “We are aware that not everything is smooth in our history. However, 
this story cannot be blackened and crossed out.”85  Such blackening highlighted the 
importance of a patriotic narrative for the future security of the country. An appeal to the 
Heroes of the Soviet Union in the War years, Knights of the Order of Glory and 
Parliaments and Governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States during a 50th 
anniversary jubilee meeting, noted: 
 
In modern conditions, the importance of a military-patriotic education of youth 
is growing. Everyone sees our duty in doing this… to pass on our life experience 
to them. [The] Youth [should be] proud of his Fatherland, [and] if necessary, be 
ready to protect the material and spiritual values of his homeland…We, veterans, 
consider inadmissible the distortion and falsification of the heroic history of the 
Great Patriotic War. Our whole history testifies that the strength and invincibility 
of [the] fraternal peoples [is] in their unity and friendship. A convincing 
confirmation of this is [in] our global historical victory over Fascism.86  
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While the changes made to educational textbooks were not significant, calls for a 
revised patriotic education were reflected in some of them. Questions posed in books like 
V. A. Potseluev’s 1997 and A. A. Kreder’s 1996 history textbook included, “What other 
examples of heroism of the Red Army, do you know?” and “How do you prove the 
Soviet-German front remained the main front of the Second World War?” 87  These 
questions matched those identified by Zajda in Putin-era textbooks. He claims that such 
questions were designed to reinforce the importance of the war in society.88 Aleksandra 
Ishimova’s 1996 children’s history book depicted patriotism in a difference sense, noting 
that it was impossible to count the times Russian soldiers had shown their courage.89 
Emphasis was placed on identifying and recognising the victories of the Soviet Union in 
the Great Patriotic War and other historical exploits, rather than the shortcomings.  
The reconfiguration of Russia’s historical education was accompanied by calls to 
connect generations. State Duma Deputy V. Volkov promoted the creation of links 
between Russia’s youth and the military, claiming, “It’s time to restore the connection of 
times.” He suggested reviving activities that saw veterans visiting neighbourhoods and 
schools, where children honoured the veterans with concerts and parties.90 The Veterans 
Organisation of Novosibirsk suggested, “Prepare to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 
Great Victory with dignity, as a national holiday, show your recognition and respect for 
the older generation… take your fate into your own hands.”91 The calls made by Volkov 
 
87 V. A. Potseluev, Istoriia Rossii XX Stoletia (Osnovnye problemy) (Moscow: Vlados, 
1997), 283; A. Kreder, Noveyshaia Istoriia XX vek: Uchebnik dlia osnovnoy shkoly, 
(Moscow: Tsentr Gumanitarnogo Obrazovaniia, 1996), 144. (Please note, this edition of 
Kreder’s textbook is different to the one published by the SOROS foundation).  
Vladimir Alekseevich Potseluev is a Russian historian. He has written history textbooks 
since the Perestroika years. In the foreword of his 1997 textbook, he calls the ideological 
hold that the Soviet Union had over its people, a “mystery.” This book has a print-run of 
30,000. This book was “Recommended by the ministry of General and Professional 
Education of the Russian Federation as a textbook for students in higher educational 
institutions.” A. Kreder’s textbook has a print-run of 40,000. Kreder (1947-2000) was a 
contemporary historian interested in global history. 
88 Zajda, “Russian History Textbooks,” 14. 
89  Aleksandra Ishimova, Istoriia Rossii v Rasskazakh Dlia Detei, (Moscow: AST 
publishing house, 1996), 121. The print-run for this particular edition was 15,000. 
Aleksandra Ishimova (1804-1881) was a famous children’s book author. The first edition 
of this book was published in St. Petersburg in 1837 and in six parts. The book was 
awarded the Demidov Prize a non-state prize for outstanding contribution to science. The 
Demidov Prize was reinstated in 1993.  
90 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 28, 19 April 1995. 
91 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 29-30, March 1995. 
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and the Veteran organisation were ones echoing the suggestions made in the draft 
programme established by Chernomyrdin in June 1994. Section Three of the programme, 
titled “Advocacy and cultural events” called for the promotion of the military and labour 
exploits, of those within the Armed Forces and in supportive roles, in the media, in 
literature and art and in other forms of active work. This promotion was organised to 
educate the population, “especially among young people, a sense of pride in the perfect 
older generations during the Great Patriotic War.”92 
Connecting the youth to veterans is an effective tool of political manoeuvring and 
initiative in the militarisation of the younger generations. Similarly to studies focusing on 
the rise of the Siloviki (Russian politicians with a military background), the veterans’ 
views have been shaped by their experiences of war. Their experiences within the Armed 
Forces are the experiences they would pass down to the younger generations. Such 
rhetoric facilitated the militarisation of society as it encouraged, as Danilova suggests, 
the support for the military cohort. While negative images of the war arose in educative 
and commemorative landscapes, these pictures were accompanied by ideas of duty. 
Russia’s youth, for example, were called upon by the Veterans’ organisation of 
Novosibirsk to continue the sacrifices of their ancestors. They said, “In memory of the 
fallen [in the name of] the Fatherland, for their military and labour exploits, now living 
as veterans…love the motherland…die and protect it.”93  
Discussions within the State Duma and concerns raised by Veterans’ 
organisations were driven by a rise in revisionist literature, rewriting the history of the 
Great Patriotic War. These accounts questioned the victory of the war when considering 
the death figures, and threatened the viewpoint that the Soviet Union was vulnerable when 
it was invaded by Nazi Germany. In response, political figures, members of the State 
Duma and veterans rallied to revive the military-patriotic spirit of the nation. As 
documented in this section, anniversary events, including the popularisation of the 
veterans’ exploits across various domains, were aimed at Russia’s younger generations. 
They believed their participation in these events would raise youth patriotism, national 
pride in Russia and instil a sense of civic duty to protect their country. This is particularly 
 
92 Chernomyrdin, “Ob utverzhdenii Programmy podgotovki I provedeniia prazdnovaniia 
50-letiia Pobedy.”  
93 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 29-30, March 1995. 
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salient in chapter five, which addresses the memory of the Great Patriotic war in the 1995 
Victory Day parade. 
 
HISTORICAL EDUCATION AS A VEHICLE OF MILITARISATION 
 
 On a global scale, schooling systems are considered the main and trusted 
institution for the education of youth, with teachers, as specialists, holding a high level of 
authority. As trusted spaces of knowledge, the information that passes through these 
institutions are regarded and accepted as the truth by the majority of students.94 Educators 
and school systems bring past experiences into the process of learning, with their 
experiences influencing how the teachers and the students interact with new ideas and 
events. 95  This process, however, while important, is only partial. In formal state 
education, the state has some control over the content and curriculum undertaken by the 
students.96 Like many other countries around the world, Russia created a curriculum that 
would best reflect its present and future goals. During the Second World War, Japan’s 
educational system was utilised as a common instrument for militarisation, socialising 
society’s youth to support an aggressive worldview.97  
Indonesia as a case study is slightly different. Even after the fall of Suharto’s 
military regime in 1998 and the implementation of a civilian government, militaristic 
discourse largely remained dominant in historical textbooks. The most interesting aspect 
of the Indonesian case, which was similar to the continued militarisation of society under 
Yeltsin’s administration, was that militaristic discourse had been so prevalent under the 
Suharto regime that such a tradition could not be undone immediately under the following 
civilian leadership. Hieronymus Purwanta suggested the continuation of militarised 
 
94 Marcia Baxter Magolda, Making their own war: Narratives for Transforming Higher 
Education to promote self-development (Virginia: Stylus Publishing, 2004), 236. 
95 While on the topic of children’s book authors, Robert Sutherland claims that books are 
shaped by the authors’ values and world view and that events may be reflective not only 
of the authors’ view but of culture at large. See for example: Robert Sutherland, “Hidden 
Persuaders: Political Ideologies in Literature for Children,” Children’s Literature in 
Education 16, No. 3 (1985): 143-157. 
96  Ekaterina Lenintova, and Jim Butterfield, “History Education and History 
Remembrance in Contemporary Russia,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, 
No. 2  (2010): 2. 
97  Saburo Ienaga, “The Glorification of War in Japanese Education,” International 
Security 18, No. 3 (1993-1994): 116-117. 
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discourses beyond Suharto’s military regime was there to promote “the power of arms 
and supports violent means of conflict resolution by glorifying the military.”98 Textbooks 
were the material structures of this ideology, in which discourses were established and 
perpetuated. 
This thesis conceptualises education as a tool of state-led militarisation in post-
Soviet Russia. As sources of information promoting an “approved knowledge” of the 
state, the educational discourses acted as official stories of Russia’s historical past.99 
Scholars of education in Post-Soviet Russia claim that efforts to reform and reaffirm a 
militaristic-patriotic education started in the Putin era. Zajda, for example, notes that 
efforts to create a more nationalistic education system were motivated by revisionist 
accounts of Russia’s participation in the Great Patriotic War. He claimed that these 
accounts lessened Russia’s role in the victory over Nazi Germany.100 However, these 
efforts appeared much earlier in the chronology of the Post-Soviet Russian State. These 
revisionist accounts, while impactful to some extent, did not topple the dominant 
narratives present in the Soviet period – i.e. the victory of the Great Patriotic War. This 
allowed for a greater re-patriotisation of education during the Yeltsin years, which 
 
98  Hieronymus Purwanta, “Militaristic Discourse in Secondary Education History 
Textbooks during and after the Soeharto Era,” Journal of Educations Media, Memory and 
Society 9, No. 1 (2017): 36. 
A similar phenomenon occurred in France following the Franco-Prussian War (1870-
1871). Fearing the demise of French Society, historian Ernest Lavisse wrote a number of 
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Germany held similar mobilising techniques and were vastly mobilised. The stories in 
these books were a reflection of the interests of the authors who, usually from aristocratic 
communities, supported German Imperialism. The First World War catapulted the war 
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Nationalists and Militarists: German Youth Literature in the First World War,” German 
Studies Review 27, No. 3 (2004): 579-582; Denis M. Provencher and Luke L. Eilderts, 
“The Nation According to Lavisse: Teaching Masculinity and Male Citizenship in Third-
Republic France,” French Cultural Studies 18, No. 1 (2007): 31-32. 
99 Zheng Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical 
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underpinned the militarisation of society under current Russian President Vladimir 
Putin.101  
 
Conceptualising the military-educational complex in Post-Soviet Russia 
 In Post-Soviet Russia, there was a clear military-educational complex. The 25 
textbooks under review in this chapter focus on Russian history. They encompass 
different historical periods, with some textbooks concentrating on the 20th century, and 
others covering Russian history from the 9th century up to the 20th century. As noted by 
Danilov and Leonov in the foreword to their 1995 textbook, the 20th century was an 
unprecedented time not just for Russia, but also around the world. This led to an influx 
of textbooks written solely about the 20th century. However, these historians also wrote 
exclusively about the 20th century to correct the communist ideological frames that 
existed in the Soviet period. 102  
Military conquests, external threats and stories of heroes dominated historical 
textbooks. Potapova notes that textbooks in the Putin era are “lessons in patriotism.” She 
claims that authors write with the aim of forging civic solidarity, or to pull on the 
emotional strings of its recipients with phrases of “love” for their country and “pride” 
they should feel for their history.103 However, this was a tactic also used in the immediate 
Post-Soviet period. Students were introduced to the history of their “ancestors,” told they 
would be “pleased to find out where and how they lived,” and that they should be “proud 
of the glorious deeds of their ancestors.”104  
Events were evaluated with the values of the author and the wider ideals of the 
state being communicated through the textbooks. Therefore, this chapter is split into two 
sections and will combine evidence of the military-educational complex under the 
subtitles of Politics of Advocacy and Politics of Attack. These headings are classifications 
employed by Robert D. Sutherland, as “ways in which inherent ideologies are 
expressed.”105 The Politics of Advocacy classification is “the upholding of a particular 
 
101 Marina Erokhina and Alexander Skevurev, “Old Heritage and New Trends: School 
History Textbooks in Russia,” in School History Textbooks across Cultures: 
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Books Limited, 2006), 90. 
102 Danilov and Leonov, Istoriia Rossii v XX veke, foreword.  
103 Potapova, “Normativity in Russian History Education,” 50. 
104 Ishimova, Istoriia Rossii v Rasskazakh Dlia Detei, 11. 
105 Sutherland, Hidden Persuaders, 3. 
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view or course of action as valid and right.” It is seen as a method of indoctrination and 
for promoting a specific set of values.106 He uses biographies of famous people to state 
that the Politics of Advocacy in this sense, and the promotion of a patriotic narrative, 
would omit negative parts of their record that would overshadow the greatness of their 
achievements.107 The Politics of Attack would be an attack on anything that conflicted 
with the author’s view and in the case of Russia’s education textbooks, the view of the 
state. Sutherland uses the discrediting of characters as an example to explain his point.108 
The chapter does not introduce a section under the title, the Politics of Assent. This term 
was conceptualised by Sutherland as the point where the author confirms the dominant 
narratives of the state. In Sutherland’s understanding, the Politics of Assent highlights the 
normalisation of an establishing ideology, through the notion that the author has 
internalised that ideology without question.109 The classifications used in this chapter 
help identify dominant discourses, one glorifying certain aspects of the state, while the 
other vilifies anything that threatens the dominant discourse. In Russia, militarised 
discourses were prominent under the themes Politics of Advocacy and Politics of Attack. 
Brave heroes, defending the motherland against hostile invaders served to glorify the role 
of historic figures performing military deeds, while ‘othering’ reaffirmed the Russian 
perception that the ‘world is a dangerous place.’ Both ensured that Russia’s youth 
remained exposed to military-patriotic discourses, which popularised defence readiness, 
sacrifice and state loyalty.  
However, textbook authors also attempted to remove themselves from the content 
of the textbooks, by providing a number of contesting views and challenging the students 
to think critically. Danilov and Leonov’s 1995 textbook showed the darker sides of the 
Great Patriotic War (by showing loss of life) in its content. In addition, Danilov and 
Leonov asked students; “What problems of the history of war need, in your opinion,  
rethinking and re-evaluation?”110 This question pushes students to reconsider issues with 
Soviet literature on the history of the war. This threatened (to some extent) the military-
patriotic discourses that were common in Soviet textbooks, because it promoted the use 
of critical analysis among its students. However, they were also asked to maintain a 
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critical line. Danilov and Leonov also asked: “What new points of view of these problems 
in recent literature seem unacceptable to you, and why?”111 In this sense, the textbooks 
did not work to de-militarise society, but to raise the critical awareness of the youth. 
Calling on students to identify what histories should be reframed and discussing issues 
with new revisionist historical discourses did not diminish the glorious messages 
associated with Great Patriotic War history.  
This chapter does not include a section under the title, Politics of Assent. This is 
because the narratives under the Politics of Advocacy and Politics of Attack are those that 
are already in line with the status quo – and the prominent acceptance of such narratives 
highlights its establishment as an ideological norm. In this chapter, the Politics of 
Advocacy will demonstrate a clear desire of educational authors to valorise Russia 
“heroes.” The Politics of Attack section will show that textbook authors played a salient 
role in the demonisation of the enemy, and the creation of the image of Russia as a 
besieged fortress.  
 
POLITICS OF ADVOCACY 
 
 Russian historical textbook authors of the 1990s promoted a largely patriotic 
image of the military. While of course, revisionist accounts threatened the dominant 
discourse of Soviet victory during the Great Patriotic War, Russia’s history was not solely 
a history of the Great Patriotic War, or one dependent on Soviet history.112 Actually, 
historical textbooks of the 1990s recognised a longer history of Russia, from its early 
conception in the 9th century up to the modern day. It was a motivation of the state to 
unite post-Soviet Russia with the Russia that existed prior to the Bolshevik Revolution.113  
As a result, religious history became a forum where historians of the post-Soviet 
era were able to reject aspects of the Soviet regime; i.e. state-sponsored atheism.114 
Historians paid particular attention to how important Christianity was to the creation of 
the Russian state. Some accounts noted that Christianity civilised the early Eastern Slavic 
tribes, and that key figures like Olga and Prince Vladimir were those who drove the 
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popularisation of Christianity in the region.115 As noted in Dvornichenko et al.’s 1999 
textbook: 
 
It was then (as the Viatichi threat, to Vladimir’s aim to grow his super union, 
enhanced) that Prince Vladimir turned his eyes to Christianity, [as] a religion in 
which the moment of centralisation, monotheism is predominant. In 988, 
Christianity began to be introduced to Russia as a state religion. In Kiev it was 
introduced painlessly with the consent of the national assembly…but in other 
lands it was imposed by force.116  
 
The attention paid to religious history in new Russian textbooks of the 1990s, 
especially those documenting Russian history from the 9th century, demonstrated a 
concerted effort to unite Russian identity with the Orthodox Christian faith. Passages like 
this highlighted a particular departure from the Soviet Union, which promoted scientific-
rationality over religion, in an effort to root Russia’s heritage and origins in the growth 
of Russian orthodoxy. The increasing use of religious figures and tropes in 
commemorative events, for example, alongside the increasing presence of religion, 
strengthened the notion that Russia in the 1990s had made considerable changes in order 
to create distance from its Soviet predecessor.  
Yet, while some changes were made, a number of procedures remained the same. 
For example, Russian leaders and soldiers who participated in military action were 
glorified. In Ammona’s 1998 history textbook for example, Sviatoslav I (943-972) was 
described as a “glorious warrior and murderous ruler.” 117  The contradiction in the 
representation of Sviatoslav is similar to depictions of Stalin. Davies noted that many new 
publications of the 1990s were tested to challenge the Stalinist myth. While many wrote 
about totalitarianism in the Soviet period as a whole, they refused to discuss 
totalitarianism more directly as they believed it would highlight more negative features 
of Stalinist rule. Instead they focused more on the injustices of the Soviet system, and 
spoke more generally on the economic, cultural and social developments made under his 
rule.118 In line with Sutherland’s Politics of Advocacy, the more altruistic and glorious 
deeds of historical figures remained vastly more prominent than their mistakes.119  
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Some authors were more explicit in their aim of outlining Russia’s glorious past. 
As noted by author Nikolai Nikolaevich Golovin in the foreword to his 1992 book on 
Russian history for children, “it is known that children are interested in stories about 
heroes and exploits.”120 The book, which was written and published originally 90 years 
before it was republished in the post-Soviet era claimed, “Russian history is rich with 
examples of heroic deeds and good beginnings.” 121  Golovin, an Imperial Russian 
General, wrote with the purpose of communicating with his readers about the history of 
“love of the homeland and self-sacrifice.” 122  The republishing of the book in 1992 
highlighted continuity between the historical narratives in the educational sector of 
Yeltsin’s Russia and Imperial Russia and an attempted re-rooting of student’s heritage in 
the immediate post-Soviet period.  
Like Golovin’s 1992 book, many other authors of textbooks published in the 
1990s left ample room for discussion of Russia’s militaristic history and the key figures 
involved. In a foreword to V. A. Potseluev 1997 textbook Istoriia Rossii XX Stoletiia, T. 
Bataeva wrote that the author had written a number of original works “on heraldry, 
foreign policy and labour activity of the Soviet people and the heroes of the country.”123 
Ishimova’s 1996 book justified her inclusion of Russia’s militaristic past as a form of 
preparation. Writing on the topic of poor living conditions in the military, she stated that 
one day readers might also need to endure poor living conditions to protect the 
fatherland. 124  Therefore, these textbooks should not only be considered a form of 
education but also socialisation – providing the students with historical information, but 
and preparing them to devote themselves to ensuring the security of its country.125  
 
120 N. N. Golovin, Moia Pervaia Rossiskaia Istoriia v Rasskazakh dlia Detei, (Moscow: 
Terra, 1992), foreword. This edition had a print-run of 50,000. Nikolay Nikolaevich 
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124 Ishimova, Istoriia Rossii v Razzkazakh dlia Detei, 4. 
125 Not all of the textbooks explored in this thesis are as militaristically charged as those 
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People and leaders of the early Kievan Rus era were especially glorified in 
textbook literature for their role in the establishment of the modern Russian landscape. 
Slavs until 862 were defined as “Brave heroes,” and classified as self-sacrificing through 
their willingness to fight neighbours and wild beasts that threatened their neighbours.126 
Rurik, Prince of Novgorod became leader of Kievan Rus in 862.127 Noted as the founder 
of the Russian state, Rurik was characterised as a protective leader who wanted to defend 
the Russian people from hostile opposition. Golovin’s 1992 book stated that Rurik 
ensured “that no one should offend the Russian people.”128 It is clear from the textbooks 
that Rurik not only founded dynastic rule in the region, but also established a foundation 
for further expansion of Kievan Rus. As noted in 1999 by Dvornichenko et al., subsequent 
leaders, for example, have continued to expand the “patchwork empire of Rurikovich.”129 
These textbooks suggest that even during the conception of the modern Russian state, 
leaders of Rus were concerned by external threats. In doing so, these textbooks indicate 
early signs of Russia’s beseiged fortress mentality, and the evolution of the pre-existing 
notion that Russia is a vulnerable country surrounded by hostile neighbours. This 
discourse is only strengthened by historical accounts and evidence that documents 
Russia’s ability to overcome invasions and conquests. This was certainly the experience 
of Oleg and Sviatoslav I. 
Upon Rurik’s death in 879, his son, Igor, was too young to ascend the throne, and 
therefore Oleg became the leader of Kievan Rus.130 While many of Rus’ conquests were 
characterised as defensive, there were of course times in which the leaders of Rus 
performed their own invasions – although, at times, these were framed within the context 
of Rus’ leaders trying to create a buffer zone. This was the case with Oleg, who was 
characterised as being clever. He was known most for his role in the defeat of Kievan 
 
and Russia’s experience of war. However, as is noted throughout the thesis, the textbooks 
do examine other aspects of Russian history also, such as religion, culture, Russian 
leadership and foreign trade.  
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Princes Askold and Dir. Ishimova’s 1996 history book noted that Askold and Dir “loved 
war very much,” depicting them as warmongering princes who posed a threat to the early 
Rus’ state. Oleg defeated them through the use of sly tactics.131 Ammona’s 1998 textbook 
claimed that Oleg travelled to Kiev upon hearing of Kiev’s successful trading structure 
with the East and its control over many southern areas. According to Ammona (1998), 
Oleg told merchants that he wanted to talk to the Princes.132 Ammona’s account supported 
that of Ishimova (1996), who claimed, “Once inside, Oleg’s warriors surrounded the 
people [of Kiev] and claimed he was [the] Prince. The warriors then killed the Princes.”133 
The defeat allowed Rus to expand into Kiev.  
A number of textbooks agree that the people of Kievan Rus characterised Oleg as 
“prophetic.”134 As Skrynnikov wrote in his 1997 textbook, “Oleg was a hero of Kiev 
epics. The annalistic history of his wars with the Greeks is permeated with folklore 
motifs… Kiev epics, retold by the chronicler, described Oleg’s campaign [against the 
Greeks] as a grandiose military enterprise.” 135  It is clear, similar to depictions of 
Sviatoslav I, that the story of Oleg’s cunning scheme to trick Askold and Dir was 
downgraded to satisfy this narrative of a “hero.” Textbook authors muted the violent 
aspects of Oleg’s conquests. This was the case with the depiction of Oleg’s raid into 
Byzantium (907). He was glorified as a hero of Kiev epics, yet as noted in Golovin’s 1992 
book: 
 
From Kiev, Oleg and his soldiers went to fight in the Greek land. On horses and 
on boats, the Russians approached the city of Tsargrad and began to burn houses 
and churches and kill residents. The Greeks got scared and said to Oleg: "Don't 
ruin our city. We'd better give you tribute as much as you want." And the Greeks 
sent him a lot of silver and gold and other expensive things. Oleg made peace with 
them and went back to Kiev with his rich booty, but before leaving, he nailed his 
shield on the gates of Constantinople in memory of his successful campaign.136 
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Skrynnikov’s 1997 textbook, for example, reduced Oleg’s role to crafty tactics. 
Skrynnikov stated, “Oleg outwitted the Greeks.” 137  Ishimova’s 1996 book, while 
acknowledging the sly tactics of Oleg, still characterised him as “brave” and self-
sacrificing.138 In doing so, the authors were trying to promote a better image of Oleg, to 
present him as a worthy hero. These narratives fit within Sutherland’s Politics of 
Advocacy classification, as they popularise a more glorious image of Oleg over the reality, 
which was that Oleg cunningly tricked Askold and Dir and then killed them and was 
brutal in his conquest of Constantinople.  
These textbooks, through the omission of Sviatoslav and Oleg’s dishonourable 
characteristics, demonstrated that they were aiming to create a more positive outlook on 
Russia’s heroes. The popularisation of historical figures from Kievan Rus’ and Imperial 
Russia served the state well. In trying to unite contemporary Russia with Russia pre-1917, 
the state needed to promote recognisable and worthy role models for Russia’s youth that 
created enough distance between the new Russian state and the Soviet period. By 
prioritising attributes that glorified the individual, the textbooks were establishing and 
promoting a set of desirable attributes. It just so happened that these attributes were ones 
of bravery, courage and state loyalty – which matched those being promoted across a 
number of Russia’s societal domains. This would continue beyond Oleg’s reign. 
The Drevylians killed Oleg in 912. His wife Olga succeeded him while his son, 
Sviatoslav I, grew.139 Sviatoslav I was commonly characterised as a “warlike” prince for 
his role in the many conquests and conflicts in his era of rule.140 In her 1996 textbook, 
Ishimova noted that people knew him as “Proud fearless Sviatoslav,” “brave hero” and 
“our hero Sviatoslav.” In accounting his struggles against the Byzantium Empire, she 
claimed, “so bravely did the Russian fight.”141 This notion of Sviatoslav as a fearless 
leader was echoed in other textbooks. During a battle in 971 on the banks of the River 
Danube and within the Dorostol Fortress against the Byzantine Empire, for example, 
 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ishimova, Istoriia Rossii v Rasskazakh dlia Detei, 15. 
139 Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 42. 
140 Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 43. 
V. V. Vedernikov, Istoriia Rossii dlia Uchashchikhsia 10-go klassa: Otvety na 
Ekzamenatsionnye Voprosy, (Volgograd: Bratiia Gruniny, 1997), 4-5. This book has a 
print-run of 2,000. Vladimir Viktorovich Vedernikov is a Soviet-Russian historian. In 
1999 he was working with pupils in Volgograd on an All-Russian competition “Man in 
History. Russia XX Century.” His students took first place. 
141 Ishimova, Istoriia Rossii v Rasskazakh dlia Detei, 21-22. 
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Sviatoslav was noted in the annals as stating, “We shall not shame the Russian land, but 
we will lay bones, for the dead do not have shame” and, “I wanted to die for my fatherland 
and for the children of my sovereign.”142 These messages not only glorified sacrifice in 
war but also provided a role model for students. Sviatoslav, characterised as a brave hero 
for his role as this fearless leader, provided a clear representation for students to follow. 
The use of the term “warlike” highlighted a culture of militarisation in Russia, with the 
view that those with an obsession with the military or military background shaped their 
foreign policy around such militaristic endeavours.143 The glorifying representations of 
Sviatoslav, which mostly surrounded his actions in war, are similar to depictions of key 
figures in chapter four and five on such as Marshal Zhukov. These discourses helped 
contribute toward notions that should a citizen sacrifice themselves through war and show 
similar courage, that they too would be praised in a similar way.  
Sviatoslav was killed under Byzantine Emperor John Tzimiske’s orders. Other 
characters of the early Russian state, such as Prince Vladimir I and Prince Danil 
Romanovich also received similar praise. Vladimir’s era was characterised as “heroic,” 
while Danil’s victory at the Battle of Yaroslav in 1245 was confirmed by the phrase, “But 
great-willed men are a formidable adversary for enemies on their own land.” 144 
Participants in the Neva Battle (1240), including Prince Alexander, were glorified for 
their role in the defeat of Sweden. Ammona’s 1998 textbook claimed, “The actions of the 
talented commander and the heroism of Russian soldiers ensured a quick and glorious 
victory.” He also noted that the victories at the Battle of Neva and Battle of Ice were only 
possible because the Russian people demonstrated, “evidence of the unshakable 
courage.”145 Many of the textbooks, as noted above, place a higher emphasis on leaders 
of the Kievan Rus – perhaps because these figures are well known and can be imagined 
by the Russian population. However, in Ishimova’s (1996) and Ammona’s (1998) 
accounts, ordinary people played a role in the victories that Russia forged.  
 
142  Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 43; Ishimova, Istoriia Rossii v 
Rasskazakh dlia Detei, 21. 
143 The militaristic policies of Peter I have been considered in a similar way to Sviatoslav 
I, as with the other Tsarist leaders, such as Paul I., Nicholas I and Alexander I. Their 
obsession with the military influenced militarism in Russia during the Tsarist Era. For 
more, please see: Keep, “The Military Style of the Romanov Rulers,” 70-71. 
144 Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 49-51. 
145 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii IX-XX v., 74-76. 
 165 
Literature on the Great Patriotic War speaks predominantly of the role of everyday 
Soviet citizens, highlighting a sense of social unity against an adversary.146 This total war 
concept, in regards to support from the home front, is not a phenomenon new to the 20th 
century. As noted in these textbooks, participation from all elements of society, not just 
on the battlefield, was considered important in understanding the Great Patriotic War 
victory. Potseluev’s 1997 textbook, for example, raised the questions, “In what way and 
how much did the rear provide [support] for the front?” and “what was the effectiveness 
of the struggle of Partisan and Underground fighters?”147 These questions promoted the 
effectiveness of the united efforts of the Russian people in the Great Patriotic War, 
strengthening the notion that state loyalty and unity leads to victory. This is a particularly 
salient notion for consideration during the 1990s. The period was tumultuous, at best. 
Support for the President, for the war in Chechnya and for the military was fractured. 
Many scholars argue that this rupture played a role in Russia’s initial loss against 
Chechnya. By highlighting Russia’s unity (on all levels) as a reason for victory, it 
reflected on contemporary matters, suggesting that through unity, Russia could prevail in 
current conflicts. It also humanised the war. Textbook authors were framing the everyday 
Russian person within heroic terms, providing a clear role that Russian students could 
relate to. By emphasising the participation of “courageous” Russians, the audience could 
also imagine their role in the conflict. It bore recognisability to the reader, that anyone, 
even the ordinary Russian people, could be acknowledged should they show the same 
courage. 
Accounts of brave Russians continued past the 13th century.  The reign of Peter I 
was greatly documented. As noted by authors of the late 17th century, a comprehensive 
modernisation programme was underway in Russia. Developments were made on 
improving trade and foreign policy for example, however, it still lagged behind much of 
Western Europe.148  As observed in Dvornichenko et al’s 1999 textbook: 
 
The country needed a strong personality, which would possess not only supreme 
power, but also an understanding of the need for change, courage and decisiveness 
 
146 Richard Bidlack and Nikita Lomagin, The Leningrad Blockade, 1941-1944: A New 
Documentary History from the Soviet Archives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012), 1-3; Anna Reid, Leningrad: Tragedy of a City Under Siege, 1941-1944 (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2012), 3-4. 
147 Potseluev, Istoriia Rossii XX Stoletiia, 308. 
148 Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 149-150. 
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of action, intelligence, energy and talent… Such detail appeared on the historical 
stage in the person of Peter I.149 
  
Noted as a “great reformer” and praised and thanked for his creation of the 
powerful navy and “energetic measures” to restructure and rearm the army, which 
resulted in victories at war, Peter I was considered the father of modern Russia.150 Various 
textbook authors noted that the transformative activities of Peter I “finally undermined” 
Sweden’s military power from 1713 until the end of the Northern Wars in 1721.151 
Golovin’s 1992 book depicted Peter I’s eventual victory in the Northern Wars as an 
outcome of his patience and positive outlook. He claimed: 
 
“If the Russians become scientists and strong people, it will be bad for us: they 
will conquer our country," said the Swedes. Then Peter remembered that these 
lands once belonged to the Russians and wanted to conquer them again. Swedes 
 
149 Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 150. 
150 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, , IX-XX vv., 205; 229-230. 
Peter I not only reformed the military, but was also seen as a figurehead in the 
modernisation of Russia more generally, and usually considered an Europeaniser. For 
example, please see: A. A. Danilov, Po Istoriia Rossii – Rabochnaia Tetrad dlia 
studentov vyzov, (Moscow: Vlados, 1998), 39-40; Tugan-Baranovskaia, Istorii Rossii dlia 
Uchashchikhsia 8-go Klassa, 23-31. Danilov’s textbook had a print-run of 50,000. 
Tugan-Baranovskaia’s textbook book had a print-run of 2,000.  
151 Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 150. 
A list of the different reforms Peter I undertook after Russia’s first loss against Charles 
VII of Sweden can be found in the following texts: A. L. Yurganov and L. A. Katsva, 
Istoriia Rossii XVI-XVIII vv. (Moscow: MIROS, 1996), 222- 223; V. I. Buganov and P. 
N. Zirianov, Istoriia Rossii konets XVII-XIX vek, Uchebnik dlia 10 klassa 
obshchestobrazovatelnykh uchrezhdenii, (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1996), 22-23; 
Vedernikov, Istoriia Rossii dlia uchashchikhsiia 10-go klassa, 24-26. 
Yurganov and Katsva’s textbook has a 50,000 print-run. Andrei L’vovich Yurganov 
(born 1959) was a Soviet and Russian historian. He is a specialist in Russian medieval 
history. Leonid Aleksandrovich Katsva (born 1957) is a Russian teacher and textbook 
author. This particular edition of Buganov and Zirianov’s textbook printed 50,000 copies. 
The 1995 edition circulated 180,000 copies. Viktor Ivanovich Buganov (1928-1996) was 
a Soviet and Russian historian. In 1993 he was a member of the Russian Academy of 
Education in the Department of General Secondary Education. In 1994 he was a member 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the History Department. He has published history 
books since 1962 and was particularly prolific in the 1980s. He is a popular historian with 
most of his books circulating in the 10,000+. Pavel Nikolavich Zirianov (1943-2007) was 
a historian and leading researcher within the institute of Russian history. He also served 
as an editor of the journal Otechestvennaya Istoriia [History of the Fatherland]. His books 
have been republished many times. 
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and Russians began to fight. The Russians still did not know how to fight well, 
and the Swedish king Charles XII first defeated the troops of Tsar Peter. 
"Nothing! - said Peter, - patience! We will learn from the Swedes to defeat them." 
The king [Peter I] gathered a new army; taught it again. Monasteries and 
merchants gave the king money. With this money, Peter dressed and fed his 
soldiers. The tsar led his army against the Swedes, and the Russians took the 
Oreshek fortress from the enemies on the banks of the Neva.152  
 
This view was supported by the stories written in Ammona’s 1998 textbook, 
which noted, “In the heroic battles of Gangut (1714) Grengam (1720)… the young 
Russian fleet defeated Swedish naval forces.”153 Peter I was the person who showed 
“courage, firmness and willingness to incur large expenses and risks” to dissolve the old 
army and create a new one.154  
His transformations, however, did come at a heavy cost to the masses i.e. taxes, 
expansion of serfdom and endless levies. 155  Similar to Sviatoslav I, Peter I was 
characterised by his obsession with the military.  Upon taking the throne in the early 
1680s, he was only ten years old. By the end of the 1680s his “war games” were described 
as realistic as “manoeuvres of a small army” and he was noted for forging relations with 
military personnel like General Patrick Gordon, who “guessed the future commander and 
statesman in the restless youth.”156  Although in some cases Peter’s obsession with the 
military was recognised as a reason for his fixation on reforming the military and 
militarising the bureaucratic affairs of Russian society, it was actually his conviction that 
“the army [and] navy… were perfect social structures, [and] should become a worthy 
model of the whole society.”157 On the whole, Peter I’s militarisation and subsequent 
victory in battles brought glory to Russia. Golovin (1992) noted: 
The Poltava victory glorified Russia. Other lands began to marvel at her wealth 
and power, the courage of her troops and the greatness of her Tsar Peter. The 
Metropolitan, on behalf of all the people, called Peter the Great Emperor, and 
since then the whole world has called him that. 
 
152 Golovin, Moia Pervaia Rossiiskaia Istoriia v Rasskazakh dlia Detei, 119-124 
153 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv., 229. 
154 Anisimov and Kamenskiy, Istoriia Rossii, 1682-1861, 21-22. 
155 Dvornichenko et al., Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka, 153. 
156 Anisimov and Kamenskiy, Istoriia Rossii, 1682-1861, 22-24. 
157 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii IX-XX vv., 204. 
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Peter the Great worked hard for the glory of Russia and the benefit of his 
people.158 
 
 Peter I’s heroism was characterised not only through his patience and 
determination but also by his military exploits and successes. His exploits brought ‘glory’ 
to Russia, showing that international prestige was contingent on military successes. These 
passages above promoted action in the military, patience to overcome military failures 
and continued loyalty to the state. These were particularly important messages during the 
1990s. Russia’s military faced defeats in the late Soviet period and early years of the 
Russian Federation, yet in contrast to Peter I’s efforts, morale within the military was 
low, with a large number of conscripts evading the draft. These educational messages 
promoted and reaffirmed the discourses that to serve in the military was a worthwhile 
activity and that veterans deserve respect. It lent itself towards militarisation by showing 
how Peter I overcame failure, relying on his perseverance and military reform to face his 
challenges.  
The glorification of military figures and societal structure in this way continued 
beyond Peter I’s reign. In reference to the Japanese War of 1905, “Russian soldiers 
showed amazing manhood and steadfastness.”159 The soldiers’ role in the Russo-Japanese 
conflict continued to be characterised as heroic and fierce. In the First World War, 
Russian soldiers were described as having “fiercely fought,” even though they were 
defeated.160  
 
One debate included in textbooks of the 1990s surrounded the desire of Russian 
politicians to pursue war. The political figures were depicted as incompetent. For 
example, when making a decision to continue the Russo-Japanese war, the Defence 
Council justified the continued participation on the basis that there was a “patriotic 
 
158 Golovin, Moia Pervaia Rossiiskaia Istoriia v Rasskazakh dlia Detei, 119-124. 
159 A. A. Danilov and L. G. Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii, XX vek: Dopolnitel’nye materialy k 
uchebniky. 9 Klass, (Moscow: DROFA, 1997), 22-24. The print-run for this book was 
8,400. Lyudmila Gennad’eva Kosulina is a Soviet and Russian historian. She works at 
the Moscow State Pedagogical University. She has co-authored over 200 textbooks, most 
of which are with A. A. Danilov and are recommended by the Ministry of Education. 
160 Yu. A. Shchetinov, Istoriia Rossii v XX vek, (Moscow: Fair, 1998), 35. 
Yuri Aleksandrovich Shchetinov is a Soviet and Russia teacher with specialisms in Soviet 
history.  
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upsurge of soldiers and sailors [in Russia], a willingness to stand up to the end.”161 
Authors discussing Russian society on the eve of the First World War also documented 
this same patriotic upsurge.  On July 26th, Nikolai II went to the State Duma for an 
emergency meeting regarding the potential outbreak of war. According to Ammona in 
1998, “He was met with enthusiasm” at a state level, but also managed to gain the support 
of the ordinary citizen. He noted that worker strikes stopped, many oppositionist praised 
the war, and “most parties supported a defensive war.”162 Potseluev’s 1997 textbook, 
similar to Ammona’s account of the First World War, claims that the Japanese War 
offered Russia an opportunity to stifle revolutionary action within the country. Following 
an ultimatum by Japan for Russia to stop pursuing its interests in the Far East, the Minister 
of Internal Affairs Pleve, in a conversation with Nikolai II, stated, “we need a small 
victorious war” to suppress the revolution.163 Russia’s foreign policy in the Far East, with 
the creation of a defensive alliance with China against Japan and garrisons at both Port 
Arthur and Vladivostok being strengthened prior to the 1904 attack by Japan, had already 
helped the Tsarist regime. As noted by Ammona in 1998, “The Tsarist government, 
fearing a looming revolution considered the small victorious war with Japan to be a good 
anecdote.”164  
Danilov and Leonov’s (1995) and Potseluev’s (1997) textbooks note that Russia’s 
defeat in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) has been considered a cause of the 1905 
revolution.165  This is a particularly interesting notion to consider. In 1994, the First 
Chechen War began. Russian leaders were forced to go to conflict with the region in hope 
that a victory would popularise the Russian president.166 As with Nikolai II’s experience 
at the start of the century, while the early years of the war suppressed dissent in Yeltsin’s 
war, the loss in the war affected the popularity of the leaders. Their vanity and desire to 
remain in power resulted in a miscalculated entrance of Russia into war, unnecessary loss 
of life and decline of Russian prestige. While certainly not a story of great militarism, the 
assessment of Russia’s role in the Russo-Japanese War showed that discourses 
 
161 Danilov and Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii, XX vek, 26. 
162 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv., 440. 
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166 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1999), 196. 
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surrounding Russia’s loss concentrated more on the weakness of Russia in terms of 
military superiority and poor command, rather than the initial decision to go to war. This 
preferred emphasis stressed the greater importance of military technology, preparedness 
and unity, which acted as a form of justification for the maintenance of a strong military. 
Although it would not have been unusual for students to question whether the 
government’s decision to go to war was rightly legitimised.167  
 
While more emphasis was placed on the brave actions of leaders and people of 
Kievan Rus, soldiers of 20th century Russia also demonstrated the same levels of 
willingness and self-sacrifice. This continuity highlighted a heritage of martyrdom in 
Russia’s historical narratives. The commonality of such discourses demonstrated a 
passing down of values to future generations of society. For students of the 1990s, the 
emphasis and glorification of such character attributes created an image of the ideal 
citizen, one that contributed towards the present Russian society through acts of heroism 
and to which continuation of a strong nation was indispensable. It was through the 
persistence of state loyalty and unity that Russia would continue to progress.  
Sutherland’s Politics of Advocacy helps us to decode how key figures and events 
were displayed in Russian historical textbooks. As noted by Sutherland, in glorifying a 
certain aspect, the author will leave out or downplay the more dishonourable attributes of 
the individual. This was certainly the case with characters such as Sviatoslav I and Oleg 
I. As a reflection of “cultural politics,” the textbooks outlined a selective construction of 
the historical event to reflect current ambitions of the Russian state, which was to 
maintain pride in the military.168 Therefore, the author chose to represent a more military-
patriotic version of the past. One of the most striking aspects of the glorification tactic 
was the role that textbooks played in the mythologisation of these characters. On the topic 
of the Siege of Kozelsk, for example, Ishimova wrote that courageous people died, “but 
 
167 Although the textbooks by Potseluev and Ammona were published after the beginning 
of the First Chechen War, they do not reference the war explicitly as they do not go that 
far forward in history. It is also unclear when these books were produced. While not 
explicitly asking students to compare contemporary issues with historical ones, issues in 
late Tsarist Russia reflected the situation in 1990s Russia. Textbooks from 2000 onwards 
include Russian history into the 21st century but focus on Yeltsin’s Russia as part of the 
ongoing “Memory wars.” 
168 Yannis Hamilakis, “Learn History! Antiquity, National Narratives, and History in 
Greek Educational Textbooks,” in The Useable Past: Greek Metahistories, ed. by Brown 
K. S and Yannis Hamilakis (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 40-41. 
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that they are alive in history, alive in the hearts of all Russians… alive in heaven, in the 
rays of immortality.”169 These narratives of their immortalisation were also common 
rhetoric of the political elite in the commemorative activities associated with the Great 
Patriotic War. Chapter five shows that society was pushed to maintain the memories of 
the victory and participants in their hearts and minds. The heroic depictions, not only of 
individual characters, but also of the everyday soldier, promoted a career within the 
military institution and the values associated with it.  
Comparable to the glorification of the veteran in the pension reforms of the 1990s 
(as noted in chapter four), the characters that these soldiers demonstrated - courage, for 
example, perpetuated attributes such as sacrifice and bravery into the public sphere and 
pushed to promote and embed nationalistic tendencies. 170  The clear and selective 
depictions of certain figures, and downplaying of their more negative attributes, 
demonstrated a distinct desire of the authors to create a more glorifying and patriotic 
depiction of the past. This is not to say that students would readily accept the depictions 
presented to them in the textbooks, since textbook authors were still recovering from 
accusations made against them in the Perestroika years. These accusations, as outlined in 
the introduction of this chapter, highlighted that historical discourses in the Soviet period 
were framed to suit the needs of the communist leadership, rather than to provide an 
objective truth. Subsequently, they raised questions about the reliability of the education 
that students had received and questioned the integrity of these authors. That being said, 
these textbooks were now operating under a system that promoted pluralism, not only in 
textbooks but also in perspectives.  These factors, and the disapproval of Kreder’s 
textbook, which was criticised for its negative portrayal of Russia’s history, show that 
society remained open to accepting a glorious representation of its historical past. These 
textbooks paved the way for the persistence and growth of militarisation, as discourses of 
hero worship increased not only within the educational setting, but became a trend that 
moved among a number of societal domains. 
 
POLITICS OF ATTACK 
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In 1990s Russian history textbooks, when one figure was glorified, they were 
contrasted with an evil counterpart. The dichotomy between the two characters gave a 
clear indication to the audience of the villain and hero in each story. The vilification of 
the enemy is a prominent tactic used across many discursive forums to create a disparity 
between the desired groups. It is a standard method of any militarised nation, since the 
process of militarisation depends on the citizens’ ability to envisage the opponent.171 This 
was particularly salient in the second chapter of this thesis. The ‘us versus them’ rhetoric, 
through its repeated use, contributed toward the normalisation of the beseiged fortress 
discourse. In Russia’s history textbooks, Russia’s opponents were typically described as 
evil, alien and wicked.172 Increased interest by scholars on education textbooks, have 
arisen because these are forums where such discourses evolve.173  
The creation of an enemy was a topic of interest in an exhibition held at the Nobel 
Peace Centre in Oslo, Norway in 2016. The exhibition was titled, “Targets.” It outlined 
the ways that different countries trained their soldiers. One aspect of this was the creation 
of an enemy in target practice. Mali, for example, used cardboard cut outs during training 
to offer a physical representation of the opponent. In post-Soviet Russia, Russia’s youth 
were ‘trained’ through narratives.174 The textbooks introduced them to multiple enemies 
from different corners of the world, contributing to the image of a hostile and 
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untrustworthy world outside of Russia. These discourse furthered the persistence of a 
‘siege mentality,’ whereby Russia needed to sustain a level of readiness against the next 
hostile invasion.  
By vilifying the ‘other,’ the educational textbooks worked as a vehicle of 
militarisation, as they contributed toward the construction of a hostile and unfriendly 
world. These same tactics were used in other domains to justify the need for a strong and 
prepared military.175 In addition, it forced students to reflect on Russia’s current situation. 
In the early post-Soviet period, Russia was involved in a number of domestic and 
neighbouring conflicts and in debate with a former Cold War adversary about the latter’s 
expansion eastwards. Media discourses played a significant role in the demonisation of 
NATO as it sought to expand its membership to include former countries of the USSR.176 
For the most part, opponents of Russia were branded as the enemy [Vrag, Protivnik, 
Nepriiatel’] within the textbooks. Support for Russia by its citizens, regardless of the 
circumstances, was depicted as strong. A. A. Danilov and Kosulina’s 1997 textbook, on 
Russian History in the 20th century, showed that “whatever the circumstances” (whether 
the citizens agreed with the conflict or not), Russians would unite to defend their land 
against an adversary. They claimed that an attack against the country, by a Vrag, meant 
that it “was necessary [for Russia] to repulse them.”177 Passages like the one above offer 
a glimpse of some of the deeper messages communicated in these textbooks. For example, 
here, Danilov and Kosulina were promoting state unity and loyalty. The Russians in 
Danilov and Kosulina’s account were showing patriotism through their love for Russia 
and willingness to protect it.  
The sense of responsibility and civic duty that was communicated in these 
messages were also conveyed by key political and social figures on the topic of Russia’s 
wider role in the world. At the 1995 Victory Day parade, for example, Yeltsin reinforced 
Russia’s role in saving the world from Fascism.  
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Similar messages were popularised in history textbooks, for example, when 
debating the Great Patriotic War. However, while claims of the same scale could not be 
used to describe Russia’s role in World War One, authors like Ammona (1998) did 
include speeches of key figures that indicated Russia’s desire to have a global impact. 
When debating whether to participate in the war, these key figures discussed the “rightful 
cause” to fight against foreign invasion, but also to save “the whole world” from German 
predominance. 178  Brendan Humphrey’s “mission exceptionalism,” which is used to 
explain a country’s belief that it holds a unique place in this world and that it has a distinct 
role to play. 179  Similar to America’s historic role of foreign intervention under the 
justification of maintaining security and to “rid the world of evil,” Russia was cultivating 
a discourse that insisted Russia also played an important role in international affairs, and 
that it was their duty/mission to do so.180 These discourses were heard in other discursive 
domains. Yeltsin, for example, claimed Russia’s role in the former Soviet Union was to 
bring peace to the region – and in the case of Chechnya, to rid the world of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
These discourses promoted a sense of civic duty, of Russia’s responsibility in the 
world and acted as a form of justification for Russia’s militaristic and current participation 
in neighbouring wars. While fought on Russian soil, people did not fully understand the 
same dangers that politicians felt Chechnya posed to Russian society. While (possibly) 
not a primary aim of the textbook authors, the messages within these textbooks were ones 
that students could apply to contemporary circumstances. Russian society was not united 
in the 1990s. Division and lack of support from home were only some of the examples 
used to justify Russia’s losses in Chechnya. Therefore it was not only books of the Putin 
era that pushed towards cultivating societal unity, but was actually a tactic used in Russian 
textbooks of the Yeltsin regime. While the historical discourses in these textbooks, as 
Cynthia Enloe put it, may not have convinced the school children of the 1990s to pick up 
a gun and enter the military, stories of consistent warfare, of Russia’s weakened state and 
aggressive neighbours strengthened the discourse that Russia was a vulnerable country in 
need of maintaining an effective defense system.  
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Another interesting feature of Russian historical textbooks of the 1990s was the 
grouping of Russia’s opponents under term the enemy. Placing the opponents within the 
same frame meant that boundaries between the different adversaries were less clear as 
they became part of this larger network of enemies that Russia needed to defend against. 
Russia’s defensive needs were demonstrated fairly early on.  
Kievan Rus was a union of Eastern Slavic areas under the leadership of three 
Varangian (Viking) princes, Rurik, Sineus and Truvor. They formed a triangular union 
of Kiev, Chernigov and Pereiaslavl. As noted in Ammona’s 1998 textbook, and echoed 
by Dvornichenko et al. (1999), “The reason for the formation of this super union, as, by 
the way of other super unions, was [to do with] an external danger, the need to deal with 
external enemies – the Khazars, Pechenegs, Varangians.”181 As noted by Ishimova in 
1996, “they [key figures in Kievan Rus’] thought only that they should fight and defeat 
their enemies.”182 
Through representations like those produced by Ammona, Dvorninchenko et al. 
and Ishimova, Russia’s textbooks of the 1990s depicted Russia as a weakened state, 
vulnerable to external threat – even from its conception. In recent years, the issue of 
creating a patriotic education that popularises a more glorious image of Russia’s history 
has become a topic of the Putin regime. As noted by Zajda in 2013, textbooks of the 1990s 
that have been republished under Putin’s leadership no longer include information, for 
example, on how many people were captured by Nazi Germany and its allies during 
World War Two.183 By removing or muting the issues that Russia faced during the Great 
Patriotic War, there is a sense that these new glorious histories will contribute toward 
creating a new patriotic society. While such accounts do instil a sense of pride in a nation, 
negative depictions of Russia’s past serve another purpose. The stories feed into wider 
societal perceptions that Russia is a vulnerable country living within a hostile world. It 
contributes toward the militarisation of society, not only because of the scaremongering 
which is evident in these passages, but because of the prominence of these stories. While 
they did not lead to an increase of Russia’s youth enlisting in the army, consistent 
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messages within these textbooks of Russia’s weakened state meant they remained 
regularly in dialogue with a number of militarised discourses. 
The vulnerability of Russia was further exaggerated through exact examples of 
war. For example, at battle with the Byzantium Empire Sviatoslav’s army was ten times 
smaller than its counterpart. 184  While Sutherland’s Politics of Attack concentrated 
predominantly on weeding out the value-driven aspects of the author, it also revealed the 
anxieties of the wider cultural realm. Listing Russia’s longstanding relationship with 
conflict militarises society in a myriad of ways. First, by asking students to pair up the 
dates with a long list of conflicts, the author is showing the student that Russia has been 
involved in many wars. Georgieva and Georgiev’s 1995 textbook of tests for teachers and 
application, for example, asked: 
 
Task 10. Indicate in which years the listed military clashes took place: 
1. Battle of Kalka 
2. Battle of Poltava 
3. Battle on the River Shelon 
4. The Battle of Cape Gangut 
5. Neva Battle 
6. The Battle of Grunwald 
7. The Battle at the village of Lesnaia 
8. The Battle of Ice 
9. The Battle of Grengam Island 
10. The Battle of the River Sit 
11. The Battle of the River Emajõgi  
12. The Battle on the River Vozha 
13. “Standing on Ukre” 
14. The Defeat of the Russian Troops near Narva 
15. The Defeat of the Livonian Order 
16. The Capture by the Russian Troops of the Turkish Fortress Ishmael 
17. The Battle of the Russian Fleet with the Turkish at Cape Kaliakra 
18. Chesme Naval Battle.185 
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The answers ranged from 1234 to 1790, highlighting the long period of time 
during which Russia was constantly at war. Zuev’s 1995 textbook reinforced the notions 
presented in Georgieva and Georgiev’s 1995 textbook. His book, which covers the 
History of Russia as a chronicle, establishes a timeline of important events that have taken 
place in Russia since its conception. From page 21 until at least page 59, 16 pages present 
lists of wars or invasions, defeats and victories. Military themes were also prominent in 
other textbooks.186 In Ishmova’s 1996 book, Istoriia Rossii v Rasskazakh dlia Detei, just 
under half (65 out of 131) of the chapters were military themed.187 In Potseluev’s 1997 
textbook Istoriia Rossii XX Stoletiia, around a fourth of its contents in the textbook 
focused on military narratives. Forty-six pages focused on the First World War, fall of 
the Tsars and the Russian Civil War, whereas 27 pages were dedicated to the Second 
World War. Sixty-nine pages focused on the Post-War reconstruction, the Cold War and 
territorial disputes during the Cold War.188 Other topics within the textbooks included 
religion, culture, literature, and foreign and domestic politics – yet the military played a 
more dominant role.  
Showcasing the extent of Russia’s militaristic past highlighted the vast role that 
war, conquests and the military played in Russia’s heritage. The sheer volume of 
militarised narratives in these textbooks, as listed above, confirmed Russia’s historical 
experience of continuous conflict. As noted in chapter two under the term ‘Geopolitics of 
vulnerability,’ Russia’s position in the world meant it was exposed to certain threats.189 
This position was also acknowledged in Russian historical textbooks. As noted in Tugan-
Baranovskaia’s 1996 textbook, “The following geopolitical conditions usually affect the 
specifics of Russian history: a vast, sparsely populated territory, a border unprotected by 
natural barriers, isolation from almost the whole of history from the seas and sea trade, a 
river network conducive to the territorial unity of Russia, an intermediate position 
between Europe and Asia.”190 The “border unprotected by natural barriers” confirmed 
and strengthened the discourse that Russia was a vulnerable country. It also strengthened 
the notion that the “unprotected… natural barriers” invited so many countries to invade 
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it. As noted by Spykman and Mackinder, whoever claimed the Heartland [Russia] would 
have a command over the world – for its profound positioning.191 This made Russia 
vulnerable to invasion.  Mackinder and Spykman regularly updated their views, claiming 
in 1943, at the height of Soviet militarisation, that it was finally manned properly. 
Of course, it was also the same security concerns that led to many of Russia’s 
historical figures, including Igor, to expand the territory of Russia. As noted by Ammona 
in 1998, Igor’s main expansionist activities were “to protect the country from raids by the 
Pechenegs and preserve the unity of the state.” He therefore participated in a number of 
campaigns to expand the territory of the early Kievan Rus’ state. He most notably 
campaigned in Byzantium, the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia. 192  Russia’s 
expansion continued into the era of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. While Peter 
I’s campaigns were driven by his desire to access the Black Sea, expansion under 
Catherine II’s leadership was as a result of external threat and invasion. According to 
Golovin’s 1992 book, Catherine II confronted many dangers. He claimed: 
 
The enemies envied the glory and greatness of Russia. Once, three hundred 
thousand Tatars and Turks attacked the Russians. At that time, Russia was ruled 
by Empress Catherine II, whom the people called the Great for her glorious 
deeds… the Russians won and took from the Turks many strong cities along the 
Danube.193 
 
Potseluev’s 1997 textbook highlighted the same concerns of the Soviet 
government under Stalin. When asking the question, “Why was the Red Army not ready 
for War?” he claimed, “The Soviet-German agreements of 1939 did not secure the borders 
of the USSR,” which led Stalin to employ “aggressive methods” for resolving territorial 
disputes. Yet, while showing obvious disagreement with Stalin’s expansionist actions, 
Potseluev also justified the Soviet’s expansionist goals. He claimed that after Germany 
declared war on Poland, that “the USSR’s mutual assistant treaties with Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania were violated by provocative, terrorist acts against the soldiers and officers 
of the Soviet troops.”194 Questions asked by Posteleuv at the end of this chapter included, 
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“What goals did the USSR pursue in the struggle for collective security?” and “[list] the 
forms and methods of strengthening state borders and expanding the USSR.”195 
 The same security issues felt by the different historical figures of Russian history 
motivated them to increase the territory of Russia. Yet this same expansion also led to 
increased insecurity as the country became attractive to those who wanted to lead a 
centrally located, vast space. In the Post-Soviet period, Russia’s territory decreased. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union not only lessened Russia’s influence in key areas of the 
world, for example, the Black Sea but also limited the size of its military – although 
Russian politicians aimed to reclaim some form of security through the CIS. The post-
Soviet period became a period of renewed vulnerabilities and new security concerns. 
With the loss of its ‘buffer zone,’ Russia’s territory faced new threats, not only from 
NATO expansionism, but also from domestic disputes within its own borders. The 
histories of the past acted to remind Russia’s students that their country had faced many 
geopolitical issues. It contributed to the notion that Russia has and continues to remain 
vulnerable to outside threat.196 Such notions formed the basis for the legitimisation of a 
strong military.   
Military alliances also posed a risk to Russian security. In V. I. Buganov and P. 
N. Zirianov’s 1996 textbook, their chapter on the era of ‘Peter the Great,’ began with an 
anecdote on Russia’s aims to renegotiate with Turkey to end the Russo-Turkish War. 
According to Buganov and Zirianov, leading Western Powers, including; “England, 
Austria, France, Netherlands, Sweden – influenced the Sultan to continue the War with 
the Russian king.”197 As noted by Ammona in 1998, Turkey was “hostile to Russia,” and 
“treacherously” (Verolomno) attacked Russia.198 It was also Ammona who claimed that 
it was England and France that pushed Russia into participating in the First World War.199 
It was these alliance systems that had pushed Russia into war, with ideas of obligation 
and duty from Russia to support England and France (also members of the Triple 
Entente), during World War One. Potseluev’s 1997 textbook highlighted, that even after 
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Russia joined in the war, Russia was left largely unaided by the allies and that “the activity 
of the Russian troops was more beneficial not to Russia, but to the allies.”200  
The passages above outline a series of events that led to a better understanding of 
the difficult relationship between Russia and the West. Only two centuries before, for 
example, England was pushing Turkey to pursue a war with Russia. The mention of 
alliances noted first that Russia’s involvement in a war was sometimes linked to fulfilling 
an obligation with another country, but also highlighted the superficiality of these 
alliances and gave meaning and understanding to Russia’s deep distrust of this hostile 
world. In the lead up to the Russo-Japanese war and First World War, some authors 
placed the origins of the war within the context of the growing American, German and 
French power. Potseluev (1997) also noted the increasingly militaristic landscape of the 
early 20th century, by outlining not only Russia’s military growth but also the increase in 
Austro-Hungary’s military capabilities.201  
Growing militarism and imperialism were given as justifications for tensions 
between countries in the early 20th century. Ammona (1998) suggested the increase of 
colonies through diplomatic and military means, and Russia’s foreign policy aims in the 
Far East were much to the “discontent of Japan, USA and Germany.”202 Potseluev’s 1997 
textbook noted Japan’s alarm at Russia’s “peaceful expansion” eastward.203 Russia’s 
participation in the First World War was justified along a similar line. As noted in a 
speech by P. N. Milyukov, “In this war, all our past and future is our rightful cause, we 
are fighting for the liberation of our homeland from foreign invasions; Europe and 
Slavism from German predominance; the whole world from the unbearable oppression 
of constantly growing weapons, ruining peaceful working people.” 204  It was in 
Milyukov’s statement that we not only see a vilification of the enemy, but also a nod to 
Russia’s duty to save the country and world from “unbearable oppression.” While 
(possibly) not a purpose of the textbooks, some of the justifications for Russia’s 
participation in World War One, for example, were reflective of the justifications for 
Russia’s role in events in the post-Soviet Period. It offered a form of understanding into 
Russia’s current role in the Chechen region. Since Chechens in 1990s Russia were 
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predominately depicted as terrorists, criminals and through a militant lens, Russia’s duty 
in the First World War offered Russia’s youth a moment of clarity and interpretation of 
the situation in the Chechen region.205 Was it their duty, like those of Russia in 1914, to 
hinder the spread of terrorism and criminality and to forge peace in the Post-Soviet 
region? Students were confronted with such considerations in these textbooks. 
Alongside the vilification of Russia’s opponents in these conflicts, the recounting 
of these militaristic endeavours established narratives that would contribute to the pre-
existing anxieties of the readers. The accounting of these conflicts only confirmed a 
pattern of invasions that endangered the Russian state. They substantiated pre-existing 
anxieties that events like the Great Patriotic War were just another incident in a cycle that 
could re-emerge again, but with a different cohort and under different circumstances. 
Such exposure emphasised Russia’s historical experience with war, contributing to the 
militarisation of society as it fortified notions that Russia was a vulnerable country 
surrounded by hostile neighbours. 
 For Russia, the recounting of historical conflicts was not done in a simple and 
factual way. Rather, the romanticisation of the historical events and effort to vilify the 
enemy ensured that events were vividly detailed and even slightly exaggerated. Known 
as atrocity propaganda/ story, especially in the British context of the First World War, the 
graphic description of opponent atrocities in and against Russia acted in a similar way. 
Atrocity propaganda is defined as a “presentation of that event (real or imaginary) in such 
a way as to (a) evoke moral outrage by specifying and detailing the value violations, (b) 
authorise, implicitly or explicitly, punitive sanctions, and (c) mobilise control efforts 
against the alleged perpetrators.”206 It is considered an important mechanism in the ‘war 
of accusations.’207  
Atrocity propaganda is best known for its use in British accounts in the First 
World War. It exaggerated and sensationalised factual events of the war in the discourses 
of popular culture and the media. Jo Fox wrote about the British use of atrocity 
propaganda, “These shocking stories allowed propagandists to justify the war, encourage 
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men to enlist, raise funds for war loan schemes, and shake the United States from its 
neutrality. The impact of such propaganda was enduring, lasting well into 1918 and 
beyond.”208 After World War One, propaganda started to be discussed in a negative way. 
British Parliamentarian Arthur Ponsonby, for example, asserted that it was propaganda 
based on lies, with Australian and British historians claiming that it tricked their countries 
into fighting a war based on false, exaggerated tales of German atrocity.209 As noted by 
Steffan Bruendel, since violence is a common theme in war, atrocity propaganda arose 
and became internalised as a form of propaganda in which the creator could create a 
dehumanised image of the ‘other.’ In Britain during the second half of the First World 
War it was used to attract support from the home front.210 
In a similar capacity, heightened images of violence and the vilification of the 
other in historical textbooks was a more subtle and child appropriate form of “atrocity 
propaganda.” Atrocity propaganda highlighted the consistent vulnerability of the Russian 
state to aggressive invaders, Russia’s weakness and (at times) ability to overcome far 
more superior forces, but only through mass loss of life. It was through the atrocity story 
that Russian textbooks were able to legitimise the need for a strong military. 
As noted in the section on The Politics of Advocacy, it was clear that some authors 
made a concerted effort to diminish the shortcomings of Russian figures in favour of their 
more glorifying attributes. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that they emphasised 
narratives of wicked enemies who performed inhumane deeds against the Russian people 
and spread distasteful images of the opponent in the textbooks. This was particularly 
salient in the books by Ishimova (1996) and Golovin (1992). As their mission was to 
write Russia’s history in stories for children, the books created a vastly more emotional 
account of Russia’s history than official educational textbooks at the time. However, they 
did establish, very early on in a Russian child’s life, that Russia had enemies and their 
depictions only set to establish a sense that outside of Russia, there was a hostile world. 
Some of the atrocious acts identified included the burning of Slavic houses by 
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neighbouring warriors.211 On the topic of 13 year old Tatar leader Temiyin, Ishimova 
wrote, “You will be frightened to learn what the 13 year old Temiyin did!” continuing to 
document how he ordered the killing of his opponents by boiling them alive.212 These 
stories of Tatar cruelty were supported by Golovin’s 1992 book. He noted:  
Soon, many Tatars came to Russia. The Russian people were scared! The Tatars 
even looked very scary: their faces were evil, their eyes were tiny, their mouths 
were huge and wide; every Tatar was hung with weapons. 
They were cunning and cruel: they only thought about how to deceive; you could 
not believe them in anything. They began to burn down Russian cities and 
villages, and they killed people. Those whom they did not want to kill, they took 
with them and made them serve [and] work hard. The houses they did not want to 
burn down, they often took away from its inhabitants. People became poor 
[and] often died of hunger.213 
 
By attaching graphic and descriptive visuals of individual attacks by Russia’s 
many opponents, the authors played a role in creating the image of a hostile ‘other.’ As 
noted above, this same level of description was not indicative of all official history 
textbooks at this time, but since they were designed for children, they did present the 
‘dangerous world’ discourse fairly early on in a child’s life. The gruesome descriptions 
of the repulsive acts of the Tatar leader Temiyin were worsened by the statement that the 
Russian people would continue to suffer 200 years of “cruel” Tatar rule. 214  These 
depictions, once again, strengthened the point of view that Russia has historically been 
vulnerable to outside threat and that the Russian people had survived and persisted despite 
these troubles. 
Russia’s weakened state as a result of “aggressive” invasions was the topic that 
dominated many textbooks. 215  When asked by Georgiev and Georgieva (1995) to 
“Indicate what caused: a) the aggression of German and Swedish feudal lords against 
Russia; b) the aggressive campaigns of the Mongol-Tatars in Russia and in Europe; c) the 
rapid conquest of Russian lands by the Mongol-Tatars,” the list of possible answers 
included: “2) The desire to expand their dominance at the expanse of their neighbours… 
5) The strife of the Princes, causing a lack of unity of the Russian principalities 6) The 
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organisation of the Mongol campaign – the unification of the military forces of different 
parts of the Tatar-Mongol Empire… 11) Tough military discipline of the Mongol-Tatars; 
12) The weakening of Russia as a result of the struggle against the Mongol-Tatars.”216 
Other options included the blessing of the Pope to organise the campaign and the success 
of nomadic cattle breeding.217  
These accounts confirmed that Russia had undergone a vast period of prolonged 
suffering and provided a discursive representation of what life could look like, should it 
be conquered. Another interesting issue raised by Georgieva and Georgiev’s list was the 
juxtaposition between Russia’s lack of unity and the Mongol-Tatar strong unity. Golovin 
(1992) also raised this point. The Tatars offered Russia an ultimatum “Give us as much 
tribute as you can – then we will not fight with you.”218 According to Golovin: 
 
The Russians knew that the Tatars were only deceiving them: they would take 
tribute, and they would fight. Russian princes replied: "We'd better fight! If you 
kill all of us, then you will take all our property for yourself." And they themselves 
sent to ask for help from the senior Grand Duke in the city of Vladimir. 
But the Grand Duke was angry with the Ryazan princes and did not send help. The 
Tatars set fire to the city of Ryazan, and killed the inhabitants. They took all the 
property of the killed. 
The Tatars also came to the city of Vladimir. They began to burn the city. The 
wife and children of Grand Duke Yuri and many people locked themselves in the 
large Vladimir Church. They decided not to surrender themselves to the Tatars 
alive, but rather die. The Tatars lit the church, and all the people, and the little 
children of the prince, along with their mother, were burned to death. 
The servants ran to the Grand Duke Yuri, who at that time was gathering an army 
in another city, and told about the terrible death of his dear family. 
The prince wept bitterly and exclaimed: "I am now alone in the world!" 
…The Russian princes said: "God punished us for quarreling with each other, 
taking away each other's lands, for not gathering all together to help each other 
when the Tatars came to the Russian land!"219 
 
These accounts noted that division of the Russian people threatened its ability to 
gain victory. This was also highlighted under the Politics of Advocacy section, whereby 
the united efforts of the Russian peoples helped them overcome adversity in the Great 
Patriotic War, for example. It confirmed the discourse that sacrifice and unity of the 
Russian people was a worthwhile civic duty as it generally leads to victory. 
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Russia’s relationship with military campaigns did not end after the Mongol-Tatar 
Empire. A number of campaigns against Lithuania and the Livonian Order, alongside 
Ivan III’s desire to regain control of Russia from the Mongol-Tatars were documented in 
textbooks focussing on that period.220  
In the 18th century, Peter I’s reign was characterised by a series of campaigns and 
invasions against Russia, although Russia was not short of pursuing any of its own foreign 
policy goals. The Northern Wars were a popular conflict of discussion. It is certainly an 
important case study, since the wars continued for 21 years and it was during this time 
that Russia’s military transformation took place. Yurganov and Katsva’s 1996 textbook, 
for example, notes that following the first defeat of Russia by the Swedish, Charles XII 
had the option of either choosing to invade Russia again, or go to Poland and dispose of 
Augustus III. He chose to divert his attention towards Poland, claiming that it would take 
years to recover the army, and claimed “to go to the immense Russia, having behind him 
the Saxon Army, more combat ready than Russia, was simply dangerous.” 221  This 
afforded Peter I the time to reform his military and led to the end of the war with Sweden 
in 1721 after a series of Russian victories. As noted earlier in this chapter (pages 169-
170), Golovin’s 1992 textbook writes an identical account of this story, outlining the 
patience and optimism of Peter I in his ability to regroup, reform and emerge victorious.222 
Histories of Russia’s comeback, especially under the leadership of Peter I added to the 
discourse of militarisation of society, as it showed that through reform Russia was able 
to improve its prospects and, in the best case, achieve victory. These stories are just 
another historical example that allowed students and teachers to pause for reflection on 
the current issues within Russia’s military. It justified the need for military reform and 
the dedication of resources and materials towards the reform efforts.  
The general notion of Russia as backward compared to an adversary has served 
as a general staple of Russian historical textbooks. These authors emphasised Russian 
weakness and the superiority of the opposition, to highlight a vulnerable Russia. By 
emphasising the vulnerability of Russia, the textbook militarised society in two ways. 
First, it allowed opportunity for Russia’s youth to consider the current state of the 
military. Russia’s military in the 1990s was in decay and in desperate need of reform and 
 
220 Danilov, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XIX vv, 29-31. 
221 Yurganov and Katsva, Istoriia Rossii XVI-XVIIIvv., 221-223. 
222 Golovin, Moia Pervaia Rossiiskaia Istoriia v Rasskazakh dlia Detei, 119-124. 
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weapon modernisation – soldiers were poorly trained and were involved in a war where 
the opposition had lesser technological capabilities, yet Russia was still losing. The 
circumstances in the Russo-Japanese war and the First World War, especially the loss of 
Russia in these conflicts due to incompetent leadership and lack of armaments, reflected 
the current situation in Russia. Second, the history reminded the youth how Russia had 
clawed back from defeat to claim victory through the process of reform and 
modernisation. The weaknesses of Russia in the past and the continuous line of conflicts 
Russia had historically been involved in acted as a justification of the need for a strong 
Armed Forces.  
On the topic of the Russo-Japanese War, Danilov and Kosulina’s 1998 textbook 
outlined a lack of military materials and ammunition held by the Russians and 
technological superiority of the Japanese fleet. For example, in the Russo-Japanese war, 
Japan had fourteen major warships and Russia only had two in the region.223 In 1997, 
Potseluev noted that in the Russo-Japanese war, Japan was preparing to attack a “fragile 
rival.”224 Other authors noted the location of the Russo-Japanese war as a reason for 
failure, stating that the remoteness of the theatre of war, small railway capacity for the 
transportation of materials and the distance of industrial centres from the war, made 
Russia’s possible victory even harder.225 Ammona listed six reasons for the defeat of 
Russia by Japan. These points included: 
 
1. Economic and military-technical backwardness of Russia compared to Japan 
2. Remoteness of the theatre of war and unpreparedness of Russian Army and 
Fleet 
3. Lack of initiative in military command 
4. Revolution in Russia and unpopularity of war among the Russian people 
5. Financial and material help to Japan by USA and England 




223 A. A. Danilov and L. G. Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii, XX Vek: Uchebnik dlia starshikh 
klassov obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdeniy, (Moscow: Iakhont, 1998), 22-23. 20,000 
print-run. 
224 Potseluev, Istoriia Rossii v XX veka, 33-35. 
225 Potseulev, Istoriia Rossii XX vek Stoletia, 34. 
Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv. 360. 
226 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv., 361. 
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Despite such weaknesses, Ammona (1998) claimed that the Russians fought an 
“unequal but heroic” battle.”227 As a consequence, Russia aimed to modernise its Armed 
Forces. Danilov and Kosulina stated that the lack of success in the Russo-Japanese War 
“served as a sad lesson for the faithful leadership of Russia.”228 While Russia undertook 
a serious of military reforms in the early 20th century, so did other countries. Potseluev 
(1997) claims that other countries like Germany and Austro-Hungary were also 
expanding their military capabilities. 229  Therefore new weaknesses also impeded 
Russia’s abilities during the First World War. In 1914 and 1915, Russian losses were 
accounted as a result of “German superiority.” As noted by Ammona (1998), “The 
Russian army was preparing to advance on the same flanks [as the Germans]… They had 
strong regiments but were led by incompetent people [and] lacked ammunition and 
weapons.”230 Danilov and Leonov’s 1995 textbook questioned Russia’s loss in World 
War One, calling it a “heavy defeat” (tiazhelykh porazhenii).231 
In 1996, Ostrovskiy and Utkin, on the topic of the Great Patriotic War, used 
phrases like “Our homeland is in great danger.”232 Danilov and Leonov (1995) asked, 
“What subjective factors weakened the defence capability of the USSR in the context of 
the impending war?”233  Zhukova’s 1998 textbook argued that the Red Army’s initial 
defeat was a result of the following: 
 
1. The military-economic potential of Germany, which used the resources of all 
Western Europe, significantly exceeded the military-economic potential of 
the USSR; 
2. Hitler’s army was mobilised, had two years of experience in the conduct of 
modern warfare, While the professional level of the Soviet troops, especially 
the commanders, decreased after mass repressions in the army 
3. Major miscalculations of the Soviet leadership in military equipment, in 
particular, underestimation of the role of mechanised formations, outdated 
ideas about the methods of warfare in the initial period. 
 
227 Ibid, 360. 
228 Danilov and Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii v XX Vek (1998), 92.  
229 Potseluev, Istoriia Rossii v XX veka, 44-46. 
230 Ammona, Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv., 447. 
231 Danilov and Leonov, Istoriia Rossii v XX veke, 31. 
232 Ostrovskiy and Utkin, Istoriia Rossii v XX vek, 253. 
233 Danilov and Leonov, Istoriia Rossii v XX veke, 107. 
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4. The miscalculations of Stalin and his entourage in analysing the international 
situation, in determining the timing of a possible outbreak of war, which led 
to the surprise attack of the enemy.234 
 
Again, and as noted above, Russia’s defeat at war was linked to a lack of military 
superiority. “A fundamental turning point in the course of the war was the seizure of 
strategic initiative, the transition from defence to a strategic offensive, a change in the 
balance of forces,” claimed Zhukova in 1998.235 Again, and similar to discourses from 
other wars, it denoted the image that Russia’s loss in war was caused by its technical 
backwardness, poor leadership and superiority of its opponents. It established the notion 
that in order for Russia to be successful, and to be able to defend itself efficiently, the 
military needed to be well prepared, readily mobilised and supported by society with great 
unity within the barracks. It supported the notion that Russia needed to maintain a strong 
military in order to ensure its security.  
The same authors who glorified Russian actors were those who also vilified 
Russia’s enemies. In doing so, they created a disparity between the Russian heroes and 
opponents. Such demonisation fulfilled and added gravity to the anxieties Russian people 
felt – since there was a historical trail of invasion from belligerent nations, or that Russia 
would be pulled into wars from the antagonistic and warmongering actions of other 
nations. The textbooks maintained the militarisation of society by sustaining the discourse 
that Russia was vulnerable to invasion. It also gave meaning and understanding to why 
Russia was so distrustful of other nations, since it found itself under constant threat of 
invasion from the other countries.  
Another storyline that sustained the need for a strong military was the emphasis 
by authors of the dichotomy between the superiority of the opposition and weakness of 
 
234 L. V. Zhukova, Istoriia Rossii XX veka: Uchebnoe posobie dlia uchashchikhsia 10-11 
klassov, (Moscow: Ekzamen, 1998), 115-116. Lekkha Vilyevna Zhukova (1963-2017) 
was a Russian historian with specialisms in the Russo-Japanese War. As noted in an 
obituary, Zhukova was “a famous author of teaching aids for schoolchildren and 
applicants. Written in an intelligible and understandable language for young people, and 
at the same time academic, devoid of simplifications and schematism, they helped several 
generations of high school graduates to successfully master and pass the history program, 
and opened the way for many to higher education in history and the humanities. Lekkha 
Vilyevna's manuals were regularly reprinted in mass editions and were highly appreciated 
by school teachers and teaching methodologists.” For more, please see: “Lekkha 
Vilyevna Zhukova,” Novosti Istoricheskogo Fakul’teta, published 25 March 2017, 
accessed 11 February 2021, http://www.hist.msu.ru/about/gen_news/28036/. 
235 Ibid, 118. 
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Russia. These discourses were most commonly seen as a cause for reforms under Peter I 
and for Russia’s loss in the Russo-Japanese War. Authors even pointed to German 
superiority as a reason for initial defeat of Russia’s army in the First World War. These 
periods were followed by rapid reform, which, apart from the case of Nikolai II, resulted 
in victories for Russia/ the Soviet Union. The discourses highlighted that division, lack 
of preparedness and the right military technology, were Russia’s main weaknesses. It was 
another discourse that supported the need of a strong military. The militaristic nature of 
these textbooks was rooted in their ability to make the student reflect on issues of 
contemporary Russia. 1990s Russia was undergoing the same fragmentations, with the 
decay of the military apparatus and growing discontent in leadership threatening the 
military’s potential in Chechnya, as Russia had experienced in the past.   
 
 The rise of a militaristic-patriotic education is often attributed to Putin’s 
leadership. However, as demonstrated throughout the chapter, the militaristic education 
of contemporary Russia had roots in the Yeltsin era. The rise of revisionist accounts, as a 
result of the democratisation reforms, led to the initiative for the re-patriotisation of the 
education system. As early as 1995 the government took greater control over the 
discourses of the textbooks. This trend has increased under the Putin regime. 
 The textbooks, examined by Sutherland’s classifications of the Politics of 
Advocacy and the Politics of Attack, demonstrate that, in some aspects, there was an effort 
by authors to produce a militaristic-patriotic education. In the Politics of Advocacy 
section, for example, it was obvious that by downplaying the Russian historical figures’ 
darker attributes that authors were trying to promote the more glorifying aspects of 
Russia’s history. The positive depictions of Russian historical figures, praised for their 
action in war, created a clear role model for Russia’s youth to measure themselves against. 
The repetitive use of discourses on ideas of sacrifice and loyalty are similar to those used 
in the commemorative activities and veteran pension reforms of the 1990s, outlining the 
key attributes of an ideal citizen. The glorification of such attributes played a role in the 
militarisation of the education system and highlighted a top down effort to militarise 
youth during this period as it promoted virtues that the state wanted to pass down to future 
generations. It also fed into and strengthened the discourse that it is a worthwhile civic 
duty to defend the fatherland. 
While Russian actors were brave, courageous heroes, Russia’s opponents were 
insidious, evil and aggressive. The juxtaposition of the two types created a clear disparity 
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between Russia and an adversary – students were told exactly who they should support. 
The repetitive reference to the enemy in a historical context, to the acts of foreign 
invaders, and Russia’s weakness against a superior adversary fed into pre-existing notions 
and discourses of Russia as a besieged fortress. It also helped legitimise the need for 
societal unity, society’s support for the military and the need for a strong military. The 
gruesome and graphic depictions of the individual acts against the Russian people further 
pitted the reader and praised Russia’s role in overcoming such adversity. 
Many of the discourses reflected the situation in 1990s Russia. While not a 
purpose of the Russian textbooks, the stories they perpetuated provided an opportunity 
for the youth to reflect on current circumstances in Russia, in which factionalism (inside 
and out of the military), the decay of military power and poor training was considered the 
main reason for the loss of war in Chechnya.  These discourses, although under the topic 
of the Politics of Advocacy and Attack, also fall under the classification of the Politics of 
Assent, as they remained within the dominant narratives of the state, as highlighted in 
chapters two, four and five.  
In addition, political discussions regarding changes to formal educational 
narratives, the re-emphasis of glorifying narratives and calls for extra-curricular 
activities, including the linkage of youth with veterans, provide further support for the 
argument that this period was one of persistent militarisation. Some of the activities 
pursued in the Yeltsin era have grown and flourished under Putin.
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CHAPTER 4 
“CARING FOR PARTICIPANTS OF WAR IS A HISTORICAL DUTY OF THE 




 In her 2010 study, Nataliya Danilova claimed that war veterans remain an 
understudied group in civil-military relations, especially on aspects in society that shaped 
the social welfare programme.1 This is still the case. Scholars of veteran studies and civil-
military relations focus predominately on the rise of ex-military personnel in elite political 
positions (siloviki), and the reintegration of the veteran into civil society.2 Research on 
veterans and veteran pension and benefits often focus on war-induced disability and cases 
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and memory. 3  These studies offer an 
invaluable insight on the implication of veteran reintroduction into society and on the 
development of medicine in light of war-induced traumas. However, they do not consider 
the more subtle effects veteran rehabilitation has on society, for example, the valorisation 
of the veteran community in political and public discourse.  
As highlighted in chapters two and three, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Soviet 
history (including their victory in the Great Patriotic War) was challenged and rewritten. 
 
1 Nataliya Danilova, “The Development of an Exclusive Veterans’ Policy: The Case of 
Russia,” Armed Forces and Society 26, No. 5 (2010): 890. 
Nataliya Danilova, “Veteran’s Policy in Russia: A Puzzle of Creation,” The Journal of 
Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, No. 6/7 (2007): 1. 
2 For debates on the role of Siloviki in contemporary Russia, see: Kryshtanovskaya and 
White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” 289-306; Sharon Werning Rivera and David W. Rivera, 
“The Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois?” Post-Soviet Affairs 22, No. 
2 (2006): 125-144; Renz, “Putin’s Militocracy? 903-924. 
3 Scholarship referred to in this paragraph includes: Samuel P. Huntington, Soldiers and 
the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 348-349; Taylor, Politics and the Russia Army, 1-23; 
Christop Koenig, “Loose-Cannons – War Veterans and the Erosion of Democracy in 
Weimar Germany,” Warwick Economics Research Paper Series, (2015), 60-62; David 
Gillespie, “Confronting imperialism: the ambivalence of war in post-Soviet film,” in 
Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia, ed. by Stephen Webber and Jennifer G. 
Mathers (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 80-93; Eichler, 
Militarising Men, 121-127. 
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Those challenging the Soviet narrative of the Great Patriotic War initially marginalised 
veterans from society.4 They saw the veterans’ victory as the further empowerment of the 
oppressive system.5 However, in 1993, discourse surrounding the veteran population 
changed, as the values they embodied, such as sacrifice, loyalty and heroism, became 
attributes the state wanted to promote in order to ensure a new generation of patriots. This 
is best reflected in Russia’s military oath. Established in January 1992, soldiers were 
required to say: 
  
I (name and nationality) enter the military service of the Russian Federation and 
swear allegiance to its people. I swear to comply with the constitution and laws 
of the Russian Federation, to comply with the requirements of military 
regulations, orders of commanders and leaders, duties legally assigned to me. I 
swear being in military service, to be honest, conscientious, worthy of the 
difficulties associated with it. Courageously, in sparing our lives, to defend the 
people and state interests of the Russian Federation.6 
 
 The oath highlighted the soldier’s commitment and loyalty to the security of the 
state by “swearing allegience to its people.” The sacrificial aspect of the oath was 
highlighted in the soldier’s commitment to “courageously” defend the state and its people. 
Veterans had made similar commitments. As noted by Anna Krylova, both Yeltsin and 
Gennady Zyuganov realised the “mobilising potential” of the veteran population, who 
they saw as signifiers of “moral and heroic ideals.”7  
 
4 The patriotic-educational programme, devised in the 1990s but established under Putin, 
was also used as a way to reconfigure the position of the veteran in post-Soviet society. 
It played a role in both disciplining youth, in controlling the veterans, and in establishing 
a role for them out of war. Please see: Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, “Russian Military 
Patriotic Education: A control tool against the arbitrariness of veterans,” The Journal of 
Nationalism and Ethnicity 38, No. 1 (2010): 81.  
5 Krylova, “Dancing on the Graves of the Dead,” 86-89. 
6 Ibid, 93. 
Yeltsin Centre, f. 8, op. 1, d. 2, l. 11, 5 January 1992. 
7 Krylova, “Dancing on the Graves of the Dead,” 94. 
In addition, V. I. Ivanov asserts the relevancy of veterans in contemporary society for the 
‘forming of patriotic qualities in current generations.’ For more, please see: V. I. Ivanov, 
“Veterany O Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine,” Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia, No. 5 
(2015): 12. 
Gennady Zyuganov (1944 – present) is the General Secretary of the Communist party 
and has served within the State Duma since 1993. He competed for the Russian 
Presidency in 1996. 
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This chapter addresses the role of Great Patriotic War veterans in Post-Soviet 
Russia. In 1990s Russia, veteran and military social welfare structures changed. 
Exclusive pensions and military social welfare packages were discussed within the State 
Duma, with new provisions set to start in 1995. Economic issues, however, dampened 
effective reform implementation. Consequently, soldiers’ wages and veteran pensions 
were largely unpaid. That being said, the state’s intended provision of the exclusive 
pensions to its military population highlighted a symbolic prioritisation of the Armed 
Forces above other sections of society. Such prioritisations (even without effective 
implementation) signalled the development of militarisation at this time. First, it 
showcased a greater commitment of the government to military issues. Second, the 
government’s dedication to veteran and military welfare was legitimised by the veteran/ 
soldier’s service to the state. The loyal, self-sacrificing and heroic attributes of the 
veteran/ soldier were those that were promoted into public consciousness.8 To this end, 
the chapter specifically examines the influence that veterans and current military 
personnel had on the development of militarism in Russia through the case study of 
Russian veteran and military social welfare policy, which was reconfigured in 1995.  
This chapter captures the process of militarisation through the concept of 
sponsorship, with enhanced pensions and benefits acting as an indicator of an informal 
hierarchical system. In this hierarchy, the veteran and current soldier sat on a higher 
pedestal than a civilian, since the sponsorship demonstrated the state’s commitment to 
the veteran and military population, and the prioritisation of the military over other 
societal groups.9 As a consequence, discourses of hero-worship became prominent in 
 
8 This chapter focuses predominately on veterans of the Great Patriotic War, since they 
became a main topic of discussion within the State Duma. That being said, 1995 was also 
a pivotal year for veterans of the Soviet Afghanistan War (known as Afghansty), who 
were recognised in the legislature in 1995.  Prior to legislative changes in 1995, 
developments were being made to alter the mechanisms through which these provisions 
could be made, with the government providing tax benefits to Afghanistan veteran 
organisations on the condition that they support the veterans. Please see: Danilova, 
“Veteran’s Policy in Russia,” 17-18. 
While the state did use the veteran to gain support and in its aim of popularising military 
values, the veterans emerged as a salient group that campaigned for their needs and place 
in society.   
9 As noted by Burke, “Power-over-the-other” is a basic characterisation of militarism and 
is hard to identify because it is present where the population accepts and internalises such 
hierarchies. In the example of the war veteran, militarism manifests where the exclusive 
pension and benefits system is assigned to the veteran community on the basis of its 
service to the state in war. As highlighted throughout this chapter, society accepts the 
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state discourse, not only in terms of pension reforms but in commemoration also. In 
January 1995, a Federal Law “About Veterans” [O Veteranakh] was introduced. Article 
8 of this law outlined the intended use of “mass media, targetted propaganda, information 
on the importance of conscientious military service and labour activity, [and] the prestige 
of state awards for military labour and exploits.”10 The state’s policy on social reforms 
showcased its secondary goal to change the discourses around the veteran population and 
Armed Forces and even popularise and revive the military-patriotic spirit of the nation.11  
 Government documents, including laws, drafts of laws, appeals and letters 
circulated within the State Duma, indicate that the government targetted veterans of the 
Great Patriotic War and Russia’s current military cohort. The documents deliberated the 
creation of an exclusive benefit and pensions package for Russian veterans, especially 
those who fought between 1941 and 1945, and was framed as a responsibility of the 
government and society to provide the resources. This was highlighted in a document 
created as a result of a parliamentary hearing held on June 7, 1994 on the issue of Social 
protection of military personnel, persons discharged from military service, and their 
family members, housing, condition and problems in the army. The document noted that 
a “person (citizen) who decides to link his life to the army must be sure, that the state 
ensures the fulfilment of obligations established by law, [and] that each soldier… will not 
be worried about his future before leaving the reserve and the future of his family.”12 In 
addition, a project relating to the Federal Law On perpetuating the victory of the Soviet 
people in the Great Patriotic War, noted that it was a tradition of the state to protect the 
memory of Great Patriotic War victors and to “take care of those who gave their lives in 
the struggle for its [the Soviet Union’s] freedom and independence.”13 These ideas were 
carried over into other areas of society also. For example, an undated information 
document relating to the law On the perpetuation of the memory of those killed in defence 
of the fatherland, outlined the Ministry of Defence’s task to search for the remains of 
soldiers killed in war.14 These statements, outlining the government’s duty of care to its 
 
exclusive reforms in line with the governmental rhetoric that they are deserving of it.  
Please see: Burke, “Women and Militarism,” 2. 
10 Yeltsin Centre, f. 8, op. 3, d. 3, l. 28-34, 12 January 1995. 
11 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 1126, l. 17-24, 7 June 1994.  
12 Ibid. 
13 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, l. 2, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
Some of the documents located in GARF were undated with no evidence of author. 
14 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, l. 14, [Undated: 1993-1995].  
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veterans, justified the state’s role in enhancing the veteran’s provision. It also contributed 
towards our understanding of militarisation through the prism of veteran and military 
social welfare. The state’s ‘duty’ to the military institution was characterised on the basis 
that those within this line of work provide a unique but vastly important service to the 
state.  
The veteran’s role in the Great Patriotic War was conceptualised as a sacrifice that 
went beyond the norms of Russian citizenship, even though Article 59 of the Russian 
constitution as of 1993 clearly stated, “Defence of the Fatherland shall be the duty and 
obligation of a citizen of the Russian Federation.”15 The use of sacrificial discourses, as 
described in this state documentation, suggested that the veterans were more worthy and 
deserving of the provision of enhanced pensions benefits, than a non-participant of war. 
Documentation to be discussed in this chapter, and as shown also in chapter five, 
demonstrates that the veterans’ sacrifice formed the basis for legitimising enhanced 
compensation and elaborate commemoration. The veteran gained these benefits through 
their role in war and by demonstrating loyalty to the state through self-sacrifice and heroic 
action. The creation of this informal hierarchy through emphasis on worthiness 
established a set of desirable qualities which society could measure itself against. Having 
provided enhanced resources to former participants of war, the relationship between the 
military community and the civilian population altered, promoting the image of the 
veteran with an aim to popularise the values they embodied and the institution to which 
they were attached.  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis and political texts  
Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) is a form of analysis that refers specifically to 
political speeches or texts usually conducted within the wider field of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), with an aim to “decode” and highlight powers, ideology and the rise of 
 
When I say targeted here, I mean in terms of prioritisation. The veteran organisations 
proved their agency through their drive to fight for the rights they believed they deserved, 
but the government also understood the power of the veteran group as an electoral group 
and as role models to the future of Russia and prioritised the veteran and military 
community for such reasons. For more, please see: Danijela Dolenec, “A Soldier’s State? 
Veterans and the welfare regime in Croatia,” Anali 14, No. 1 (2017): 61. 
15  “Russian Federation’s constitution of 1993 with amendments through to 2008,” 
constituteproject.org, modified 19 February 2021, accessed 11 April 2020,  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Russia_2008.pdf. 
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hegemonic discourses.16 The popularisation of dominant discourses is a key consideration 
of scholars like Teun A. Van Dijk, for example. He considers political discourse as a form 
of interaction and outcome of the discursive practices of professional politicians and 
associating institutions, which involves the participation of the masses. He claims that 
political texts or speeches are constructed to promote and even achieve a political goal.17 
This is a similar consideration of Jane Muldering et al. Muldering et al. argues that CDA 
plays a particularly important role in policy analysis because it highlights the ideological 
unpinnings and “hidden interests” of the creator. 18  As such, political discourse is 
constructed with the worldviews of the creator in mind. One of the main topics of study, 
in relation to CDA and PDA, are political speeches. Charteris-Black’s 2005 piece, for 
example, explains the impact of metaphors in political speeches on society. He notes that 
the speeches of politicians use metaphor to pull on the emotional strings of its audience, 
to strengthen the politicians’ authority and in myth making.19 Political speeches, aimed 
at addressing an audience, are favourable avenues of study in relation to CDA because 
these speeches represent the views of the government, created with state policy and the 
art of persuasion in mind. 
 However, while political speeches are obvious sources of examination for 
scholars interested in the dominance and popularisation of certain discourses, the 
governmental discussions and documents that underpin these public texts, are also worthy 
sources of study in the field of CDA. As noted by Eva Vetter, powerful discourses 
transform social life in terms of social relations, representation and identity. According 
to Vetter, official documents standardise and control these future discourses.20 Therefore 
 
16  Jiayu Wang, “A New Political Communication Agenda for Political Discourse 
Analysis: Critical Reflections on Critical Discourse Analysis and Political Discourse 
Analysis,” International Journal of Communications 10, (2016): 2766. 
Eva Vetter, “Hegemonic Discourse in the Habsburg Empire: The case of education. A 
Critical Discourse Analysis of two mid-19th century government documents,” in 
Diglossia and Power: Language policies and practice in the 19th century Habsburg 
Empire, ed. by Rosita Rindler Schjerve (Berlin: Mounton De Gruyter, 2003), 272-273. 
17 Teun A. Van Dijk, “What is political discourse analysis?” in Political linguistics, ed. 
by Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcuen (Amsterdam: Benjamins Publishers, 1998), 12-13. 
18 Jane Muldering, Nicolina Montesane Montessori and Michael Farrely, “Introducing 
Critical Policy Discourse Analysis,” in Critical Policy Discourse Analysis, ed. by Jane 
Muldering, Nicolina Montesane Montessori and Michael Farrely (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2019), 6-7. 
19 Jonathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric: The persuasive power of metaphor 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 13-14. 
20 Vetter, “Hegemonic Discourse in the Habsburg Empire,” 274. 
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text produced in political environments from “expert advice and dominant mode of 
governing,” are important documents to be examined using CDA because they are 
considered as texts which contribute toward the evolution of a hegemonic discourse on 
issues that eventually impact society in some form or another.21 
 This chapter examines a number of State Duma documents, including laws, draft 
of laws, letters, memorandum and decrees from the 1990s. Many of the documents found 
in GARF were focused on veteran and military welfare changes. They discussed 
introducing exclusive pensions and social welfare reforms for those who perfomed a 
service to the state in the military. CDA is a valuable tool of analysis in this chapter. First, 
analysing governmental documents through CDA helps identify key considerations taken 
during deliberations on the issue of veteran and social welfare. Second, CDA highlights 
the dominant discourses used to help legitimise welfare reform during this period. Finally, 
CDA aids our understanding of how and why these discourses arose. This chapter found 
that the primary aim of the government was to enhance veteran and military social welfare 
in line with their service to the state. The secondary aim of the government was to use 
these justifications to enhance the prestige of the military and military service in society. 
Therefore, changes to veteran and military welfare in 1990s Russia were a vehicle of 
militarisation.  
 
HISTORY OF VETERAN AND MILITARY SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 
 
 Glorification of veterans was not new to the Post-Soviet period, but began under 
Leonid Brezhnev as he promoted the cult of the Great Patriotic War.22 However, while 
the valorisation has remained a staple of the Victory Day parade, it is surprising that a 
comprehensive exclusive pension and benefits package did not exist until the 1990s. The 
idea of an exclusive veteran’s package existed in the Soviet era, but was extremely flawed 
and not reflected in official legislation.23 This is suprising, since the foundations of social 
 
21 Ibid, 274. 
Muldering et al., “Introducing Critical Policy Discourse Analysis,” 6-7. 
22 Mark Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group, 1945-1955,” Slavic Review 65, 
No. 1 (2006): 112. 
23 According to Danilova, exclusive pensions in Russia are attributed to three factors; 
political situation, rituals in civil-military relations and the social welfare system. She 
surveys Russia’s veteran welfare policy in conjuction with such factors, finding that 
patterns in civil-military relations and the ideologcal character of the Armed Forces 
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welfare in the USSR were embedded in the principles of Marxism-Leninism.24 These 
principles included the promise of improved living conditions, free health, medical 
protection and housing accommodation.25 State pensions were introduced fairly early on 
in the Soviet period, established in 1917 to cover all workers.26 However, under Joseph 
Stalin’s leadership, changes were made to the system in order to fulfil Stalin’s desire to 
implement a programme that would benefit only those who demonstrated their loyalty to 
the state. As early as Stalin, we can see an emergence of an informal hierarchical system 
in which the veterans were glorified for their role in conflict. 27 Edele claims, however, 
that such glorification ended in 1948, after a period of mass mobilisation when the 
provision of extra resources would have benefit most. He states that following a period 
of mobilisation, veterans were reintegrated into society without the privileges they 
received months earlier, and that they “ceased to exist as an officially recognised status 
group.”28  
Failure to recognise veterans of the Great Patriotic War, led to the emergence of 
Veterans’ organisations and policies after the death of Stalin. 29  These organisations 
lobbied for aid, which they believed they were entitled to.30 Organisations like the Soviet 
Committee of War Veterans, grew under Brezhnev, and aimed to create an all-soviet 
network of veterans, with the establishment of “participant of the Patriotic War” 
 
contribute to a type of civil-military relations based on mutual benefit. She claims that in 
the Soviet period, exclusive pensions were created but the mechanisms were not in place 
to implement them. For more, please see: Danilova, “Veteran’s Policy in Russia,” 2. 
24 Aleksandra Wiktorow, “Soviet Union,” in Social Welfare in Socialist Countries, ed. by 
John Dixon and David Macarov (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 184-185. 
25 Ibid. 
26  Andrea Chandler, Shocking Mother Russia: Democratisation, Social Rights and 
Pension Reform in Russia, 1990-2000 (Toronto: University Toronto Press, 2004), 24-25. 
27 Robert Dale, Demobilised Veterans of the late Stalinist Leningrad: Soldiers to Civilians 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 48. 
Mark B. Smith, “Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship: The constitutional Right to 
Welfare from Stalin to Brezhnev,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism and Development 3, No. 3 (2012): 394. 
28 Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group,” 110. 
Sieca-Kozlowskia, “Russian Military Patriotic Education,” 78. 
29 Andrea Chandler claims the ‘Big Deal’ demonstrated the government’s commitment 
to improve post-war conditions for veterans, with the 1956 Victory Day the date in which 
the government announced that such provisions would be created to honour participants 
of the war. Please see: Andrea Chandler, “Veteran’s Rights in the Russian Constitutional 
Court, 1993-2010,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 54, No. 3-4 (2012): 322. 
30 Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group,” 112. 
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becoming a recognised category in 1978.31 Those who sat within this recognised group 
were eligible for special access to medical care, and discounted travel benefits. While the 
rise in social welfare seems to suggest a duty of care to its veterans, in fact, the standards 
of Soviet healthcare had fallen rapidly – confirming that while these veterans had access 
to such benefits, the quality of such facilities highlighted flaws in the system.32 These 
flaws were not limited to the quality of medical services provided to the veteran, but also 
in the devaluation of the pensions when compared to the increasing costs of living in the 
Post-Soviet period and in the lack of legislation protecting budgets set out for veteran 
welfare.33  
This was a particular issue of 1990s Russia. As noted in a reference by the 
Department of the Defence on the issue of Financing from the federal budget of state 
centralised capital investments under the “housing” programme on the territory of the 
Russian Federation in 1993-1994, “Letters from unions of reserve officers of the territory 
of the Russian Federation show that the funds allocated from the budget are not always 
used for their intended purposes.”34 In other words, the creation of more robust legislation 
controlling the budget on veteran issues was necessary. Other issues of veteran policy 
legislation included the disparity (in terms of provisions) between veteran groups, which 
was dependent on the conflict they were associated with. Historically, veterans of the 
Great Patriotic War have received more resources than veterans of other wars. Veterans 
of the First World War, for example, received marginally less than Veterans of the Great 
Patriotic War. While the renewed memorialisation and valorisation of the Great Patriotic 
War veterans suggests little changed in this era, higher allowances were also given to 
participants of Afghanistan and the war in Chechnya.  
 
 Veterans are an important group in society. Their exclusive status is rooted in the 
special relationship that is present between the soldier and the state. At the crux of this 
relationship is the soldier’s duty as a guarantor of state security and for the renewal of the 
state.35 The soldier’s role as state protector has been a historical part and parcel of the job. 
 
31  Ibid. 
Smith, “Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship,” 399. 
32 Ibid, 399. 
33 Chandler, “Veteran’s Rights in the Russian Constitutional Court,” 322. 
34 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 1126, 57-58, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
35 David Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System in 
the People’s Liberation Army,” China Quarterly, No. 127 (1991): 527-529. 
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Initially, the citizen-soldier was created from the idea that their role in protecting the state 
was simply a repayment for the rights and privileges of citizenship.36  This idea has 
formed the basis for future expectations of a soldier. For example, in the Middle Ages, 
serfs served a period of time in the military as payment to their rulers. 37  However, 
conflicts fought during the 100 Years War of the 14th and 15th centuries changed the 
dynamics between the soldier and the state. No longer was the soldier primarily making 
a payment to the state through military service, but now the state needed to provide a duty 
to the military; most appropriately through social welfare guarantees. In waging bigger 
wars, nations and empires needed larger armies. Under Cardinal Richelieu, 17th century 
French Clergyman and Statesman, there was a struggle to amass the manpower required 
to defend France against other European countries. This led him to improve health and 
welfare services for members of the military in an aim to recruit extra men. 38  The 
dedication of the monarchto Richelieu’s military institution was shown by their continued 
commitment to the welfare of the French army, which was increasing in size.39 Both 
attitudes have remained a staple of a citizen’s duty to protect the state, and with that, is 
the state’s duty to protect the soldier. For example, in democratic states, the role of the 
soldier is to protect democracy – with many narratives of war discussing the preservation 
of this democracy and attributes attached to it.  
The state’s duty to the military institution, however, is the most interesting 
discursive frame as it creates a clear hierarchy within society. American case studies 
dominate research on this topic but can be used to illustrate the situation in Post-Soviet 
Russia, with a clear emergence of a transnational notion of “deserving.” In post-Civil War 
America, those appealing for governmental help were categorised into deserving and 
undeserving.40 The viewpoint centred on the notion that provisions of welfare should not 
be given to those who are un-deserving. As noted by Theda Skocpol, from 1880 to 1910s, 
“veterans pensions became a keystone of an entire edifice of honourable income 
 
36 Caroline Varin, Mercenaries, Hybrid Armies and National Security: Private Soldiers 
and the state in the 21st Century (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 30. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Colin Jones, “The Welfare of the French Foot-Soldier,” History 65, No. 214 (1980): 
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39 Jones, “The Welfare of the French Foot-Soldier,” 194. 
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supplements and institutional provision.”41 Therefore the civil war pension system was 
defined within the terms that those who received governmental help, deserved it. Skopcol 
notes that governmental rhetoric pushed toward the creation of an informal hierarchy that 
justified the provisions on the basis that they would hinder a former veteran, “who 
honourably wore the Federal Uniform,” from entering an almshouse.42  In the era of 
Ronald Reagan, the G. I. Bill reignited the juxtapositions between deserving and 
underserving, with those deserving being characterised within the prism of military 
service.43 However, and most interestingly, Olivier Burtin argues that many scholars of 
veteran affairs and pension reforms have taken it for granted. He claims that scholars 
explicitly examine veteran pensions without placing them within the wider context of 
state pensions, because these scholars treat the creation of veteran pensions as a natural 
process, whereas they are actually the outcome of long historical processes of lobbying, 
protests and entitlement.44 Having already indicated veteran struggles in post-Stalinist 
Soviet Union and during the period of Perestroika, the pension and benefit policies 
awarded to the veteran population, in the 1990s, cannot be considered an outcome of a 
natural process.45  
While the provision of enhanced pensions and benefits are mainly an outcome of 
rallies and lobbying by interest groups, they have enjoyed success because of the lack of 
prominent opposition. In the American case study, Burtin notes that critics of enhanced 
veteran pensions may have slowed the process, but that actions to develop veterans’ rights 
have persisted because of political elites who first, want to garner support of the veteran 
population for electoral purposes, and because they did not want to be typecast as anti-
veteran.46 We can see commonalities between the American case study and Post-Soviet 
Russian veteran politics.  
 
41 Ibid, 7. 
42 Ibid, 149-150. 
43 Jennifer Mittlestadt, The Rise of the Military Welfare State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Havard University Press, 2015), Chapter 4.  
44 Burtin, “The History of Veteran’s Policy in the United States,” 241. 
Amir Weiner, “In the Long Shadow of War: The Second World War and the Soviet and 
Post-Soviet World,” Diplomatic History 25, No. 3 (2001): 455. 
45 Chandler, “Veteran’s Rights in the Russian Constitutional Court,” 322-323. 
 Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group,” 112. 
46 Burtin, “The History of Veteran’s Policy in the United States,” 242. 
We may also want to take into consideration the threat posed by the military to the 
government. As noted by M. Duverger, the military is a constant danger to civilian 
leaders. They must be consistently reminded that their role is to serve the state. As is 
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The Presidential election of 1996 motivated Yeltsin to foster a positive 
relationship with veterans, in the view that they were a key voting constituency.47 First, 
promoting and legalising increased benefits to veteran and military figures were tactical 
moves made to secure the vote of these constituents. Second, rejecting veteran and 
military pension policies that enhanced the quality of their welfare would be considered 
anti-veteran. Since the various presidential candidates were hoping to secure the veteran 
and military vote, they acted in favour of military community in this sense. Finally, and   
in relation to anti-veteranism, governmental literature largely emphasised the point that 
it was a duty of the state and society to care of war participants, claiming that actions to 
the contrary would highlight depreciation in the role of the veterans in the war. For 
example, in an information leaflet made for the law On the perpetuation of the memory 
of those killed in the defence of the Fatherland, it was the responsibility of the Russian 
state and society to participate in and help fund “search work,” which included 
establishing “the fate of the soldiers who were missing during the Great Patriotic War.” 
Another document, which was an appeal made in a meeting of the Heroes of the Soviet 
Union, again highlighted the state’s responsibility to improve conditions of veterans in 
Russian society. In addition, however, and as noted in the previous chapter, veteran 
groups and state duma representatives claimed that the small amount of laws in this area, 
alongside the rise of an anti-military-patriotic education, showed lack of respect for the 
veterans who forged victory over Nazi Germany. This was also a key argument for those 
working outside the federal government. For example, V. Konev, Chairman of the 
Yekaterinburg City Council Union “Rear Front”, appealed to the government for 
enhanced pensions for the Workers of the Rear during the Great Patriotic War. He noted 
 
highlighted in scholarship by Wendy Hunter and Duverger, history of military coups 
show that a civilian authority must maintain a cautious attitude towards the military – 
with the provision of enhanced benefits a form of maintaining a positive relationship. For 
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that current provisions to labour workers did not reflect the dire conditions they faced 
during the Great Patriotic War.48  
Veteran and military social welfare reforms of the 1990s were driven by 1) 
presidential campaign of 1996, 2) motivation to provide the veteran and military 
community with the benefits believed to match the service they had provided to the state 
and 3) to increase the prestige of the veteran community in society. They were not the 
outcome of a natural process, but an outcome of lobbying by veteran organisations, 
tactical political maneuvers made by the government prior to the presidential campaign 
and opportunities to alter the standing of the military in Russia’s society. These changes, 
despite poor implementation, highlighted the prioritisation of the veteran and military 
community in society, which was motivated by various factors.  
 
DEFINING THE VETERAN 
  
Many developments were made in the 1990s to change the position of the veteran 
and the military community in society. For example, organisers of the 1995 Victory Day 
parades made a significant effort to reconcile the past with the present by having the 
current military cohort, participants of war in Chechnya and of military schools in 
Moscow, acting out the role of the veterans. This reconciliation is imagined as a process 
of mythologisation and future militarisation. However, in the context of veteran affairs, 
the use of the current and future military regiments highlighted that current and future 
generations will continue to go to war, and if injured, need appropriate care and support.49  
One major debate of the 1990s was on the definition of the veteran, since the state 
was scrutinised for the “expansive interpretation of the concept, ‘veteran’”50 In response, 
 
48 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, l. 2, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 37, 13 February 1995. 
GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 54-55, [Undated 1993-1995]. 
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49 Shaun Walker, The Long Hangover: Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 8-9. 
Weiner, “In the Long Shadow of War,” 455-456. 
50 “Vesenniaia sessiia gosudarstvennoy dumy 1995 goda,” Izvestiia, 1995, 19-20. 
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the government took steps to construct a fixed interpretation of the veteran, but in doing 
so, were forced to consider the boundaries of who could be regarded as a veteran of the 
Great Patriotic War. In a letter by the Committee of Labour and Social Support, calls for 
change claimed that there were “new veterans in our time, [and that] it is necessary to 
reflect their problems in new legislation.” 51  In January 1995, a Federal Law was 
introduced under the title “About veterans” (O Veteranakh), in which the government set 
out to establish a number of different veteran groups, which were determined on the 
account of “merits during the defence of the Fatherland, impeccable military service and 
long conscientious work.”52 Those included in this line-up were, Veterans of the Great 
Patriotic War, Veterans of military operations on territories of other states, veterans of 
military service, veterans of internal affairs bodies, and veterans of the prosecution office 
of Justice.”53 This definition, not only solidified recognition for those who participated in 
the Great Patriotic War, but provided recognition for other conflicts fought since 1945, 
for example, the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict.  
Changes to the definition of the veteran also initiated a dialogue on the role of 
civilians and workers of the rear in previous wars. While there is no documentation 
showing an expansion of the term ‘veteran’ in official legislation, workers of the rear 
received greater attention in pension discussions and were celebrated through the 
provision of medals. These medals are documented in Figure thirteen of chapter five and 
are the same as those given to combative participants of the Great Patriotic War. The Law 
for the Jubilee Medal for “50 years of victory in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945” was 
established in 1993.54 In 1994, recipients of the medal were stipulated as: 
 
Persons who have a ‘certificate of a participant of war’; 
Workers in the rear, awarded for self-sacrificing labour during the Great Patriotic 
War with orders of the USSR, medals ‘for valiant work in the Great Patriotic 
War,’ ‘For labour valour,’ ‘For labour distinction.’55 
 
Those eligible for these medals were identified via a military identification card, 
or by proof of employment history.56 
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52 Yeltsin Centre, f. 8, op. 3, d. 3, l. 28-34, 12 January 1995. 
53 Ibid. 
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55 Ibid. 
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Placing the worker of the rear into the same category as a frontline veteran is 
particularly interesting because it promotes/ glorifies supporters of war. While the role of 
home-front worker has been appreciated in political discourse globally, for example, the 
role of women in factories during the First World War, for the workers’ ability to maintain 
farms, food supplies, to create ammunition and uniforms, it is only in the Russian case 
that such a close comparability has been made.57 As justified by Konev, “Participants in 
the war and workers in the rear actually lived their lives in difficult but similar extreme 
conditions, but in modern times they live in different conditions.” 58  What Konev 
suggested is that workers of the rear made similar sacrifices under parallel conditions. 
However, veteran policy did not reflect these similarities, and workers of the rear were 
not receiving the care they deserved. Konev’s comments are strongly justified for some 
workers, especially those in Leningrad, for example, whose residents were required to 
uphold the blockade with few resources.59 As noted in a letter to veterans of the Leningrad 
Blockade in 1993, Yeltsin wrote, “The feat of the war veterans, and the residents of the 
Neva, will never fade in the memory of Russians, of all the people in the world. History 
knows no examples like this…the residents of the Neva stronghold waged a selfless 
struggle against the Fascist invaders. The city survived in a fierce battle with the 
enemy.”60 Both sources note the sacrifice of veterans of the Soviet Union during the Great 
Patriotic War, and indicate that the victory of the conflict was not solely limited to the 
soldiers on the front but also depended on the work of civilians. Another reason why 
Konev’s comments hold a sense of legitimacy is situated in the fact that the Great Patriotic 
War was fought on Soviet soil. Unlike workers of the rear in Britain during the First 
World War, many of the Soviet labourers were confronted with the direct terrors of war. 
Konev’s statement viewed the labourer’s role and experience of war as equal to the 
soldiers on the front and questioned the disparity in the provision of aftercare.  
Research carried out on the boundaries between the soldier and citizen has mostly 
been drawn from a British and First World War perspective. While British home-front 
 
57 Scholars of the First World War have mostly made this link, claiming that air raids, for 
example, blurred the boundaries between the front line and home front as the war was 
taken away from the battlefield and civilians became the targets. Susan R. Grayzal, At 
Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-3. 
58 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 54-55, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
59 Bidlack and Lomagin, The Leningrad Blockade, 1-3; Reid, Leningrad, 3-4. 
60Yeltsin Centre, f. 6, op. 1, d. 120, l. 4, 17 January 1993. 
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labourers would not have had the same experience as a country where the war was directly 
fought on their soil, scholars of this topic argue that changes made to normal life in Britain 
in the First World War, for example food rationing and limitations on leisure activities, 
were characterised by civilians as “doing their bit” and a strike against Germany.61 Dean 
Evans argued that despite a clear difference in the experiences of soldiers and civilians of 
the First World War, the war was causing changes on the home front and that scholars 
should consider revising the boundaries between soldiers and civilians.62 Tammy Proctor 
comes to a similar conclusion, noting that the dichotomy between the soldier and civilian 
positively served the government in terms of propaganda, but ignored the problems that 
civilians faced and the important contribution they made in order to facilitate the war.63  
The contribution of the civilian population in the Great Patriotic War was great. 
During the inter-war period, Stalin industrialised the Soviet Union at a dramatic rate, 
creating a military industrial complex that was compatible with the demands required in 
a conflict with a magnitude of the Great Patriotic War. Industry and agriculture were 
reconfigured to suit the needs of the conflict, which in functioning within a wartime 
capacity, led to a larger mobilisation of society beyond the battlefield. As Enloe wrote, 
“few other institutions can command such a vast financial, labour and material resources 
as a military.”64 From the perspective of Fredrick W. Kagan, “The Great Patriotic War 
was a war of the entire Soviet people,” claiming that Soviet men and women “willingly” 
went to work in factories to support the armed forces.65  
Efforts were made by the Yeltsin government to provide some sense of social 
protection to these civilian groups. For example, in January 1994, he introduced a decree 
to ensure “social guarantees and privileges” to residents of Leningrad, who were awarded 
a medal “For the Defence of Leningrad” and the badge “Resident of the besieged 
Leningrad.”66 Although these guarantees remain unclear, the acknowledgement of the 
government’s need to support civilians who played a role in protecting Leningrad 
 
61 Dean Evans, “How Far were the Lines between the Frontline and the Homefront 
blurred in East Kent (Canterbury),” Masters diss., (University of Kent, 2016), 4-7. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Tammy Proctor, Civilians in a World at War, 1914-1918 (New York: NYU Press, 
2010), 37. 
64 Enloe, Manuevers, 47. 
65 Fredrick W. Kagan,  “The Great Patriotic War,” in The Military History of the Soviet 
Union, ed. by Kagan, Fredrick W. and Robert Highham (New York: Palgrave, 2016), 
150. 
66 Yeltsin Centre, f. 8, op. 1, d. 4, l. 80, 18 January 1994. 
 207 
highlighted a clear disregard of the historical lines that previously separated a soldier’s 
role from a civilian. That being said, the everyday citizen was not rewarded for their role 
in the defence of Leningrad – it was only those who had already been ceremonially 
recognised through medal provisions. While not always regarded in the form of pensions, 
the inclusion of the worker in the rear was an important step taken by the government in 
the 1990s.  
During this period, Russia was involved in a number of neighbouring and local 
wars, including the conflict in Chechnya. While technically taking place on Russian soil, 
the war seemed far-flung for much of Russia’s population. Support for rear workers of 
the Great Patriotic War showcased the importance of home-front workers to the political 
institution. It also demonstrated that sacrifice and loyalty to the state could be shown 
through war-supportive roles. On 7 May 1995, Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the 
title of Veteran of Labour (Veteran truda).67  Reemphasising the role of Labour Veterans 
in previous conflicts, the decree highlighted the continued integral role that workers of 
the rear would play in the present and future conflicts. The expansion pushed new ideas 
relating to civic duty into the public sphere, as those who participated in such supportive 
roles and demonstrated attributes of loyalty to the country found recognition as key 
citizens of the state.  
By expanding the definition of the veteran, the government publicised the role 
that society plays in conflict. It noted, similar to studies on a civilian’s role in the First 
World War, that the roles played by soldiers and citizens in war are parallel when 
considering the sacrifices made by both parties for the war effort.68 Factory workers and 
farmers, comparable to soldiers, were acknowledged as vital cogs in the war machine. 
While the role of “citizen-soldiers” had received attention in political discussion in the 
State Duma, the recognition of these groups through the medals further embedded this 
understanding on a societal level.  
By acknowledging the role these extra actors played in conflict, the state was 
popularising the link between civic duty and the state defence. First, it forced the citizen 
to consider their part in a war and how they would contribute towards it in a supporting 
role. The second objective was to glorify participation in conflict, whether on the 
 
67 Yeltsin Centre, f. 8, op. 1, d. 5, l. 13, 7 May 1995. 
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battlefield or on the home front. Konev demonstrated the state’s desire to cultivate these 
discourses, by claiming, “Workers of the rear require substantial extra pensions, so that 
at least the rest of their lives will be worthy of the people who forged the Victory in the 
Great Patriotic War.”69 He was not the only person calling for a reward system for 
workers of the rear. As noted in a statement by the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation on the 17 February 1995, Oleg Orestovich Mironov acknowledged that a 
number of proposals were received by the Communist Party from voters calling for the 
state “to award the workers of the home front “for selfless labour in the years of the Great 
Patriotic War.”70 These statements highlighted the all-encompassing impact that war and 
conflict had on society, noting that soldiers on the battlefield were not the only important 
actors in a war, but that the possibility of victory was also reliant on those working to 
maintain the forces and society on the home front.  
 
SPONSORING THE VETERAN 
 
Changes made to veteran social policy during the 1990s significantly changed the 
position of the veteran community in society. The steps taken by the government to alter 
veteran policy during this period demonstrated that Russia was still militarised in some 
respects, through a series of steps being made by the government to popularise the Armed 
Forces and to prioritise the military over other parts of civil society. The transformation 
of veteran and military welfare policies and the provision of enhanced pensions and 
benefits to former military personnel unveiled a subtle state-led effort to militarise 
society. In this chapter, the process of militarisation is captured through the concept of 
sponsorship. The phrase “sponsorship” is being used to describe the provision of 
enhanced pensions and benefits to the veteran population.  
 
 Scholars of commercial and sports sponsorship agree on the main actors involved 
in a sponsorship transaction. Participants in the sponsorship paradigm include the 
sponsor, sponsee and consumer.71 Researchers also concur that in sponsorship the brand 
image of both the sponsor and sponsee will affect the image of one another, and will 
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determine the response of a consumer. 72  In the field of commercial and sports 
sponsorship, the process of sponsorship is a form of promotion that will benefit each 
actor, and may even benefit the community.73 Through sponsorship, the community will 
foster a relationship between the sponsor and consumer and between the sponsee and 
consumer.74 Research on sponsorship shows there is a mutually beneficial aspect of 
sponsorship for each actor involved in the process. While the brand image may affect the 
image and therefore the identity of the sponsor and sponsee, fan involvement (which 
refers to the extent to which a consumer identifies with the sponsored) demonstrates 
another element, whereby the consumer also buys into the values being displaced by the 
sponsor/ sponsee relationship.75  In the sponsorship-militarisation paradigm, the State 
inhibits the role of the sponsor, the veteran/ military community represents the sponsee 
and society plays the role of the consumer. A reconceptualisation of Tony Meenaghan’s 
process (study-specific phrasing is in brackets) is documented below: 
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(Figure 1. Diagram of sponsorship process)76 
 
 
  Figure One outlines the main processes of the sponsorship-militarisation 
nexus. However, there are a number of mini-processes taking place during the 
sponsorship transaction. The first process involves the state-veteran-society course. On 
this course, the state dedicates enhanced provisions to veteran and military groups. 
Through the endowment of these resources, the group is then politicised in a number of 
ways. This politicisation occurs because the government expects a sense of loyalty from 
veteran groups in return. This is particularly important to consider since changes to 
veteran pensions occurred in the lead up to the 1996 Presidential elections. While we can 
conceptualise the initial process of enhanced pensions and benefits as an aspect of 
neopatrimonialism, it does not explain the other advantages gained by the state as a result 
of this exclusive social welfare policy.77 Through the concept of sponsorship, these other 
aspects can be captured. A sponsorship transaction usually takes place when the sponsee 
represents attributes that are desirable to the state. This includes characteristics and values 
which they want to be associated with, and that they want to pass on to their consumers. 
A sportsperson is a good sponsee, not only because they win, but also because they 
embody important values such as discipline, determination and resilience. A brand will 
choose to sponsor an athlete with these values over an athlete who is arrogant, selfish and 
demonstrates poor sportsmanship because they want the athlete to reflect the ethos of the 
 
76 Meenaghan, “Understanding Sponsorship Effects” 105-106. 
77 Neopatrimonialism is a staple mechanism of power and control in the Post-Soviet 
space. The embeddedness of neopatrimonialism has been documented as having existed 
in pre-Petrine Russia. Since the collapse of the union, many of the Post-Soviet states, 
including Russia, have been characterised as hybrid regimes with aspects of democracy 
and the use of non-democratic devices. Put simply by Alisher Ilkhamor in his 2007 study, 
neopatriomonialism is a process in which a patron purchases the loyalty of a client and in 
return that client protects the interests of the patron. The patron can be anyone in a 
leadership role, including a president, a business manager and even a parent. Clients as 
‘rent-seeking actors’ compete for money, power and even resources, with the simple 
request that they would prop up the power, control or even provide security for the patron. 
Please see; Alisher Ilkhamor, “Neopatrimonalism, interest groups and patronage 
networks: The Impasses of Governance System in Uzbekistan,” Central Asian Survey 26, 
No. 1 (2007): 65-67; Vladimir Gel’man, “The Viscious Circle of Post-Soviet 
Neopatriomonialism in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 32, No. 5 (2016): 458; Oleksandr 
Fisun, “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective,” The Journal 
of Post-Soviet Democratisation 20, No. 2 (2012): 91-93. 
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brand.78 The state chose to provide veterans with an enhanced pension and benefits 
package, not only because the state believed it was their duty to do so, but because they 
wanted to promote the values associated with the former participants of war. The 
government also wanted those characteristics to reflect on the state in order to revive 
values of militarised patriotism in society. These values include self-sacrifice, loyalty to 
the state and heroism.  
However, Madrigal notes that brands do not simply sponsor an athlete, event or 
television programme to inform the audience of the brand’s core values, claiming that 
sponsorship as a vehicle of communication works in a multitude of ways in order to 
project the core values of the sponsor and sponsee onto the consumer.79 How does this 
lend to militarisation? By ‘sponsoring’ the veteran/military population through an 
enhanced pensions and benefits package, the state was promoting militaristic values of 
self-sacrifice, loyalty and heroism to society. Veterans still remain relevant today as the 
“most important means of forming patriotic qualities in current generations.” 80  The 
sponsorship sent a message to society that those who demonstrate such attributes are 
worthy of receiving the same level of benefits. Partnering state justifications for enhanced 
pensions with emphasis on a veteran’s loyalty to the state, to narratives presented in 
commemorative activities and in educational textbooks, further legitimised the provision 
of such benefits as it called attention to the role that veterans played in the preservation 
and renewal of the state. For example, the appeal by Konev outlined the need to 
compensate the workers of the rear for the sacrifices they made to ensure the victory of 
the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War.81 The prevalence of such discourses in 
society helped embed such narratives into societal discourse. Russian citizens were less 
likely to question the exclusivity of the pension and social protection protocols laid out 
for the veteran population, as doing so meant questioning the worthiness of the veteran 
and downplaying their role in the Great Patriotic War – doing such would be blasphemy.82  
 
78 Meenaghan, “Understanding Sponsorship Effects,” 102-104. 
Ferrand and Pages, “Image Sponsoring,” 278. 
79 Madrigal, “Social Identity, Effects in belief – attitude-intentions hierarchy,” 146. 
80 Ivanov, “Veterany o Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine,” 12. 
81 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 54-55, [Undated 1993-1995]. 
82 In 1997, two million veterans received personalised congratulatory messages from 
Boris Yeltsin. In an opinion poll study by FOM, 1,500 people were told about the 
messages. When asked why they thought Yeltsin did this, 26% claimed it was a neutral 
motive, while 16% saw it as a positive motive. Those who believed the action of the 
president was neutral argued he sent the message because “veterans deserve it.”  Those 
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The process of sponsorship, in this case, demonstrates a clear state effort to 
saturate society with militaristic-patriotic narratives. It highlights a transfer of values 
from the sponsee to the sponsor, and from the sponsee to the consumer – the values 
propagated here are those attached to serving in the military or contributing towards the 
war effort from the home front. The veteran policy, which was legitimated as an award 
for those who demonstrated worthiness by emphasis on sacrifice, loyalty and heroism, 
established a standard by which society would be measured, where demonstration of such 
values would result in the same benefits.  
Another process in the sponsorship-militarisation paradigm to consider is the 
relationship between the sponsor and society, and in this case, the state and society. While 
changes to veterans’ social welfare policy during this period can be attributed to the 
state’s need for veteran participation in the 50th anniversary celebrations, commitment to 
the social needs of ex-military personnel also positively affected the image of the 
government.  Since brand image is affected by the image of the sponsor and vice versa, 
it is important to consider in what ways this transaction would have affected the 
relationship between the government and society. Interestingly enough, and in what can 
be seen as a victory of the state, when asked “The Leadership of Russia and President B. 
Yeltsin have given the holiday of the 50th anniversary of Victory a special place. Has your 
attitude to President B. Yeltsin changed?” eight percent of the 1368 respondents answered 
that their views of the President improved, while eight percent answered that their opinion 
of the president declined. Ten percent stated answered, “it was hard to say.” 74% claimed 
that their views had not changed, but it is unknown what their views were initially.83 
Positive changes to the veteran’s pension system had more chance of changing public 
opinion towards the state, since it actually altered the veterans’ lives in ways the parade 
could not. Simply honouring the veteran in the ceremony did very little to improve their 
lives and did not mean they would then have access to medical care, money to pay their 
rent and to live a comfortable life.  
 
who saw Yeltsin’s messages as a positive motive, believed it was motivated ‘out of 
respect for veterans.” “O Prezidentsikh pozdravleniiakh veteranam,” FOM, 27 July 1995, 
accessed 27 April 2020, https://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19972903. 
83  “Shirokoe prazdnovanie 50-letiia Pobedy ne povliialo na otnoshenie Rossiian 
Prezidentu,” FOM, May 1995, accessed 13 April 2020, 
https://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19952001. 
 213 
By providing more resources to the veteran/ military community, it not only 
demonstrated the state’s commitment to its forces, but also benefitted society by 
removing the burden from friends and family members. As noted by Koustuv Dalal and 
Leif Svanstrom, war fatalities and war-induced injuries can cause financial problems 
within a family setting. They claim, “Losing a breadwinner to injuries and/ or death often 
results in huge economic burdens by pushing families into poverty, or poorer families 
deeper into poverty.”84 This is because other family members need to make up for the 
loss of income resulting from such injury, and may need to pay for new medical costs as 
a result of the injury and even take on the burden of care as an informal caregiver.85 This 
is an obvious outcome of enhanced pensions and benefits to war veterans and increased 
social welfare to current military personnel. It removes the strain from the family who 
either fill the gap left by active service men or those unable to fulfil the jobs they left 
behind before the conflict – either through injury of loss of life in war. This is where there 
is a slight difference between the government-veteran or government-society relationship 
and the sponsor-sponsee relationship in the sponsorship paradigm - the veteran’s agency 
in comparison to the sportsperson or celebrity.  In a sports/ commercial sponsorship 
transaction, the sponsee has the power to reject the sponsorship. This is not the same case 
for the average veteran, who in most cases, would rely on either help from a relative or 
from the state in order to survive. The differentiation however, strengthens the concept 
of sponsorship in this sense, as the role of the sponsor is enabled with little protest – 
except, in most cases, to increase welfare. 
By releasing the burden of family members to financially support the veteran, it 
highlighted the importance of the veteran to the state and generated goodwill towards the 
government. As noted by Colin McDonald, “sponsorship is not just talking directly about 
the company and products but is about supporting something dear to your heart.”86 The 
government’s support of the veteran community through these enhanced pensions 
demonstrated a strong sense of goodwill from the sponsor, who was making an 
investment. This investment by the Russian government towards the veteran community, 
 
84 Koustuv Dalal and Leif Svanstrom, “Economic Burden of Disability Adjusted Life 
Years (DALYs) of Injuries,” Health, 7, (2015), 488; Roxana E., Delgado, Kimberly 
Peacock, Barbara Elizondo, Margaret Wells, Jordan H. Grafman and Mary J. Pugh, “A 
Family’s Affair: Caring for Veterans with Pentrating Traumatic Brain Injury,” Military 
Medicine, 183, 3/4, (2018), 379-380. 
85 Delgado et al., “A Family’s Affair,” 379. 
86 McDonald. “Sponsorship and the Image of the Sponsor,” 34. 
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a personal cause for most Russian families, (since nearly every Soviet family was touched 
by the Great Patriotic War), played a role in fostering a better relationship between state 
and society. A letter sent by the All-Russian Council of Veterans to Yeltsin, demonstrated 
warm relations between the veteran community and Boris Yeltsin. In the letter, they 
expressed gratitude to Yeltsin for greeting the veterans, and asked that proposals to 
change veteran policy be taken into consideration. They signed the letter by wishing 
health and happiness to Yeltsin in the New Year.87  
While there are similarities between the process of sponsorship and the 
sponsorship-militarisation nexus, there are also some differences. For example, the 
benefits for the sponsor are different in the government-veteran-society paradigm than 
that of the sponsor-sponsee-consumer nexus. In a sports/ commercial sponsorship 
process, the sponsor expects economic benefits, such as increased sales of its 
merchandise. In the government-veteran-society arrangement, the benefit to the 
government was not material, but symbolic. In this process, society was confronted with 
militaristic values of loyalty, patriotism and state-protections, which not only became 
embedded in state policy, but also in the discourses associated with veterans more 
generally. These narratives had been re-cultivated not only through state legislature, but 
also in historical educational textbooks and in the commemorative rituals of the Victory 
Day parade. The justification of enhanced veteran pensions alongside glorifying 
narratives not only associated ideas of heroism with stories of sacrifice in war, but also 
created a baseline of attributes that need to be demonstrated in order to receive similar 
treatment. Scholars of sponsorship show that investments are made to those who 
demonstrate desirable values because the sponsor wants to expand and promote these 
values into the future.  
The success of the veteran sponsorship as a viable mechanism of militarisation is 
similar to a commercial, sports sponsorship journey. Not only were the values of the 
sponsee being promoted through the process, but also a strong relationship was being 
cultivated between the government and veteran population, the government and society 
 
87 Yeltsin Centre, f. 6, op. 1, d. 183, l. 109, 27 December 1996. 
In 1997, Yeltsin sent a message of congratulations to two million veterans by May 9th. As 
noted in an opinion poll by FOM, “59% of the respondents whose families received 
congratulations said they were very pleased, moved and grateful for their attention.” “O 
Prezidentsikh pozdravleniiakh veteranam,” FOM, 27 July 1995, accessed 27 April 2020, 
https://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19972903. 
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and the veteran and society. Stronger connections were made through recognition of the 
sacrifice of the veteran by the state, in state discourses and the creation of enhanced 
pensions and benefits. Relationships were bettered between the state and society, through 
acknowledgement of the state that care of the veterans was part of a wider responsibility 
of the state.88 It is difficult to measure the true impact of the changes of veteran policy in 
regard to the popularisation of the Russian Armed Forces, because there were other 
mechanisms in place. As noted throughout this chapter, discourses of the veterans’ 
sacrifice were not only present in state discourses surrounding welfare discussions. In 
fact, these discourses were further cemented into public consciousness by their presence 
across societal domains and within commemorative activities and in educational 
historical discourses.  Collectively, these narratives worked well to propagate and 
promote patriotic-militaristic narratives into the public sphere.89  There are, however, 
major differences in the way these narratives were cultivated. The process of veteran 
sponsorship was much more subtle. In a traditional way, the government was performing 
a duty of care. However, what was also taking place was the permeating of key militaristic 
values in society, which not only popularised the military service and rebranded the 
government as caring, but also renewed a sense of citizenship based on loyalty, patriotism 
and self-sacrifice.  
 
SOCIAL WELFARE AND VETERAN POLICY IN 1990’s RUSSIA 
During the 1990s a number of social welfare policies were introduced to provide 
additional allowances to certain societal groups. According to Irina Sinitsina, these 
groups included: 
 
88 Yeltsin Centre, f. 6, op. 1, d. 183, l. 109, 27 December 1996. 
“O Prezidentsikh pozdravleniiakh veteranam,” FOM, 27 July 1995, accessed 27 April 
2020,  https://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19972903. 
89 Ruth Wodak and Rudolf De Cillia, on a study of Austrian commemorative events in 
1988, define official commemoration as ‘open publication of matters of historical 
consciousness, which can be supported by consensus within the political field and among 
its principal actors.” Non-official sites, like the media, also reproduce these views. While 
not distinctly on the topic of pension reform, the study can be used to explain how pro-
patriotic and militaristic narratives permeated amongst society, since narratives used to 
justify enhanced pensions and benefits to veteran and military sectors were 
complemented by those spoken at the 1995 Victory Day parade and within historical 
textbooks. For more, please see: Ruth Wodak and Rudolf De Cillia, “Commemorating 
the Past: The Discursive Construction of Official Narratives about the ‘Rebirth of the 
Second Austrian Republic,’” Discourse and Communication 1, No. 3 (2007): 338-339. 
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a) The ‘deserving disadvantaged,’ that is, those who mostly through no fault of 
their own, would suffer impoverishment in the absence of assistance (e.g. 
orphans, the disabled and the elderly without pensions); 
b) Those who had rendered special services to their country (e.g. labour heroes, 
veterans of the Second World War and other conflicts, and those who are 
working in particularly hazardous professions or demanding locations, such 
as first responders at Chernobyl);  
c) Public servants, where benefits provided a hidden salary supplement (e.g. 
members of the military, the security services and judges).90 
 
Additional benefits provided to these ‘special groups’ created an informal 
hierarchy.91 With two of the groups included in the list of beneficiaries being related to 
the Armed Forces, the government created a disparity in privileges between the military 
institution and rest of society. It was the prioritisation of the military community over 
other factions of society that demonstrated the state’s commitment to those from and 
within the military industry. Since the provision of an exclusive pension and benefits 
package was through the worthiness of the soldier, by their service to the state, the 
pension had wider implications for the notion of civic duty and the popularisation of the 
Armed Forces, as it pushed the notion that the commitment of the soldier to the country 
meant that they would be looked after accordingly and receive the same benefits.  
Sacrificial discourses became the basic justification given by state figures for 
enhanced social packages. Some scholars argue that veterans believe, on the basis of such 
sacrifice, they are entitled to benefits.92  Dale suggests this sense of entitlement was 
 
90 Irina Sinitsina, “Experience of Implementing Social benefits Monetization Reform in 
Russia. Literature Review,” SSPRN Electronic Journal, (2009), accessed 24 April 2020, 
10.2139/ssrn.1436409, 8-9. 
91  As noted by Anna-Karina Kolb, a citizen’s status is largely demonstrated by the 
distribution of provisions by the state through social policy. This policy is created on the 
civil and political rights of the citizen. Adding to Kolb’s conceptualisation, we can 
consider Russia’s distribution of enhanced pensions as an added form of legitimacy, or 
as the rebranding of the veteran as a ‘super-citizen,’ since the increased pensions and 
benefits had been calculated on the basis of their sacrifice for the state. Therefore, the 
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population is excluded from receiving the same benefits as a veteran on the basis of 
military service. For more, please see: Anna Karina Kolb, “European Social Rights 
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Welfare State Reform in Europe, ed. by Jet Bussemaker (London: Routledge, 1999), 166. 
92 Edele, “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group,”137. 
Deborah Cowen, Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 58. 
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cultivated by the publication of posters released during the Great Patriotic War, which 
outlined soldiers’ rights to special social welfare during and after military service. 93 
While not displayed on propaganda posters, political discussion in the 1990s on veteran 
policy made similar revelations. Appeals calling for changes to veteran pensions 
legitimated the creation of a social welfare scheme based on and reflective of the soldiers/ 
veterans’ sacrifice. These discourses, used repeatedly in both commemorative and 
legislative environments, were ones that became normalised. Since veterans and soldiers 
were the main beneficiaries of the exclusive pension system, it was the character attributes 
that they demonstrated during their service to the state and the sacrifices they made in a 
military capacity that became a requisite for what was deemed worthy. The veteran, a 
clear poster boy for the exclusive pension scheme, was a symbolic representation of the 
values that needed to be adopted and demonstrated by other civilians who might also want 
to benefit from the same allowances. The emphasis on this topic in governmental 
documentation, and the commitment (and even enthusiasm) from the political elite to 
support this initiative, highlights a state-led effort to militarise society.  
This section outlines changes to pension and benefit provisions for the veteran/ 
military community during the 1990s. It shows that a comprehensive system of social 
welfare was established for the benefit of the military institution. The provision of such 
benefits was the start of the state-veteran-society transaction, whereby veteran groups 
were privileged through the state’s creation of an exclusive veteran social welfare system. 
The state justified the exclusive pension system through the idea of worthiness, which is 
one of the main proponents that has driven the sponsorship paradigm, as core values 
demonstrated by the veteran (loyalty, patriotism and sacrifice) dominated society. 
Suzanne Mettler best documents the effect of state policy on society. She draws on the 
work of E. E. Schattschneider and Theodore Lowi to argue that policies act as institutions 
and therefore establish a set of norms that not only change politics but profoundly affect 
and may shape an audience’s notion of their duty as a citizen.94 Similarly to Mettler’s 
argument, changes to veteran policy during this time demonstrate a state-led effort to 
develop the militarisation of society - for it not only promoted the core values of the 
military - but also formed a social hierarchy with the veterans at the pinnacle.  
 
93 Dale, Demobilised Veterans in the Late Stalinist Leningrad, 48. 
94 Suzanne Mettler, “Bringing the State Back in to Civil Engagement: Policy Feedback 
Effects of the G. I. Bill for World War 2 Veterans,” The American Political Science 
Review 96, No. 2 (2002): 352. 
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Pension Reform in Yeltsin’s Russia 
In February 1995, Chernomyrdin wrote a letter to State Duma Federal Assembly 
Chairman, Ivan Rubkin on the issue of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Great 
Patriotic War. His letter outlined further possible improvements to Great Patriotic War 
veteran pensions. He noted that pension differences acted as a catalyst of rising “social 
tensions among participants of the Great Patriotic War.” He justified his initiative, which 
outlined pension provisions to widows of deceased servicemen (who did not remarry) and 
same pension provisions for rear workers, on the basis that it would reduce the systemic 
disparities in pensions between those injured in the war and other participants of the Great 
Patriotic War. Chernomyrdin was echoing the remarks of A. Lukiankov. In October 1994, 
Lykiankov noted that the volunteer who was “eager for the front,” but played a supporting 
role in the rear instead, should not receive a lesser pension. He claimed, “In an ethical 
sense, the division is immoral.”95  
Changes made to the pension system were done with this differentiation in mind, 
but also, and as reflected in the forthcoming documentation, to provide the veterans with 
a social welfare policy they deserved. By creating a veteran social welfare policy that 
reflected the veterans’ service to the state and legitimated on the basis of worthiness, the 
government established a goal for members of society wanting to also be ‘worthy’ of 
exclusive entitlements – with displays of sacrifice and loyalty to the state being some of 
the main objectives.96 It established a set of core values that became central to the idea of 
 
95 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1111, l. 7, 24 February 1995. 
GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 135, l. 12, 19 October 1994. 
96 The theme of sacrifice is one of salience in social policy reforms in the twentieth 
century. As noted by Cowen, the scale of sacrifices made during the Second World War 
in Canada cultivated the understanding that such sacrifice elicited an expansion to social 
welfare. In interwar Germany, veteran organisations used the theme of sacrifice to 
demand compensation from the community. Greg Eghigian claims that these different 
organisations presented the moral obligation of the state as one in which would offer 
monetary rewards for their sacrifice in the First World War. As noted by Communist 
leader Gennady Zyuganov in a Communist Party Statement made on the 11th January 
1995, “there is no more significant and memorable event than the victory of the Soviet 
people…[than]…in the Great Patriotic War.” For more, please see: Cowen, Military 
Workfare, 45; Greg Eghigian, “Injury, Fate, Resentment, and Sacrifice in German 
Political Culture, 1914-1939,” in Sacrifice and National Belonging in Twentieth-Century 
Germany, ed. by Marcus Funck, Greg Eghigian and Matthew Paul Berg (Texas: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2002), 105-206; GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 1, 11 January 
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the ideal Russian citizen, which permeated amongst society from such emphasis in 
government documentation and through state-organised initiatives such as exclusive 
social welfare reforms and commemorative events. 
The first of two changes to the minimum old-age pension provisions took place 
on the 1st May 1995. Minimum pension for veterans was fixed at 45,460 roubles per 
month. The next change occurred on the 1st August 1995, whereby there was an increase 
of 3,182 roubles to these pensions. Pensions at this stage stood at 48,642 roubles per 
month. 97  These modifications were ‘officially’ motivated by the upcoming 50th 
anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, with Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin calling 
for the acceleration of these changes in light of the “social significance of the planned 
events.”98 Deputy Yu. Yarov placed similar pressures on State Duma Chairman Ivan 
Rubkin, assuming the approval of these changes. He stated, “In accordance with the 
agreement, I urge you to consider this bill at a meeting of the State Duma today… Submit 
it to the Federation Council for approval, so that it is approved by the Federation Council 
tomorrow.”99  
The transformation of the veteran social welfare policy during this period is 
particularly interesting as it serves a number of the state’s aims. The changes can be 
analysed as an innocent act of the government, which saw the changes as a part of their 
duty to provide care for the (ex) members of the military institution. However, veteran 
participation in the commemorative celebrations may have also played a particular role 
in these alterations. Another reason for the changes to pensions were the upcoming 1996 
presidential elections.100 However, the establishment of an exclusive veteran policy also 
created an informal societal hierarchy that elevated the position of the veterans in society. 
Discourses noted that veterans deserved these pensions because of their service to the 
state. This discourse was reinforced across a number of societal domains, in educational 
textbooks, where historical figures were praised for their heroism in war, and in the 
 
97 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1111, l. 12, [Undated: 1993-1995].  
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100 “O Prezidentsikh pozdravleniiakh veteranam,” FOM, 27 July 1995, accessed 27 April 
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commemorative activities for the state. For example, Yeltsin outlined his “deep respect 
for the heroism and dedication [of the defenders] of the fatherland,” in a statement made 
at an award ceremony, where he presented the Order of Zhukov to six veterans of the 
Great Patriotic War.101 The discourses strengthened and added legitimacy to the veterans’ 
right to these exclusive pensions. By introducing an exclusive pension reform on the basis 
of the veterans’ demonstration of their “dedication” to the state and “heroism,” during the 
Great Patriotic War, it established a list of core values that would become a basic 
requirement for someone who would want to achieve the same benefits. Therefore, it 
lended itself to the militarisation goals of society as it aimed to create a positive image of 
a career within the Armed Forces.  
This is not unique to Russia and is best demonstrated by Christopher Dandeker et 
al., who claim that veteran policy of the Dutch and French all-volunteer forces was driven 
by the concern that “the climate for recruitment and retention is as favourable as 
possible.”102  By providing society with a direct visual example of the veteran as a 
character who encompassed these desirable attributes, the state was making a concerted 
effort to militarise society – which was best achieved through the reemphasis of certain 
militarised values associated with the military institution. A statue of Marshal Zhukov 
was unveiled on the eve of the 1995 Victory Day Parade, with the Medal of Zhukov and 
Order of Zhukov also being established in the name of the famous Marshal.103 Speeches 
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by Luzhkov and Yeltsin noted Zhukov’s decisive role in the victory and protection of the 
fatherland, further pushing narratives of hero-worship, courage and state loyalty.104  
Veteran policy provided old-age pensioners with a monthly payment of 45,460 or 
48,642 roubles per month, with additional allowance to a few specified groups. Double 
the minimum pension was provided to disabled veterans, and veterans over 80 years old. 
The extra payment was legitimised to aid extra costs associated with the external care for 
the disabled person.105 As noted by Chernomyrdin in a letter and an attached explanatory 
note from 1995, “Widows of servicemen who lived in the Great Patriotic War, who did 
not enter into a new marriage, have the right to be given two pensions, one of which is 
the survivor’s pension.” 106  By creating a fixed minimum payment, the policy 
demonstrated the government’s attempt to regulate veteran pensions, yet it did not wholly 
confront issues of disparity, as noted above. War invalids, for example, still received more 
benefits. A non-disabled veteran could also benefit in a similar way, but only if that 
veteran reached the age of 80. The government’s inability to address the pension disparity 
between invalids of war and other participants of the Great Patriotic War, demonstrates 
that the ‘official’ aim of the government was not the main one on their agenda.  
The creation of an exclusive veteran’s pension, however, affected society in other 
ways. Not only did it take the burden away from the veteran’s family, but it also created 
a clear distinction between the military institution and Russian society. It acted as an 
official recognition of the soldier’s sacrifice in war, and used stories of this sacrifice to 
legitimise the government’s prioritisation of the veteran/ military community.107 As noted 
by P. G. Coleman and A. Podolskij, veterans of the Great Patriotic War were popular 
recipients of an exclusive veteran reform because of the “enormity of their sacrifice.”108 
Russian militarism during this period persisted due to the unquestionable justifications of 
the government, which legitimised reform to veteran social welfare pensions to reflect 
the sacrifices made by the veterans – with little protest from society. As noted in a 
parliamentary hearing On social protection of servicemen, persons dismissed from the 
military service and their family members in 1994, members of the military “for a long 
 
104 Yeltsin Centre, f. 8, op. 1, d. 2, l. 11, 5 January 1992. These attributes were also 
outlined in the military oath of 1992. 
105 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1111, l. 2-5, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
106 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1111, l. 15, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
107 Dandeker, “What’s in a Name?” 161. 
108 P. G. Coleman and A. Podolskij, “Identity Loss and Recovery in Life Stories of Soviet 
World War Two Veterans,” The Gerontologist 47, No. 1 (2007): 52.  
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time bore and endured the hardships associated with being in a public service of a special 
kind, risking their lives.”109 Promotion of the military’s core values, alongside notions of 
worthiness enabled the persistence of militarism during this period. Not only did the 
promotion of these key core values permeate among society through official 
governmental discourse, but also the laws and changes to pensions were passed with little 
to no protest because they were justified on the basis of worthiness.  
 
Benefit Reforms under Yeltsin 
Beyond pensions, veterans were also entitled to receive extra benefits. In Britain, 
in recent years, discount offers have opened up beyond the usual concession groups 
(children, students and old-age pensioners), to include National Health Service workers 
and members of the Military. This process had already taken place in 1990s Russia with 
the military cohort and military veterans being the main beneficiaries of these subsidies. 
As with pensions, the state’s decision to offer extra benefits to ex-military personnel may 
have been motivated by a number of influences such as moral sense of duty, by the 
upcoming 1995 celebrations, because of the 1996 presidential election or because the 
state wanted to popularise a career in the Armed Forces.  The benefits were arguably more 
of an important contribution to the veteran, in the sense that non-military citizens 
(whether for old age or because of work) are entitled to a pension. In comparison, not 
every member of society was entitled to the similar benefits. As stipulated in calculations 
on the Federal Law, “On the establishment of a unified status of a participant of the Great 
Patriotic War”: 
 
In the event of the adoption of the law, citizens of the Russian Federation awarded 
with medals, “For Victory over Germany” and “For Victory over Japan”… [will] 
receive rights for the following benefits: 
a) Free travel on road, rail and water transport on suburban land/ right to free 
travel in public transport they already use/: 
b) Right for multiple annual travel with a 50% discount and a discount for rail, 
water and long-distant air transport/: 
c) The right to receive free medicines/ in the present time they have rights to 
receive food with a 50% discount 
d) An additional payment in the amount of 50% of the established minimum, that 
is, by adding to the resulting pension a complete minimum amount, because 
half of it they do not get.110  
 
109 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 1126, l. 6-7, June 1994. 
110 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 793, l. 13, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
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The provision of these benefits was similar to the extra pension allowances. They 
acted as a form of sponsorship, whereby the government gave the group exclusive access 
to benefits not open to other members of the public. The exclusive nature of these benefits 
militarised society in a subtle way. Unlike the Victory Day celebrations, these packages 
allowed the continued glorification of the veteran through everyday state legislation. As 
noted in an appeal from the 24th February 1995 to the Heroes of the USSR, Knights of the 
Order of Glory, Parliament, Government and the CIS, the pensions and the benefits 
should be enacted to improve the living conditions of veterans, “To war veterans, 
providing a standard of living worthy of the great achievement of this generation.”111  The 
language used in this appeal was similar to that used by Konev on the topic of Workers 
of the Rear, and highlights the emergence of a common discourse linking the exclusive 
pension reform to the worthiness of a veteran’s role in society. By justifying improved 
pension and benefit costs in terms of worthiness and tying this level of worthiness to the 
veteran’s role in the Great Patriotic War, the government reiterated this idea of the model 
citizen, by providing extra and exclusive awards for carrying out aspects of civic duty. 
The provision of such ‘luxuries’ to ex-military members and more exclusively to those 
who served the military between 1941 and 1945, demonstrated the government’s 
commitment and prioritisation of the military community above civil society. By 
envisaging the extra benefits that could be gained through service to the nation, the state 
was also attempting to popularise careers that contribute towards the protection of the 
motherland and provide a service of loyalty to the state. It also highlighted the state’s duty 
to support the troops not only during their service, but also in their retirement. As noted 
previously, and stated by Aparina and Lukianov, the “duty of caring for participants and 
victims of war is a historical tradition in Russia.”112  
Exclusive benefit entitlement to ex-military personnel acted in a similar way to the 
provision of extra pensions in the state-veteran-consumer sponsorship transaction. 
However, it could be argued that the provision of extra benefits actually created a greater 
division between the veteran/ military population and the remaining members of society. 
This is due to that fact that while veterans received a larger pension, members of the 
public were also entitled to a pension. In contrast, they were not entitled to any extra 
 
111 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 37, 24 February 1995. 
112  GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, l. 2, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
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benefits. With a desire to improve the prestige of the military, the provision of such 
resources elevated the position of the veteran and career within the military through the 
creation of an exclusive veteran policy. 
 
Social Protection of the Current Military Cohort under Yeltsin 
While defence and foreign policy budgets were 100% financed by the federal 
government, aspects of veteran privileges such as veteran hospitals were financed by 
regional governments, and in some cases, partly through enterprises. 113   This was 
problematic to an extent, since the regional governments did not always have the 
resources to support funding necessities. This issue was rectified in 2002 when the 
Russian government reformed its social policy, placing veteran welfare under the 
responsibility of the federal government.114   
While veteran benefits were a main topic of discussion within the State Duma 
during the 1990s, the 50th anniversary and re-emergence of social issues associated with 
veterans and veteran policy influenced the issue of social welfare policy of the current 
military cohort. A number of parliamentary hearings were held in June 1994 to discuss 
the “Social protection of servicemen, persons dismissed from military service and their 
family members.”115 These forums would discuss social protection, housing and medical 
access for the current military cohort. The chairman in the parliamentary hearing under 
the same title demonstrated the urgency of such a topic, claiming: 
 
Today's parliamentarians are the ones our committee devotes to one of the most 
urgent problems of the Armed Forces of Russia, and society as a whole - the social 
protection of military personnel, persons dismissed from the military service, 
army and navy veterans, members of their families. In terms of numbers, this non-
settlement group of the Russian Federation is estimated at more than 10 million 
people. A significant part of them throughout their lives bore and endured the 
hardships associated with being in the public service of a special kind, risking 
their lives... We can talk without a reason that the army of Russia today remains 
 
113  Galina Kurliandskaia, “Decentralisation in the Russian Federation,” Economic 
Change and Restructuring 39, No. 3-4 (2006): 221. 
Sinitsina, “Experience of Implementing Social Benefits Monetization Reform in Russia. 
Literature Review,” 9. 
Elena Maltseva, “Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: A Comparison of Social 
Benefits Reform in Russia and Kazakhstan,” PhD diss., University of Toronto (2012), 
234. 
114 Kurliandskaia, Decentralisation in the Russian Federation,” 231-232. 
115 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 1126, l. 6-7, June 1994. 
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the guarantor of the stability and security of our society. This and my opinion is 
associated with a high level of intelligence, education and potential, which is still 
inherent in the majority of the officer corps and enlistees of our army… [who are] 
ready to step over their own “want” in the name of public “need” by the 
performance of official duty, even if it involves a risk to life. Evidence of this is 
more than enough.116 
 
 The urgency of such a topic was influenced by the fact that only one law on 
pension benefits for those undergoing military service and in service to the state of 
internal affairs and their families existed.117 Described as guarantors of stability and 
security and as those who overcome “their own ‘wants’ in the name of public ‘need,’” 
adjustments to the social protection of this category of citizens were legitimised, again, 
on a basis of worthiness. As outlined in the decision by the Defence Committee of the 
State Duma on the topic of Social Protection: 
 
     2. The list of ‘protected articles’ of the annual state budget, the availability of 
money in the state treasury and percentage of the GNP [must be] intended to 
ensure the security of the forces, [and] must necessarily include: 
a) Monetary maintenance of military personnel, including compensation paid in 
return for food rations and sublease housing; 
b) Financing of technical support and to the life support of missile defence, air 
defence, strategic missile defence facilities, communications, arsenals, 
district warehouses for the storage of weapons, landfills etc. – all connected 
with the real danger of death, environmental catastrophes, military danger; 
this is not only the initial condition of social security, but also the guarantee 
of the state’s right to life of all veterans 
c) Provision of food and items of the first necessity to ‘closed’ garrison and city 
enterprises…primarily remote from densely populated regions of the country 
Fixing these provisions in the defence budget for 1994 is the main task of 
each deputy of the committee.118  
 
 
In a separate law the construction of housing for military personnel who have been 
transferred to the reserve or resigned was set at a limit of 279.9 million roubles.119 The 
significant amount of monetary resources allocated to fulfil the needs of the social welfare 
policy highlights a growth in Russian militarism in this period. One of the main 




118 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 1126, l. 17-24, 7 June 1994. 
119 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 1126, l. 56-57, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
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dedicated to the military institution.120 The veteran pension and benefits system already 
acquired a significant portion of the state and regional funding total budget. The proposed 
dedication of more money from the state budget for the purposes of veteran and military 
social welfare showcased the importance of the veteran and military community in 
society. 121  This is an extremely important aspect to take into consideration when 
reflecting on the state of militarism during this period. Not only was the level at which 
the state budget was dedicated to military spending an indication of militarism, but the 
fact that the government made the decision to make such commitments highlighted the 
favourable position of the military in society. These benefits were utilised by the 
government for two reasons: to raise support from military/veteran institutions; and to 
popularise a career within the Armed Forces.122 In official state discourse, the provision 
of social welfare was documented, rather, as a form of duty by the state. For example, as 
noted in the parliamentary hearing from 7 June 1994, “A person (citizen) who decides to 
link his life to the army must be sure, that the state really ensures the fulfilment of 
obligations established by law, that each soldier, while still in the [role], will not be 
worried about his future before leaving the reserve and future of his family.”123 However, 
narratives surrounding this official justification highlighted the underlying goals of the 
government in adopting such legislation, as the chairman called for efforts to “restore the 
best in the army,” and “revive the military-patriotic spirit of Russians.”124 The enhanced 
social welfare opportunities offered to the military cohort at the time highlighted a 
government commitment to the care of its military. On the surface, the government 
justified this action as a duty of the state to support a worthy cause. They legitimised such 
 
120 L. I. Radway, “Militarism,” 300-305. 
121 Scholars of militarism argue that such a process is in play when the needs and value 
of the military are placed above the needs of society. Having provided a significant 
amount of the state budget to social welfare for veterans and serving members of the 
military, this demonstrates a clear commitment by the state to the military. Please see; 
Mittlestadt, The Rise of the Military Welfare State, Introduction; Volker Rolf Berghan, 
Militarism: The History of an International Debate: 1861-1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 39. 
122 As documented at the start of this chapter, in order to popularise a career in the Armed 
Forces, countries have often used social welfare as a form of persuasion to encourage 
enlistment into the military. For more on this, read; Robert K. Griffith, U.S. Army’s 
Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1864-1974 (Washington DC: DIANE Publishing, 
1997), 34-36. 
123 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 1126, l. 17-24, 7 June 1994. 
124 Ibid. 
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duty based on the risk these soldiers would be taking.125 However, also included in this 
discourse was the desire of the state to reignite patriotic feeling amongst society and to 
popularise the military institution. The examples presented above highlight a number of 
elements in play. First, by promoting the enhanced social welfare provisions to military 
personnel as an act of duty, the government was presenting the image of an ideal citizen, 
one whose demonstration of loyalty to the state was worthy of exclusive benefits. It not 
only promoted the idea of a career in the military, but also created a civic role for those 
in non-military careers. If a soldier’s role is to die defending the country, then it is 
society’s role to commemorate them. Similarly in this case, if it is a soldier’s role to risk 
their lives for society, then it is the duty of society to ensure they are cared for after 
service.126 Here, the rhetoric of the government demonstrated that they were trying to lead 
by example.  
 
VETERAN WELFARE AS A FORM OF MILITARISATION  
 
Changes to veteran and military welfare policy during this period demonstrate a 
state-led effort to militarise society. While official justifications legitimated changes 
based on lack of laws, non-implementation of laws and rise of social tension, there were 
a number of underlying rationalisations that enabled the persistence of militarisation in 
society. The first justification demonstrating a state-led effort to militarise society was 
based on creating a pension to match the sacrificial deed of the veteran. By basing pension 
legislation on the veteran’s role in the Great Patriotic War, the government was enhancing 
the veteran’s position in society and separating their contribution to society from those 
who did not work in the army or contribute towards the war effort by promoting the 
worthiness of a veteran over non-participants in war. This level of glorification not only 
showed the state’s effort to popularise a career in the Armed Forces, but also raised 
questions regarding the conceptualisation of the ideal citizen. The act of sponsorship, 
 
125 As noted in Richard Alston, Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt: A Social History 
(London: Psychology Press, 1995), 53-58 privileges provided to Roman soldiers in the 
second century highlighted a commitment of the government to increase the status of 
soldiers and to deal with ‘special problems of the soldier’s career.’ While Alston uses 
length of service as an example, he highlights risk of sudden death in the capacity of a 
soldier further on in his analysis.  
126 Deborah D. Buffton, “Memorialisation and the selling of war,” Peace Review: A 
Journal of Social Justice 17, No. 1 (2005): 28. 
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carried out through the government’s provision of an exclusive pension and benefit 
policy, contributed towards the renewed notions of the ideal citizen and therefore the 
militarisation of society, as it enabled certain character attributes (loyalty, patriotism and 
willingness to sacrifice), as demonstrated by veteran participation in conflict, to permeate 
amongst society and to become a basic requirement for anyone wanting to gain similar 
allowances.   
Another justification that contributed towards the militarisation of society during 
this period was the governmental legitimisation that these changes were being made to 
reflect upon the worthiness of the veteran/ military community. Since such worthiness 
was attached to ideas of sacrifice and loyalty, the creation of an exclusive veteran pension 
and growth in disparity in allowances between the military population and civilian cohort 
were accepted on the basis that civilian society (apart from war time labourers) could not 
justify a similar worthiness in their own field. Any opportunity to protest on these grounds 
would have been well and truly stamped out by the repetition of narratives, not only in 
political documentation, but also in governmental rhetoric during the commemorative 
activities glorifying the veteran and military community for their sacrifice and role in the 
protection of the motherland. A number of documents in preparation for the Victory Day 
parade and in creating the reform justified such reforms on the basis of the soldier’s role 
in war. As noted in A Federal Law On perpetuating the victory of the Soviet people in the 
Great Patriotic War, special measures for veterans including commemorative practices 
were justified on the premise that the ‘defenders of the motherland…gave their lives for 
its freedom and independence.” In a Federal Assembly speech, similar words were spoken 
when the speaker announced, “We will always remember the names of courageous sons 
and daughters of the motherland, who gave their dearest life for the sake of the freedom 
of the motherland.”127 
The final justification was based on underlying narratives relating to the current 
military-patriotic position in society. Those involved in the parliamentary hearings on 
social protection called for a revival in a military-patriotic nation and improvement to the 
prestige of the Russia’s military. A government commission was approved on 30th 
December 1994 on the subject of ‘social issues of military personnel, citizens discharged 
from military service, and members of their families.’ One of the tasks of the commission 
 
127 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, l. 2, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 135, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
 229 
was “Regeneration and implementation of nationwide measures aimed at increasing the 
prestige of military service, improvement of socio-economic, legal and sociological 
conditions of drafting for the military service.”128 Such rhetoric highlighted a growing 
concern of the position of the military in society. Changes to veteran and military policy 
were seen as a solution that could be used not only to elevate the position of the military 
institution but also to demonstrate the government’s commitment to supporting current 
and future servicemen. Such narratives demonstrated that changes to social welfare 
policy, in both a current military setting and for veterans of previous conflicts, were made 
with the intention by the government to popularise the military institution and militarise 
society.  
 
In conclusion, a number of changes were made to veteran social welfare policy 
under Yeltsin’s leadership. First, the changes to veteran policy confronted the term 
‘veteran’ and created a fixed definition that not only recognised those veterans from the 
Great Patriotic War, but also recognised all ex-military personnel that had participated in 
a conflict in defence of the motherland. Fixing the definition for the term veteran raised 
questions regarding who could be deemed a veteran. These questions sparked a discussion 
regarding the sacrifices of home-front workers during the Great Patriotic War and 
contributed towards the development of militarism as it forced society to think of their 
own role in a potential future conflict. The second of these changes to veteran policy acted 
as a form of sponsorship by the government. Similar to commercial and sports 
sponsorship schemes, the creation of an exclusive veteran’s pension contributed towards 
the militarisation of society as it promoted the three core values of loyalty, patriotism and 
self-sacrifice that are associated with the military and enabled them to permeate society. 
In addition, the provision of an exclusive pensions, benefits and money scheme for social 
protection of the current military cohort required a significant proportion of the state 
budget, demonstrating the state’s commitment to the military institution over civilian 
society and therefore highlighting the importance of the Armed Forces in society. 
Government documentation shows that these changes were not made by the government 
as a form of duty, but to revive the military-patriotic spirit of the nation. Therefore, and 
as evidenced above, changes to veteran policy were used by the government as a 
 
128 GARF, f. 10200, op. 1, d. 174, l. 81-84, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
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mechanism of militarisation, and demonstrates that there was a government-led 
continuation of societal militarisation under the leadership of Yeltsin. 
 231 
CHAPTER 5 
PAYING THE DEBT: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1995 VICTORY DAY PARADE 
AND ASSOCIATED CELEBRATIONS  
 
 
 On 9th May 1995, the Russian state commemorated the 50th anniversary of the 
Great Patriotic War victory. They celebrated the anniversary with two elaborate military 
parades, and by opening memorials, monuments and museums built for the occasion. 
National military parades were a custom of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union 
but were discontinued after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 1  In 1995, they were 
reintroduced as part of the 50th anniversary celebrations. Its renewal marked a new age of 
militarism in Russia, demonstrating a serious state-led effort to revive military-patriotic 
wartime discourses and use them to shape Russian national identity.2 Aims to control the 
wartime discourses were three-fold. First, the government wanted to use the basis of the 
Great Patriotic War and the Union’s eventual victory to reinforce a nationalistic-patriotic 
Russian identity, which crumbled after the Soviet collapse. Second, the promotion and 
celebration of this anniversary validated the veterans’ place in society. Glasnost 
marginalised veterans in the early years of the Russian Federation for furthering the 
oppressive Soviet system through their military victories.3 This process of inclusion was 
also to acquire votes in the lead up to the 1996 Presidential election.4 Finally, the most 
 
1  Yan Mann, “(Re)cycling the Collective Memory of the Great Patriotic War,” The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 33, No. 4 (2020): 512. 
2 Markku Kangaspuro and Jussi Lassila, “Naming the War and Framing the notion in 
Russian Public Discussion,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 54, No. 3-4 (2012): 377. 
3 This marginalisation is best demonstrated by Anna Krylova. She discusses a change in 
journalistic portrayal of the Great Patriotic War veteran in the mid 80s and early 1990s. 
She argues that among other denunciations of the past were also the veterans, whose role 
in the victory of the Great Patriotic War allowed for the continuation of the Soviet State. 
While these narratives were more anti-Soviet than anti-military and anti-veteran, they 
played a role in the depopularisation of the Armed Forces, leaving the veterans feeling 
‘betrayed.’ She notes the demonstrations that took place on Victory Day 1993 as a turning 
point in which demonstration participants in their 40s and 50s wanted to not only protect 
the veterans, but to protect their victory. For more, please see: Krylova, “Dancing on the 
Graves of the Dead,” 88-93. 
4 Ibid, 97. 
Roger D. Marwick, “The Great Patriotic War in Soviet and Post-Soviet Collective 
Memory,” in The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History, ed. by Dan Stone 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 695-696. 
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important reason for such grandeur was to popularise an institution and part of society 
that was in serious demise after its defeat in Afghanistan and ongoing conflict in 
Chechnya.5 In doing so, the celebration aimed to promote military-patriotic discourses 
and promote a career in the military.  
The chapter builds upon the work of Markku Kangaspuro and Jussi Lassila, which 
argues that the 1995 Victory Day has been largely neglected in scholarship. They claim 
that the event was important for a multitude of reasons, including the re-emergence of 
Soviet symbolism. This chapter focuses on the celebration’s role in glorifying the veteran, 
maintaining the Great Patriotic War’s relevance in the Post-Soviet era and legitimising 
the Armed Forces through emphasis of past, present and future national threats.6 The 
chapter asks why and how the anniversary was celebrated? With an aim to identify its 
role in the militarisation of society, it also asks to what extent the theme of sacrifice, in 
regard to the Great Patriotic War and the Russification of the wartime narrative, 
contributed towards its evolution from a historical event to one of ‘mythical 
timelessness.’7 It notes that emphasis on sacrifice and spectator responsibility militarised 
Russia’s society through the cultivation of a debt ideology. This debt ideology framed the 
 
5  As noted by Kangaspuro and Lassila, Izvestiia, which was a newspaper critical of the 
state in 1995, wrote comparisons between Stalin’s exile of the Chechen population on the 
eve of the Great Patriotic War with Yeltsin’s war in Chechnya six months before the 
celebration day. For more, please see: Kangaspuro and Lassila, “Naming and Framing 
the nation in Russian Public Discussion,” 380. 
6 Ibid, 381. 
The term Russification is usually used to describe the cultural assimilation of non-Russian 
communities with the cultural and political norms of the Russian Federation; this can 
include imposition of the Russian language, for example. In this thesis, the term 
Russification refers to the assimilation of Soviet events, tropes and symbols with the 
policies and identity of the Post-Soviet Russian Federation. The term Russification is 
favoured over the phrase de-Sovietisation, as this case study is specific to the actions of 
the Russian Federation. 
7 Mythical Timelessness in relation to the Great Patriotic War was a term first used by 
Dr. Mikhail Nemtsev in a workshop held at Swansea University in 2017. Nemtsev argued 
that the prominence of the Great Patriotic War in the discourse of Russia’s daily landscape 
allowed soldiers of Russia’s current army to fight with that victory in their mind, seeing 
the conflict in Crimea, for example, as an extension of the victory forged in 1945. The 
mythologization process, as highlighted later in this chapter will demonstrate how the 
Great Patriotic War remains prominent in society on a grassroots level. For more, please 
see: Mikhail Nemtsev, “Life of a devoted militant out of a battlefield: Variations of 
everyday militarism in Russian Communities,” workshop, Militarisation of Everyday 
Life in Europe: Past Practices and Future Challenges, Swansea University, Swansea, 
November 2017. 
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sacrifice of war veterans as a debt which could only be paid off through society’s 
participation in commemorative activities. It also finds that the Russification of certain 
wartime discourses, especially in the symbolisms of the commemorative landscape, 
demonstrated a clear objective of the state to integrate the victory into the current Russian 
context – allowing for militaristic-patriotic discourses to endure the regime change that 
took place in 1991.  
To this end, the chapter shows that current processes under Putin had their origins 
in Yeltsin’s Russia. The chapter investigates such forms of militarisation from the top 
down, creating a foundation for further research. As the case study chapter of this thesis, 
the chapter examines the Victory Day celebrations by drawing on a rich range of sources. 
To understand how the commemorative events contributed toward the militarisation of 
Russian society, the chapter examines prominent discourses in laws, appeals and letters 
circulating within the State Duma at this time. It also analyses the rituals, symbolisms and 
discourses in speeches made at events taking place in the lead up to (and on) Victory Day 
by assessing videos of the parade and associating celebrations. It also investigates the 
symbolic nature of monuments, commemorative spaces and souvenirs specifically 
created for this commemorative date. In doing so, it shows to what extent the Russian 
state relied on the past to cultivate pro-military sentiments in the newly formed Russian 
Federation.  
The first part of this chapter outlines the historical role of military ceremonies in 
power play activities. It shows that parades acted as a forum of discipline and control 
beyond the Soviet era and was a tradition of Imperial Russian leaders. The chapter then 
discusses the relationship between military parades, commemoration and mythbuilding 
state practices. The section highlights the common use of history to create “universality 
of experience,” noting the role of military spectacle and associating discourses in 
legitimising past experiences in contemporary day contexts. 8  The following section 
investigates the role of the spectator in military parades. The final two sections of this 
chapter focus on the 1995 Victory Day celebrations. They outline why and how the 
anniversary was commemorated, with an in-depth analysis of the two parades, 
monuments and commemorative souvenirs. They examine the remobilisation of Soviet 
discourses, and the increasing use of Russian symbols, which demonstrated a clear 
departure from the Soviet era and goal of the Russian state to reshape the Soviet victory 
 
8 Mann, “(Re)cycling the collective memory,” 509-510. 
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into a Russian one. Together, this chapter shows a clear aim of the state to revive military-
patriotic discourses and to place them within the current Russian context. The promotion 
of these discourses ensured that society remained exposed to glorified images of the 
military, coupled with notions of sacrifice and state loyalty.  
 
Multi-modal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) 
 Parades, political speeches, monuments and collectable souvenirs come together 
to form commemorative rituals. Ron Scollon and Philip Levine note that language is 
“constructed across multiple modes of communication.”9 Speeches produced discourses 
of veteran valour through spoken text; while parades, monuments and souvenirs were 
discursive spaces communicated through visual means. Multi-modal critical discourse 
analysis is a useful tool for analysing commemoration.  It emerged as a form of analysis 
from Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen’s work, which argued that language is 
shaped through its social and cultural use.10 The political speeches, parades, monuments 
and collectable souvenirs created for the Great Victory’s 50th anniversary were shaped to 
fit the celebration, the state’s desire to popularise the victory and promote collective 
memory. Therefore the discourses in isolation were given extra layers of meaning through 
their association with the commemorative event and similar bonds that tied these 
memorial discourses together. Known as monomodality, it means that we cannot consider 
the following sources in isolation. David Machin highlights that “in multimodal 
communication, the different modes [have] become more integrated and visual elements 
were being used to communicate complex ideas and attitudes.” Only by bringing together 
the textual, symbolic, ceremonial, visual and architectural changes made for this event 
can we truly understand 1) what discourses the state aimed to instil in society and 2) how 
shared discourses across these domains helped reaffirm particular dominant discourses.  
 Chapter four outlined CDA’s value for understanding and examining political 
discourses. CDA is also valuable for analysing monuments. Monuments are visual 
 
9 Philip Levine and Ron Scollon, “Multimodal Discourse Analysis as the confluence of 
Discourse and technology,” in Discourse and Technology: Multimodal Discourse 
Analysis, ed. By Ron Scollon and Philip Levine  (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), 1-2. 
10  Per Ledin and David Machin, “Multi-modal critical discourse analysis,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies, ed. by John Flowerdew and John E. 
Richardson (Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 62. 
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representations of ideas, attitudes and ideologies.11 As symbols and identity-shapers, they 
must be “easily de-codable by an average mass receiver.”12 Monuments symbolise a 
society’s heritage, identity, values and future goals; they perpetuate historical myth, give 
importance to a particular issue and “function as local landmarks.”13 War memorials are 
a significant aspect of war commemoration. On commemorative holidays, they are used 
as ceremonial grounds where political and societal elite lay wreaths and enact moments 
of silence as a sign of respect to the war dead.  However, as a permanent part of the 
landscape’s architecture, monuments act as signifiers of death, victory and glory; 
reminders of the veterans’ sacrifice for the greater good. They mute debates on war 
futility by highlighting war and the soldiers’ sacrifice as worthwhile, necessary and 
normal. This helped feed into and reaffirm prevailing militarising discourses, which 
considered soldiery an important form of civic duty.14 Souvenirs are considered in a 
similar way. Souvenirs are pocket monuments, decorated with symbols aimed at 
transporting, supporting and establishing a series of desired messages. Some are 
functional, acting more than just nuggets of sentimentality. Their functionality makes it 
more difficult for a person to contest the symbolic imagery, since they are necessary 
everyday items. A monument and souvenir’s symbolic contribution to societal 
militarisation can be assessed through CDA, as it identifies what messages are being 
communicated and where/ how they dominate discourses.   
CDA is also a helpful tool for analysing ceremonial rituals. Monuments become 
ceremonial grounds during memorial days, as political elite gather and ceremoniously 
pay their respects to the veterans by laying wreaths and committing to a minute’s silence. 
These rituals reiterate the memorial’s symbolic importance in society as elites gather in 
this one space to show gratitude. Second, monuments are usually placed in central 
locations of town squares in order to represent “cherished values and hegemonic version 
of our shared history.”15 In the same sense, a political elites’ wreath laying ritual is done 
 
11 David Machin, “What is multimodal critical discourse studies?” Critical Discourse 
Studies 10, No. 4 (2013): 350. 
12 Natalia Krzyzanowska, “The discourse of counter-monuments: semiotics of material 
commemoration in contemporary urban spaces,” Social Semiotics 26, No. 5 (2016): 470. 
13 Krzyzanowska, “The discourse of counter-monuments,” 468 
Gill Abousnnouga and David Machin, “The changing spaces of war commemoration: a 
multimodal analysis of the discourses of British monuments,” Social Semiotics 21, No. 2 
(2011): 175-176. 
14 Machin, “What is multimodal critical discourse studies?” 350. 
15 Ibid, 351. 
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on behalf of society, representing a collective appreciation of the memory being 
commemorated. Usually televised and photographed, onlookers remain part of this ritual 
without actually needing to be there.  A monument’s unveiling is also a crucial part of 
establishing the statue’s importance. Krzyzanowska notes that monument unveiling 
ceremonies bring the relevance of the memory into the present. She claims that a 
monument’s creation confirms the importance of that memory in society, showing that it 
remains a significant part of a society’s current and future political culture.16 Beyond 
monument ceremonial rituals, military parades are forms of power. Speeches, music, 
visuals and symbols come together to reaffirm military-patriotic discourses that 
popularise military potency, veteran valour and worthwhile victory. This form of power 
undergoes a detailed examination in the next section. 
MCDA and CDA are valuable tools for analysing commemoration. Memory 
discourses are multifaceted; built from memories, rewritten histories, state performances, 
permeated in a country’s architectural sites and in visuals. Together they reaffirm a 
desired and dominant discourse. Commemoration is thoughtfully designed. While elites 
work to commemorate the sacrifices of the war dead, they look to avoid futile 
representations of the war, instead framing the veteran’s sacrifice as a necessary action 
for the nation’s survival. This was the case in 1990s Russia. MCDA and CDA help us to 
understand how the various modes of commemoration symbolise the Great Patriotic War 
and their intended contribution to other societal discourses during this time. Together, 
they confirmed Russia’s long history with conflict and the veteran’s enhanced position in 
society. 
 
Military Parades and Power.  
On the 9th May 1995, Russia celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic 
War victory (1941-1945). As the New York Times reported:  
 
The Russian Government, eager to show the world and its own people that theirs 
remains a proud and powerful nation, put on perhaps the most elaborate military 
pageant seen here since the early 1980's, at the end of the Brezhnev era. The 
hammer and sickle and the Soviet star, symbols of the Communist Party, which 
led the nation to victory, were prominently displayed despite its fall from power.17 
 
16 Krzyzanowska, “The discourse of counter-monuments,” 468. 
17  R.W. Apple Jr., “V-E Day Plus 50: The Overview; Allied Victory in Europe Is 
Commemorated in Moscow, The New York Times,” 10 May 1995, accessed 20 September 
 237 
 
The event was an extravagant display of Soviet paraphernalia and military 
hardware thundering down the Red Square and on Poklonnaia Gora. 18  Numerous 
memorials, including Moscow’s Great Patriotic War museum, were opened to the public. 
The parades and commemorative landscape portrayed Russia’s military in positive terms, 
emphasising the victory of the Soviet Union to enforce current day ambitions. The 
commemorative landscapes provided a picture of Russia’s military institution that was 
vastly different to reality. In actual terms, Russia’s military was in turmoil. The media 
exposed issues like Dedovshchina and failures in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) to 
the public.19 Negative coverage affected public perception of the military, while many 
soldiers in Russia’s military cohort questioned what they were fighting for. In the age of 
glasnost, glorified victories of the past, like the Great Patriotic War, became a distant 
memory. 20  At the time of the celebration, Russia’s army was involved in the First 





18 The display of Soviet paraphenalia was widely debated within the State Duma, with 
officials arguing that the victory was Soviet and should be memorialised as such. This 
issue is further debated below but has been highly confronted in literature on the Post-
Soviet era, with scholars arguing that the use of Soviet symbols was to first, allow the 
Russian government to transform the Soviet victory into a Russian one, and secondly, the 
Post-Soviet Russian society was ready to adopt its Soviet past because it was not so 
different from the regime it succeeded. For more, please see: Lev Gudkov, “The Fetters 
of Victory: How the War provides Russia with its Identity,” Osteuropa 55, No. 4 (2005), 
accessed 18 July 2020, https://www.eurozine.com/the-fetters-of-victory/; Tomas 
Kavaliauskas, “Different Meanings of May 9th: Victory Day over Nazi Germany, for 
Russia and the Baltic States,” Interdisciplinary studies on Central and Eastern Europe 9 
(2011): 321-326; Kangaspuro and Lassila, “Naming and Framing the nation in Russian 
Public Discussion,” 381. 
19 Herspring, “Dedovshchina in the Russian Army,” 609-610; Herspring, “Undermining 
Combat Readiness,” 515-516; Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military,” 23-24; 
Leon Aron, “Russia’s New Foreign Policy,” 2. 
20 Michael Galbas, “Our Pain and Our Glory,” Social Strategy of legitimisation and 
functionalisation of the Soviet-Afghan War in the Russian Federation,” Journal of Soviet 
and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 1, No. 2 (2015): 103. 
21 Lieven, Chechnya, 196. 
Kangaspuro and Lassila, “Naming and Framing the nation in Russian Public Discussion,” 
380. 
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The Russian state used the commemorative date to rewrite discourses around the 
military, and to identify parallels between the military of the Great Patriotic War and 
Russia’s current military institution. They used Russia’s victorious past to show that 
victory was possible again. Military parades are notorious for representing control and 
power. They showcase the military capabilities of that country, manpower and level of 
discipline of that military and the power of the leader. Commemorative military parades 
demonstrate a country’s physical level of power and control. However, they also 
showcase the state’s control over historical discourses. Similar to educational textbooks, 
the parades used history to promote a sanitised discourse of the event being 
commemorated. In this case, Russia in the 1990s relied on Russia’s glorious militaristic 
past to shift public perception of the current military apparatus, while also trying to show 
the world that Russia was a serious military power.   
Military parades were a key aspect of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. 
The regimes held absolute power and needed to find a way to exercise control. Leaders 
used parades to exercise power, to discipline the military, to demonstrate a level of 
subordination to domestic audiences, and project an image of power within the 
international domain.22  Power and control was therefore represented through human 
discipline and military technology. This form of control is in line with Michel Foucault’s 
perception of the docile soldier. He considered the soldier as an excellent subject to use 
when executing control, power, and forming national identity, as the soldier was 
recognisable to the masses. In addition, the values the soldiers embodied were desirable 
to the state – ones that the state wanted to promote. The most important characteristic of 
the eighteenth century soldier, however, was their ability to be shaped, as if “formless 
clay.”23 Through marches, drills and parades, the soldier learnt to march a certain way, to 
correct their posture, “turning silently into the automatism of habit.”24 In a similar way, 
the continuous and replicated displays of the Victory Day parade from the Soviet to the 
Post-Soviet periods slowly turned the audience into a recipient of the same discipline, 
subordination and ritual.  
During Imperial and Soviet rule, control over society was exercised through secret 
police networks, labour camps, censorship laws and economic constraints. In the newly 
 
22 Keep, “The Military Style of the Romanov Rulers,” 70-71. 




formed “democratic” Russian Federation, new approaches were needed to influence a 
population with new and increased political participation rights. One mechanism was the 
continued use of these ritualistic parades. The victory parades, which resumed under the 
same justification of commemoration, enabled government control without the autocratic 
powers of the previous regime. In a sense, the discursive nature of this event was even 
more important to the newly formed Russian State, which did not have censorship on its 
side because this landscape was organised by state organisations that were able to produce 
a standardised discourse about the Great Patriotic War victory.25 The success of these 
parades is evident in the enormous role they continue to play in Putin’s Russia. The rituals 
established in the Tsarist and Soviet period and revived under Yeltsin continue to be used 
as a discursive forum, to control and perpetuate certain discourses.  
At these forums, the act of remembering reminded Russian society of the 
devastating impact of the Great Patriotic War, while the political speeches drew temporal 
lines between the past and present. Stories of danger and threat were exemplified by 
discourses of veteran sacrifice and heroism, which justified society’s participation in 
these events. The veterans’ role in these parades was (and remains) most crucial to 
ensuring the participation (and therefore, the control) of society. Militarism was a product 
of this control, since the military-patriotic discourses that valorised the veteran 
community, and their sacrifice, shamed the public into participating in public 
remembrance activities. The public’s participation therefore acted as a form of 
recognition, acknowledging the important role society was willing to play to support and 
pay respects to the veteran community. While the military’s prioritisation was directed 
from the top, it was the participation from below that validated this level of priority and 
demonstrated the success of these parades in militarising society. While these parades 
were initially discontinued on a national level, after 1991, localised and small-scale 
parades continued.26  
 
25 While the Media Law in 1992 did limit the discourses of journalists, they were still 
able to operate in a more open environment than was possible in the Tsarist and Soviet 
era.  
26 Events would still take place on a local and regional level and were usually organised 
by political parties such as the Communist party. Veterans “flocked to the streets and 
squares of Moscow to defend their version of the War story,” which became increasingly 
under threat by the new independent media. For more on this, please see: Krylova, 
“Dancing on the Graves of the Dead,” 90.  
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In 1995 and for the special 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, the Russian 
government decided to revive the Victory Day parade and to establish it on an annual 
basis. An undated project document by State Duma Deputies Aparina and Lukiankov 
from between 1993 and 1995, linked to the Federal Law On perpetuating victory of the 
Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, claiming “The Day of May the 9th is declared a 
national holiday [known as] Victory Day. Victory Day is a non-working day and is 
annually marked by a military parade and artillery salute.”27 The sensational military 
displays in Moscow and St. Petersburg promoted the militarisation of society as they 
encouraged the public to participate in the events of the National holiday. These 
performance rituals popularised the military, demonstrated the close relationship between 
the Armed Forces and political institutions, and the use of memory in present and future 
political and societal goals and in institutional legitimisation.28 As highlighted in chapter 
four, the Victory Day also popularised military values of sacrifice and state loyalty into 
public space, creating a set of ideal attributes that the rest of society should strive to 
 
27 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
This Federal Law was an outcome of efforts by veteran organisations who called for a 
Moscow Jubilee to be held alongside associating events and the establishment of the 9th 
May as a state holiday for all the state (republics) of the USSR. The suggestions made by 
M. Tronov of the All-Russian Council of Veterans of War, Labour, Armed Forces and 
Law Enforcement Agencies, included the introduction of a 20 hour “History of the Great 
Patriotic War 1941-1945 and the feat of the people in the defence of the fatherland” course 
into higher education institutions, to create exhibitions from 1993 to 1995 on films and 
art about the main battles and operations of the Great Patriotic War, to hold an open art 
exhibition on Manezhe Square etc. For more, please see: GARF, f. 10026, op. 1, d. 2861, 
l. 30-34, 15 April 1993. 
28 This thesis adopts Jan Kubik’s use of legitimacy/ legitimisation as the process, “when 
rulers invoke the ultimate values and symbols of a given group in constructing their public 
image.” As demonstrated throughout this chapter, the values and images that are being 
promoted in the ceremonial activities of Yeltsin’s Russia are being cultivated in a similar 
vein and, to some extent, in purpose of seeking political/ institutional legitimacy. For 
more links between commemorative rituals and political legitimacy, please see: Jan 
Kubik, “Polish May Day Celebrations in the 1970’s and in 1981: An Essay on Symbolic 
Dimension of a Struggle for Political Legitimacy,” The Polish Review 34, No. 2 (1989): 
100; Janice M. Irvine and Jill A. Irvine, “The Queer Work of Militarised Parades,” 
Contexts: Sociology for the Public 16, No. 4 (2017): 3; Klinka Locmele, Olga Procevska 
and Vita Zelce, “Celebrations, Commemorative Dates and Related Rituals: Soviet 
Experience, its Transformation and Contemporary Victory Day Celebrations in Russia 
and Latvia,” in The Geopolitics of History in Latvian-Russian Relations, ed. by Nils 
Muiznuks (Riga: Academic Press of the University of Latvia, 2011), 110; Hung Chaing-
Tai, “Mao’s Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s,” The China Quarterly, No. 
190 (2007): 430.  
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achieve. The ritual element of the Victory Day Parade played a specific role in promoting 
and legitimising the military institution.29  
 
Telling a story?  
In addition to building legitimacy, parades are also myth builders. Brezhnev era 
Victory Day parades contributed toward the cult of Victory – with rituals and practices 
organised to elevate war participants above non-participants in an informal social 
hierarchy. 30  In Post-Soviet Russia, this cult was revived.31  Participants of war were 
promoted in the Victory Day parade and through the popularisation of a debt ideology, 
which emphasised stories of their sacrifice and loyalty during the wartime. 
The veterans’ victory was immortalised through emphasis on their sacrifice. Boris 
Yeltsin spoke of such sacrifice in a speech to veterans who were awarded the Order of 
Zhukov on the 5th May 1995. He said, “the war is past but the memory of it is timeless, 
the immortal feat of soldiers and underground commanders and the Partisans of the 
Workers… who all ensured the defeat of the Nazi hordes, we will always remember the 
enormous efforts of deprivation and sacrifice, [in which] the Great Victory was 
achieved.”32 First, the collective act of remembering was acknowledged by the phrase 
“we will always remember.” Yeltsin placed himself in the same position as an audience 
member, promoting communal responsibility. This responsibility, mobilised by using 
“we,” was to remember the veterans’ sacrifice in the Great Patriotic War. Calls like this 
actively engaged with audience members and rallied them to participate. Second, the act 
of remembering was linked to veterans’ sacrifice. Yeltsin noted the “enormous efforts of 
deprivation and sacrifice” to muster support for the veteran community and justify the 
role that non-participants of war should play in perpetuating the memory of the soldier’s 
 
29 Dominic Bryan claims that by legitimising political regimes, rituals usually include 
characters that are deemed superior and inferior. He uses the example of a Merina, whose 
rulers referred to themselves in rituals as conquerers, whereas the everyday person (or 
inferior) is personified as the conquered. We can use this conceptualisation to understand 
the aims of the Russian political elite to legitimise the military institution. Veterans and 
the current military cohort (as the superiors) are portrayed as the sacrificial lamb, as 
heroes, while the rest of society is depicted as the generations saved by their actions. For 
more, please see: Dominic Bryan, Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and 
Control (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 19-21. 
30 Locmele et al. “Celebrations, Commemorative Dates and Related Rituals,” 116.  
31 Kangspuro and Lassila, “Naming the War and Framing the Nation in Russian Public 
Discussion,” 380. 
32 Yeltsin Centre, f. 21, op. 1, d. 128, 5 May 1995. 
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sacrifice. Immortalising the veterans’ sacrifice further, at a Federal Assembly meeting in 
March 1995, the final victory of the Soviet Union over Nazism in May 1945 was 
characterised within a messianic frame. Chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rubkin 
claimed, “Your meeting is dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the most memorable and 
most significant date of the 20th century - May 1945 – the day of the triumph of good and 
freedom, the final deliverance of peoples from the threat of fascist enslavement.” 33 
Combining the victory with notions of sacrifice, Russian exceptionalism, and religious 
tropes added several layers to the memory of the Great Patriotic War. It helped legitimise 
elaborate forms of remembering, reinforced positive images of the veterans’ sacrifice and 
immortalised their victory.  
Lev Gudkov investigates the adoption of godly tropes in commemorative 
activities, claiming that war is often likened to biblical events to immortalise the 
veteran. 34  This ‘immortalisation’ mythologised the anniversary. Another way the 
commemoration became timeless was through the cultivation of a debt ideology; not only 
by emphasising ideas of sacrifice, but also outlining current generation’s indebtedness to 
such sacrifice. These discourses acted to promote youth participation. Finally, the victory 
was mythologised by its annual celebration. Onlookers paid their debt by participating in 
memorialisation activities, only for the process to occur again a year later. The 
commemorative process was thus cyclical.  
Maoz Azaryahu, writing about militarism in Israel, argues that military parades 
are ideological and political, with each spectacle displaying specific political ideologies 
and particular power relations.35 The debt ideology, which emerged in Russia, added a 
layer of emotion to existing patriotic sentiments being displayed. It was built by common 
reference to veterans’ sacrifice and the future sacrifice that should be committed to 
preserving and ensuring the protection of the fatherland and in consolidating peace. Those 
who did not sacrifice themselves in the same way were indebted to those who did. At the 
 
33 GARF, f. 10100, op. 2, d. 135, 1 March 1995. 
34 Gudkov, “The Fetters of Victory.” 
Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, and Nancy M. Wingfield, “Gender and the Construction of 
Wartime heroism in Czechslovakia and the Soviet Union,” European History Quarterly 
39, No. 3 (2009), 483.   
35 Maoz Azaryahu, “Military and Militarism in Israeli Society,” in Independence Day 
Military Parade: A Political History of a Patriotic Ritual, ed. by Edna Lomsky-Feder and 
Eyal Ben-Ari (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), 91. 
Peter G. Goheen, “Symbols in the Streets: Parades in Victorian Urban Canada,” Urban 
History Review 18, No. 3 (1990): 237. 
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Federal Assembly meeting in March 1995, Rubkin stated, “Time separates us more and 
more from May 9th, 1945, but no one has to be forgotten and nothing should be forgotten. 
We will always remember the names of the courageous sons and daughters of the 
motherland, who gave their dearest life for the sake of freedom of the Motherland.”36 
Boris Yeltsin echoed similar sentiments. When presenting State Awards on the 27th April 
1995, he noted: 
 
Glory, the highest insignia of which we have awarded a well-deserved award. For 
selfless service to the Motherland of Russia, I sincerely thank you for your work… 
The state award is given to veterans of the Great Patriotic War. They made a great 
contribution to the defeat of Nazi invaders. They showed strength on the 
battlefields, the heroism of veterans [and showed the] inexhaustible strength of 
spirit of our people.37  
 
 Calls to “always remember” and providing “well-deserved” awards for the 
veterans’ victory were only few examples where society was asked to repay the debts of 
the war victors. Commemoration turns to militarisation when the debt is being repaid. 
Russian society was being called upon to commemorate. To commemorate is to be aware 
of the history that is being memorialised, to worship and pay respects to those who 
participated in the event under commemoration. The commemorative events, therefore, 
furthered the militarisation of society by maintaining sacrificial discourses, building debt 
and establishing society’s responsibility to perpetuate the Veterans’ victory. At each stage 
of this paradigm, society was exposed to military-patriotic discourses enacted to continue 
the victory of the Great Patriotic War in living memory. 
According to Daniel Sherman, organisers of public commemorations coordinate 
these events to memorialise the past and promote the state’s current political goals.38 
These parades not only demonstrated the country’s military capabilities but were also 
created to make society feel proud of its military. Pride was considered an important 
element influencing military support.39 Ceremonies are framed and created around the 
 
36 GARF, f. 10100, op.  2, d. 135, 1 March 1995. 
37 Yeltsin Centre, f. 21, op. 1, d. 126, 27 April 1995. 
38  Daniel J. Sherman, “Commemoration,” in The French Republic: History, Values, 
Debate, ed. by Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christopher Prochasson (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 327. 
39 Natalia Bertuol notes that Victory Day, while centered on the historical narratives, uses 
the debates to enforce ‘blind national pride and militarism.” Please see: Natalia Bertuol, 
“In the event of shelling: Remembering the Great Patriotic War,” Junior Year Abroad 
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public. Jack Santino claims that the ‘public’ parades ensured that issues central to the 
agenda of political elites remained a collective interest and priority of the public.40 
Agreeing with Santino, Azaryahu argues that ritualised communications exchanged 
between national leadership, military command and army are “the supreme values of the 
nation as a political community.” 41  On the day of the Victory Parade, society was 
confronted with the political aims of the state, packaged neatly into a choreographed 
military parade and communicated in the name of those who forged the Victory of the 
Great Patriotic War.  
Reviving militaristic-patriotism required the Russian state to commemorate the 
anniversary by emphasising sacrifice and heroism. Scholars of commemoration note that 
remembrance activities not only supported the history but provided opportunities for 
onlookers to re-familiarise themselves with the history, to ‘reaffirm and reconfirm’ the 
existence of the institutions attached, and to reflect on the military’s role in society.42 
Therefore, war commemoration militarises society as it exposes them to romanticised 
stories of sacrifice and honour, while shaming them into participating and playing an 
active role in the event.  
 
THE ROLE OF THE SPECTATOR 
The anniversary was an opportunity for the Russian state to draw upon the 
country’s history to reignite interest in the military institution, which had reached a 
nadir.43 To change societal attitudes, the government included them in the celebration of 
the event, since the most important aspect of a parade is the relationship between the 
performer and spectator. The performer-spectator relationship is not only significant for 
institutional legitimacy, but hinges on the parade’s ability to transport values and ideals. 
The spectator would take on four roles. First, the spectator became a participant through 
 
Network (JYAN) Blog (blog), 3 May 2018, accessed 17 March 2020, 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/in-the-event-of-shelling-remembering-the-
great-patriotic-war. 
40  Jack Santino, “Performative commemoratives, the personal, and the public: 
Spontaneous shrines, Emergent Rituals, and the field of Folklore,” Journal of American 
Folklore 117, No. 466 (2004): 368. 
41 Azaryahu, “Military and Militarism in Israeli Society,” 91. 
42 Locmele et al. “Celebrations, Commemorative Dates and Related Rituals,” 110. 
43 Olga Malinova, “Political Uses of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Russia from 
Yeltsin to Putin,” in War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, ed. by John Fedor, 
Markku Kangaspuro and Jussi Lassila (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 53. 
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the establishment of Victory Day as a Russian national holiday.44 Removing obstacles 
(such as work) enabled more people to attend the celebrations and outlined the 
significance of the commemoration day to the state (unfortunately, there is no information 
documenting how many people attended or watched the 50th anniversary event in Russia). 
In addition, nationalising the date, coupled with statements such as ‘[9th May] will be for 
us all a day of remembrance’ imposed the collective duty to commemorate on society.45 
The second role of the spectator was as a performer as part of the collective. An undated 
Federal Law on perpetuating the memory of the war victors, which centered on 
commemoration and enhanced social welfare benefits, stated, “Bearing in mind that 
caring for participants and victims of war is a historical duty of society and the state.”46 
The flamboyant display of military prowess in the parades and exhibition of 
Soviet paraphernalia became instruments manipulated by the state to create social 
cohesion and shape public consciousness by cultivating and popularising pro-military 
narratives that promoted the “glorious victory” of the Great Patriotic War.47 In this second 
role, the spectator became a bystander to the state’s militarisation project. By performing 
their civic duty, participating in the commemorative events and paying respects to the 
veterans in memorial activities, the spectator was engaging with (or even mobilised by) 
the military-patriotic discourses popularised by the state. This was enhanced by the 
spectator’s third role as the onlooker.  
The third role was more traditional. The spectator needed to view a performance. 
Encouraging a performer-spectator relationship is not only constructed by political 
messages, but in its entertainment-value. Military spectacles are important forms of 
 
44 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, l. 2, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
As noted by Locmele et al. the Victory Day parade was not deemed a national holiday in 
previous Soviet regimes, for example, under the leadership of Stalin, because state leaders 
believed it would promote the importance of participants of war above that of Stalin. In 
the Post-Soviet period, the aims of the parade were to promote the veteran community 
and the values in which they embodied. It was also an opportunity for the government to 
showcase the career of the military in a positive light and to rally societal support of the 
military.  
45  “Istoricheskii parad v chest’ 50-letiia Pobedy v Velikoi Otechestvenoi Voine,” 
YouTube video, 1:01:08, posted by Sovetskoe Televidenie. GOSTELERADIOFOND 
Rossii, 8 May 2018, accessed 11 October 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSKqdWfyJjI. 
46 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, l.  2, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
47 Locmele et al., “Celebrations, Commemorative Dates and Related Rituals,” 110-111. 
Santino, “Performative commemoratives, the personal, and the public,” 367. 
Kavaliauskas, “Different Meanings of May 9th,” 321. 
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entertainment.48 18th century Britain considered parades as theatrical forms of war. Neil 
Ramsey notes that spectators displayed a desire for representations of war, which were 
spectacular and stimulating rather than reflective of real warfare.49 This was similar to 
Eric Kit-Wai’s experience of Hong-Kong Military Parades. He claims that the parades 
allowed him to appreciate the “physical strength, discipline, and the ultimate obedience 
of the People Liberation’s Army war machine,” adding that images of heavy rifles and 
fierce soldiers made him feel excited and fearful at the same time.50 Parades require a 
phenomenal level of organisation, with geographical layout and time schedule taken into 
consideration to produce the “most dramatic and symbolic effect.” Adolf Hitler’s colossal 
and tightly choreographed parades were instrumental to the success of societal 
militarisation in Nazi Germany, with the romantic and symbolic elements taking society 
on a journey of exaggerate militarised-patriotism.51 The All-Russian Council of Veterans 
of War, Labour, Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies wanted to ensure that 
everyone could access the victory day parade. On 15th April 1993 they suggested that the 
press, central television, radio, public institutions and creative groups should provide 
“wide coverage of events and side events related to the 50th anniversary of the Great 
Patriotic War.”52  
By guaranteeing that society could access the anniversary events without leaving 
the comfort of their living room, military-patriotic discourses were brought to the 
spectators as they watched/ listened and read about the memorial activities. It moved 
society towards militarisation by exposing them to discourses of heroism, sacrifice and 
with little need to step away outside the front door. While not active in the same way as 
a spectator physically attending these events, the homebound observer remained in 
dialogue with the discourses that validated veteran prestige and historical danger. Linking 
the Great Patriotic War victory to contemporary security issues brought the historic 
conflict into modern day context, therefore propelling the spectator into its fourth role - 
the advocate. 
 
48 Scott Hughes Merely, British military spectacle: from the Napoleonic wars through the 
Crimea (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), 139. 
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(Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2016), 81-82. 
50 Eric Kit-Wai, “Re-Nationalisation and me: My Hong-Kong story after 1997,” Inter-
Asia Cultural Studies 1, No. 1 (2000): 176. 
51 Hung, “Mao’s Parades,” 412-413. 
52 GARF, f. 10026, op. 1, d. 2861, 15 April 1993. 
 247 
As an advocate, the spectator linked the historical content to current day political 
ambitions. History has been utilised by many countries and in various ways to 
commemorate or raise concerns regarding social issues. It also informs present day 
discourses. Marita Sturken claims that memory plays a considerable role in the present 
and future, with memory forming a basis of identity.53 Myths, memories and symbols 
touch the “emotional depth of national identity,” mobilising individuals and collective 
groups. 54  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent a crisis of 
identity. The ‘Communist Utopia,’ which sought to promote an ideology to transcend 
borders, left Russia without its own distinct identity.55  Lack of public unity and collective 
support toward the First Chechen War, for example, impeded Russia’s ability to win the 
conflict in the Caucasus region. One historical event did achieve national reconciliation, 
namely the Great Patriotic War. While a Soviet Victory, the event’s memory was resilient 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union on the basis that it affected almost every Russian 
family. As stated by Olga Malinova, “the memory of the Great Patriotic War has proven 
to be the most “politically usable” element of Russia’s past,” due to its “high level of 
social acceptance” and popularity in different societal domains during the demise of the 
Soviet Union.56 It is through understanding its popularity that we can comprehend why it 
remains central to Post-Soviet identity formation.57 In this sense, Russia’s politicians 
were subjected to militarism, by their use and reliance on the memory of the Great 
Patriotic War to unite society and communicate/ promote contemporary issues. Like 
leaders before them, Yeltsin and his team were able to shape the discourses to fit their 
needs, utilising militarised-patriotism to reconcile divisions within society and restore 
pride in the Armed Forces.  
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56 Malinova, “Political Uses of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Russia from Yeltsin 
to Putin,” 45. 
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Parades are an excellent mechanism of control, power and communication. They 
demonstrate the discipline of the soldiers/veterans, who practice and perform a tightly 
choreographed routine. Power is showcased not only by the synchronised actions of the 
performers but also by the display of modern weapons and technology. Communication 
was the most important element of the parade. Without the pervasive nature of the parade, 
ideas of control and power would not be demonstrated. The most important role of the 
parade was to communicate grand narratives of the past, and to use them to inform the 
future. During the 1995 parade, Russia’s military was in turmoil. The state used the 
parade to reconfigure societal views of the Russian military. They did this by emphasising 
the veterans’ glorious victory, by reaffirming Russia’s historic relationship with conflict 
and reproducing Russia’s besieged fortress mentality. In doing so, the parade was used 
as a vehicle of militarisation and to justify a strong military. 
 
WHY COMMEMORATE THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR? 
The Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany was not inevitable; in fact it was 
a long, grim struggle that hindered Soviet advancement and contributed towards huge 
loss of Soviet life. For every American soldier who perished against Nazi Germany in the 
Second World War, another 79 died for the Soviet Union.58  On 11th January 1995, 
Communist Party Leader Gennady Zyuganov claimed, “In the history of the twentieth 
century there is no more significant and memorable event than the victory of the Soviet 
people and their allies over Hitler’s fascism in the Great Patriotic War.”59 He outlined the 
Great Patriotic War’s significant role in modern Russian history as an outcome of the 
high death rates, which saw most Soviet families acquiring their own personal experience 
of war. 60 The Great Patriotic War’s importance in Russian society, as publicised in other 
domains, validated the elaborate celebration of its victorious conclusion.  Similar to 
France, where public commemoration was transformed after World War One, Russia 
needed to re-establish the victory day parades to ensure “the ritual repetition of tribute to 
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the War dead.”61 As declared in a draft Federal Law from 1995 On the Perpetuating 
Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, “The anniversary of 
the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory of the Soviet people over Nazism obliges us to 
take this federal law into force and to apply it until May 9, 1995.”62 The persuasive 
properties of a military spectacle attracted the government as it presented opportunities 
to change public attitudes towards the Armed Forces through emphasis on associated 
topics like memory and sacrifice. 
The state emphasised public participation in anniversary activities. They 
encouraged collective input by emphasising society’s indebtedness to the veteran’s 
sacrifice. In this case, commemoration can be considered a form of currency, where civic 
participation in the memorial activities acted as a payment to previous generations for 
their role in the victory of war. Emphasis on civic indebtedness, however, showed that 
this debt would never be fully repaid, leading to a memory cycle (which has continued to 
this day). This has enabled the Great Patriotic War to gain mythical status, for the hold it 
still has on society. The Federal Law above demonstrated this best. Aparina and 
Lukiankov legitimised proposed commemoration and welfare activities to “keep and 
protect the memory of the defenders of the motherland, to take care of those who gave 
their lives in the struggle for its freedom and independence.”63 The mythic nature of Great 
Patriotic War memory practices enabled the persistence of militarisation, as it reiterated 
the importance of the in Russian society and to its heritage. However, the cycle, 
maintained by the yearly occurrence of the parades, means that society remains exposed 
to discourses of militarised patriotism, serving to remind them of this debt and their civic 
duty to appreciate the veterans’ sacrifice. 
 Dominant discourses around the Victory Day celebrations blurred the lines 
between the state responsibility and civic duty. The discourses reshaped commemorative 
practices, making them a fundamental part of civic duty. In March 1995 the All-Russian 
Volunteers [subbotnik] of Victory appealed to the State Duma, stating, “The current 
generations of Russian citizens, like the other post-Soviet states, remain indebted to the 
heroic warriors and the workers of the rear.”64 In other words, and as Deborah D. Buffton 
notes, if a soldier’s highest duty is to die in war, then it is a duty of the civilian population 
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to commemorate and memorialise that sacrifice. 65  Intensified interest in civic duty, 
relating to commemoration, demonstrated the state’s desire to increase public 
participation in war memorialisation. The public’s participation in the commemorative 
activities influenced the militarisation of society.  
First, it legitimised the military institution. When commemorating a veteran of 
war, the participant not only memorialises the individual, but also the wider institution 
with which they were associated – for example, the Armed Forces, arms manufacturers, 
wartime economy. In this sense, the participant not only popularised the position of the 
veteran, but also ‘celebrated’ and promoted the institution that won the war. Second, the 
memorialisation promoted societal militarism as it forced public familiarity with the 
war’s history and discourses that the state was endorsing. Known as “Victory Day” or 
Den’ Pobedy, public commemoration was organised under the pretext that society was 
celebrating the victory of the Great Patriotic War. The term Victory repressed the true 
horror of the war. Instead, Russia focused on the eventual win over Nazi Germany rather 
than the losses.66 Third, increasing civic responsibility facilitated societal militarisation 
by forcing the youth of 1995, with no direct recollection of the war, to engage with the 
historical discourses and to perpetuate these discourses onto future generations. For 
example, Yeltsin stated the youth should not “dull the memory” of the war's victory.67 In 
doing so, Russia’s younger generations were placed into an imagined community, 
performing commemorative activities for those they may not have a direct link with. This 
is perhaps the most sinister mechanism of militarisation. With the greatest distance from 
the Great Patriotic War, Russia’s younger generations were learning about an event from 
sanitised discourses and interpretations.68 They carried particular versions of this history 
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forward, with memorial events becoming platforms where these stories could garner 
momentum and normalisation.69 
Militarisation was sustained through this notion of debt, which resurfaced on an 
annual basis. Emphasis on the present and future society’s responsibility to 
commemorate, to fulfil this debt, ensured that Russian society remained in dialogue with 
militarised-patriotic discourses of sacrifice, state loyalty and justified memorialisation. 
Nataliya Danilova notes that war commemoration fashions a new solidarity in societies 
by continuing “a patriotic mission.” In the context of Russia and the Great Patriotic War 
the “patriotic mission” was to continue the sacrificial actions of previous generations.70 
This contributes towards our understanding of the state’s decision to memorialise the 
Great Patriotic War with such extravagance. By emphasising society’s responsibility to 
commemorate, the eternal glorification of the military reaffirmed the Victory Day 
anniversary. 
Victory Day served as a reminder of Russia’s heritage and informed public 
identity. By fortifying the public’s role in the commemorative activities of the Great 
Patriotic War anniversary, the state redefined Russia’s national identity. In addition, it 
reaffirmed what Benedict Anderson’s calls an “imagined community.” Russia’s citizens 
were bound together by their collective responsibility to commemorate the veterans’ 
victory and memorialise their sacrifices.71 The victory saved past, present and future 
generations from Fascism and ensured the survival of the Russian state. These ideas 
connected participants who observed the commemorative activities. In addition, and 
taking into consideration Russia’s low life expectancy rate, many of the wartime veterans 
would have died by 1995. Therefore, the representations of their experiences in the 
commemorative landscape were also more likely to be imagined.72  
By encouraging the public to commemorate, the state ensured that society 
remained exposed to militarised-patriotic discourses. This was demonstrated in a message 
 
mass celebrations like those of Victory Day were used to transport narratives, which 
ensured a representation of Russia and the Armed Forces at their best. 
69 Locmele et. al, “Celebrations, Commemorative Dates and Related Rituals,” 110. 
70  Nataliya Danilova, The Politics of War Commemoration in the UK and Russia 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 3. 
71 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1983), 6. 
72 Russian males born between 1896 and 1927 were predicted to live between 30.9 and 
39.3 years. For more, please see: France Mesle and Jacques Vallin, Morality and causes 
of death in 20th century Ukraine (London: Springer, 2012) 5-6. 
 252 
to veterans of the Great Patriotic War during a Federal Assembly meeting held on 1st 
March 1995. Rubkin declared, “Time separates us more and more from May 9, 1945, but 
no one has to be forgotten and nothing should be forgotten. We will always remember 
the names of courageous sons and daughters of the Motherland, who gave their dearest 
life for the sake of freedom of the Motherland.”73 The anniversary was justified by the 
veterans’ sacrifice. This was illustrated in a February 1995 meeting for the Heroes of the 
Soviet Union. The appeal stated, “Veterans of war have every reason to be proud of their 
military and labour exploits for the benefit of the fatherland. They deserve honour and 
respect. These were the years of our immortal glory; it was a feat that will forever remain 
in the hearts of all subsequent generations.”74 The state’s promotion of the Victory Day 
celebrations, as evident in the above sources, served the state’s objective to promote 
positive militaristic sentiments. Promoting the celebrations and assigning this day 
national holiday status formulated a ritual where May 9th would become a day Russian 
citizens commemorated the war dead. In doing so, civilians were annually reminded of 
the military’s victory, which also helped reshape civilian attitudes towards the Armed 
Forces. The commemoration inserted the Armed Forces into their lives, but on the terms 
of the military.  
The 50th anniversary celebrations were integral for a number of reasons. They 
memorialised the war-dead, aimed to unite society and to shape Russia’s identity (which 
was undergoing transformation at this point). As the military’s power diminished, the 
victory celebrations promoted emblematic notions of patriotism, which had the ability to 
help foster feelings of positivity towards the military institution. The audience was 
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confronted with enticing displays and militaristic-patriotic messages that went far beyond 
patriotic messages in the education and media domains.75 These activities contributed 
towards the maintenance of militarisation of society during a time of low military 
prestige.  
 
How did the state commemorate the Great Patriotic War? 
On May 9th 1995, two parades marked the 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic 
War. The first parade was held on Poklonnaia Hill.76 In this parade, military hardware, 
including tanks and planes, were showcased. The second parade was held on Moscow’s 
Red Square. The parade aimed to pay respect to Great Patriotic War veterans. Numerous 
monuments were erected, including the statue of Marshall Zhukov in front of the State 
History Museum on the Manezhe Square and the statue of St. George at Moscow’s 
Victory Park.77 In addition, the state commissioned new medals and other collectables, 
such as commemorative coins, for the anniversary. These commemorative spaces and 
keepsakes enabled militarisation to permeate within society and beyond the 24 hours of 
the victory day, since it stamped usable everyday objects with military-patriotic symbols.  
The total cost of the celebrations, excluding the enhanced veteran pensions, was 
293 billion roubles. 78  The event’s large price tag demonstrated the government’s 
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‘wowed’ with a grand display of ceremonial pageantry. 
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dedication to commemorating the anniversary. In the context of John Keep’s militarism 
checklist, which regarded “disproportionately heavy state expenditure on military ends” 
as a requisite, the high cost of the event showed the prioritisation of the military institution 
and therefore signs of militarism.79 During the 1990s, Russia faced serious economic 
difficulties – with rising unemployment and increasing rates of homelessness. Rather than 
fulfilling the economic needs of the Russian people, the government attempted to achieve 
its own aims by dedicating extensive resources to ceremonial purposes. Not only were 
the economic issues of society overlooked, but also discussions regarding the 
commemoration date trumped debates on the topic of societal welfare. These topics 
involved the parade’s organisation and subjects associated with it, including symbols, 
collectables and youth engagement. Topics relating to the parade included veteran welfare 
and education.  
Symbols became an important discussion point in preparation of the celebration 
day. As with any parade, symbols are important as they transmit values and ideals from 
the performers or organisers to the spectator’s consciousness. They are not just considered 
historical pieces that told an objective truth but objects, which justified and reaffirmed 
ideas of submission and loyalty to leaders and the country and legitimised existing 
institutions - such as the military.80  In the case of the 50th anniversary of the Great 
Patriotic War, Soviet symbols reminded the audience of the military institution that 
existed alongside these symbols, which in 1945 was triumphant. Jakob Vogel’s work on 
folkloric militarism shows that symbols and uniforms shape the “persistent national-
military significance of the celebrations.” Here, the temporal dimensions of symbols as 
representations of the past and reminders for the future can be furthered.81 Symbols 
discussed in this chapter created authentic images of the past, while also reminding 
society of the victory it once experienced. 
Symbols referred to in State Duma documents included the Soviet flag. One 
appeal in particular compared the Russian flag to that of the flag used by the Russian 
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liberation Army, which fought against the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War.82 A. 
Melnikov, chairman of the Veteran Committee of the Kemerovo region justified the use 
of the Soviet flag in the following excerpt from January 1995: 
 
We believe that the Great Victory Day must be held in Moscow and other cities 
of the country under the red flag…  
It is known that the red colour of the flag in Russia has centuries-old history. 
Under Dmitri Donskoy’s victory was won on the Kulikovo field, the crimson 
colour was the military banner of Dmitri Pozharsky. The white-crimson-blue 
banner was used in the 18th century by Peter I in the Northern Wars, and then it 
was transferred to the merchant Navy. After the February revolution of 1917, the 
re-coloured flag became the symbol of Russia and was approved by the 
provisional government. And it was this flag that was used by Vlasov. It is 
sprinkled with betrayal.  
Please do not discard our offer. Imagine what feelings we veterans of the Great 
Patriotic War will experience if we go in the columns under this flag.  
The red colour of the flag is the colour of our victory in the greatest war. It roared 
over the defeated Reichstag in Berlin in 1945. 
Understand us. We will cover ourselves with eternal disgrace, desecrate the graves 
of millions of Soviets who fought under the red banner, liberated Russia, Europe 
from the mouth of the Fascist plague, we therefore humiliate the now living 
veterans of the front and rear, who did not think the 50th anniversary of the victory 
would have been marked under the banner of the traitor Vlasov, who was fighting 
against his own camp.83 
 
This comparison showed strong and emotional links between the veteran 
community and the flag. The tricolour flag was adopted in the Post-Soviet state as a 
continuation of the Russian flag that existed before the Soviet period. The proposal to use 
the Soviet flag, however, represented the emotional reach of the Great Patriotic War, 
showing that society was ‘triggered’ by images of the enemy during this time. While this 
meant the Victory parade was coupled with images of the Soviet past, its use showed the 
state conforming to the wishes of those who fought at the time. Therefore, using the 
Soviet flag in the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War was important as it 
demonstrated the government’s desire to unite a larger audience, with that larger audience 
still potentially associating their identity with their Soviet past. 
 As demonstrated in a study conducted between June 2015 and July 2016, 20 years 
after the 1995 commemoration, 69% of Russians do not view the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union in a positive light.84 Using Soviet paraphernalia in the victory parades ensured 
wider participation in the commemorative events. The use of the Soviet flag was also 
linked to its representation of the war dead. An open letter to Boris Yeltsin and other 
prominent leaders of the State Duma by Great Patriotic war veterans stated, “We have the 
right to celebrate the victory anniversary as we want. And the desire is right and simple: 
the jubilee identities must pass under the flag of the USSR…for which we shed blood and 
our young comrades died in the field of battle quite young.”85 Another appeal supported 
the content of the open letter by claiming that the extinction of Soviet symbols during the 
celebration of the 50th anniversary would be “blasphemy over the dead, with the infliction 
of great resentment, an insult to all living people who forged the victory at the front and 
in the rear.”86 As displayed in Figure One, the Soviet flags were subsequently included 
in the 50th anniversary celebrations. 
 
 
(Figure 1. Close up image of soldiers marching in St. Petersburg on May 9th 1995 under 
Soviet Paraphernalia).87 
 
These statements are interesting as they impede the state’s ability to link the 
commemoration to post-Soviet Russian identity. Yet, they acknowledge and allow the 
Russian government to use these symbols in their renewal of these parades. In doing so, 
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the symbols transcended the regime change and reinforced the continuity of militarisation 
in society. Rather than seeing a ‘break’ of militarisation in society, people were being 
reminded of the Soviet parades, and their revival was just that – a revival. It continued 
and, for the most part, replicated events that took place several years before. However, 
newer elements were introduced to these parades, showing a clear departure from the 
Soviet period. 
In addition to the historic Soviet symbols, the new Post-Soviet military uniform 
and MiG-31 fighter-interceptor was unveiled.88 The introduction of the modern objects 
alongside the vision of Soviet memorabilia reinforced the Great Patriotic War’s 
timelessness as it muddied the boundaries between the past and present. The use of 
historical paraphernalia in the commemorative activities of the state was important to the 
continuation of militarisation practices in the post-Soviet period as it placed the historical 
victory at the Great Patriotic War within the current frame of the Russian state. Hughes 
noted, “uniforms operate at a symbolic level; most importantly; this genre of clothing 
raises interesting questions about individuality and conformity, self-control, and the 
visual representation of identity.” 89  Connecting both eras through historic and 
contemporary symbols played an informing role on Russia’s national identity. The 
temporal connections impacted the militarisation of society at this time. Linking the past 
to the present, in relation to historic wars and contemporary military readiness showed 
that the world continued to be a dangerous place. The symbols reaffirmed the discourse 
that Russia is a vulnerable country facing new and potentially hostile threats every day, 
enforcing ideas of defence readiness and continued mobilisation. The connections placed 
the romanticised retelling of the war into the context of real authentic threats facing 
Russia at that time.  
The use of Soviet paraphernalia and historical hardware authenticated the 
memorialisation of the event. It provided a utopian and romantic image of military power, 
subsequently provoking “great interest and excitement from onlookers.” 90  Many 
onlookers relied on stories from family members to supplement their understanding of 
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the event. Historical symbols validated these stories, providing greater understanding of 
the memorialisation beyond the commemoration event. The festivities, coupled with the 
display of Soviet paraphernalia and new equipment, enabled the government to influence 
current societal debates on the country’s Armed Forces. It provided an opportunity for 
them to construct a dialogue with the past that contributed toward altering how the victory 
of the Great Patriotic War was remembered - as enduring.91  
As demonstrated above, there was a clear public interest in the anniversary events 
of the Great Patriotic War. This was best shown in an open letter to Yeltsin, where 
onlookers noted their concern about the symbols that would be used to commemorate the 
war victims and participants. They argued that Soviet flags and symbols should be used. 
The structure and organisation of the parades significantly affected militarism during this 
period. Not only was the public mentally invested in this event, but the symbols’ use also 
allowed the government to create a sense of continuity between the parades of the Soviet 
period and the Post-Soviet era. This was particularly important, as the parades were 
considered a simple revival of a tradition that occurred before – rather than as a 
mechanism of state militarism. These symbols authenticated the memorialisation, 
creating a visual for participants and those from the war period to re-familiarise 
themselves with the history. Those born after the war were able to create an image of it 
from these visuals. Building on the work of Bryan, who claims that rituals construct a 
sense of timelessness, Soviet paraphernalia created links between the past and present.92 
For example, the government showcased new technology and uniforms, with very little 
push back, since the theme of the commemoration still centred on the wishes of the past 
generations. The Soviet symbols were able to entice the historically informed, while the 




 The first parade of 1995 was held on Poklonnaia Hill. It included traditional 
aspects of the first Victory Day parade in 1945 by incorporating old regiment formations, 
but also introducing new elements with the exhibition of Russia’s military hardware. The 
second parade, held for the veterans of the Great Patriotic War on Red Square, was more 
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traditional. The elaborate ceremonies militarised society by showing excessive allegiance 
to war veterans, which promoted military’s societal position. This is especially the case 
when considering the role of Russia’s current military cohort, which was acting out the 
role of the veterans in the parade on Poklonnaia Hill. It allowed the celebration of Russia’s 
current military cohort, which was performing the role of the Great Patriotic War 
veterans. Following Russia’s failure in Afghanistan and its tumultuous role in Chechnya, 
which saw the demise in military prestige, the parades aimed to foster positive attitudes 
towards the military. As an annual event, Russian civilians were regularly exposed to 
glorified militaristic discourses. The parades marked a permanent fixture in the holiday 
calendar, dominating national television channels and news outlets. Posters of the 
upcoming parade were placed on every sidewalk, while merchandise adorned pop-up 
fixtures in supermarkets. These parades were not limited to 9th May but were an outcome 
of months of preparation and marketing. They maneuvered the Russian people, forcing 
them to think about their understanding and familiarity of the event.  
Glorifying the Armed Forces was a major goal of the state. In the context of the 
parade, the military institution was promoted through emphasis on the veterans’ sacrifice. 
This sacrifice was acknowledged early on in both parades, as the inspector and 
commander approached each group with a congratulatory messages.93 They thanked the 
different regiments for their sacrifice in war, and for perpetuating the victory on the 50th 
anniversary. The use of sacrificial discourses is not unique to Russia. Rather, references 
to sacrifice are used quite regularly in war commemoration. Its use is multifaceted, to 
immortalise and heroise the war participants, to dispel stories of war futility by justifying 
the sacrifice in the name of the state’s survival or renewal, to emphasise the victory over 
loss, and to ensure the continuation of memorialisation. Sacrifice is commonly framed in 
a spiritual sense, adding a mythic element to the memory. In May 1995, Yeltsin said:  
 
We remember the roar we sang and the dying testaments of the mothers of 
orphaned children who fell in incomplete tears, we recall the war years heavy 
nights to the point of exhausion, but we [also] remember the jubilant Reichstag 
soldier and the handshake on the Elbe and the joy of the liberated world, this 
memory is sacred.94  
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Yeltsin’s statement did not stand on its own. Just months prior, in February 1995, 
veterans were told “[they] have every reason to be proud of their military and labour 
exploits for the benefit of the fatherland. They deserve honour and respect. These were 
the years of our immortal glory, it was a feat that will forever remain in the hearts of all 
subsequent generations.”95 Both statements showcased the veteran’s immortalisation for 
their participation in the Great Patriotic War. As the process took place, the veterans 
adopted a divine position in society, as those who should be revered and whose values 
should be replicated.96 These values were popularised in the victory celebrations and 
through enhanced welfare provisions, as documented in chapter four.97  
This valorisation was a positive development for the veterans and was also a “gift” 
to state unity and for state goals. Salih Can Acikoz’s study on Turkish veterans in the 
1990s noted that the glorification of the veteran community enabled the Turkish 
government to create a militarised, nationalistic political culture, with ritualistic and 
ceremonial landscapes. It aided the creation of “local communities of loss,” unified by 
common discourses of loss of mobility (injury) and life.98 In Russia, the educational 
textbooks’ use of ‘ancestor’ sought to unite students under this common metanarrative of 
the Great Patriotic War, therefore highlighting that the sacrificial discourses displayed in 
the victory celebrations did not stand alone, but added and complemented preexisting 
societal discourses on the historical event. Having enforced discourses of ancestral 
sacrifice across the different domains demonstrated a state-led effort to unify and 
therefore militarise society. Discourses of ancestral sacrifice bridged the Soviet and Post-
Soviet period. James Booth’s study on political identity highlights the importance of 
 
95 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, 22 February 1995. 
96 Michael Rowlands, “Trauma, Memory and Memorials,” British Journal of Psychology 
15, No. 1 (1998): 59. 
Jackie Feldman, “Between Yad Vashem and Mt. Herzl: Changing Inscriptions of 
Sacrifice on Jerusalem’s ‘Mountain of Memory,’” Anthropological Quarterly 80, No. 4 
(2007): 1163. 
Paul Gough, “The Commemoration of War,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Heritage and Identity, ed. by Brian Graham and Peter Howard (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008), 3-4. 
97 As noted by Krylova, Yeltsin’s Presidential Campaign promised a redressing of the 
veterans grievances and public recognition of their heroic deeds. For more, please see: 
Krylova, “Dancing on the Graves of the Dead,” 97. 
98 Salih Can Acikoz, “Sacrificial limbs of Sovereignity: Disabled Veterans, masculinity 
and Nationalist Politics in Turkey,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 26, No. 1 (2012): 
5-10. 
 261 
‘continuity of community across time’ for the creation of a political identity. He argues 
that political identity is subject to attribution, responsibility and accountability of the past 
and of a country’s future. The ancestor is important in this sense. Booth argues that 
feelings of responsibility and indebtedness to a country’s past are only possible when 
feeling connections with something from the previous regime. In post-Soviet Russia, 
Soviet traditions, narratives and the people of the Union still existed. Memories of the 
Great Patriotic War enabled unity and promoted collective responsibility to memorialise 
past events and perpetuate this tradition into the future.99 In addition, Acikoz points out 
that valorising the veteran community in Turkey also led to the veterans’ adoption of ultra 
nationalistic tendencies and exaggerated state loyalty. The veterans then acted as 
gatekeepers and protectors for pro-militaristic laws.100 Veterans who felt marginalised in 
the early Post-Soviet period by an anti-Soviet press were encouraged to continue their 
mission despite the betrayal, with their own rituals established in place of those that 
existed in the Soviet period.101  
The inspector’s message of gratitude in the parade was spoken to each ‘front’ 
present. Numerous ‘fronts’ were addressed with the same messages, which demonstrated 
the government's desire to show personal gratitude to that specific regiment.102 In doing 
so, the messages stressed the veterans’ special role in society and set an example for 
others to follow. If high level political and military elites were prepared to dedicate 
extensive time to thanking the various Great Patriotic War fronts and provide the 
resources for an elaborate commemoration, then it should also be in the interests of the 
public, for whom the sacrifice was made, to commit and show the same level of 
gratitude.103 The political and military elites’ actions in the parades pushed society closer 
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to militarisation. It set an example for others to follow, showing simple actions that could 
be taken to show gratitude and emphasising the military’s importance to the state by 
dedicating excessive resources and time to the veterans’ celebration. The actions of the 
political and military elites reinforced the discourse that a person’s sacrifice for the state 
was worthy of praise and was the highest form of civic duty. 
As an active mode of commemoration, these parades enacted a similar level of 
historicalisation as a war memorial. As the parade took place, the parade’s landscape 
transformed into the battleground of the Great Patriotic War and into a landscape of 
history. Speeches and visuals focused on the Great Patriotic War’s history, which 
transported onlookers to the parade of June 1945. Emphasis on societal indebtedness was 
highly instrumental in the militarisation of society during this period. The veterans’ 
sacrifice was highlighted in Yeltsin's speech, where he acknowledged the “unprecedented 
price” paid for saving the world from fascism.104 Russia had a historical relationship with 
conflict, war and invasion, however the Great Patriotic War was unmatched in its scale. 
Twenty-seven million people died in this conflict. Historically Russians had sacrificed 
themselves in conflict in a similar way to Great Patriotic War participants. However, 
collectively the huge extent of loss, which was a product of this conflict, fortified the 
war’s importance.105 Highlighting the “unprecedented price” demonstrated a clear effort 
by the government to immortalise the veteran, and to place them on at a higher rank in 
the hierarchical society. Doing so enabled the state to promote desirable traits – attributes 
such as self-sacrifice and loyalty. Pavel Grachev’s speech echoed Yeltsin, stating, “the 
unity of the whole country, love for the fatherland, the highest patriotism of the people, 
the feat of arms of soldiers and officers, the talent of military leaders and the sacrifice of 
rear workers became the most important factors of the Great Victory.”106 In addition to 
this claim, Yeltsin addressed the youth of Russia, stating that May 9th  would “be for us 
all a day of remembrance,” and that the youth should not “dull the memory” of the war's 
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victory.107 The shifting of responsibility onto the youth to maintain a cult of memory of 
the Great Patriotic War shows the youth’s role in these commemorative events.  
Nataliya Danilova’s 2016 study on war commemoration and militarisation 
connects the two processes by highlighting the political elite’s calls for society to 
participate in the commemorative process. She uses President Clinton’s ‘support the 
troops’ slogan as an example. This was similar to Yeltsin’s demands for Russia’s youth 
to perpetuate the memory the Great Patriotic War victory.108 This statement was justified 
by Yeltsin's emphasis on the veterans’ determination to “save future generations, rid them 
of the disasters of war.”109 His statements on societal indebtedness formulated new ideas 
of civic duty, where commemoration was integral. In doing so, Yeltsin elevated the 
veteran’s role and image in society. It also told onlookers what part they should play in 
future memorialisations.  
Some aspects of the June 1945 parades were replicated in the 1995 parades. These 
similarities were recognisable to those who had witnessed these parades before. The 
parades’ rituals and exciting displays of military might were integral to the state’s ability 
to attract a large audience. After all, the performative aspects of the ceremonies were key 
to cultivating the parade’s popularity.110 Therefore, the parade was an invaluable tool of 
militarisation as it fostered an image of military grandeur through displays that excited 
and interested its spectators. The grand spectacles, with glorified visuals of Russia’s 
military, bridged the gap between commemoration and militarisation as it enforced 
military-patriotic discourses and reaffirmed messages of pride and state loyalty. Society 
was exposed to these discourses through dazzling performances of military might and 
speeches of veteran valour. 
The parade on Poklonnaia Gora was unique. It was ritualistically similar to the 
parade on Moscow’s Red Square. However, in contrast to the veterans’ parade, the 
veterans were the audience.111 Current units of the Moscow Garrison and cadets from the 
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military schools acted out the role of the veteran.112 Similar to the parade on Red Square, 
the soldiers lined up within their regiments on one side of Kutuzovsky Avenue. They 
faced the audience, who were located on the same side as the Victory Memorial 
Complex.113 The parade’s sequence mirrored the 1945 victory day parade. The inspector 
and commander of the parade (in this ceremony, Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev and 
Colonel-General Leonid Kuznetsov) approached each regiment and congratulated them 
on the victory of the Great Patriotic War. 114  They moved in sync. Two aspects are 
important here. The repeated sequence reinforced the rituals established immediately 
after the Soviet victory, creating continuities between the Soviet and post-Soviet period. 
Yet, using a younger cohort to represent the veterans placed the procedures, traditions 
and the histories of the Soviet period in current context. As Danilova notes, by looking at 
the youth as newer generations of the 'glorious dead,' the past can be preserved but also 
placed within a contemporary context.115  
The ritual was repeated on Moscow’s Red Square. This time Veteran Marshall of 
the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov and Veteran General of the Army Vladimir Govoro took 
on the roles of the inspector and commander.116 The regiments, which stood in the same 
positions as those on Poklonnaia Hill, were filled with veterans, to whom messages to the 
"war victors" were more appropriately directed. 117  In both spectacles, the military 
orchestra played and displayed banners of the various Fronts that were used in the 1945 
parade. Using the same music and Soviet symbols is important for the militarisation of 
society. First, using music from 1945 demonstrated a clear desire by the state to transport 
the audience to the origin of the victory – to create a sense of authenticity to this parade. 
In addition, those veterans and onlookers who were present in the 1945 parade would 
remember these different ceremonial aspects and also feel closer to Great Patriotic war 
victory. Chapter three noted state efforts to unite veterans and youth, hoping to establish 
a relationship between the two groups. 118  These ceremonies provided a historical 
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representation of the first victory parade and drew the youth into the story of the Great 
Patriotic War victory. As participants of the commemoration, the veterans’ involvement 
added a further layer of legitimacy to the stories being told on Red Square. The veterans’ 
participation suggested they supported the discourses being promoted by the state. 
According to Mann, veterans often favoured state discourses of the war to their own 
experiences. He stated: 
 
In one instance, during a conversation between a librarian and a veteran who liked 
to ‘read about the war,’ the librarian asked, ‘But why? You yourself were a soldier 
in the war. Wasn’t that enough?’ The veteran replied, ‘Oh, what kind of war was 
that? I like to read about a real war that has heroism.119 
 
Veterans participated in these events because it enabled them to engage with 
discourses largely absent in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The discourses that did exist 
questioned the Great Patriotic War victory and the veterans’ role in upholding the 
repressive Soviet state. This marginalised the veteran community. The veterans’ 
relevance was reestablished by celebrations, enhanced pension reforms, and moves to 
create a military-patriotic education. In this sense, the veteran community was moved by 
militarisation - relying on glorified militarised discourses to reaffirm their position in 
society and to rewrite their own Great Patriotic War experiences.  
In both parades, the different regiments marched past the audience. They faced 
the audience as they marched. 120  Facing the audience, which included political and 
military elites, displayed a gesture of submission to the political and state institutions. 
This is particularly important to take into consideration. Grachev, who was a key player 
in the infamous Chechen War, stood on top of Lenin's mausoleum. This was another ritual 
of the Soviet period. Leaders of the Soviet Union stood upon Lenin’s mausoleum during 
parades. Their high physical position represented the greater power they held over 
society.121 The veterans’ salute, which demonstrated loyalty and submission, was also 
considered an exhibition of the support for the Defence Minister and his endeavours. The 
public display of submissiveness contradicted media discourses that presented a divided 
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military, especially in terms of the Chechnya question. In keeping with the traditional 
sequences of the historical parades, this public image of accordance created a counter-
narrative to the stories constructed by the media. At the apex of power, Yeltsin, Grachev 
and other military figures demonstrated their control by repeating tradition that originated 
in the Soviet period. Its continuation enabled the political and military elite to imitate 
popularity, control and legitimacy.  
The government achieved a number of its aims by constructing a set of ritualistic 
traditions. First, it established continuities between the past and present. The younger 
cohort in the Poklonnaia Hill parade, reenacting a sequence reminiscent of the first 
parade, created temporal links between the 1945 parade and the parades of 1995. In 
addition, the traditional choreography, including the salutes, enabled the government to 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of an ordinary spectator, who may have considered these 
salutes an act of submission. Therefore the Great Patriotic War had the ability to reconcile 
periodic and political division. It was at many levels that the parade militarised society. 
From a political point of view, the commemorative activities militarised the political elite 
by their reliance of the event to unite society. The veteran community benefitted from 
ceremonial militarism as it altered discourses that previously erased their societal 
importance. Society was militarised by the elaborate preservation of memory, visuals of 
veteran subordination and images of military grandeur. The rituals which were renewed 
during this period persisted into contemporary Russia, with President Putin continuing to 
build upon the militaristic patriotic reach of these parades. 
Showcasing Russia’s military might was also a motivation behind these parade. 
In the early 1990s a new post Cold War world order was being shaped. The Poklonnaia 
parade ensured that foreign dignitaries, including U.S. President Bill Clinton, were 
subjected to huge spectacles of military potency. It displayed Russia's military hardware, 
including tanks and aeroplanes (strategic bombers TU-95 and Tu-160).122 The military 
hardware’s use was a new aspect to the parades. A parade of tanks and an airshow 
including these new bombers stormed down/over Kutuzovsky Avenue. This display was 
followed by Grachev's speech. He claimed that Russia's Armed Forces were deemed 
"battleworthy" and ready to defend Russia in case of external threats and "encroachment" 
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on the country's interests.123 He also used the emergence of new threats to legitimise the 
strengthening of the Armed Forces, claiming, “Unfortunately, today the difficult 
interweaving of historical territorial, political, economic and national contradictions 
remains a military danger, and while there is danger, we must strengthen and qualitatively 
renew our armed forces.” 124  Grachev’s emphasis on military readiness and future 
development was most important, as tensions between East and West had risen at this 
time as a result of NATO expansion. Chapter two showed that NATO expansion was not 
only a political concern but also a concern to society, who saw NATO expansion as a 
threat to the security of Russia.125 Since military reform had not yet taken place in Russia, 
this grandiose display was an effective portrayal of Russia’s renewed military power. 
Figure two best exhibits the extent of military might on display in the parade.  
 
 
(Figure 2. Armed Formations marching up Kutuzov Avenue, in parallel to Poklonnaia 
Gora)126 
 
Russia’s elaborate display of military strength also ‘entertained’ the spectator who 
was receptive to the excitement of the theatrics displaying Russia’s war machine. Roger 
Stahl discusses the use of a military-media-entertainment complex (MMEC) in order to 
entice and engage spectatorship. 127  He discusses the Gulf War more specifically, 
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highlighting differing tropes that came to typify spectacular warfare. Stahl highlighted 
the pervasiveness of consumer warfare and demonstrated the overwhelming reach of a 
war that was situated in a far-flung region through the workings of the MMEC. According 
to Stahl, the MMEC promotes clean warfare, technofetishism and support-the-troops 
rhetoric.128 Taking specifically ideas relating to technofetishism, which is defined as the 
“worship of high-tech weaponry,” the Russian state wanted to wow the audience by 
showcasing these weapons, especially considering aviation had not been included in a 
military parade since 1957.129 While discussions on militainment are usually linked to 
film media, and discussions of technology and its use in cinema, news and other virtual 
capacities, it is also relevant to war theatrics. To produce a parade of commemoration, 
one that draws in an audience, it must be a spectacle. As noted by Paul Virilio in 1989, 
“war can never break free from the magical spectacle because its very purpose is to 
produce that spectacle,” and that there is “no war…without representations, no 
sophisticated weaponry without psychological mystification.” 130  Virilio’s own 
assessment demonstrates that the crux of the citizen-spectator relationship is not 
fundamentally the truthful reflection of the event, and not solely in the mourning of lost 
generations, but is located in the entertaining value of the parade. The Victory Day 
parade’s use of modern technology, organised and disciplined military parade and the 
“remember the war dead” rhetoric very much reflected a spectacle that wanted the 
audience to take on the role as a ‘mere consumer-of-content.’131 
Beyond its ability to demonstrate Russia’s military might and to entertain, the 
parade also generated discussion about the future of Russia’s Armed Forces. This was 
showcased more appropriately in Grachev’s speech, and more specifically by his 
reference to military reform. He asserted that, “we must qualitatively renew our armed 
forces,” using regional disputes and new challenges to Russia’s national security as 
justification.132 This was particularly important since Grachev played a key role in the 
initiation of the Chechen Conflict. His alarming messages regarding new threats to 
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national security of course acted as a legitimator for his actions in Chechnya and a 
common tactic in efforts to militarise society. Chapters two and three show that media 
and educational discourses drew upon previous and current threats to Russia’s security. 
Prolific reference to war in Russian history textbooks, for example, reaffirmed the 
discourse that Russia has always needed to defend its borders. Yeltsin reinforced these 
ideas in his Red Square speech. Unlike Grachev's speech, which was set in the present 
context, Yeltsin emphasised Russia's historical relationship with conflict. He underlined 
Russia's war torn past by stating that Moscow and Russia “stand and will stand...[as for] 
centuries they have risen from the ruins.”133 Emphasising Russia’s historical relationship 
with war, Yeltsin fortified the traditional Russian justification for the necessity of a large 
military institution based on the principle that it is vulnerable to outside hostility. Both 
discourses played an instrumental role in the persistence of militarisation of society 
during this period. Grachev's speech covered issues of national security in a rational 
manner. 134  Without directly mentioning the Chechen War, he provided a general 
assessment of the geopolitical situation at the time, simply warning that Russia should 
maintain a certain level of mobilisation. His message was then reinforced by Yeltsin, who 
outlined a pattern of death and devastation in Russia as a result of war.  
Eric Meyer argues that Geschichtspolitik ("Politics of History"), defined by Edgar 
Wolfrum as a "political-instrumental way of dealing with history and historiography 
which aims to influence contemporary debates," should be defined as a political domain 
whereby actors use historical narratives to serve specific and political interests.135 In the 
context of the Chechen War, placing emphasis on Russia's devastating past legitimised 
Russia's continuing protective role, especially since Russia justified its role in Chechnya 
on the basis that ethic Russians in the region were in danger. In addition, Yeltsin 
manipulated Great Patriotic War memory to inform future goals of the state. He promoted 
partnership and renewed alliance through images like the “handshake on the Elbe.” He 
reinforced Russia’s obligation to ensuring that fascism did not prevail.136 His comments 
on fascism are laid out in the undated project related to the Federal Law On Perpetuating 
the victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. The project’s 
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authors, Aparina and Lukianov, stated the “most important direction of state policy of the 
Russian Federation in the manifestations of the memory of victory in the Great Patriotic 
War is a decisive struggle against the manifestations of fascism.” 137  By drawing on 
historical discourse to inform future policy goals, Yeltsin showcased the multifaceted 
nature of commemoration, as an instrument not only to remember the past but also to 
accomplish present and future political goals.  
Both parades fulfilled numerous state goals. On a superficial level, the elaborate 
ceremony reestablished rituals for subsequent parades and displayed the extent of 
Russia’s military might. On a deeper level, sacrificial and debt discourses shifted the 
responsibility towards the civilian, promoting collective commemoration as a substantial 
part of civic duty.138 The rituals enabled the government to exercise power within the 
public realm and in front of an audience. The audience witnessed discipline, 
choreography and military submissiveness to the political and military elite. Images of a 
fractured Armed Forces were overshadowed by this moment of choreographed 
submissiveness, reaffirming and legitimising the state’s domestic and foreign political 
endeavors. Victory Day allow certain actors to reintroduce glorified images of the 
military into the public realm. Both parades were extremely instrumental to the 
militarisation of Russian society. Through the synchronised, exciting displays, which 
included symbolic representations of the war’s victory, the audience was more likely to 
absorb messages beyond those presented in the media. Speeches by politicians, like 
Yeltsin, reaffirmed preexisting discourses. He popularised the notion that serving the 
military was a worthwhile cause, that veterans deserve respect and that Russia has and 
will continue to rise against inevitable adversity. Grachev’s speech promoted the idea that 
Russia needed to remain ready and up-to-date, highlighting current and future national 
security threats. Both speeches strengthened the idea that Russia is a vulnerable country 
in a hostile world. Though the parades were an invaluable tool of the Russian state, 
commemorative monuments and souvenirs allowed the military institution to permeate 




137 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, [Undated: 1993-1995].  
138 Frank Ellis, “The Great Fatherland War in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian literature,” 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, No. 4 (2007): 610. 
 271 
The Great Patriotic War’s 50th anniversary not only warranted a vast and 
expensive military parade, but a complete rejuvenation of the physical commemorative 
landscape. Numerous monuments dedicated to the celebration of the Great Patriotic War 
were introduced. As noted by Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, the event enabled the 
state to lead an ambitious campaign to revive and re-interpret the war’s history.139 
Monuments built in time for this anniversary included the “Marshal of Victory,” a 
memorial statue built to commemorate the victories of Marshal Zhukov, a key leader in 
the Great Patriotic War. These monuments were built in Russia’s administrative centre, 
demonstrating the importance of the Great Patriotic War to the nation’s history. Forest 
and Johnson and Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubek claim that memorials placed within 
the capital city of a nation reflected the role the political elite envisaged that the event 
would play in current identity formation. In addition, it emphasised the importance that 
had been attached to these past events.140  
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Yeltsin worked extensively to ensure that these 
monuments were refined to represent Russian national identity. Luzhkov especially, 
“amassed symbolic capital in the city…to promote an image of Russia as a great military 
and spiritual power bridging the gap between East and West.”141 However, Russifying 
the Great Patriotic War was problematic. For example, Victory Park housed churches and 
other religious structures, which drew a line between Sovietism and the new Russian 
state.142 While the introduction of religion into the narrative around the Great Patriotic 
War allowed the newly formed Russian federation to gain some autonomy over the Great 
Patriotic War memory, it also removed some of its significance. Instead of being 
showcased as a “victory over fascism” in the case of this Victory Park, the Great Patriotic 
War was being restructured to be an extension of the “age-old Christian story,” another 
external enemy the Russian military bravely fought against.143 It also highlighted tensions 
between the speeches given by political leaders in the parades and memory discourses 
that were being communicated by the memorials and exhibitions at  the Great Patriotic 
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War museum. However, it remained important to the Russian government that these 
monuments promoted longevity, and a mythologisation that would allow their existence 
to remain eternal.  
From the day they were erected, these monuments became embedded in the 
concrete landscape of the city. They showcased a continuation of commitment to the 
memorialisation of their predecessors, while informing Russia’s future national identity. 
Paul Gough notes that monuments “provided a sense of anchoring… in a mobile and 
disjointed society.”144 While Gough is more concerned with British memorials, his ideas 
can be linked to the Russian case, since the Russian Federation lacked a sense of 
collective identity in its early years. The monuments linked the past, present, dead and 
living, and the current society under a static and common historical symbol of the war. 
Noted as ‘official memory,’ these monuments exhibited devotion to the Great Patriotic 
War memory and to the institution that forged the victory - the Armed Forces.145 These 
memorials maintained societal militarisation, as their erection demonstrated continuity 
and loyalty to the past and the institutions concerned.146  
In addition, not all monuments constructed in the Post-Soviet period were 
specific. While they sat in places of specificity like Victory Park, they glorified and 
represented a common theme that ensured their everlasting relevance. These monuments 
fit into Anderson’s understanding of national imaginings. When discussing the Tombs of 
Unknown Soldiers, he states that tombs are “void…of identifiable mortal remains or 
immortal souls… [yet] are nonetheless saturated with ghostly national imaginings.”147 
Jacques Le Goff’s portrayal of the Unknown Soldier’s Tomb is similar to that of 
Anderson, showing that the monument’s anonymity helped reconcile the nation in a 
shared memory.148 In such cases, the monuments did not create a direct representation of 
war but constructed a sense of meaning and feeling. Therefore, these monuments were 
simply about giving substance and physicality to the material.149  While the Zhukov 
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monument, discussed below was a portrayal of an individual, the obelisk in Victory Park 
is more abstract, representing the theme of war rather than memorialising individuals 
associated with the Great Patriotic War. The monument is more relatable and easier to 
accept.  
On the 8th May 1995, the Russian state revealed a new monument called “Marshal of 
Victory” dedicated to Marshal Zhukov.150 The statue was situated on Manezhe Square, 
which neighbours Red Square.151 The monument depicted Zhukov on horseback, as a 
reminder of his role in the Victory Day Parade of June 1945. The statue also depicts his  
horse trampling on Nazi symbols. The trampling of the swastika was a common image in 
Great Patriotic War monuments, and symbolised that Zhukov was an important individual 
in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The statue was revealed in a small ceremony. Luzhkov 
delivered a speech at the unveiling ceremony, stating, "We are opening a monument to 
the great son and commander of Russia whose most decisive contribution to 
the victory has been acknowledged by the whole world, to Marshal Zhukov." 152 
Following Luzhkov’s speech, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who was surrounded by 
other state officials including Patriarch Alexei II, revealed the statue.  Figure three shows 
Boris Yeltsin cutting the ribbon around the monument and removing the wrapping. A 
small public audience attended the ceremony, and soldiers carried out a ceremonial march 
to pay homage to Zhukov. Two guards protected the statue, for the purposes of the 
ceremony only. Jonathan Trigg notes that the presence of political elites at the opening 
of a monument or its placement near public buildings highlighted the significance of the 
memorial because of the “immense official involvement in the planning element of these 
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memorials.” 153   This was the case with the ‘Marshal of Victory.’ The location of the 
monument and the official opening ceremony, which was sanctioned by prominent 
political and religious elites, showed respect for Zhukov as an individual and 
acknowledged the indispensable role which he played in the victory of the Great Patriotic 
War. Zhukov’s historical importance was cemented in history even before 1995. On 17th 
June 1994, Svetlana Migdisova and Elena Petrenko of FOM asked Russian citizens the 
question, “Which of the listed historical workers of Russia and the USSR do you most 
consider a Russian patriot?” Out of 1,200 respondents, Peter I scored highly at 46%, with 
Marshal Zhukov following in second with 29%. Other ‘patriots’ included Russian 
military leader Alexander Suvorov and first leader of the Soviet Union, Vladimir 
Lenin.154 
 
(Figure 3. Unveiling of Marshall Zhukov Monument by President Boris Yeltsin)155 
 
Patriarch Alexei II’s attendance was most interesting. While his involvement was 
only ceremonial, it demonstrated a growing departure from Soviet Union and efforts to 
Russify the commemoration. As noted by Trigg, utilising religious symbolisms, 
discourses and even religious elites in memorialisation practices added a level of 
spirituality and validity to the event and people that were being commemorated. 156 
However, this was not the main target of the state. The religious dimensions to the Victory 
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Day celebration symbolised that the Russian State wanted to separate itself from the 
Soviet Union. Having repressed religious organisations during the Soviet period in favour 
of scientific rationalism, the victories of the Soviet Union were packaged within a wider 
discourse of saving the Communist state rather than by God.  
The collapse of Communist Party rule left the victory without a justification – 
since both the country and the cause that the soldier originally died for no longer existed. 
Roger Marwick claims the demise and devaluation left citizens of the Russian Federation 
with little social identity and political purpose.157 The rebirth of the cult of the Great 
Patriotic War alongside a reenergised and politicised Russian orthodoxy filled the gap 
and allowed for the Great Patriotic War to assume greater significance in the Post-Soviet 
period. In 1993, a survey found that 98% respondents regarded the Great Patriotic War 
as Russia’s most important historical event.158 Combining the commemorative events 
with religious tropes demonstrated a clear use of the event to inform and generate support 
for state policies. Yeltsin aimed to saturate images of heroism and patriotism with 
“orthodox motifs” of self-sacrifice and other Russian values, such as loyalty to the state. 
Krylova refers specifically to Yeltsin’s desire to renew feelings of “imperial military 
valour.” 159  These new religious elements show the political elite’s desire to 
commemorate the event within the boundaries of the new Russian state. They 
demonstrated the state’s aim to militarise society by valorising the veteran population 
through pro-religious discourses. The use of religious motifs and presence of religious 
figures helped sanctify the discourses that were produced, reaffirming the discourse that 
veterans were worthy of respect. The choreography at the Marshal of Victory opening 
ceremony reinforced messages of the veterans’ heroism. Soldiers marched in front of the 
statue and held a salute aimed at Zhukov, showing similar subordination and respect to 
Zhukov as was shown to state leaders in the Victory Day parade on Red Square. Figure 
four shows this sequence.  
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 276 
 
(Figure 4. Soldiers marching in front of Marshall Zhukov’s monument on Manezhe 
Square in Moscow)160 
 
The monument and opening ceremony showcased Marshal Zhukov as a hero of 
the Great Patriotic War. Having been created in Post-Soviet commemorative practices 
and narrated as the son and commander of Russia by Luzhkov, Zhukov was re-
characterised as a hero of Russia, rather than the Soviet Union.161 This showed the state’s 
effort to reconceptualise Zhukov’s historical role within the context of modern-day 
Russia. In doing so, the government attributed significance to his role in the Post-Soviet 
period, and promoted aspects of his heroism, bravery and courage. This reconfiguration 
demonstrated a clear state objective to militarise society. Since these traits were deemed 
only recognisable within the confines of a military pursuit, it deemed a career in the 
military as the only route that similar characteristics could be demonstrated. In doing so, 
it popularised these traits and promoted the institution he was attached too. 
 
A day after the Marshal of Victory’s unveiling, Victory Park and the Great 
Patriotic War museum opened. The project, which originated during the Brezhnev era, 
finally came into fruition under Yeltsin and Luzhkov’s direction. The museum and park’s 
construction and opening, under Post-Soviet leadership, posed many questions. Why 
were Soviet leaders unable to create this commemorative landscape? And why did post-
Soviet leaders decide to do it? Schleifman notes his surprise that authoritarian regimes 
before Yeltsin lacked the ability to produce a grand narrative about the Great Patriotic 
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War and the park.162 Rather, Great Patriotic War discourses fluctuated under the regime’s 
different leaders. For Stalin, the commemorative landscape lay rather bare. He worried 
that veteran glorification would threaten his own power base.163 In the Khrushchev era, 
and during de-Stalinisation, marginalised characters like Marshal Zhukov were re-
glorified. The cult of the Great Patriotic War was constructed under Brezhnev, while 
Gorbachev’s glasnost uncovered the Soviet horrors and destroyed the discourses 
cultivated by Brezhnev. The park’s building plans were laid out in 1978, but not imagined 
until the 1990s.164 Despite severe political, economic and social issues, the Post-Soviet 
leaders succeeded in creating and constructing the victory park “in a new post-soviet 
language.”165 Schleifman indicates that the Victory Park’s creation was done under the 
notion that it not only represented the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, but also 
embodied deeper discourses of Russia’s heroism over other foreign invaders.166 Marwick 
supports this idea, stating that the complex offered the newly formed Russian state the 
opportunity to incorporate the Great Patriotic War as a national myth.167 The state’s desire 
to promote a more general depiction of Russian victory through the Victory complex 
showcased the state’s desire to militarise society. First, it ensured the Great Patriotic War 
was reframed within the modern-day Russian context. Second, it placed the Great 
Patriotic War within a larger network of historical Russian conflicts. Both contributed 
toward, created and reaffirmed the discourse that Russia was a vulnerable country, 
historically prone to invasions and hostility. The importance of the Victory Park’s 
location went beyond the Great Patriotic War. 
Grachev spoke of Poklonnaia Hill’s importance within the frame of the Great 
Patriotic War, claiming: 
 
We must always remember here on Poklonnaia Gora, the sacred place of military 
glory in Moscow, that hero city that never obeyed the enemy. With the celebration 
of the 50th anniversary of the victory of the Great Patriotic War here on Poklonnaia 
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Gora we confirm our loyalty to the sacred ideals of freedom and the independence 
of the motherland.168 
  
The term “never obeyed the enemy” emphasised the many times foreign armies 
marched on Moscow. More generalised discourses of Russia’s insecurity against hostile 
neighbours served as a reminder that Russia has always needed to secure its borders with 
a large army. These discourses fed into a popular Russian perception that wars of the past 
would occur again, under different circumstances and with a new generation acting as 
Russia’s saviours. The militaristic dimension is more interesting here. By placing the 
Great Patriotic War within the context of Russia’s wider history of military struggles, the 
state pushed a ‘scaremongering discourse,’ one that justified the need for a strong 
military.  
On 9th May 1995, the Great Patriotic War museum situated at Park Pobedy 
(Victory Park) opened. A number of monuments dedicated to the Second World War 
were located in this park. The landscape’s organisation was largely symbolic and 
purposeful. The seven fountains situated on the main walkway towards the museum 
represent the seven years or the Second World War, rather than the five years of the Great 
Patriotic War.169 The site of the Victory Park also housed a Russian Orthodox Church, a 
Synagogue and Mosque.  Both aspects suggest a deliberate attempt to Russify the 
commemorative landscape, with homage to the Second World War rather than the Great 
Patriotic War and inclusion of religious tropes demonstrating a clear distinction between 
the Soviet era and the newly formed Russian state. 170 Why would the state want to 
Russify the victory? As noted before, Russifying the victory allowed Russia’s civilians 
to lay claim and adopt the victory of the Great Patriotic War within the confines of the 
new Russian state. It assisted militarisation efforts during this period, demonstrating a 
clear state objective to reconfigure the victory’s relevance in present day Russia. In doing 
so, it reframed the Soviet victory as a Russian one and enabled it to remain an important 
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(Figure 5. Monument to the Great Patriotic War located in front of the Great Patriotic 
War Museum in Moscow’s Victory Park)171 
 
The most important monument on the site of the Great Patriotic War museum was 
the Obelisk, created by Zurab Tsereteli and situated outside the entrance to the 
museum.172 As pictured in Figure five, the obelisk is a colossal statue dedicated to the 
Great Patriotic War. The height of the Obelisk is 141.8 metres, marking the 1418 days of 
the Great Patriotic War.173 The column is intricately designed, displaying the names of 
key cities of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. Nike, which represents 
victory in Greek mythology,174 sits at the top of the obelisk. Placing Nike’s image on top 
of the obelisk personified not only Russia’s struggle but also its eventual victory. While 
the column represents the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Great Patriotic War, the 
statue at its base depicts a more general notion of Russia and war. As shown in Figure 
six, a statue of St. George lies at the base on the obelisk. It is slaying a dragon (covered 
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in Nazi symbols).175 The image is similar to Moscow’s coat of arms, which depicted a 
horseman with a spear in his hand slaying a basilisk. It remained closely linked to the 
legend of St George who slayed a dragon that demanded human sacrifices and created 
closer links between religion and military.176  
It also mirrored the ‘Marshal of Victory,’ unveiled a day earlier. While depicting 
a different person, together the Marshal of Victory and St. George at the base of the 
obelisk created familiar checkpoints around Moscow, where onlookers could connect 
with the Great Patriotic War’s history. Replicating or mirroring militaristic symbols/ 
images is a tool of militarisation. As highlighted earlier in CDA literature, repeated ideas, 
signs and visuals help establish a dominant discourse. By standardising a certain image 
of heroism, in this case the strong masculine male upon a horse trampling on Nazi 
symbols, observers become accustomed to this certain type of militarisation. First, it 
creates a certain familiar image – onlookers associate heroism with masculinity. This is 
particularly important. The statues replicated monuments dedicated to other Russian 
historical figures like the Statue of Yuriy Dolgorukiy (1099-1157), erected on Moscow’s 
Tverskaia Square in 1954. Dolgorukiy founded Moscow but was also famous for his 
military conquests in Kiev. He was depicted, like Zhukov and St. George, on horseback. 
Other similar statues include the Bronze Horseman (dedicated to Peter the Great) and the 
Monument of Nicholas I (1796-1855).  
These checkpoints standardised heroic action at the hands of a strong, masculine 
man on a horse. Second, they established the story – these men (Zhukov and St. George) 
are trampling on the enemy. It reaffirmed the notion that a veteran’s sacrifice deserves 
respect as their participation prolonged the state’s existence. Third, this is an image that 
Russian citizens can find, not only on Manezhe Square, but 20 minutes away at the 
Victory complex. Again, it created a sense of familiarity, which standardised definitions 
of heroic figures and military valour. Zhukov became part of a larger network of Russian 
heroes, defending Russia from outside threats. It reinforced the discourse that Russia was 
a vulnerable country surrounded by hostile neighbours. By placing the Great Patriotic 
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War memory within Russia’s wider military history, the victory of the Great Patriotic 
War became an extension of Russia’s contemporary national identity, especially since 
Russia’s wider history became more salient in Russia’s new landscape. For example, the 
Coat of Arms of Moscow was reinstated as an emblem of the Russian Federation 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1993.177  
 
 
(Figure 6. Base of Monument to the Great Patriotic War located in front of the Great 
Patriotic War Museum in Moscow’s Victory Park)178 
 
The obelisk was unveiled alongside the Museum’s opening on the 9th May 1995. 
The ceremony is shown in Figure Seven. Foreign dignitaries, Russia’s political and 
military elite and members of the public were in attendance. The ceremony began with 
Yeltsin cutting the ribbon to the Great Patriotic War obelisk, marking the official opening 
of the site. Krasnaia Zvezda reported on the opening ceremony, stating, “At the climax, 
the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin cuts a symbolic scarlet ribbon: The anthem of Russia 
sounds. Hundreds of colourful balloons soar into the sky. The victory memorial complex 
to the Great Patriotic War on Poklonnaia Hill is now open.”179 Chinese, British and 
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American political figures spoke during the ceremony. Bill Clinton’s speech outlined the 
Soviet Union’s integral role in the victory of the Second World War, emphasising that 
the Cold War clouded America’s judgement and realisation of the Union’s part in the 
victory.180 Reinforcing Russia’s colossal role in the Great Patriotic War consolidated the 
need to treasure and commemorate the victory of the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet 
Union, including Russia’s role in it. While each speech highlighted the Soviet Union’s 
role in the Great Patriotic War, the foreign dignitaries also reinforced the notion of allied 
victory in World War Two, emphasising future cooperation in a world no longer 
consumed by the Cold War. The ceremony was well attended by the political elite, veteran 
groups and a public audience. Figure Eight shows the massive crowd gathered for the 
event. The audience was colourful as celebratory banners and balloons assimilated into 
the crowd. The monument opening also meant the opening of the newly restructured 
Victory Park Complex, including the Great Patriotic War Museum, which stands directly 
behind the monument. A number of monuments are held in the commemorative rooms 
within the museum, demonstrating a different form of commemoration based on space.  
 
 
(Figure 7. Unveiling of the obelisk statue located in front of the Great Patriotic War 
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(Figure 8. Crowds gathered at the opening of the Great Patriotic War Museum and 
ceremony unveiling the monument to the GPW)182 
 
The Great Patriotic War museum holds numerous visual representations of war in 
forms other than monuments, for example, in panorama displays. This section however, 
focuses on the two main monuments within the walls of the Great Patriotic War Museum. 
These monuments are focal points of the museum. They are housed in rooms which act 
as shrines to participants and victims of the Great Patriotic War but have also been 
generalised to some extent. While this may have been an attempt to Russify the victory, 
this generalisation also made the memorials relatable. The first monument under analysis 
is the monument situated in the Hall of Remembrance and Sorrow.  
This monument is displayed in Figure nine. As exhibited, while the monument is 
brightly lit, it sits within a dark space dimly lit from above by strings of glass beads, 
symbolising tears of mourning. The monument is of a woman, identified as a mother, 
crying over a fallen soldier. The use of the woman/soldier discourse is not uncommon in 
commemorative practices.183 Buffton, for example, notes that monuments depicting a 
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female figure holding the frame of a dead soldier in her arms were used in post-World 
War One France.184 According to Buffton, the woman’s identity is often ambiguous, 
representing either mother, widow, the nation itself or the Virgin Mary, which reinforces 
the image of a soldier who has sacrificed himself. This sanctified image of the soldier is 
further intensified by the fact that the statue is made from white marble, which signifies 
not only the purity of love between mother and son but adds a sense of spirituality or 
timelessness to the commemorative piece. Most statues in marble are those created to 
memorialise Greek or Roman histories and therefore the “marble lends antiquity to the 
meaning potential of the commemorative war monument.”185 Shleifman notes that the 
monument portrays the image of pieta, which is reminiscent of the image of Jesus on the 
lap of Mary following his crucifixion. 186  This statue reaffirmed societal discourses 
relating the soldier and veteran to saviours and protectors through sacrifice, further 
justifying their privileged position in society. As noted by Machin, often a soldier’s death 
is framed as a sacrifice made for the nation. Therefore, the woman’s possible role as 
mother Russia represented the worthwhile role of war and sacrifice, “silencing the own 
soldier’s suffering, fear and bewilderment at the war and horrors it brought.” 187  In 
addition, the abstract representation of the fallen soldier, either in the arms of a mother, 
mother Russia or within the arms of the Virgin Mary, enabled the observer to attach their 
own experiences and values to the monument.  
The monument’s location is important to establishing a dialogue between the 
space, monument and spectator.  The abstract monuments helped make these connections. 
While some of those visiting the memorial may have a direct understanding of the war, 
this museum was produced in a time when a new generation would be visiting the war 
museum. This younger generation may not have a direct understanding of the Great 
Patriotic War and therefore the exhibit needed to draw people in and “make the unfamiliar 
familiar.”188 The Hall of Remembrance and Sorrow is long, with a walkway leading to 
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the monument. Dimmed lighting, contrasted with the brightness of the monument entices 
the spectator to view the statue, often adding magic or guiding the spectator to different 
exhibitions. 189  As noted by Fabienne Galangau-Querat on The Grande Galerie de 
l’Evolution, “lighting expresses numerous messages that can direct, inform, part or 
gather, conceal or reveal, enlarge or limit.”190 It has the ability to reshape space, placing 
emphasis on monuments deemed more important than others. The central positioning of 
this monument at the end of the ‘hall’ emphasised the importance of the monument to our 
understanding of sorrow, which is greatly displayed as the woman leans over the soldier 
with a sad facial expression.  
The monument reaffirmed notions of sacrifice, in both religious and secular terms. 
The religious dimension not only russified the monument but added further layers to the 
monument. The monument’s abstract and multifaceted nature allowed more than one type 
of person to find value and meaning in the monument. For example, it was not only a 
former participant of war who might find familiarity with the monument, but also the 
religious person who might envisage the war participants’ own sacrifice within the story 
of Jesus. Whether deliberate or not, adding religious tropes to the monument 
demonstrated a state led effort to mythologise the war and to militarise society. The statue 
remained significant and relevant in the new Post-Soviet period because of the 
generalised images of sacrifice in war, which embodied a number of different symbolic 
meanings. The nature of the monument was timeless and promoted ideas of self-sacrifice 
through the image of the womanly figure mourning over the soldier. The soldier’s 
sacrifice is popularised through ideas of state loyalty, as depicted by the woman’s role as 
mother Russia. In addition, the woman, as a symbol of the Virgin Mary promoted the 
notion that such sacrifice was not futile. It showed that sacrifice was a worthwhile activity 
as it aided the renewal of the nation and added purpose to the soldier’s role in war. Since 
many of the discourses and symbols situated on the Victory complex were focused 
towards saving the state from past and future acts of aggression, the monument was an 
important symbol of militarisation. It encompasses history, mythology and hope, uniting 
past sacrifice to the present and future aims of the state. 
 
 
189  Fabienne Galangau-Querat, “The Grande Galerie de l’Evolution,” in Reshaping 
museum space architecture, design, exhibitions, ed. by Suzanne Macleod (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2005), 99. 
190 Ibid, 102. 
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(Figure 9. Monument in the Hall of Remembrance and Sorrow, situated in the 
Great Patriotic War Museum located at Moscow’s Victory Park)191 
 
The next monument under analysis is known as the Soldier of Victory, displayed 
in the Museum’s Hall of Glory. As seen in Figure ten, the monument is situated in a 
commemorative space that bears the names of recipients of the Hero of the Soviet Union 
distinction. The Soldier of Victory is located in the centre of the room. He is a large 
bronze male figurine holding an olive branch under a bowl of fire. The addition of a cape 
depicted billowing behind the figure helps bring the monument to life. A war medal is 
displayed on his left breast. The olive branch is a universal symbol of peace and victory, 
similar to the image of a flame torch, which resembles notions of enlightenment and 
hope.192 The soldier’s uniform is ambiguous. The outfit is neither a military uniform nor 
is it showing a soldier belonging to a particular unit of the nation’s Armed Forces. This 
allows the Soldier of Victory to be recognised as a worker in the rear, soldier and hero in 
a mythical sense. By doing so, the monument’s reach is extensive. The colossal figure 
embodies the concept of glory as embedded in the human action of the war. While this 
 
191 Grieving Mother, 9 May 1995, white marble sculpture, Great Patriotic War Museum, 
Moscow, Photo Courtesy of Author (2018). 
192 Andrew A. Rigby, “Peace Symbol’s Origins,” Peace Review, 10:3 (1998), 476. 
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statue does not represent a specific individual like the ‘Marshal of Victory,’ it does 
produce an image (or point of reference) of heroism and glory for an onlooker. 
 
 
(Figure 10. “Soldier of Victory Monument” situated in the Hall of Glory in the Great 
Patriotic War Museum Located in Moscow’s Victory Park)193 
 
The Hall of Glory is a monument itself. Figure eleven shows the Soviet-themed 
emblem displayed at the centre of the hall’s ceiling. This emblem includes the Order of 
Victory. The word ‘Victory’ [Pobeda] is inscribed on it. The Hall of Glory is a vast space, 
decorated with a number of white and bronze artefacts. Small-sculpted images of cities 
within the Soviet Union and their names are adorned in sculpted in ribbons above a list 
of recipients of the Hero of the Soviet Union award. Figures ten and twelve show that 








(Figure 11. Soviet-themed emblem displayed on ceiling of the Hall of Glory in the 
Great Patriotic War museum located in Moscow’s Victory Park)194 
 
 
(Figure 12. “Soldier of Victory” monument situated in the Hall of Glory in the Great 
Patriotic War Museum Located in Moscow’s Victory Park)195 
 
Monuments introduced during the 50th anniversary celebrations showcased 
different aspects of war. The monument situated in the Hall of Remembrance and Sorrow, 
for example, displayed a mournful image of war, whereas the Soldier of Victory exhibited 
 
194  Order of Victory, 9 May 1995, ceiling ornament, Great Victory War Museum, 
Moscow, Photo courtesy of author (2018). 
195  Soldier of Victory, 9 May 1995, bronze sculpture, Great Patriotic War Museum, 
Moscow, Photo courtesy of author (2018). 
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a more glorified vision. The multifaceted dimensions of war are highlighted by the 
differences between these two memorials. The monument in the Hall of Remembrance 
and Sorrow sanctified the image of war, which added importance to the soldier’s role in 
conflict. The Soldier of Victory depicted heroism and glory. These values were desirable 
to the state.  
Some monuments were more specific than others. The Marshal of Victory, for 
example, was specific to Zhukov and memorialised the individual. Whereas the Obelisk, 
while attached to some attributions of the Great Patriotic War, presented a more vague 
representation of victory by including the image of Nike at the top and St. George at its 
base. Attaching symbols that encompassed a sense of Russianness extended the statue’s 
ideological reach. However, these monuments were also similar. For example, the 
Marshal of Victory and St. George were later versions of other Russian heroes riding on 
horseback. They created standardised images of heroic figures as military figures, 
masculine and strong. Additionally, the monuments in the Great Patriotic War museum 
were not stand alone items, but components of the display within the room they were 
situated. The location and lighting of the monument in the Hall of Remembrance and 
Sorrow, was produced to draw the spectator in, while the Soldier of Victory within the 
Hall of Glory was the actor who made glory, as displayed on the walls, possible. 
Unveiling these monuments in extravagant ceremonies and in the presence of 
international attendees was another way for the government to display the immense 
importance of these commemorative monuments to society. 
All monuments mentioned above which honoured victims of the Great Patriotic 
War were also saturated with emblematic notions of patriotic-militarism that were 
relevant to present day Russia. The concentration of these monuments in Russia’s 
political capital demonstrated its importance to Russia’s political culture of the 1990s and 
its importance within the government’s agenda. This ‘memorial canon’ enabled the 
government to revive positive symbols of the military in society through monuments that 
glorified victory, military service and sacrifice. Danish journalist Asne Seierstad 
questioned a participant from Nashi (a youth movement in Russia since 2005) on the use 
of the Soviet past in contemporary society. She asked “Is that [the use of soviet past] what 
happens when the present is too…confusing?” The participant responded by saying, “We 
are patriots. That’s why we’re concerned about the past.” 196  Similar to the views 
 
196 Asne Seierstad, Angel of Grozny: Life Inside Chechnya (London: Virago, 2007), 187. 
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expressed by the Nashi member, the creation of these monuments highlighted the re-
emergence of a nationalist stance by the Russian government, which established symbols 
of Soviet past to evoke nationalist sentiments. These monuments demonstrated a sense of 
continuity and commitment to the past and the institutions concerned.197 Etching visuals 
of militarised-patriotism into Russia’s physical landscape, demonstrated the 
government’s commitment to raising patriotism and pride in society, and popularising the 
Armed Forces.  
 
Commemorative Collectables 
Commemorative souvenirs were launched as part of the Great Patriotic War 
anniversary, including medals, state prizes, postal stamps and coins. The souvenirs’ 
creation demonstrated a state-led effort to militarise society beyond the battlefield as 
national and international postal routes, together with everyday monetary transactions, 
became saturated with military symbols. These collectables promoted values of self-
sacrifice, loyalty and heroism in warfare. These collectables were arguably more 
important vehicles of militarisation than the monuments. Unlike the monuments, the 
population could keep these small artefacts in their own personal spaces, for example, 
their apartments. In addition, some of these collectables were functional, for example, 
postal stamps and money. The functionality of these articles meant the values they 
represented pervaded deeper in society, moving from the location of a park, museum or 
square and invading private space.  
Souvenirs constructed for the anniversary added agency to the event. The 
souvenirs’ creation showed that the event was of great political importance, as it 
immersed itself within many layers of commemoration. As representations of historical 
significance, for some, they functioned as tokens of sentimentality.198 On the other hand, 
these souvenirs also served as substitutes for memories that did not exist.199 Souvenirs 
created for particular events provide a synchronised practice of collective 
 
197 Barbara A. Misztal, “Durkheim on Collective Memory,” Journal of Classic Sociology 
3, No. 2 (2003): 124-126. 
198 D. Roland Gerber, “Souvenirs: Many Dimensions and One Definition,” International 
Journal of Management Cases 10, No. 3 (2008): 26. 
199 Verena-Susanna Nungesser, “I Forgot to Remember (to Forget): Personal Memories 
in Memento (2000) and Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004),” in Mediation, 
Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney 
(Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 2009), 36. 
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remembering. 200  For example, the dated commemorative coins created links across 
society.  The souvenir’s owner was placed into an imagined community and transported 
to the date depicted on the collectable piece.201 The anniversary date, its emphasis across 
numerous societal domains, and the celebratory commemorative pieces constructed a 
symbolic web, which informed the process of collective remembering. On the topic of 
commemoration and India’s film industry, keepsakes created from anniversary events are 
physical and material forms of spoken and symbolic discourses. In Russia, political 
discourses were carved into these keepsakes, which persisted beyond the 24-hour 
celebration date. 202 The mementos served as continuous reminders of the Soviet victory 
and helped contribute towards the transformation of the Great Patriotic War from an 
historical event to one of mythical timelessness. In doing so, the souvenirs discussed in 
this section maintain the importance of the military victory in society, and therefore 
sustained Russian militarism.  
In war commemoration there are two types of medals: gallantry medals and 
campaign medals. Gallantry medals are ones awarded for acts of bravery whereas 
campaign medals were handed out to participants in war for ‘simply being there.’203 The 
Russian State introduced a number of commemorative campaign medals for the 50th 
Anniversary celebration. In 1995, the Russian state created a commemorative medal to 
memorialise the 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War (See figure thirteen).  
Yeltsin signed an Approved Law of the Russian Federation On the Establishment 
of the Jubilee Medal in 1993. The medal front (left hand picture displayed in Figure 
Thirteen) included a picture of the “Kremlin Wall, Spassky Tower, and the Cathedral of 
the Intercession [Red Square’s St. Basil’s Cathedral] and the festive Salute,” with the 
“image of the Order of the Great Patriotic War and the figure “1941-1945,” along the 
 
200  Meike Holscher, “Performances, Souvenirs, and Music: The Diamond Jubilee of 
Queen Victoria 1897,” in Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural 
Memory, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney (Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 
2009), 184. 
201 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 33. 
202 Neepa Majumdar, “The Nostalgia Industry and Indian Film Studies,” South Asian 
Popular Culture 13, No. 1 (2015): 86-87. 
203  Matthew Richardson, “Medals, Memory and Meaning: Symbolism and cultural 
significance of Great War Medals,” in Contested Objects: Material Memories of the 
Great War, ed. by Nicholas J. Saunders and Paul Cornish (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 
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circumference of the laurel branches.”204 The phrase “50 years of victory in the Great 
Patriotic War” was displayed on the medal’s reverse side above a laurel wreath.205 
Servicemen and civilian personnel who participated on the front in the Great Patriotic 
War, partisans of the Great Patriotic War, members of the Underground, servicemen and 
persons of civilian personnel who served during the Great Patriotic War, including the 
workers of the rear, were eligible to receive the Jubilee Medal.206 The Jubilee Medal was 
another instrument utilised to remind citizens of the debt that they owed to the war victors. 
Alongside the parades, political speeches and discourses on enhanced veteran welfare, 
these collectables reaffirmed the notion that the veteran paid the ultimate sacrifice, that 
their sacrifice was worthwhile and that they deserve respect (and therefore, 
commemoration). It also showcased the type of awards current and future soldiers could 
achieve by serving the state in a similar way. These discourses permeated further because 
they were repeated across a number of domains. This repetition added legitimacy and 
reinforced the extent of the veteran’s sacrifice and society’s duty to remember and 
celebrate, while also ensuring that society was confronted with these discourses 
throughout the process of commemoration. In this way, society remained exposed to 
military-patriotic discourses that established that veterans merited privileged roles in 
society and society’s collective duty to commemorate. The Jubilee medal was not the 
only award established on this date.  
The Order of Zhukov was another award founded in time for the Victory 
anniversary. On the 5 May 1995, Boris Yeltsin presented the Order of Zhukov to 
numerous high-ranking Soviet military personnel. Yeltsin introduced the award with the 
following statement: 
 
Dear friends, today on the eve of the anniversary of the Great Victory, prominent 
military leaders and heroes of the battles of the Great Patriotic War are the first to 
be awarded with the new Order of Russia, the Zhukov Order… The memory of 
him approved a new Russian order, a military commander’s order awarded to 
military leaders for merits in the development and successful conduct of major 
military operations to protect the fatherland. Dear veterans, along with Marshal 
Zhukov you had the opportunity to fight to bring about the great victory. I think 
the Zhukov order will be especially dear to you. You deserve this high award for 
 




military labour and can rightfully be proud of it on the eve of the anniversary of 
the Great Victory.207 
 
The Order of Zhukov was not widely awarded, showing the award’s greater 
prestige when compared to the Jubilee medal. The award’s creation showcased that the 
hierarchical spirit of Russia’s militarisation efforts during this period existed not only 
between the military and non-military but was woven within the culture of the military 
apparatus. This structure was further imposed by Yeltsin’s words, which highlighted the 
glorious deeds of “military leaders for merits in the development and successful conduct 
of major military operations to protect the fatherland.” Zhukov, as a military leader in the 
Great Patriotic War, embodied attributes of heroism, sacrifice and strategic success in the 
same sense that recipients of this award embodied Zhukov and his values. As 
demonstrated already with the creation of the Zhukov monument, Zhukov remained 
salient in the war commemoration activities of the Yeltsin period. 
The Zhukov State Prize was also established for the anniversary date. It was 
awarded to those who produced “outstanding achievements in the field of military science 
and technology, as well as the best works of literature and art dedicated to the Great 
Patriotic War.” 208  The prizes attempted to motivate society to support the state’s 
militaristic goals as it essentially encouraged citizens who had not actively fought in the 
war to support it mentally, spiritually and culturally. Cynthia Enloe considers militarism 
as a process that is cultural as well as physical. The Zhukov State Prize combined 
literature and art with militaristic narratives, allowing militarism to pervade Russia’s 
cultural domain. No longer was military power so easily contested as it slipped into public 
life beyond the boundaries of the actual conflict. In fact, embracing militarism was 
rewarded.  
While only specific groups of people were eligible for these awards, they were 
still important indicators of state-led efforts to militarise society. By deploying these 
prizes, the government glorified the anniversary and military institution. They were 
utilised as instruments to elevate the standing of the military institution in society and 
ensure continued memorialisation.  
 
 
207 Yeltsin Centre, f. 21, op. 1, d. 128, 5 May 1995. 
208 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 989, [Undated: 1993-1995]. 
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(Figure 13. Commemorative medal released in 1995 for veterans of the Great Patriotic 
War. On the back of the medal (displayed in right picture) includes the inscription “50 
years of victory in the Great Patriotic War”)209 
 
Alongside new medals and prizes, commemorative postal stamps were released 
for the anniversary. Robert Jones notes that stamps are “official products of governments, 
who use them to send messages to the public.”210 Russian commemorative stamps of 
1995 were created to embed militaristic-patriotic messages within society. They fostered 
positive and nostalgic images of the military and also highlighted the global importance 
of Russia’s role in the war. This is best shown in Figure fourteen. Figure fourteen displays 
the image of three men, including one soldier standing in front of a tomb, with the image 
of a concentration camp forming the backdrop of this stamp. The inscription on the top 
right hand corner translates as, “Liberation of prisoners from Fascist Concentration 
Camps.” The stamp exhibits the devastation caused by the Great Patriotic War, while 
reminding society of the reason for which the war was waged. This is particularly 
important in the context of the First Chechen War. As new negative interpretations of the 
Great Patriotic War emerged, the stamps showed that war was not necessarily futile and 
that the outcomes can be positive. Ahmadreza Afshar emphasises the role of postal stamps 
 
209  50 ann WW2 obverse, last modified 14 October 2020, Wikimedia, 
https://bit.ly/3ruzC22.   
50 ann WW2 reverse, last modified 14 October 2020, Wikimedia, https://bit.ly/3spHlQd.  
210 Robert A. Jones, “Heroes of the nation? The celebration of scientists on the Postage 
Stamps of Great Britain, France and West Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History  
36, No. 3 (2001): 403. 
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as a form of communication by claiming, “Postage Stamps are always used as a 
propaganda medium with which they transfer messages to a broad audience.”211 This 
particular stamp legitimised military action and sacrifice as an action taken for a great 
cause. It added to the militarisation of society by reaffirming, discourses of veteran 
sacrifice and promoting collective forms of commemoration by placing it within the wider 
context of international security. 
 
 
(Figure 14. Commemorative Stamp with the inscription “Liberation of prisoners 
from Fascist Concentration Camps”)212 
 
 
Figure fifteen displays the Eternal Flame of the Fallen, under the same 
inscription. It depicts a tomb decorated by a helmet and piece of material with a flame 
emerging from a star-shaped sconce. An abstract representation of planes flying over the 
tomb sits at the background. Igor Cusack observes, “Stamps can be seen as small pieces 
of art.” He claims that previous scholars have failed to uncover the ideological nature of 
this form of art. The stamp symbolises mythical timelessness. The Eternal Flame 
personified the perpetual memory of the Great Patriotic War, providing a visual reminder 
of the sacrifices made for the war, and therefore justifying lasting forms of 
commemoration. 
 
211 Ahmadreza Afshar MD, “A Brief Iranian Medical History through Commemorative 
Postage Stamps,” Arch Iran Med 13, No. 2 (2010): 161. 
212  Stamp Russia 1995 Konclager, last modified 18 November 2020, Wikimedia, 
https://bit.ly/3w8eYbq. 
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The postal stamp displayed in Figure sixteen exhibited an image of Marshal 
Zhukov at the Victory Day Parade reflecting his role as inspector in the first Victory Day 
Parade of 1945. Forming the background of this stamp were visuals of armed formations. 
Zhukov was sitting on a horse, which closely replicated the monument on Manezhe 
Square. The replicated image of Zhukov added to his immortalisation. Zhukov became a 
symbol of the Great Patriotic War, which demonstrated Zhukov’s indispensable role in 
society’s understanding of the war and its victory. Zhukov’s prominence in the 1995 
Victory Day celebrations created continuity across various commemorative landscapes. 
He became an icon that others could measure themselves against, glorifying the role of 
the military service and the idolatry that comes from it.  
 
(Figure 15. Commemorative Stamp of Eternal Flame of the Fallen with the inscription 
“Eternal memory to the Fallen in the Great Patriotic War”)213 
 
 
213  “Russia stamp 1995 No. 211,” Wikimedia, last modified 31 October 2020,  
<https://bit.ly/2P5L7Qx> Copyright Wikicommons. 
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(Figure 16. Commemorative Stamp of Marshall Zhukov in front of crowds at the First 
Victory Day Parade in Red Square. Includes the inscription “Victory Parade”)214 
Alongside the commemorative postal stamps, the government introduced 
numerous coins created for the 50th anniversary. Josh Lauer notes, “The effectiveness and 
worth of paper currency does not depend on visual persuasion of rhetoric.”215 This is 
because currency is functional and necessary. Money’s necessary role makes it a popular 
medium to convey and transport messages. The symbolic power of currency is widely 
noted in literature on nation-state building and legitimacy. State leaders and icons are 
popular images on currency because they act as legitimisers, validating the institutions 
they represent. Jan Penrose and Craig Cumming’s work on bank note iconography in 
Scotland outlines the communicative aspects of currency, linking the use of the thistle to 
represent Scottish-ness.216 The coins created for the 50th anniversary were also used to 
communicate messages. These coins displayed images of famous battles linked to the 
Great Patriotic War, war outcomes and important military figures.  As “vehicles of state 
propaganda,” these coins satisfied the government’s desire to issue militarised-patriotic 
 
214  “Russia stamp 1995 No. 214,” Wikimedia, last modified 19 November 2020, 
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messages beyond the 24-hour scope of the Victory Parade.217 As functional and necessary 
items, they were greater mediums “of mass communication,” since they could not be 
contested for their required use in everyday life.  
The coins offered a nostalgic representation of the military, depicting specific 
historical moments rather than presenting the various concepts relating to war. In doing 
so, the coins demonstrated desired militarisation of society despite a breakdown and 
regime change.  Figure seventeen displays three commemorative coins honouring the 
“50th Anniversary of the Great Victory.” The image of a popular Soviet wartime 
propaganda poster by Irakly Toidze entitled, “The Motherland is calling us,” is on the 
first coin. The central coin depicts a group of Soviet soldiers during a tank attack, while 
the coin on the far right includes an illustration of Soviet military sailors situated in front 
of a warship and warplane. These coins exhibit historical snapshots of war, using images 
that create an authentic image of the war, drawing upon historical symbols to engage with 
older generations who lived during this period. They also acted as a cue for younger 
generations without a direct connection to the war. Some of the coins commemorated 
specific Great Patriotic War victories.  
Figure sixteen, for example, exhibits three commemorative coins memorialising 
the Soviet’s role in the liberation of Europe from Fascism. The coin on the far left displays 
four Soviet Soldiers in military action, with the Hungarian parliament building in the 
background. “Budapest 13.02.1945,” is inscribed on the bottom of the coin. The central 
coin depicts an image of two soldiers, one American and Soviet. The American soldier is 
leaning on the Soviet Soldier’s shoulder. They face each other, which can be considered 
as a representation of the bond between them. They stand against a backdrop of both the 
American and Soviet flags. “Meeting on the Elbe 25.04.1945,” is inscribed on the base 
of the coin. The last coin illustrates the image of Soviet soldiers sitting atop a tank, 
receiving greetings from residents of the city. The tank is positioned in front of Prague’s 
Old Town Hall. The coin is inscribed “Prague 09.05.1945.” These coins, released under 
the title “The Liberation of Europe from Fascism” portrayed the Soviet Union’s 
international role in the Great Patriotic War. While the Soviet Union’s primary goal was 
to defend its own borders, it liberated other countries from Nazi Germany. Yeltsin echoed 
 
217 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “East is East, and West is West? Currency Iconography as 
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the significance of the events displayed on the coins in his Victory Day Red Square 
speech. He claimed: 
 
We remember the Reichstag Soldier jubilant and the handshake of the Elbe and 
the job of the liberated world, this memory is sacred…For the sake of a common 
goal, Europe’s best sons and daughters shoulder to shoulder in the liberation 
struggle, participated in the Great Resistance Movement…Dear guests, we are 
united. Not only in our hatred of fascism. We are united in our efforts to preserve 
the future generations.218  
 
As necessary, functional everyday items, the coins were in constant use, moving 
from one family to the next after each monetary transaction. These coins were forums of 
communication, decorated to transport a series of discourses relating to the 50th 
anniversary of the Great Victory. Some of these coins were decorated with iconic images 
from the time of the conflict, while others popularised the global impact of the Soviet 
Union’s victory. Together, they legitimised the war effort, valorised the veterans’ 
sacrifice and justified the memorial event. Together, the political discourses, elaborate 
parades, new commemorative landscape and souvenirs ensured society was confronted 
with militaristic-patriotic discourse. Numerous lines were drawn across the 
commemorative landscape, linking together common discourses of sacrifice and state 
loyalty. These discourses acted to legitimise the actions of the veterans and to glorify the 
institution that they were attached too, providing images of sacrifice, glory and heroism. 
 
 
(Figure 17. Three commemorative coins created for the GPW anniversary, all issued on 
the 28.04.1995 with the inscription “50th Anniversary of the Great Victory)219 
 
218 Yeltsin Centre, f. 21, op. 1, d. 130, 9 May 1995. 
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For the right coin, please see: “50 years of the Great Victory,” Wikimedia, last modified 






(Figure 18. Commemorative coins created for the GPW anniversary, issues between 




The souvenirs listed above are paramount to our understanding of identity and 
tradition formation in the Post-Soviet Period. They validated the military’s societal 
importance, despite cuts to military budget and a rising number of draft evasions during 
the First Chechen War. Souvenirs are unique forums of communication in the sense that 
some are functional and crucial to everyday life. Because of this, they are circulated more 
widely and regularly, and in the private domain. Some symbols on the coins, like the 
propaganda poster, were recognisable and evoked nostalgic sentiments. The duplicated 
images of Zhukov on the stamps are one example of how these souvenirs “provide an 
image field for the play of representation of heroic subjects.”221 The image of Zhukov on 
a horse, reminiscent of his role in the Great Patriotic War parade, was a familiar visual 
across numerous commemorative domains. This reinforced Zhukov’s important role in 
the victory, but also created a respectable role model, someone who embodied desirable 
patriotic values of heroism, state loyalty and sacrifice.  
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Both the monuments and the commemorative souvenirs played a paramount role 
in the militarisation of society. As material objects, they permeated society beyond the 
national holiday date. Entrenched with militaristic symbols, they referenced veterans’ 
sacrifice, promoted the image of Russia as a liberator and established a set of war icons 
that helped sanctify the military institution. In addition, prominent discourses on the 
veteran’s sacrifice fed into other societal discourses, thus legitimising the necessity for 
annual commemorations. As a result, it satisfied the goals of the government in 
facilitating the militarisation of society. 
 
The symbolic capital amassed from the organisation and construction of 
commemorative activities, as products of the 50th anniversary, were instrumental in the 
persistence of societal militarisation in the formative years of the Russian Federation. 
This chapter has shown that the parades and organisational discussions aimed to glorify 
the veterans’ sacrifice and their associating institution. In light of the first Chechen War, 
which was fought during this celebration, this commemoration had the exciting qualities 
necessary for fostering positive attitudes towards the military. The memory of the Great 
Patriotic War was exploited by the Russian political elites, who used Russia’s war-torn 
past to promote military preparedness. Political and historical discourses emphasised 
historical threats, which justified the maintenance of a strong military. Outlining the 
veterans’ sacrifice also served another purpose. By accentuating the veterans’ courage 
and selflessness, commemoration became a currency used by Russian society to 
demonstrate gratitude for their ancestors’ sacrifice. Yet the notion that future generations 
will “remain indebted” to the veterans, meant that full payment would never be received. 
The sacrificial discourses facilitated the persistence of societal militarisation, effectively 
shifted responsibility from the state and ensuring the motivation of the memorialisation 
became an integral part of civic duty.  
The parades were elaborate spectacles demonstrating military potency, gratitude 
for veterans’ sacrifice and glorification of the Armed Forces. Tsarist and Soviet rituals 
continued into the post-Soviet period through exciting displays and rituals revived during 
the 1990s. The Poklonnaia Parade showed Russia’s military potential by choreographing 
an intricate spectacle of precision and military power. The parades were entertaining. The 
anniversary date’s popularity, and its ability to draw in support, depended on the theatrical 
aspects of the parades. The use of Soviet symbols in a highly choreographed parade 
sequence ensured that the spectators were confronted with a nostalgic and symbolic 
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display of militarised patriotism, which created a genuine representation of war. The 
symbols used in this “elaborate military pageant” were instrumental in the militarisation 
of society.  Unlike educational textbooks and discourses in the media, the symbols and 
parade choreography acted as an exciting visual representation of the war, which 
effectively linked together the past with current and future day ambitions.  
The commemorative souvenirs, including coins and stamps were most effective 
in transferring messages to the society. As functional pieces, the symbolisms they carried 
were less likely to be contested. The commemorative mementos, alongside the messages 
within the parades, helped outline the victorious elements of the war, overshadowing the 
horrors of war by emphasising the Soviet Union’s eventual victories. These messages 
were extremely instrumental, especially in the context of the war in Chechnya. They 
propagated the notion that while the Great Patriotic War was destructive in some ways, it 
was necessary, possibly changing attitudes towards the Chechen War and its objectives. 
The erection of commemorative monuments also facilitated the militarisation of society 
beyond the date of the victory parade, as symbolic concrete reminders embedded in 
Moscow’s architectural landscape. These monuments, built in areas of political 
importance, highlighted the military’s elevated standing in Russian society and place in 
national identity, also demonstrating its significance to Russia’s political agenda. 
The sensational military display, alongside the creation of the commemorative 
monuments and keepsakes, were effective mechanisms of militarisation in 1990s Russia. 
They enabled the government to create discourses that emphasised veterans’ sacrifice, 
which reaffirmed notions that military service was a worthwhile civic duty and that 
veterans deserve respect. By holding the parades, Russia revived Tsarist and Soviet 
traditions with the elaborate displays of military grandeur acting as a continuous reminder 
of the victory once gained and possible again. These parades were successful and have 
gained further popularity under the leadership of President Putin, who uses these parades 





In July 2020, Russia adopted a new constitution via a state referendum. The new 
constitution was a reconfiguration of the one created during the Yeltsin period. It now 
includes a clause on “historical truth.” As noted on the State Duma website, “‘The 
Russian Federation honours the memory of defenders of the Fatherland and protects 
historical truth. Diminishing the significance of the people’s heroism in defending the 
Fatherland is not permitted,’ the text of the new law says. Children are declared the most 
important state policy priority in Russia. The state should create conditions that contribute 
to the comprehensive spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical development of children, 
fostering patriotism, civic engagement and respect for elders.”1 In the lead up to the 
referendum, and on the 24th June 2020, Putin spoke at the Victory Day parade of Russia’s 
duty in perpetuating the “pure truth” of the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War; that 
the burden fell predominately on the Soviet Union and that great sacrifices were made in 
order to achieve this victory. He called for the truth to be passed on to children and 
grandchildren, further adding to the immortalisation of the historical event.2  
Just twenty-five years prior to Putin’s “pure truth” speech, discussions within the 
State Duma spoke of Russia’s need to preserve the truth of the Great Patriotic War, and 
to warn off revisionist accounts of the Soviet victory. It was under Yeltsin that current 
generations were told of their duty to preserve the memory of those who sacrificed 
themselves in the war and to pass that memory onto future generations.3 It was also 
Yeltsin who aimed to immortalise and mythologise that historical event, with the Federal 
Law of December 8th 1997, titled, On immortalising the Soviet People’s Victory in the 
Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, placing a permanent Guard of Honour at the Tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier.  
As with the cult of the Great Patriotic War, the success of Russian militarism in 
contemporary Russia is often attributed to Vladimir Putin. However, this is not the case. 
 
1 “What changes will be in the Constitution of the Russian Federation,” duma.gov.ru, 12 
March 2020, accessed 15 July 2020, http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/48039/. 
2 “Putin’s Victory Day Parade Speech,” Youtube video, 1:34:16, posted by Russia Today, 
steamed live 23 June 2020, accessed 24 June 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4pFnlr0zck. 
3 “Istoricheskii parad v chest’ 50-letiia Pobedy v Velikoi Otechestvenoi Voine.” 
GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 29-30, March 1995. 
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In fact, many of the prevailing discourses of the Putin regime were rooted in the Yeltsin 
era. This thesis set out to understand militarisation in the 1990s Russia. It challenged the 
widespread assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union constituted a break in the 
militarisation of society, arguing that literature on the topic saw cuts to defence budgets 
and the declining prestige of the military as an indication of demilitarisation, with little 
regard for the cultural dimensions of militarisation. Scholars claiming that the physical 
demise of the military showcased a process of demilitarisation were not entirely wrong, 
but were far too focused on what the military was lacking from a physical perspective to 
appreciate the cultural continuation and revival of military narratives and rituals amongst 
society. These accounts focused on one aspect of militarisation but claimed to represent 
the process in its entirety.  
The thesis addressed these limitations by focusing on prominent societal discourse 
from a top-down perspective, to demonstrate how and with what mechanisms the state 
and other dominant societal institutions were popularising and promoting pro-militaristic 
narratives. It achieved this through the method of Critical Discourse Analysis and the 
examination of documents located at the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the 
Russian State Library, and the Yeltsin Centre. The thesis found that the militarisation of 
society persisted beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union because the narratives of 
ancestral sacrifice and a siege mentality remained dominant in the discourses of the four 
domains under review. These narratives, as in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, made 
Russian militarism resilient to regime change and allowed for the continued militarisation 
of society. The thesis showed that Yeltsin reproduced and established a number of 
militarised rituals that have formed a basis for Putin’s own militarisation efforts. It is 
through understanding the mechanisms of militarisation in place under Yeltsin that we 
can pinpoint the origins of the militarised traditions and myths that are located under 




What does this study tell us about Russian identity more generally? Russian 
identity is built on militarism and its anxieties lie largely within its geography. Russia is 
a vast country. With no natural barriers on its western boundaries inviting invasion and 
its multi-ethnic population threatening divisions within society, Russia has relied on its 
military in order to feel protected. From the West, Russia has experienced many 
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invasions, from Poland, Sweden and Germany. Japan during World War Two and the 
growth of China threatened Russia on its Eastern borders. The Tsarist and Soviet regimes 
aimed to face this threat by creating ‘buffer zones’ through foreign campaigns: Peter I 
with his annexation of Narva and Catherine II with the annexation of Crimea. The Soviet 
Union expanded into Eastern Europe under the premise of Communism. During both 
regimes, society was mobilised against outside threats in an educative setting, through 
administrations and in the media. Both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes used their autocratic 
power to enforce such mobilisation. The onset of democracy threatened the discourses 
established during these periods, initially questioning the level of Western threat and the 
over-exaggerated and costly security measures in place. Over a short amount of time, 
even democracy fell prey to militarism, with the discourses of a vulnerable Russia and 
duty to protect against hostile neighbours gaining salience alongside hostility to the 
strengthening of NATO and Islamic fundamentalism. In this context, militarism united 
Russia’s multi-ethnic society under stories of a common enemy, justified strong 
autocratic measures in lieu of personal freedom and has formed the basis of Russian 
nationalism and the strengthening and maintenance of a strong military apparatus.  
What does the thesis tell us about Russian militarism? The thesis shows that 
Russian militarism goes well beyond the material values of the military and permeates 
within society in a multitude of ways. Narratives of external and internal threat unite 
society and bolster leadership, in the same way that stories of sacrifice instil a desire to 
defend the legacy of such heroes onto the current and future generations of Russia. 
Russian militarism is not dependent on a strong military apparatus, but its great power 
status is. Rather, Russian militarism depends on Russia’s vulnerability, which intensifies 
militaristic-nationalistic action, justifies increased funds towards militaristic equipment 
and pursuits and mobilises societal consciousness on the home front. Russian militarism 
depends on traditions; a tradition of historical conflict and invasion, ritual of Russian 
sacrifice for the greater good of society and the world and tradition of the military in 
solving nonmilitary issues. Scholars of Russian and Soviet history often frame Russian 
militarism within the concept of Samobytnost’, which acknowledges Russia’s unique 
path, underlined by authentic military ideas, culture, values and goals.4 Many of the 
traditions that Russia created, however, were adopted during the European enlightenment. 
 
4 Eugene Miakinkov, War and Enlightenment in Russia: Military Culture in the Age of 
Catherine II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 129. 
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What is unique to Russian militarism is, in fact, what motivates it. Russia’s insecurity 
triggered by its unique geography influences Russia’s need to maintain a mobilised 
society on a grassroots level, to show off its military might in elaborate parades and justify 
excessive spending on the military apparatus. The term Samobytnost’ does, however, 
explain the messianic nature of Russian militarism, which showcases Russian people, 
united, as saviours of the state and the world. The thesis demonstrated that veterans of the 
Great Patriotic War, and participants of war (in the historical textbooks) were 
immortalised through their glorification in societal narratives. The growing relationship 
between Russia’s military and the Orthodox Church denotes a wider aim of the Putin 
regime to tie together images of the Russian veteran and soldier within religion.5  It shows 
that Russian militarism requires a hierarchy in which the veteran and soldier is deemed 
above a nonparticipant of the military and war.  
 
 
QUESTIONS OF THE THESIS 
 
In an attempt to understand the state of militarisation under Boris Yeltsin, the 
thesis answered three questions: 1) what top-down mechanisms militarised Russian 
society?; 2) What discourses and narratives were prominent in the four societal domains, 
and in what way did they contribute towards the militarisation of society?; and 3) How 
did the discourses within the different societal domains fit into (and add to) current 
literature on the state of militarism and militarisation in Post-Soviet Russia?  
 
What top-down mechanisms militarise Russian society? 
The thesis defined cultural militarisation as a function of “public pedagogy” and 
as a process where there is a “pervasive injection of military themes and references into 
the cultural arena.”6 Four domains identified as places of knowledge-exchange included 
the media, education sector, veteran welfare, and commemorative outlets. The 
educational sector, for example, is one of socialisation – producing Russia’s new 
 
5 Robert A. Saunders and Vlad Strukov, “Historical dictionary of the Russian Federation: 
Samobytnost,” enacademic.com, 2010, accessed 16 July 2020, 
https://russian_federation.enacademic.com/504/Samobytnost. 
6 Giroux, “War on Terror,” 211. 
Waley-Cohen, “Militarisation of Culture in Eighteenth-Century China,” 279. 
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generations, while the media and political institutions (including commemorative) were 
of a pedagogic nature in their ability to spread information and knowledge to a mass 
audience.7   
Chapter two introduced the media as a mechanism of militarisation, or “tool of 
warfare” in its ability to bring military issues to the forefront of public consciousness. 
This was achieved through the sheer prominence of military themes in the print media, 
influenced by poor economic conditions and its need to increase readership numbers. The 
media also strengthened societal militarisation through emphasis on Russia’s 
vulnerability and othering techniques. This did not mean that such discourses led to 
increased numbers joining the military. However, it did expose the public to a militarised 
worldview.  
Chapter three utilised the classifications created by Robert Sutherland in his study 
on ideology in children’s books in order to assess the discourses within historical 
educational textbooks published in the 1990s. These classifications included the Politics 
of Advocacy and the Politics of Attack. The education system can be considered a vehicle 
of militarisation by highlighting a pattern of historical warfare, the vulnerability of Russia 
and stories of glorious heroes. It allowed Russia’s youth to reflect upon the current 
conditions in which Russia found itself. Russia’s youth of the 1990s are adults under the 
Putin regime; the chapter best shows how and why Putin’s militarisation project has been 
received so well in contemporary times.  
Chapter four captured the process of militarisation through the concept of 
sponsorship, arguing that the provision of enhanced social welfare created an informal 
hierarchical system in which the veteran and soldier sat at the apex of society. Through a 
comparison with sports and commercial sponsorship practices, the pension and military 
social welfare reforms made during the Yeltsin period showed the state’s determination 
to alter attitudes towards the veteran population and highlight the veteran’s heroic acts in 
an effort to militarise society. The attributes associated with the military, such as heroism, 
courage and loyalty, are those the state wanted to popularise in society, and thus by 
‘sponsoring’ the veteran and soldier with exclusive pensions and benefits, the government 
deemed them worthy of receiving such provisions measured by their military service to 
the state.  
 
7 Meyer, “Politics of Memory,” 176. 
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Chapter five argued that commemoration in Russia was a vehicle for militarisation 
through the cultivation of a debt ideology. It was the case study chapter that brought 
together the theories and understandings of cultural militarisations found in the previous 
chapters. In this process, discussions made around the commemoration date, both at the 
planning stages and in the actual event, emphasised the veterans’ sacrifice and their 
loyalty to the state. Society was then offered the opportunity to repay this debt through 
their participation in commemorative events. The introduction of the Victory Day 
celebration as an annual event meant that members of society who had paid their debt 
through their participation in commemorative activities went through the process 
repeatedly, year by year.  
The different mechanisms of militarisation located in this study showcase that 
militarisation goes beyond its physical dimensions. Rather, we should consider the word 
militarisation as an umbrella term, and even phrases such as cultural militarisation and 
physical militarisation as a second-tier umbrella, which also encompasses a number of 
dimensions. Physical militarisation, for example, would be an umbrella term for studies 
on budget, recruitment, weapons procurement, while cultural militarisation includes 
education, use of memory, social welfare and the media. The various mechanisms in play 
during the Yeltsin period demonstrate that the cultural militarisation of society persisted, 
while the physical dimensions of the military continued to decay. 
 
 
What discourses and narratives were prominent in the four societal domains, and in what 
way did they contribute towards the militarisation of society?   
 The thesis uncovered two main discourses that spanned across the different 
chapters. The most prominent discourse was that of a weak Russia in a world full of 
hostile enemies. As documented throughout the thesis, this discourse is one that had 
prevailed in Russia prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and has been able to gain 
relevance under the different regimes. Russia’s history has played an integral role in the 
cultivation of such discourses, with stories in Russian historical textbooks and in the 
commemorative events and even in reference to NATO acting as a reminder to Russian 
society that Russia has faced a number of invasions and conflicts. The second dominant 
discourse was of ancestral sacrifice and loyalty to the state. Well documented in Russian 
historical education and in political discussions, the emphasised heroics of Russia’s 
forebearers forged a sense of civic duty to protect and to continue the victories of the past. 
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As in Russia today, there was a clear (while gestured) prioritisation of the military and 
veteran community justified by their (militarised) service to the state. 
In chapter two this discourse found its roots in the conflicts located in the former 
Soviet region and in Chechnya. The media demonised the Chechen population, 
characterising them as criminals, terrorists and bandits. Yeltsin legitimised Russia’s 
intervention in the region on the basis of re-establishing law and order. 8  Various 
newspaper interviews confirmed that a prevailing generalisation of the Chechen 
population had emerged on the basis of societal discourse. NATO became a topic of 
interest more seriously in the later stages of the 1990s. Reports by the media on NATO 
had a profound impact on Russian opinion, with accounts of Russian people boycotting 
American goods, and growing discontent towards Russia’s possible membership. Some 
newspapers even speculated that NATO action in Kosovo was a practice test for its 
eventual intervention in Chechnya. While the media was not outwardly pro-war, it was 
anti-NATO. This siege mentality was also dominant in the educational sector.  
Chapter three analysed 25 Russian history textbooks of various periods of Russian 
history and a number of state documents on the topic of youth historical education during 
the 1990s. First, the textbooks dedicated a vast amount of space to the topic of military 
and warfare, emphasising Russia’s historical ties with conflict – and therefore adding 
further impetus to the discourse of Russia as a besieged fortress. Students were able to 
read about the vulnerable state of Russia’s army in the formative years of Peter I’s 
leadership and hold a mirror to events taking place in 1990s Russia. It was through 
military modernisation that Russian leaders aimed to solve the military’s inefficiencies, 
adding legitimacy to Russia’s need for a strong and modern military apparatus in 
contemporary times. Such findings prompt further questions; is the success of Russian 
militarisation contingent on the use of history? Russia’s historical past has been used by 
the state to achieve its militaristic aims; the history of Russia’s militaristic past adds 
grounds for a strong defence sector. However, Russian militarism is also rooted in 
messianic-style concepts, glorifying the role of the military as saviours of the state, who 
“liberated Russia [and] Europe from the mouth of the Fascist plague.”9 The discourse of 
ancestral sacrifice and heroism found salience in the educational historical textbooks of 
the 1990s. Under the classification of Politics of Advocacy, Russian historical actors were 
 
8 Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, 54-59. 
9 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, 30 January 1995. 
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largely glorified for their actions, while negative aspects of their leadership were muted. 
Students were told that they should be proud of their ancestors “glorious deeds.” Political 
actors and veteran groups called on the youth to join with the veteran population, to show 
their gratitude for their sacrifice by holding parties, concerts and cleaning memorials.10  
The discourse of ancestral sacrifice and loyalty to the state was most noticeable 
in chapters four and five. Chapter four emphasised the sacrificial deeds of veterans and 
Russia’s current military in order to legitimise the provision of enhanced benefits and 
pensions. The documents found at GARF and the online archives of the Yeltsin centre 
showed that social welfare changes were justified on the basis of worthiness. The military 
and veteran population were deemed most deserving of the benefits based on their service 
to the state. In doing so, the government created a catalogue of values that needed to be 
showcased through service in a military way in order for a person to claim the same 
benefits. It created a sense of citizenship in which the ideal citizen would be rewarded for 
their role in the protection of the state. In addition, the government sought to extend the 
definition of the veteran, on the grounds that ‘workers of the rear’ were just as important 
in the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany. The extension was symbolic since it 
signified the victory of the Great Patriotic War as possible only with the contribution of 
the entire society. The 50th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War drew upon both 
discourses in order to popularise the Armed Forces and reproduce the significance of the 
Soviet victory over Nazism into contemporary consciousness. The anniversary 
emphasised the heroic deeds of the veteran population, pushing the responsibility of 
continued commemoration onto the current and future generations of Russia. The debt 
ideology created as a result acted as a form of guilt, in which gratitude could only be 
showcased through participation in commemorative activities. It was framed as a sense 
of civic duty, in which the soldiers’ duty was to protect society, while society’s duty was 
to protect the soldiers’ memory. This discourse was furthered in the monuments and 
collectables unveiled for this event with the image of the weeping mother over the soldier 
in the Hall of Remembrance (Zal pamiati I skorbi) and the Soldier of Victory in the Hall 
of Glory (Zal slava), mythologising the memory of the Great Patriotic War soldiers. 
Yeltsin and Grachev used the events to speak of new and emerging threats and security 
concerns facing the country, emphasising the important role of the military to the defence 
of Russian society. 
 
10 GARF, f. 10100, op. 1, d. 1003, l. 29-30, March 1995. 
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 Both discourses worked in a tandem, with sacrifice and loyalty to the state acting 
as the solution to the external dangers threatening Russian security. These discourses have 
formed the basis for the militarisation efforts of former regimes in Russia and have found 
salience under Vladimir Putin. It is through the reproduction and revival of such 
discourses that Russian militarism has been able to persist beyond regime change, 
underpinning Russia’s complex relationship and reliance on the military.   
 
How do the discourses within the different societal domains fit into (and add to) current 
literature on the state of militarism and militarisation in Post-Soviet Russia? 
 Beyond the main purpose of investigating militarisation in the Yeltsin period, the 
thesis made a number of contributions to our understanding of Russian militarism. First, 
it challenged the dominant viewpoint that 1990s Russia was a decade of demilitarisation. 
As a result, it disputed the claim that the successes of current militarisation efforts in 
Russia are an outcome of the Putin administration and argued instead that today’s trends 
are rooted in Yeltsin’s Russia. Finally, the thesis demonstrated that the development of 
societal militarisation is situated in processes beyond the scope of its physical dimensions.  
Literature on the Post-Soviet period largely argued that 1990s Russia was 
undergoing a process of demilitarisation. This viewpoint is not entirely wrong, yet 
scholars primarily examined documents, subjects, individuals and institutions with a 
direct link to the military.11 Militarisation is not limited to the material aspects and is 
situated in areas beyond its physical dimensions. Scholars like Cynthia Enloe and Henry 
Giroux pinpointed that the process of militarisation goes beyond the military institution, 
and is also cultural, institutional and behavioural.  Scholarship on the Yeltsin period, 
however, is largely outdated. Over the last couple of years, vast research has been 
conducted within the subfield of critical military studies, with scholars such as Victoria 
Basham, Linda Åhäll and Jonathan Dunnage et al., updating and redefining the 
boundaries of militarisation and militarism.12 
 
11 One of the only studies that currently exists, which links together the state of Russia’s 
military from a cultural and societal perspective is an edited volume assembled by 
Jennifer G. Mathers and Stephen Webber. Accounts within the volume note how films of 
the post-Soviet period demonstrated a soldier’s loss of identity as a result of decaying 
military power, highlighting that the Russian people were nostalgic for a strong military. 
12  For research on militarism and militarisation, please see: Åhäll, “The Dance of 
Militarisation,” 154-168; Victoria Basham, “Waiting for war: Soldiering, temporality and 
the gendered politics of boredom and joy in military spaces,” in Emotions, Politics and 
 312 
A growth of such literature prompted a revision of the Yeltsin period. Chapter one 
sought to define the concept militarism and militarisation, identifying that the power of 
militarisation is not only measured by its material value but also its bureaucratic 
dimensions, the habits of institutions and within the cultural sphere. Scholars of Russian 
militarism under Putin have attempted to do this. White and Kryshtanovskaya, for 
example, showed that military power is not totally driven by the physical aspects, but that 
actually, it is the people who are in power that have control over the material. 
Yet, a rereading of Yeltsin’s Midnight Diaries showed that leaders with a civilian 
background can also hold militarised worldviews – especially considering that Yeltsin 
was not entirely separated from militarism, having been socialised in a militarised Soviet 
Union. Yeltsin’s presidency was shaped by war. He began his democratic political career 
on top of a tank, retiring from office only two months after the start of the Second 
Chechen War. In between, he launched ‘peacekeeping’ missions in the former Soviet 
space, sent troops to Chechnya and called on the military’s help to solve political crisis. 
Beyond the use of the military in a physical way, Yeltsin revived militaristic traditions of 
the state, rebranding the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War as a Russian one in an 
effort to unite Russian citizens, to inform current and future political goals and 
reemphasise threats to Russian security. These acts of revival by Yeltsin show that the 
cult of the Great Patriotic War under Putin was built on the foundations created by 
Yeltsin’s administration. Yeltsin reinvented the Victory Day parade, adopting rituals of 
the Soviet era and adding new traditions, such as its annual occurrence. The speeches of 
Yeltsin, calling for the continued memorialisation of the event and its passing down to 
future generations are calls that are replicated by Vladimir Putin. Veteran organisations 
and State Duma deputies made efforts to join the youth with veterans and implemented a 
pro-patriotic education in order to revive the patriotic spirit of the youth, in the same way 
that the recent constitutional changes have prohibited a negative portrayal of the Great 
Patriotic War in the public sphere. Yeltsin built the house that Putin decorated.  
 Having examined the state of Russia’s military through a cultural lens, the thesis 
was able to overcome a number of limitations. The thesis examined the processes of 
 
War, (Interventions), ed. by Linda Åhäll and Thomas Gregory (New York: Routledge, 
2015), 128-140; Jonathan Dunnage, Susan T. Jackson, Eugene Miakinkov and Michael 
Sheehan, “Understanding militarism after the end of the Cold War: History, International 
Relations and Media studies ask new questions,” History Compass 17, No. 12 (2019): 1-
13. 
 313 
militarisation beyond its physical dimensions and sought to understand whether a society 
could be militarising without the physical presence of strong military. The thesis found 
that there was a clear state-led effort to maintain pro-militaristic themes in everyday 
discourses. The media, while not directly under the control of the state, highlighted the 
important place that the military and war had taken in societal discourses as it continued 
to utilise methods of mobilisation through the use of scaremongering techniques. The 
thesis does not argue that such discourses led to increased numbers of military volunteers; 
however, they ensured that issues of the military sat at the forefront of mass 
consciousness. The thesis was able to show that in lieu of a physical military, society 
remained exposed to a militarised worldview  
The thesis contributes to current literature on militarisation by proposing a number 
of original ways in which the process of militarisation can be captured. The notion of a 
debt ideology or measurement of militarisation through the concept of sponsorship 
outlined the many subtle ways in which Russia’s dominant state institutions have 
continued to militarise its society. The models and mechanisms introduced in this thesis 
can certainly be used to understand and track the process of militarisation under the Putin 
administration, and within a comparative capacity to understand processes of 
militarisation in other countries. Since many of the discourses found in this thesis were a 
result of deep-rooted traditions of the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, a wider study on 
countries of the former Soviet Union, for example Belarus, may reveal the adoption and 
continuation of similar rituals. In its aim to understand the process of militarisation from 
a cultural perspective, the thesis found that indeed, the militarisation of society can 
continue without a physical military as long as military themes and the discourse that “we 
must be defended” remain dominant.  This was the case in Yeltsin’s Russia.  
 
FOUNDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Scope for future research 
The thesis investigated the cultural militarisation of Russian society from a top-
down perspective and had little room (with a few exceptions) to showcase how people on 
the ground received the militarised discourses. Therefore, the study should act as a step 
or foundation for future research on the period, especially concerning society’s response 
to such mechanisms and discourses. In addition, there are places in which the scope of 
this thesis can be extended. First, future research should investigate the link between 
 314 
religion and militarism in 1990s Russia. Current research by Victoria Fomina, for 
example, focuses on religion, morality and militant nationalism. Her case study on 
Evgenii Rodionov, an orthodox Russian soldier killed by Chechens in 1996 for his refusal 
to remove the cross and convert to Islam, demonstrates the first steps towards the creation 
of the strong connection that currently exists between the military and Orthodox 
Church.13 Through his relationship with the church, as showcased by his refusal to betray 
the cross, Rodionov became a model for the ideal Russian citizen. According to Fomina, 
the newspaper Zavtra framed Rodionov’s story through a pseudo-religious lens in which 
a renewed image of the military man was created by emphasising his strong commitment 
to his principles and sense of morality. Future research should include a focus on the 
Orthodox Church as a form of pedagogy in which sermons are assessed to examine their 
militaristic dimensions.  
Second, the connection between gender and militarism in Russia during this 
period largely remains within the structure of dedovshchina. Upon the examination of 
historical textbooks during the 1990s, there was a noticeable contradiction. Those heroic 
participants in glorious wars and military campaigns were mainly men, and the campaigns 
of Catherine II were largely limited to diplomatic exchanges. Men prevailed in these 
histories, pushing women to the margins of these glorious wars and military exchanges. 
It was also primarily men who were recognised by Yeltsin for state prizes, awarded during 
the Great Patriotic War celebrations – thus women lacked suitable role models that 
reflected on their strength, loyalty and heroism during war. It is through the books and 
state recognition that militarisation ensued and as Cynthia Enloe claimed, “masculinity 
[continued] to be the currency for domination and exclusion.”14 Even as the masculinised 
role of the male was shortened by the cutbacks in the military, the patriarchal structures 
of society were maintained through the projected role of the heroic and strong male within 
 
13 Victoria Fomina, “Between heroism and sainthood: New martyr Evgenii Rodionov as 
a moral model in Contemporary Russia, History and Anthropology 29, No. 1 (2018): 101-
102. 
14  Cynthia Enloe, “Understanding militarism, militarisation and the Linkages with 
Globalisation: Using a Feminist Curiosity,” Gender and Militarism: Analysing the Links 
to Strategise for Peace, Women Peacemakers Program, (2014), accessed 14 November 
2019, http://www2.kobe-
u.ac.jp/~alexroni/IPD%202015%20readings/IPD%202015_9/Gender%20and%20Milita
rism%20May-Pack-2014-web.pdf, 7.  
 315 







Gosudarstvennoi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii  (GARF) 
 
Fond 10026 - “S’ezd narodnykh deputatov Rossiiskoi federatsii, verkhovnyi Sovet 
Rossiiskoi federatsii i ikh organy,” 1990-1993.  
Fond 10100 - “Federal’noe Sobranie Rossiiskoi Federatsii.” 1993-. 




Fond 21 - “Audiozapisi meropriiatii s uchastiem B. N. El’tsina iz Arkhiva Prezidenta 
RF. Kopii.” 
Fond 6 – “Dokumenty lichnogo fonda B. H. El’tsina iz Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. Kopi.” 
Fond 8 - “Kollektsiia. Normativno rasporiaditel’nye akty i materialy k nim iz Arkhiva 





“Chechnya: Nashi Voyska uspeshno zavershili operatsiyu v rayone Smashek.” 
Krasnaia Zvezda, 11 April 1995. No. 80. 
“Chechnya: Trudnyi vybor Kremlia (Ekspress-analiz nedeli).” Izvestiia, 10 December 
1994. No. 238. 
“Koalitsionnoe Pravitel’stvo.” Argumenty i Fakty, 10 December 1997. No. 50. 
“Na vechnom ogne.” Ogoniok, November 1991. No. 46. 
“Postanovlenie III Sezda KP RF ‘O bratoubiystvennoy voyne v Chechenskoi 
Respublike i merakh po vykhodu iz voznikshego krizisa.’” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 
Moscow, 20 February 1995. No. 13. 
“Rel’sovaia Voina.” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 27 May 1998. 
“S kem voyuem v Chechne?” Ogoniok, August 1996. No. 34 
“Shakhtry Nachali ‘Rel’sovoi voiny.’” Izvestiia, 16 May 1998. 
 317 
“Situatsiia v Chechne.” Kommersant, 26 August 1994. No. 160. 
 “Situatsiia v Tadzhikistane.” Kommersant, 15 December 1992. No. 61. 
“Stanislav Govorukhin predlagaet privech’ S. Kovaleva I K k otvetstvellosti za 
klevetu.” Krasnaia Zvezda, 21 April 1995. No. 89. 
“Terror bez granits.” Argumenty i Fakty, 28 January 1998. No. 5. 
“Terrorizm: Igry Diletantov.” Ogoniok, November 1994. No. 46-47. 
 “Vesenniaia sessiia gosudarstvennoy dumy 1995 goda.” Izvestiia, 1995. 
“Vizit Gracheva v Tadzhikistan.” Kommersant, 6 February 1993. 
“Vmesto novgorodnikh podarkov v detskie ladoni lozhitsia smert – chechenskii uzel 
vse tyzhe.” Pravda, 20 December 1994. No. 235. 
“Y detei voiny pal’tsy pozhozhi na kurok.” Novaia Gazeta, 24 June 1996. No. 23.  
Artemenko, Viktor. “Pamiati general-mayora Viktora Vasil’evicha Vorob’eva.” 
Pravda, 10 January 1994. No. 333. 
Artemenko, Viktor. “Pogib, kak zhil, - na peredovoy.” Pravda, 10 January 1994. No. 
333. 
Baturin, Yuri. “Moskva-Groznii: Nuzhny kompromissy, na voprosy.” Izvestiia, 24 
June 1995. No. 115. 
Berezina, Elena. “Ne khochu byt’ armianinom!” Ogoniok, December 1994. No. 48-
49. 
Bolotin, Alexander. “Eta Pulia Eshche ne tvoia.” Ogoniok, April 1992. No. 14-15. 
Charodeev, Gennady. “Vengriia, Pol’sha i Chekhiia uzhe v NATO/ Na ocheredi - 
Ukraina?” Izvestiia, 1999. No. 43. 
Chelnokov, Alexei. “Cherez Chechnyu-Avtostopom, spetsialnyi correspondent 
‘Izvestiia.’” Izvestiia, 24 December 1994. No. 247. 
Dementieva, Irina. “Ne meshayte rabotat’, g-n gubernator.” Izvestiia, 20 June 1995. 
No. 111. 
Golts, Alexander. “Ukreplenie SNG – Vazneishaia Zadacha Nashei Diplomatii,” 
Krasnaia Zvezda. 08 July 1995. No. 152-153. 
Gritchin, Nikolai. “Po Samashkam ogem i mechom,” Izvestiia, (18 April 1995). 
Gritchin, Nikolai. “Vlasti Stavshimi predprinimayut mery dlia zashchity mestnykh 
kavkaztsev.” Izvestiia, 23 December 1994. No. 246. 
Gromok, Valerii. “Zalukhniki Rel’sovoi Voiny.” Krasnaia Zvezda, 10 February 1998. 
Ilia Mishtein. “Nato ili ne nado?” Ogoniok, February 1994. No. 8. 
 318 
Kamyshev, Dmitry. “Situatsiia v Chechne.” Kommersant, 23 December 1994. No. 
244. 
Klaus Von Cretor, Nikolai. “Esli by Ia byl Russkim Marshalom.” Sovetskaia Rossiia, 
30 August 1994. No. 62. 
Kornetov, Robert. “Situatsiia v Chechne.” Kommersant, 17 September 1994. No. 176. 
Kovalev, Sergey. “Elena Badyakina: ‘Opalennye Bedoy.’” Sovetskaia Russia, 
Moscow, 28 January 1995. No. 11. 
Kovalskaya, Galina. “Khuzhe mozhet byt’ tol’ko voina.” Ogoniok, 10 February 1995. 
No. 40. 
Kozhanov, Nikolai. “Grozhnyi: Razrushaem, potom budem stroit’ – i vse za schet 
Rossiiskogo Byuzheta.” Pravda, 10 November 1994. No. 3. 
Kuznetsov, Sergei and Lyudmila Proshak. “Komu voyna, komu – mat’ rodna?” 
Argumenty i Fakty, 30 March 1999. No. 13. 
Latsis, Otto. “Chechenskaia voyna proigrana v Moskve.” Izvestiia, 29 December 
1994. No. 250. 
Lukanin, Mikhail. “Sobytiiai Komentarii. Tak kak zhe budet vygliadet pamiatnik 
Zhukovu?” Krasnaia Zvezda, 20 September 1994. No. 216. 
Makarov, Dmitri. “S. Khadzhiev ‘Ia ne marionetka.’” Argumenty i Fakty, 27 July 
1995. No. 30. 
Mikheev, Vladimir. “NATO razbombit serbov i bez soglasiia OON.” Izvestiia, 2 
October 1998. No. 185. 
Muradov, Boris and Igor Popov. “Za fasadom Balkanskogo krizisa.” Argumenty i 
Fakty, 7 April 1999. No. 14. 
Muradov, Boris, and Igor Popov. “Yugoslavskie Strasti.” Argumenty i Fakty, 30 
March 1999. No. 13. 
Nadein, Vladimir. “Budushchee NATO reshaetsiia v Moskve.” Izvestiia, 14 February 
1995. No. 28. 
Nadein, Vladimir. “Sergey Kovalev – Kongressu SSHA: Chechenskaia Voyna 
Ozhestochla nashe obshchestvo.” Izvestiia, 4 May 1995. No. 81. 
Nikonov, Aleksander. “Strannaia Voyna.” Ogoniok, 1999. No. 15. 
Obolenskii, Gennady. “Ne Nado na Nas Davit.” Krasnaia Zvezda, 18 January 1997. 
No. 12-13. 
Pelts, Alexander. “V Pamiat pavshizh i vo slavu zhivykh.” Krasnaia Zvezda, 11 May 
1995. No. 105.  
 319 
Plutnik, Albert. “Bylo by prestupleniem upustit’ shans pokonshit’ s voynoy v 
Chechne.” Izvestiia, 24 June 1995. No. 115.  
Rachkova, Olga and Vladimir Danshin. “Uchebnik noveyshey istorii popal v 
istoriyu.” Kommersant, 31 October 1997. No. 188. 
Rotar, Igor. “Chechniia: Davniaia Smutab Sobytiia v respublika budut razvivatsia po 
alzhirskomu variant.” Izvestiia, 27 October 1995. No. 204. 
Rozhnov, Georgii. “Voiska na Ulitsakh.” Ogoniok, February 1991. No. 7. 
Sargin, Aleksander, and Vitaly Tseplyaev. “Za” i “Protiv” razoruzheniia. Kto seychas 
ugrozhaet Rossii?” Argumenty i Fakty, 19 November 1997. No. 47. 
Saveiliev, Oleg. “’Snova razlyubili SSHA,’ VTsIOM Press-sluzhba.” Argumenty i 
Fakty, 20 April 1999. No. 16. 
Selenev, Gennady. “Ruslan Khasbulatov: V oppozitsii k rezhimu Dudaeva vse 
chechenskoe obshchestvo.” Pravda, 22 September 1994. No. 174. 
Selunin, Vasily. “Chto u Nas Poluchitsia?” Ogoniok, February 1991. No. 6. 
Shafarevich, Igor. “Voyna Vyigrana. Chechnia Proigrana?” Pravda, 13 April 1995. 
No. 68. 
Shimov, Yaroslav. “Samashki: Zhizn’na peplishche.” Izvestiia, 25 April 1995. No. 
76. 
Somov, A. “‘Za’ i ‘Protiv.’” Argumenty i Fakty, 26 November 1997. No. 48. 
Stugovets, Vitaly. “V oboronnoy politike Rossiia iskhodit iz prioriteta mirnykh 
sredstv obespecheniia svoey bezopasnosti.” Krasnaia Zvezda, 27 October 1999. No. 
229. 
Sychov, Alexander. “Rossiia budet Sotrudnichat’ s NATO, Tol’ko esli etot Blok ne 
Popolzet na Vostok.” Izvestiia, 25 May 1995. No. 94. 
Tasmanskiy, Dmitry. “‘V ochered, sukiny deti, v ochered!’ (P. P. Sharikov o 
rasshirenii NATO).” Novaia Gazeta, 10 March 1997. No. 10. 
Tseplyaev, Vitaly. “Mikhail Gorbachev: Zdravstvui, oruzhie?” Argumenty i Fakty, 
1999. No. 15. 
Tseplyaev, Vitaly. “Pugat’ Ameriku sebe dorozhe?” Argumenty i Fakty, 30 March 
1999. No. 13. 
Tseplyaev, Vitaly. “Rossiia v Kol’tse vragov?” Argumenty i Fakty, 17 June 1997. No. 
25. 
Yakov, Valery. “Samashki: Aktsiia na Ystrashenie.” Izvestiia, 18 April 1995. No. 71. 
 320 
Yakov, Valery. “V Groznom Solntse, Vesna i strel’ba.” Izvestiia, 25 April 1995. No. 
76. 
Zhelnorova, Natalia. “Chechniia – otdushina dlia voennykh.” Argumenty i fakty, 25 
January 1996. No. 4. 
Zhukov, Maksim, and Dmitry Kamyshev. “Situatsiia v Chechne.” Kommersant, 1 
December 1994. No. 228. 
Zhukovets, Gennady. “Dzhokhar Dudaev: Vlast’ my mogli vziat’ v techenie chasa.” 
Ogoniok, December 1991. No. 49. 




Ammona, G. A. Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX vv. Uchebnoe pospobie v dvukh tamakh, Tom. 
1. Moscow: Infra-M, 1998. 
Anisimov E. V. and A. B. Kamenskiy. Istoriia Rossii, 1682-1861, Moscow: Terra, 
1996. 
Bataeva, T. Predislovie to Istoriia Rossii XX Stoletia (Osnovnye problemy), by V. A. 
Potseluev, 3-7. Moscow: Vlados, 1997. 
Buganov, V. I., and P. N. Zirianov. Istoriia Rossii konets XVII-XIX vek, Uchebnik dlia 
10 klassa obshchestobrazovatelnykh uchrezhdenii. Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1996.  
Danilov, A. A. and L. G. Kosulina. Istoriia Rossii, XX vek: Dopolnitel’nye materialy 
k uchebniky. 9 Klass. Moscow: DROFA, 1997. 
Danilov, A. A. and S. V. Leonov. Istoriia Rossii v XX veke: Teotricheskii kurs. 
Moscow: Moscow University of Humanities, 1995.  
Danilov, A. A. Istoriia Rossii, IX-XIX: Spravochnik Shkol’nika Moscow: Drofa, 
1999. 
Danilov, A. A. Po Istoriia Rossii – Rabochnaia Tetrad dlia studentov vyzov. Moscow: 
Vlados, 1998.  
Danilov, A. A. and L. G. Kosulina. Istoriia Rossii, XX Vek: Uchebnik dlia starshikh 
klassov obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdeniy. Moscow: Iakhont, 1998.  
Dvornichenko A. Yu, A. V. Kirillov, E. A. Shaskal’skaya and Z. O. Dzhaliashvili. 
Istoriia Rossii, IX-XX veka: Uchebnik dlia abiturinentov i studentov. Sankt 
Petersburg: Nestor, 1999.  
 321 
Georgieva, N. G. and V. A. Georgie. Istoriia Rossii, IX v – nachalo XX v.: Testy v 
pomoshch’ prepodavateliam i abiturientam. Moscow: Moscow University Publishing 
House, 1995. 
Golovin, N. N. Moia Pervaia Rosskaia Istoriia v Rasskazakh dlia Detei. Moscow: 
Tovarishchestvo M. O. Vol'f, 1992. 
Ishimova, Alexandra. Istoriia Rossii v Rasskazakh Dlia Detei, (Moscow: AST 
Publishing House, 1996) 
Kislitsyn, S. A. Istoriia Rossii v Voprosy I Otvetakh. Rostov-On-Don: Feniks, 1999. 
Kreder, A. Noveyshaia Istoriia XX vek: Uchebnik dlia osnovnoy shkoly. Moscow: 
Tsentr Gumanitarnogo Obrazovaniia, 1996. 
Lichmana, B. V. Istoriia Rossii: XX Vek: Kurs lektsiy po istorii Rossii Vtoraia 
polovina XIX-XX vv. Yekaterinburg: USTU, 1993.  
Ostrovskiy, V. P. and A. I. Utkin. Istoriia Rossii v XX vek, Klass 11. Moscow: 
DROFA, 1996. 
Potseluev, V. A. Istoriia Rossii XX Stoletia (Osnovnye problemy). Moscow: Vlados, 
1997.  
Shchetinov, Yu. A. Istoriia Rossii v XX vek. Moscow: Fair, 1998. 
Skrynnikov, R. G. Istoriia Rossiiskaia IV-XVII vv. Moscow: Ves Mir, 1997.  
Tugan-Baranovskaia, L. I. Istorii Rossii dlia Uchashchikhsia 8-go Klassa; Otvety na 
Ekzamenatsionnye bilety Volgograd: Bratiia Grininy, 1996. 
Vedernikov, V. V. Istoriia Rossii dlia Uchashchikhsia 10-go klassa: Otvety na 
Ekzamenatsionnye Voprosy. Volgograd: Bratiia Grininy, 1997. 
Yurganov, A. L. and L. A. Katsva. Istoriia Rossii XVI-XVIII vv. Moscow: MIROS, 
1996.  
Zhukova, L. V. Istoriia Rossii XX veka: Uchebnoe posobie dlia uchashchikhsia 10-
11 klassov, Moscow: Ekzamen, 1998. 
Zuev, M. N. Khronika Rossii Istoriia, Moscow: Drofa, 1995.  
 
VIDEOS, ONLINE SOURCES AND OPINION POLLS 
 
“About the Newspaper.” Sovross.ru. Accessed 23 November 2020. 
sovross.ru/newspaper.  
“About the Newspaper.” Zvezda.ru. Accessed 23 November 2020. http://redstar.ru/o-
gazete/?attempt=1.  
 322 
“Average monthly salaries in Russia 1991-2000.” Elena’s Blogs (blog). Accessed 7 
March 2021. https://blogs.elenasmodels.com/en/average-salaries-in-russia/. 
“Boris Vasilievich Lichman.” Ural’skiy Institut ekonomiki, upravleniia i prava. 
Published 14 April 2016. Accessed 11 February 2021. 
http://www.urep.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2232%3A14
0420162&catid=5%3A2009-10-10-14-21-17&lang=ru. 
“Den’ Pobedy: Istoriia voennykh paradov.” TASS. 8 May 2015. Accessed 5 
November 2018. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/1171423.  
“Evgeniy Ily’ich Ukhnalyov (1931-2015).” Geral’dika.ru. Accessed 6 April 2020.  
https://sovet.geraldika.ru/article/17588.  
“Excerpts from Yeltsin Speech on Chechnya With PM-Russia-Chechnya, Bjt.” The 
Associated Press. 28 December 1994. Accessed 21 January 2019. 
https://apnews.com/40b126a5acf44c58e82ab6d6cd3997b2. 
“History.” Rossiiskii Uchebnik. Accessed 11 December 2020. 
https://rosuchebnik.ru/about/. 
“Istoricheskii parad v chest’ 50-letiia Pobedy v Velikoi Otechestvenoi Voine.” 
YouTube video. 1:01:08. Posted by Sovetskoe Televidenie GOSTELERADIOFOND 
Rossii. 8 May 2018. Accessed 11 October 2018. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSKqdWfyJjI. 
“Istoriia Muzeia.” Muzei Pobedy. Accessed 12 October 2018. 
https://victorymuseum.ru/about/history/. 
“Izdel’stvy ‘Terra’ knizhnaia iarmarka vruchila priz: Knigu utrom, knigu vecherom.” 
Kommersant. 5 September 1997. Accessed 17 December 2020. 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/183569. 
“Japan Tsunami: Military begins search for bodies.” 1 April 2011. BBC News. 
Accessed 28 February 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
12931418. 
“Lekkha Vilyevna Zhukova.” Novosti Istoricheskogo Fakul’teta. Published 25 March 
2017. Accessed 11 February 2021. http://www.hist.msu.ru/about/gen_news/28036/. 
“O Izdatel’stve.” Ves’ Mir Izdatel’stvo. Accessed 17 December 2020. 
https://www.vesmirbooks.ru/about/. 
“O Izdatel’stvo.” Izdatel’stvo Nestor Academik. Accessed 17 December 2020. 
http://www.nestor.su/about.html.  
 323 
“O Kompanii.” INFRA-M Gruppa Kompaniy. Accessed 17 December 2020. 
https://infra-m.ru/about/o_kompanii/. 
“O Prezidentsikh pozdravleniiakh veteranam.” FOM. 27 July 1995. Accessed 27 
April 2020. https://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19972903. 
“Ob izdatel’stve.” Izdatel’stvo Vlados. Accessed 11 December 2020. 
http://vlados.ru/ob-izdatelstve/.  
“Obshie Trebovaniia K Tekstovym dokumentam: Edinaia sistema konstruktorskoi 
dokumentatsii.” Mezhgosudarstvennyi Standart. 8 August 1995. Accessed 20 
November 2020. http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200001260.  
“Putin’s Victory Day Parade Speech.” YouTube video. 1:34:16. Posted by Russia 
Today. Steamed live 23 June 2020. Accessed 24 June 2020. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4pFnlr0zck.  
“Russia-Yeltsin, Clinton Among Leaders Honouring.” AP Archive video. 2:19:18. 
Posted by WTN Pool. 15 May 1995. Accessed 12 November 2018. 
https://bit.ly/2QbSPJ2.  
“Russia: V.E. Day Celebrations Update.” AP Archive Video. 2:51:10. posted by 
APTV. 8 May 1995. Accessed 12 November 2018. https://bit.ly/3syYve8.  
“Russian Federation’s constitution of 1993 with amendments through to 2008.” 
constituteproject.org. Modified 19 February 2021. Accessed 11 April 2020.  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Russia_2008.pdf. 
 “Shirokoe prazdnovanie 50-letiia Pobedy ne povliialo na otnoshenie Rossiian 
Prezidentu.” FOM. May 1995. Accessed 13 April 2020. 
https://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19952001.  
“Statut ordena Zhukova.” Gosudarstvennye Nagrady Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Accessed 
24 June 2020. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060302222704/http://www.award.adm.gov.ru/orden/
orden_14.htm  
“The Deputy Director of the DROFA publishing house was killed.” Kommersant. 16 
November 1996, No. 196. Accessed 11 December 2020, 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/243221. 
“The Dragon Episode in the St. George Legend.” In St. George and the Dragon: 
Introduction, edited by E. Gordon Whately, Anne B. Thompson and Robert K. 




“Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 Maia 1994 goda, No. 930 “Ob 
uchrezhdenii ordena Zhukova i medali Zhukova.” Gosudarstvennye Nagrady 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Accessed 24 June 2020. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120311063109/http://award.adm.gov.ru/doc/u930.ht
m. 
“Vernut’sia v Rossiyu: Pamiati Aleksandra Nikolaevicha Bokhanova.” Bokhanov.ru. 
14 January 2021. Accessed 12 February 2021. https://xn--80abe7bdc0c.xn--p1acf/.  
“Voennyi Parad Pobedy 9 Maia 1995- 50 letie Pobedy/ Military Parade May 9 Victory 
1995.” YouTube video. 1:00:26. Posted by Rota Pochyotnogo Karaula. 31 January 
2016. Accessed 5 December 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-
cbz6KPEdY. 
“What changes will be in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” duma.gov.ru. 
12 March 2020. Accessed 15 July 2020. http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/48039/. 
“Historical Currency Converter.” Historical Statistics. Accessed 26 March 2020. 
http://www.historicalstatistics.org/Currencyconverter.html. 
Apple Jr., R.W. “V-E Day Plus 50: The Overview; Allied Victory in Europe Is 
Commemorated in Moscow.” The New York Times. 10 May 1995, accessed 20 
September 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/10/world/v-e-day-plus-50-the-
overview-allied-victory-in-europe-is-commemorated-in-moscow.html. 
Bertuol, Natalia. “In the event of shelling: Remembering the Great Patriotic War.” 
Junior Year Abroad Network (JYAN) Blog (blog). 3 May 2018. Accessed 17 March 
2020. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/in-the-event-of-shelling-
remembering-the-great-patriotic-war.  
Blackburn, Joshua. “War Sells.” Provokateur. March 2003. Accessed 20 January 
2017. www.provokateur.com/war-sells-1. 
Burbulis, G. “O razvitii gumanitarnogo obrazovaniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii.” Pravo. 
13 April 1992, accessed 20 February 2021. 
http://ips.pravo.gov.ru/?doc_itself=&backlink=1&nd=102015761&page=1&rdk=1#
I0.  
Chernomyrdin, Viktor. “Ob utverzhdenii Programmy podgotovki i provedeniia 
prazdnovaniia 50-letiia Pobedy i drugikh pamiatnykh dat Velikoi Otechestvennoi 




Clarke, Doug. “Moscow Victory celebrations continue.” RadioFreeEurope 
RadioLiberty. 10 May 1995. Accessed 1 November 2018. 
https://www.rferl.org/a/1140932.html. 
Fox, Jo. “Attrocity Propaganda.” British Library. 29 January 2014. Accessed 28 
October 2019. https://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/atrocity-propaganda. 
Gallagher, James. “Ebola: British Military sent to tackle West Africa.” BBC News. 8 
September 2014. Accessed 28 February 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
29113530. 
Heinrich, Markus. “New Century, Old Rivalries: Russian Military Modernisation and 
NATO.” E-International Relations. 2016. Accessed 9 June 2018. https://www.e-
ir.info/2016/06/25/new-century-old-rivalries-russian-military-modernisation-and-
nato-responses/. 
Lexico.com. s.v. “Militarise.” Accessed 14 June 2020. 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/militarise.  
Lexico.com. s.v. “Militarism.” Accessed 12 June 2020. 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/militarism. 
Lipman, Maria. “Media Manipulation and Political Control in Russia: Russia and 




Masci, David. “In Russia, nostalgia for Soviet Union and positive feelings about 
Stalin.” Pew Research Centre. 29 June 2017, Accessed 6 November 2018. 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/29/in-russia-nostalgia-for-soviet-
union-and-positive-feelings-about-stalin/.  
McCann, Paul. “War Sells Serious Newspapers.” The Independent. 20 April 1999. 
Accessed 20 January 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/war-
sells-serious-newspapers-1088456.html.  
Migdisova, Svetlana and Elena Petrenko. “Desiat’ imen, bolee vsego 
sootvetstvuyushchikh predstavleniyu o russkom patriote, - ot Petra I do Lenina.” 
FOM. 17th June 1994. Accessed 5 April 2020. 
https://bd.fom.ru/report/map/of19941206.  
 326 
Saunders, Robert A. and Vlad Strukov. “Historical dictionary of the Russian 





Abousnnouga, Gill, and David Machin. “The changing spaces of war 
commemoration: a multimodal analysis of the discourses of British monuments.” 
Social Semiotics 21, No. 2 (2011): 175-196. 
Achugar, Mariana. “Critical Discourse Analysis and History.” In The Routledge 
handbook of Critical Discourse Studies, edited by John Flowerdew and John F 
Richardson, 298-311. Oxon: Routledge, 2018. 
Acikoz, Salih Can. “Sacrificial limbs of Sovereignty: Disabled Veterans, masculinity 
and Nationalist Politics in Turkey.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 26, No. 1 
(2012): 4-25. 
Adamsky, Dima. The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors 
on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US and Israel. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010. 
Afshar MD, Ahmadreza. “A Brief Iranian Medical History through Commemorative 
Postage Stamps.” Archives of Iranian Medicine 13, No. 2 (2010): 161-165. 
Åhäll, Linda. “The Dance of Militarisation: A Feminist Security Studies Takes on 
‘the political.’” Critical Studies on Security 4, No. 2 (2016): 154-168. 
Albrecht, Ulrich. “Red Militarism.” Journal of Peace Research 17, No. 2 (1980): 135-
149. 
Alston, Richard. Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt: A Social History. London: 
Psychology Press, 1995. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London and New York: Verso, 1983. 
Andreev, Evgeny M., Leonid E. Darsky, and Tatiana L. Kharkova. “Population 
Dynamics: Consequences of Regular and Irregular Changes.” In Demographic 
Trends and Patterns in the Soviet Union before 1991, edited by Wolfgang Lutz, 
Sergei Scherbov and Andrei Volkov, 423-440. London: Routledge 1994.   
Anitasari, Deti. “Critical Discourse Analysis: Mass Media.” INA-Rxiv, January 13, 
2018. doi:10.31227/osf.io/a23y6.  
 327 
Aron, Leon.  “Russia’s New Foreign Policy.” American Enterprise Institute, (1998) 
https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/russias-new-foreign-policy/ 
Askerov, Ali. “The Chechen Wars, media and democracy in Russia.” Innovative 
issues and approaches in Social Sciences 8, No. 2 (2015): 8-24. 
Azaryahu, Maoz. “Military and Militarism in Israeli Society.” In Independence Day 
Military Parade: A Political History of a Patriotic Ritual, edited by Edna Lomsky-
Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari, 89-116. Albany: SUNY Press, 2012. 
Bacevich, Andrew. The New American Militarism: How Americans are seduced by 
War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Bagger, Hans. “The Study of History in Russia during the Post-Soviet Identity Crisis, 
Scando-Slavica 53, No. 1 (2007): 109-125. 
Barylski, Robert V. The Soldier in Russian Politics, 1988-1996: Duty, Dictatorship 
and Democracy under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1998. 
Basham, Victoria M. “Gender, Race, Militarism and Remembrance: The Everyday 
Geopolitics of the Poppy.” Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist 
Geography 23, No. 6 (2016): 883-896. 
Basham, Victoria M. “Waiting for war: Soldiering, temporality and the gendered 
politics of boredom and joy in military spaces.” In Emotions, Politics and War, 
(Interventions), edited by Linda Åhäll and Thomas Gregory, 128-140. New York: 
Routledge, 2015. 
Belin, Laura. “The Russian Media in the 1990s.” The Journal of Communist Studies 
and Transitional Politics 18, No. 1 (2002): 139-160. 
Benn, David Wedgewood. “The Russian Media in Post-Soviet Conditions.” Europe-
Asia Studies 48, No. 3 (1996): 471-479. 
Berghan, Volker Rolf. Militarism: The History of an International Debate: 1861-
1979. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Bernazzoli, Richelle M., and Colin Flint. “Power, Place and Militarism: Toward a 
Comparative Geographic Analysis of Militarisation.” Geography Compass 3, No. 1 
(2009): 393-411. 
Berryman, John. “Russian Foreign Policy: An overview.” In Russia after the Cold 
War, edited by Bowker, Mike and Cameron Ross, 336-358. United Kingdom: 
Longman, 2000. 
 328 
Bidlack, Richard and Nikita Lomagin. The Leningrad Blockade, 1941-1944: A New 
Documentary History from the Soviet Archives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012. 
Blum, Jerome. Lord and Peasant in Russia: From the Ninth to the Nineteenth 
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 
Bodnar, John. “Commemorative Activity in Twentieth Century Indianapolis: The 
Invention of Civic Tradition.” Indiana Magazine of History 87, No. 1 (1991): 1-23. 
Booth, James W. “Communities of Memory: On Identity, Memory and Debt.” 
American Political Science Review 93, No. 2 (1999): 249-263. 
Bradshaw, Michael, and Jessica Prendergrast. “The Russian Heartland Revisited: An 
Assessment of Russia’s Transformation.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 46, 
No. 2 (2005): 83-122. 
Braithwaite, Rodric. “Dedovshchina: Bullying in the Russian Army.” Open 
Democracy. 2010. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/dedovshchina-bullying-
in-russian-army/.  
Braun, Aurel. “Russian Policy Towards Central Europe and the Balkans.” In The 
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, edited by Robert E. Kanet and Alexander 
V. Kozheimiakin, 49-77. London: Palgrave, 1997. 
Bromley, David G., Anson D. Schupe and J. C. Ventimigla. “Atrocity Tales, the 
Unification Church, and the Social Construction of Evil.” Journal of Communication 
29, Vol. 3 (1979): 42-53. 
Brown, Douglas J. “Dedovshchina: Caste Tyranny in the Soviet Armed Forces.” The 
Journal of Soviet Military Studies 5, No. 1 (1992): 53-79. 
Bruendel, Steffan. “Othering/ Atrocity Propaganda,” International Encyclopaedia of 
the First World War. (2017): 1-22.  https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-
online.net/pdf/1914-1918-Online-otheringatrocity_propaganda-2014-10-08.pdf. 
Bryan, Dominic. Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control. 
London: Pluto Press, 2000. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K and Paige Sullivan. Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States: Document, Data, and Analysis. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. 
Buffton, Deborah D. “Memorialisation and the selling of war.” Peace Review: A 
Journal of Social Justice 17, No. 1 (2006): 25-31. 
 329 
Burck, Charlotte. “Comparing qualitative research methodologies for systemic 
research: the use of grounded theory, discourse analysis and narrative analysis.” 
Journal of Family Therapy 27, No. 3 (2005): 237-262. 
Burds, Jeffrey. “The Soviet War against ‘Fifth Columnists’: The Case of Chechnya, 
1942-4.” Journal of Contemporary History 42, No. 2 (2007): 267-314. 
Burke, Colleen. “Women and Militarism.” Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom. 1994. https://www.wilpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Unknownyear_Women_and_Militarism.pdf.  
Burrett, Tina. “The end of independent television? Elite Conflict and the 
reconstruction of the Russian television landscape.” In The Post-Soviet Russian 
Media: Conflicting Signals, edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutching and Natalia 
Rulyova, 71-86. Oxon: Routledge, 2009. 
Burtin, Olivier. “The History of Veteran’s Policy in the United States.” Historical 
Social Research 45, No. 2 (2020): 239-260. 
Bushkovitch, Paul. “The Romanov Transformation 1613-1725.” In The Military 
History of Tsarist Russia, edited by Fredrick W. Kagan and Robin Higham, 31-46. 
New York: Palgrave, 2002. 
Bushnell, John. “Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society.” 
Journal of Social History 13, No. 4 (1980): 565-576. 
Caiazza, Amy. Mothers and Soldiers: Gender, Conscription, and Civil Society in 
Contemporary Russia. New York and London: Routledge, 2002. 
Chaing-Tai Hung. “Mao’s Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s.” The 
China Quarterly, No. 190 (2007): 411-431. 
Chandler, Andrea. “Veteran’s Rights in the Russian Constitutional Court, 1993-
2010.” Canadian Slavonic Papers 54, No. 3-4 (2012): 319-339. 
Chandler, Andrea. Shocking Mother Russia: Democratisation, Social Rights and 
Pension Reform in Russia, 1990-2000. Toronto: University Toronto Press, 2004. 
Charteris-Black, Jonathan. Politicians and Rhetoric: The persuasive power of 
metaphor. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005. 
Chimombo, Moira P. F., and Robert L. Roseberry. The Power of Discourse: An 
Introduction of Discourse Analysis. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Publishers, 1998. 
Coleman, P. G. and A. Podolskij. “Identity Loss and Recovery in Life Stories of 
Soviet World War Two Veterans.” The Gerontologist 47, No. 1 (2007): 52-60. 
 330 
Colley, Linda. “Britishness and Otherness: An argument.” Journal of British Studies 
24, No. 4 (1992): 309-329. 
Cooper, Julian. “Conversion is Dead, Long Live Conversion!” Journal of Peace 
Research 32, No. 2 (1995): 129-132. 
Cooper, Julian. “Demilitarising the Russian defence economy: a commentary.” 
Security Dialogue 26, No 1 (1995): 35-39. 
Cooper, Julian. “Social-Military Relations in Russia: The Economic Dimension.” In 
Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia, edited by Stephen Webber and Jennifer 
G. Mathers, 131-156. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006. 
Cowen, Deborah. Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008. 
Cremades, Pelegri Sancho. “An overview of Critical Discourse Analysis Approaches 
to Mass Communication.” In Critical Discourse Analysis of Media Texts, edited by 
Pelegri Sancho Cremades, Jose Maria Bernardo Paniagua, Guillermo Lopez Garcia 
and Enric Serra Alegre, 17-38. Valencia: Los Autores, 2007. 
Dalal, Koustuv and Leif Svanstrom. “Economic Burden of Disability Adjusted Life 
Years (DALYs) of Injuries.” Health 7, (2015): 487-494. 
Dale, Robert. “Remobilising the Dead: Wartime and Postwar Soviet Burial Practices 
and the Construction of the Memory of the Great Patriotic War.” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 22, No. 1 (2021): 41-73. 
Dale, Robert. Demobilised Veterans of the late Stalinist Leningrad: Soldiers to 
Civilians. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. 
Dandeker, Christopher, Simon Wessely, Amy Iversen and John Ross. “What’s in a 
Name? Defining and Caring for “veterans:” The United Kingdom in International 
Perspective.” Armed Forces and Society 32, No. 2 (2006): 161-177. 
Danilova, Nataliya. “The Development of an Exclusive Veterans’ Policy: The Case 
of Russia.” Armed Forces and Society 26, No. 5 (2010): 890-916. 
Danilova, Nataliya. “Veteran’s Policy in Russia: A Puzzle of Creation.” The Journal 
of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, No. 6/7 (2007).  
http://www.pipss.org/document873.html . 
Danilova, Nataliya. The Politics of War Commemoration in the UK and Russia. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
Danks, Catherine J. Russian Politics and Society: An Introduction. Essex: Pearson 
Education, 2011. 
 331 
Davies, R. W. Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era. New York: St. Martin’s Press inc, 
1997. 
De Monchy, Marike Finley. Powermatics: A Discursive Critique of New 
Communications Technology. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015. 
Delgado, Roxana E., Kimberly Peacock, Barbara Elizondo, Margaret Wells, Jordan 
H. Grafman and Mary J. Pugh. “A Family’s Affair: Caring for Veterans with 
Penetrating Traumatic Brain Injury.” Military Medicine 183, No. 3/4 (2018): 379-
385. 
Dezhnev, Vladimir N. and G. Shadrinsk. “Nikolai II i Rossiiskaia Imperatorskaia 
Armiia.” Vestnik Shadrinkskogo Gosudarstvennogo Pedagogicheskogo Universiteta, 
(2016): 146-150. 
Dolenec, Danijela. “A Soldier’s State? Veterans and the welfare regime in Croatia,” 
Anali 14, No. 1 (2017): 55-76. 
Donson, Andrew. “Models for Young Nationalists and Militarists: German Youth 
Literature in the First World War.” German Studies Review 27, No. 3 (2004): 579-
598. 
Dunnage, Jonathan, Susan T. Jackson, Eugene Miakinkov and Michael Sheehan. 
“Understanding militarism after the end of the Cold War: History, International 
Relations and Media studies ask new questions.” History Compass 17, No. 12 (2019): 
1-13. 
Duverger, M. The Study of Politics. Berlin, Germany: Springer Science and Business 
Media, 2012. 
Edele, Mark. “Soviet Veterans as an Entitlement Group, 1945-1955.” Slavic Review 
65, No. 1 (2006): 111-137. 
Eghigian, Greg “Injury, Fate, Resentment, and Sacrifice in German Political Culture, 
1914-1939.” In Sacrifice and National Belonging in Twentieth-Century Germany, 
edited by Marcus Funck, Greg Eghigian and Matthew Paul Berg, 90-117.  Texas: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2002. 
Eichler, Maya. Militarizing Men: Gender, Conscription and War in the Post-Soviet 
Russia. California: Stanford University Press, 2012. 
Eklof, Ben. “Introduction – Russian Education: the Past and the Present.” In 
Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects, edited by Ben 
Eklof, Larry E. Holmes and Vera Kaplan, 1-20. Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005. 
 332 
Elliott, Jane. Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches.  London: SAGE Publications, 2005. 
Ellis, Frank. “The Great Fatherland War in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian literature.” 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, No. 4 (2007): 609-632. 
Enloe, Cynthia. “Understanding militarism, militarisation and the Linkages with 
Globalisation: Using a Feminist Curiosity.” In Gender and Militarism: Analysing the 
Links to Strategise for Peace, edited by Isabelle Geuskens, Merle Gosewinkel and 




Enloe, Cynthia. Globalisation and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link. Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016. 
Enloe, Cynthia. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s 
Lives. Berkley: University of California Press, 2000. 
Enloe, Cynthia. The curious feminist: Searching for women in a new age of Empire. 
Berkley: University of California Press, 2004. 
Erokhina, Marina, and Alexander Skevurev. “Old Heritage and New Trends: School 
History Textbooks in Russia.” In School History Textbooks across Cultures: 
International Debates and Perspectives, edited by Jason Nicholls, 83-92. Oxford: 
Symposium Books Limited, 2006. 
Esin, Cigdem.“Narrative Analysis Approaches.” In Qualitative Research Methods in 
Psychology: Combining Core Approaches, edited by Nollaig Frost, 92-118. New 
York: Open University Press, 2011. 
Evren Eken, Mehmet. “The Un-Scene Affects of On-Demand Access to War.” In 
Understanding Popular Culture and world politics in the digital age, edited by LJ 
Shepherd and C Hamilton, 137-152. United States: Taylor and Francis, 2016. 
Fairclough, Norman. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. 
London: Routledge, 2003. 
Fedor, Julie. “Dedovschina and the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers under 
Gorbachev.” The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, No. 1 (2004): 
2-5. 
 333 
Feldman, Jackie. “Between Yad Vashem and Mt. Herzl: Changing Inscriptions of 
Sacrifice on Jerusalem’s ‘Mountain of Memory.’” Anthropological Quarterly 80, No. 
4 (2007): 1147-1174. 
Ferrand, Allain and Monique Pages. “Image Sponsoring: A Methodology to Match 
Event and Sponsor.” Journal of Management 10, No. 3 (1996): 278-291. 
Fish, Steven M. “Reform and Demilitarization in Soviet Society from Brezhnev to 
Gorbachev” Peace and Change 15, No. 2 (1990): 150-172. 
Fisun, Oleksandr. “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial 
Perspective.” The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratisation 20, No. 2 (2012): 87-96. 
Fomina, Victoria. “Between heroism and sainthood: New martyr Evgenii Rodionov 
as a moral model in Contemporary Russia.” History and Anthropology 29, No. 1 
(2018): 101-120. 
Forest, Benjamin and Juliet Johnson. “Unravelling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era 
Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow.” Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers 92, No. 3 (2002): 48-72. 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Penguin, 
1991. 
Frank, William C. and Phillip S. Gillette. Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to 
Gorbachev, 1915-1991. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. 
Frost, Nollaig. “Qualitative Research in Psychology.” In Qualitative Research 
Methods in Psychology: Combining Core Approaches, edited by Nollaig Frost, 3-15. 
New York: Open University Press, 2011. 
Froumin, Isak and Igor Remorenko. “From the ‘Best-in-the World’ Soviet school to 
a Modern Globally Competitive School System.” in Audacious Education Purposes: 
How Governments Transform the Goals of Education Systems, edited by Fernando 
M. Reimers, 233- 250. Switzerland: Springer Open, 2020. 
Fuller, William C. Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914. New York: The Free 
Press, 1998. 
Fussell, Paul. Wartime: Understanding and behaviour in the Second World War. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Gaddy, Clifford G. The Price of the Past: Russia’s Struggle with the Legacy of a 
Militarised Economy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. 
 334 
Galangau-Querat, Fabienne. “The Grande Galerie de l’Evolution.” In Reshaping 
museum space: Architecture, design, exhibitions, edited by Suzanne Macleod, 95-
107. Oxon: Routledge, 2005. 
Galaviz, Brian, Jesus Palafox, Erica R. Meiners and Therese Quinn. “The 
Militarisation and Privatisation of Public Schools.” Berkley Review of Education 2, 
No. 1 (2011): 27-45. 
Galbas, Michael. “Our pain and our glory: Social strategy of legitimisation and 
functionalisation of the Soviet-Afghan War in the Russian Federation.” Journal of 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 1, No. 2 (2015): 91-132. 
Gel’man, Vladimir. “The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatriomonialism in 
Russia.” Post-Soviet Affairs 32, No. 5 (2016): 455-473. 
Gerber, D. Roland. “Souvenirs: Many Dimensions and One Definition.” 
International Journal of Management Cases 10, No. 3 (2008): 24-29. 
Gerber, Theodore P., and Sarah E. Mendelson. “Strong Public Support for Military 
Reform in Russia.” PONARS Public Memo 288 (2003): 1-9. 
German, Tracey. Russia’s Chechen War. London: Routledge, 2003. 
Gillespie, David. “Confronting imperialism: The ambivalence of war in post-Soviet 
film.” In Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia, edited by Jennifer G. Mathers 
and Stephen Webber, 80-93. Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2006. 
Gillis, John R. The Militarization of the Western World. London: Rutgers University 
Press, 1989. 
Giroux, Henry A. “War on Terror: The Militarising of Public Space and Culture in 
the United States.” Third Text 18, No. 4 (2004): 211-221. 
Giroux, Henry. “Ideology and Agency in the Process of Schooling.” Journal of 
Education 165, No. 1 (1983): 12-34. 
Goffman, Erving. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience. 
Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1996. 
Goheen, Peter G. “Symbols in the Streets: Parades in Victorian Urban Canada,” 
Urban History Review 18, No. 3 (1990): 232-243. 
Golburt, Luba. “Vasili Petrov and the Poetics of Patronage.” E-Journal of Eighteenth-
Century Russian Studies 3, (2015): 47-69. 
 335 
Golts, Alexander M., and Tonya L. Putnam. “State Militarism and Its Legacies: Why 
Military Reform Has Failed in Russia.” International Security 29, No. 2 (2004): 121-
158. 
Golts, Alexander. Military Reform and Militarism in Russia. Washington DC: The 
Jamestown Foundation, 2018. 
Gonzales, Roberto J. Hugh Gusterson and Gustaaf Houfman. Militarisation: A 
Reader. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2019. Kindle Edition.  
Gorkov, Yuri and Valeri Danilov. “Gotovil li Stalin unprezhaiushchi udar protiv 
Gitlera v 1941 g.” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoria, No. 3 (1993): 29-45. 
Gough Paul. “The Commemoration of War.” In The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Heritage and Identity, edited by Brian Graham and Peter Howard, 323-347. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. 
Grayzel, Susan R. At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from 
the Great War to the Blitz New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Gresh, Jason P. “The Realities of Russian Military Conscription.” Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 24, No. 2 (2011): 185-216. 
Griffith, Robert K. U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1864-1974. 
Washington DC: DIANE Publishing, 1997. 
Gudkov, Lev. “The Army as an institutional model,” translated by Jennifer G. 
Mathers. In Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia, edited by Jennifer G. Mathers 
and Stephen Webber, 39-60. Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2006. 
Gudkov, Lev. “The Fetters of Victory: How the War provides Russia with its 
Identity.” Osteuropa 55, No. 4 (2005). https://www.eurozine.com/the-fetters-of-
victory/  
Hamilakis, Yannis. “Learn History! Antiquity, National Narratives, and History in 
Greek Educational Textbooks.” In The Useable Past: Greek Metahistories, edited by 
K. S. Brown and Yannis Hamilakis, 39-67. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002. 
Hassan, Aaminah. “Language, Media and Ideology: Critical Discourse Analysis of 
Pakistani News Bulletin Headlines and its impact on viewers.” Humanities: SAGE 
Open 8, No. 3 (2018): 1-15. 
Hassell, James. “Implementation of the Russian Table of Ranks during the Eighteenth 
Century.” Slavic Review 29, No. 2 (1970): 283-295. 
 336 
Hassid, Jonathan. “Four Models of the Fourth Estate: A Typology of Contemporary 
Chinese Journalists.” The China Quarterly 208 (2011):813-832. 
Herspring, Dale R. “Dedovshchina in the Russian Army: The Problem that won’t go 
Away.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 18, No. 4 (2005): 607-629. 
Herspring, Dale R., “Undermining Combat Readiness in the Russian Army, 1992-
2005,” Armed Forces and Society 32, No. 4 (2006): 513-531. 
Herspring, Dale R., “Vladimir Putin and Military Reform in Russia.” European 
Security 14, No. 1 (2005): 137-155. 
Hirshleifer, Jack. The Dark Side of the Force: Economic foundations of conflict 
theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Holscher, Meike. “Performances, Souvenirs, and Music: The Diamond Jubilee of 
Queen Victoria 1897.” In Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural 
Memory, edited by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, 173-186. Berlin and New York: 
Walter De Gruyter, 2009. 
Hoskins, Andrew, and Ben O’Loughlin. War and Media; The Emergence of a 
Diffused War. Cambridge: Wiley and Sons. 2013. 
Hughes, Lindsey. Russia in the Age of Peter the Great. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2004. 
Humphreys, Brendan. “Russia Exceptionalism: A Comparative Perspective,” Politics 
in Central Europe 12, No. 1 (2016): 9-20. 
Hunter, Wendy. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers. 
Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 
Huntington, Samuel P. Soldiers and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957. 
Hymans, Jacques E. C. “East is East, and West is West? Currency Iconography as 
Nation-Branding in the wider Europe.” Political Geography 29, No. 2 (2010): 97-
108. 
Ienaga, Saburo. “The Glorification of War in Japanese Education,” International 
Security 18, No. 3 (1993-1994): 113-133. 
Ilkhamor, Alisher. “Neopatrimonalism, interest groups and patronage networks: The 
Impasses of Governance System in Uzbekistan.” Central Asian Survey 26, No. 1 
(2007): 65-84. 
Irvine, Janice M. and Jill A. Irvine. “The Queer Work of Militarised Parades.” 
Contexts: Sociology for the Public 16, No. 4 (2017): 32-37. 
 337 
Isaacs, Jeremy, and Taylor Downing. Cold War: For forty-five years the World held 
its breath. London: Abacus, 2008. 
Ismailov, Murod, and Nozima Ganieva, “In search for the Russian national identity: 
Do history textbooks hold the answer?” Journal of alternative perspectives in the 
social sciences 5, No. 2 (2013): 366-392. 
Ivankine, Alex and Tom Perlmutter, “A Very Russian Coup,” YouTube Video, 47:26, 
April 11, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFkomwe7ZnM.  
Ivanov, V. I. “Veterany o Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine.” Sotsiologicheskie 
Issledovaniia, No. 5 (2015): 12-17. 
Jackson, Camille. “Legislation as an indicator of Free Press in Russia; Patterns of 
Change from Yeltsin to Putin.” Problems of Post-Communism 63, No. 5-6 (2016): 
354-366. 
Jacobsen, C. G. “Russia’s Revolutionary Arbiter? Arms and Society, 1988-1994,” 
War and Society 13, No. 1 (1995): 101-146. 
Jacobsen, C. G. The New World Order’s defining Crises, the Clash of Promise and 
Essence. Dartmouth: Darmouth Publishing Co. Ltd, 1996. 
Jones, Anthony. “The educational legacy of the Soviet period.” In Education and 
Society in the New Russia, edited by Anthony Jones, 3-24. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 
1994. 
Jones, Colin. “The Welfare of the French Foot-Soldier.” History 65, No. 214 (1980): 
193-213. 
Jones, Ellen. “Manning the Soviet Military.” International Security 7, No. 1 (1982): 
105-131. 
Jones, Robert A. “Heroes of the nation? The celebration of scientists on the Postage 
Stamps of Great Britain, France and West Germany.” Journal of Contemporary 
History 36, No. 3 (2001): 403-422. 
Kagan, Frederick W.   “The Great Patriotic War.” In The Military History of the Soviet 
Union, edited by Kagan, Frederick W. and Robert Higham, 137-151. New York: 
Palgrave, 2016. 
Kangaspuro, Markku  and Jussi Lassila. “Naming the War and Framing the notion in 
Russian Public Discussion.” Canadian Slavonic Papers 54, No. 3-4 (2012): 377-400. 
Kaplan, Vera. “History Teaching in Post-Soviet Russia: Coping with Antithetical 
Traditions.” In Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects, 
 338 
edited by Ben Eklof, Larry E. Holmes and Vera Kaplan, 247-271. Oxon:  Frank Cass, 
2005. 
Karpov, Vyacheslav and Elena Lisovskaya. “Educational change in a time of social 
revolution: The case of Post-Communist Russia in Comparative Perspective.” In 
Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects, edited by Ben 
Eklof, Larry E. Holmes and Vera Kaplan, 22-46. Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005. 
Kavaliauskas, Tomas. “Different Meanings of May 9th Victory Day over Nazi 
Germany, for Russia and the Baltic States.” Interdisciplinary Studies on Central and 
Eastern Europe 9 (2011): 319-336. 
Keep, John. “Military Style of the Romanov Rulers.” War and Society 1, No. 2 
(1983): 61-84. 
Keep, John. “Paul I and the Militarisation of Government.” Canadian-American 
Slavic Studies 7, No. 1 (1973): 1-14. 
Keep, John. “The Origins of Russian Militarism.” Cahiers du Monde russe et 
sovietique 26, No. 1 (1985): 5-19. 
Kenez, Peter. A History of the Soviet Union from the beginning to the end. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Kipp, Jacob W. “Lenin and Clausewitz, The Militarisation and Marxism, 1914-1921.” 
Military Affairs 49, No. 4 (1985): 184-191. 
Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. and Nancy M. Wingfield. “Gender and the Construction of 
Wartime heroism in Czechslovakia and the Soviet Union.” European History 
Quarterly 39, No. 3 (2009): 465-489. 
Kit-Wai, Eric. “Re-Nationalisation and me: My Hong-Kong story after 1997.” Inter-
Asia Cultural Studies 1, No. 1 (2000): 173-179. 
Koikkalainen, Katya. “The Local and the International in Russian Business 
Journalism: Structures and Practices.” In Globalisation, Freedom and the Media after 
Communism: The Past as Future, edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutchings and 
Natalia Rulyova, 71-85. Oxon: Routledge, 2009. 
Kolb, Anna Karina. “European Social Rights Towards National Welfare States: 
Additional, Substitue, Illusory?” In Citizenship and Welfare State Reform in Europe, 
edited by Jet Bussemaker, 165-178. London: Routledge, 2003. 
Koltsova, Olessia. News Media and Power in Russia. Oxon: Routledge, 2006. 
 339 
Kozhemiakin, Alexander V., and Roger E. Kanet. “Russia and its Western neighbours 
in the ‘Near Abroad.’” In The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, edited by 
Robert E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, 28-48. London: Palgrave, 1997. 
Kronsell, Annica, and Erika Svedberg. “Introduction: Making Gender, Making War.” 
In Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices, 
edited by Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, 10-27. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Krujit, Dirk, and Kees Koonings. “From Political Armies to the ‘war against crime:’ 
The Transformation of Militarism in Latin America.” In Militarism and International 
Relations: Political economy, security and theory, edited by Anna Stavrianakis and 
Jan Selby, 91-103. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
Krylova, Anna. “Dancing on the Graves of the Dead: Building a World War Two 
Memorial in Post-Soviet Russia.” In Memory and the impact of political 
transformations in public space, edited by Daniel J. Walkowitz and Lisa Maya 
Knauer, 83-103. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2005. 
Kryshtanovskaya, Olga and Stephen White. “Putin’s Militocracy.” Post-Soviet 
Affairs 19. No. 4 (2003): 289-306. 
Krzyzanowska, Natalia. “The discourse of counter-monuments: semiotics of material 
commemoration in contemporary urban spaces.” Social Semiotics 26, No. 5 (2016): 
465-485.  
Kubik, Jan. “Polish May Day Celebrations in the 1970’s and in 1981: An Essay on 
Symbolic Dimension of a Struggle for Political Legitimacy.” The Polish Review 34, 
No. 2 (1989): 99-116. 
Kurliandskaia, Galina. “Decentralisation in the Russian Federation,” Economic 
Change and Restructuring 39, No. 3-4 (2006): 213-233. 
Lambeth, Benjamin. “Russia’s Wounded Military.” Foreign Affairs 74, No. 2 (1995): 
86-98. 
Landberg, Alison. Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American 
Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004. 
Lapidus, Gail W. “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya.” International 
Security 23, No. 1 (1998): 5-49. 
Lasswell, Harold D. “The Garrison State.” American Journal of Sociology 46, No. 4 
(1941): 455-468. 
 340 
Lauer, Josh. “Money as Mass Communication: U.S. Paper Currency and the 
Iconography of Nationalism.” The Communication Review 11, No. 2 (2008): 109-
132. 
Le Goff, Jacques. History and Memory. Translated by Steven Rendall and Elizabeth 
Claman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
Lebedev, Anna Colin. “From a mother’s worry to Soldiers’ Mothers’ Action: 
Building Collective Actions on Personal Concerns” In Understanding Russianness, 
edited by Risto Alapuro, Arto Mustajoki and Pekka Pesonen, 84-98.  London: 
Routledge, 2011. 
Ledin, Per, and David Machin. “Multi-modal critical discourse analysis.” In The 
Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies, edited by John Flowerdew and 
John E. Richardson, 60-76. Oxon: Routledge, 2018.  
Lenintova, Ekaterina, and Jim Butterfield. “History Education and History 
Remembrance in Contemporary Russia.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 
43, No. 2 (2010): 139-166. 
Leshchiner, Viacheslav R. and David I. Poltorak. “The Standard for History 
Education in Russia’s Schools.” The History Teacher 27, No. 3 (1994): 317-324. 
Levario, Antonio Miguel. Militarising the border: When Mexicans Became the 
Enemy. Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2012. 
Levine, Philip and Ron Scollon. “Multimodal Discourse Analysis as the confluence 
of Discourse and technology.” In Discourse and Technology: Multimodal Discourse 
Analysis, edited by Ron Scollon and Philip Levin, 1-6. Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004. 
Lieven, Anatol. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1999. 
Liu, Yongbing. “The construction of cultural values and beliefs in Chinese language 
textbooks: A Critical Discourse Analysis.” Discourse: Studies in the cultural politics 
of education 26, No. 1 (2005): 15-30. 
Locmele, Klinka, Olga Procevska and Vita Zelce. “Celebrations, Commemorative 
Dates and Related Rituals: Soviet Experience, its Transformation and Contemporary 
Victory Day Celebrations in Russia and Latvia.” In The Geopolitics of History in 
Latvian-Russian Relations, edited by Nils Muiznuks, 109-138. Riga: Academic Press 
of the University of Latvia, 2011. 
 341 
Lutz, Catherine. “Making war at home in the United States: Militarisation and the 
current crisis.” American Anthropologist 104, No. 3 (2002): 723-735. 
Macdonald, Colin. “Sponsorship and the Image of the Sponsor.” European Journal 
of Marketing 25, No. 11 (1991): 31-38. 
Macgilchrist, Felicitas. “Textbooks.” In The Routledge handbook of Critical 
Discourse Studies, edited by John Flowerdew and John F Richardson, 525-539. Oxon: 
Routledge, 2018.  
Madrigal, Robert. “Social Identity, Effects in belief – attitude-intentions hierarchy: 
Implications for Corporate Sponsorship.” Psychology and Marketing 18, No. 2 
(2001): 145-165. 
Magolda, Marcia Baxter. Making their own war: Narratives for Transforming Higher 
Education to promote self-development. Virginia: Stylus Publishing, 2004. 
Majumdar, Neepa. “The Nostalgia Industry and Indian Film Studies,” South Asian 
Popular Culture 13, No. 1 (2015): 85-88. 
Malinova, Olga. “Political Uses of the Great Patriotic War in Post-Soviet Russia from 
Yeltsin to Putin.” In War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, edited by John 
Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro and Jussi Lassila, 43-70. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017.  
Mangan, J. A. “Prologue: Combative Sports and Combative Societies.” In Militarism, 
Sport, Europe: War without Weapons, edited by J. A. Mangan, 1-9. London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
Mann, Michael. “The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism.” New Left 
Review 1, No. 162 (1987). 
Mann, Yan. “(Re)cycling the Collective Memory of the Great Patriotic War.” The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 33, No. 4 (2020): 508-513. 
Marshall, Tim. Prisoners of Geography: Ten maps that explain everything about the 
world. London: Elliott and Thompson, 2016. 
Marten, Kimberly. “Reconsidering NATO expansion: a counterfactual analysis of 
Russia and the West in the 1990s.” European Journal of international Security 3, No. 
2 (2018): 135-161. 
Marwick, Roger D. “The Great Patriotic War in Soviet and Post-Soviet Collective 
Memory.” In The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History, edited by Dan 
Stone, 692-713. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
 342 
Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Mathers, Jennifer G. “The Generals Manoeuvre on the Political Battlefield.” World 
Today 51, No. 12 (1995): 231-234. 
McDermott, Roger. “Russia’s Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion.” Russie. Nei. 
Visions, No. 37 (2009) 
McIntosh Sunstrom, Lisa. “Soldiers’ Rights Groups in Russia: Civil Society Through 
Russia and Western Eyes.” In Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment, edited by 
Alfred B. Evans, Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sunstrom, 178-196. New York 
and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2006.  
McNair, Brian. “Reforming and Restructuring in the Soviet media: Before and after 
the August 1991 coup.” In Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, edited by 
John Eldridge, 53-72. Oxford: Taylor and Francis, 2003. 
McNair, Brian. Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media. London: Routledge, 
1991. 
Meenaghan, Tony. “Understanding Sponsorship Effects.” Psychology and Marketing 
18, No. 2 (2001): 95-122. 
Melnick, A. James. “Beyond the Economy: Internal Factors Affecting the Future of 
the Russian Military.” Naval War College Review 47, No. 3 (1994): 33-50. 
Menning, Bruce W. “Paul I and Catherine II’s Military Legacy, 1762-1801,” in The 
Military History of Tsarist Russia, edited by Fredrick W. Kagan and Robin Higham, 
77-106. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 
Menning, Bruce W. “The Imperial Russian Army, 1725-1796.” In The Military 
History of Tsarist Russia, edited by Fredrick W. Kagan and Robin Higham, 47-76. 
New York: Palgrave, 2002. 
Merely, Scott Hughes. British military spectacle: from the Napoleonic wars through 
the Crimea. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
Merridale, Catherine. “Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 38, No. 1 (2003): 13-28.  
Mesle, France and Jacques Vallin. Morality and causes of death in 20th century 
Ukraine.London: Springer, 2012. 
Mettler, Suzanne. “Bringing the State Back in to Civil Engagement: Policy Feedback 
Effects of the G. I. Bill for World War 2 Veterans.” The American Political Science 
Review 96, No. 2 (2002): 351-365. 
 343 
Meyer, Eric. “Memory and Politics.” In A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies: 
An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, edited by Astrid Erll, Ansgar 
Nünning, and Sara Young, 173-180. Germany: Walter De Gruyter, 2008. 
Miakinkov, Eugene. War and Enlightenment in Russia: Military Culture in the Age 
of Catherine II. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020. 
Mikaberidze, Alexander. Russian Officer Corps of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. New York: Savas Beatie, 2005. 
Misztal, Barbara A. “Durkheim on Collective Memory.” Journal of Classic Sociology 
3, No. 2 (2003): 123-143. 
Mittlestadt, Jennifer. The Rise of the Military Welfare State. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Havard University Press, 2015. 
Moran, John P. From Garrison State to Nation State: Political Power and the Russian 
Military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Westport: Praeger, 2002. 
Morgan, W. John, and Grigori Kliucharev. “Higher Education and the Post-Soviet 
Transition in Russia.” Journal of Education 47, No. 1 (2012): 3-8. 
Muldering, Jane, Nicolina Montesane Montessori and Michael Farrely. “Introducing 
Critical Policy Discourse Analysis.” In Critical Policy Discourse Analysis, edited by 
Jane Muldering, Nicolina Montesane Montessori and Michael Farrely, 1-22. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019. 
Naimark, Norman M., David E. Powell and Kurt M. Campbell. “Moscow’s Cult of 
Militarism.” The National Interest, No. 4 (1986): 53-64. 
Nelson, Todd. “History as Ideology: The Portrayal of Stalinism and the Great 
Patriotic War in Contemporary Russian High School books.” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, 
No. 1 (2015): 37-65. 
Nungesser, Verena-Susanna. “I Forgot to Remember (to Forget): Personal Memories 
in Memento (2000) and Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004).” In Mediation, 
Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, edited by Astrid Ell and Ann 
Rigney, 31-48. Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 2009. 
Odom, William E. The Collapse of the Soviet Military. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2000. 
Odom, William. “The ‘militarisation’ of Soviet society.” Problems of Communism 
25, No. 5 (1976), 34-51. 
 344 
Oleynik, Anton. “Dedovshchina as an Element of the “Small Society”: Evidence from 
Russia and Other Countries.” The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet 
Societies, No. 1 (2004). 
Paul, Michael C. “The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.” The Journal of 
Military History 68, No. 1 (2004): 9-45. 
Payne, James L. “Marxism and Militarism” Polity 19, No. 2 (1986): 270-289. 
Penrose, Jan and Craig Cumming. “Money Talks: Banknote iconography and 
symbolic constructions of Scotland.” Nations and Nationalism 17, No. 4 (2011): 821-
842. 
Petrović, Boban, Janko Mededović, Olivera Radović and Sanja Radetić Lovrić. 
“Conspiracy Mentality in Post-Conflict Societies: Relations with the ethos of conflict 
and readiness for reconciliation.” Europe’s Journal of Psychology 15, No. 1 (2019): 
59-81. 
Pinter, Walker M. “The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914.” The 
Russian Review 43, No. 3 (1984): 231-259. 
Pipes, Richard. “Militarism and the Soviet State.” Daedalus 109, No. 4 (1980): 1-12. 
Potapova, Natalia. “Normativity in Russian History Education: Political Patterns and 
National History Textbooks.” Journal of Social Sciences of Education 14, No. 1 
(2015): 47-55. 
Powe, Lucas A. The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Press in 
America. Berkley: University of California Press, 1991. 
Proctor, Tammy. Civilians in a World at War, 1914-1918. New York: NYU Press, 
2010. 
Provencher, Denis M. and Luke L. Eilderts. “The Nation According to Lavisse: 
Teaching Masculinity and Male Citizenship in Third-Republic France.” French 
Cultural Studies 18, No. 1 (2007): 31-57. 
Purwanta, Hieronymus. “Militaristic Discourse in Secondary History Textbooks 
during and after the Soeharto Era.” Journal of Educations Media, Memory and Society 
9, No. 1 (2017): 36-53. 
Rachbauer, Markus. The Soldiers’ mothers of Russia. Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2008. 
Radway, L. I., “Militarism.” In Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, edited by D. L. 
Sills, 300-305. New York: MacMillan Co and Free Press, 1968. 
Raeff, Mark. Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary? Lexington, Massachusetts: 
D.C. Heath & Company, 1966. 
 345 
Ramanatham, Renugah and Tan Bee Hoon. “Application of Critical Discourse 
Analysis in Media Discourse Studies.” The Southeast Journal of English Language 
Studies 21, No. 2 (2015): 57-68. 
Ramsey, Neil. The Military Memoir and Romantic Literary Culture 1780-1835. 
Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2016. 
Ray, Oliver Allen. “The Imperial Russian Army Officers.” Political Science 
Quarterly 76, No. 4 (1961): 576-592. 
Reid, Anna. Leningrad: Tragedy of a City Under Siege, 1941-1944. London: 
Bloomsbury, 2012. 
Renz, Bettina. “Media-military relations in Post-Soviet Russia: Who is the 
watchdog?” In Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia, edited by Jennifer G. 
Mathers and Stephen Webber, 61-79. Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2006. 
Renz, Bettina. “Putin’s Militocracy? An Alternative Interpretation of the Siloviki in 
Contemporary Russian Politics.” Europe-Asia Studies 58, No. 6 (2006): 903-924. 
Richardson, Matthew. “Medals, Memory and Meaning: Symbolism and cultural 
significance of Great War Medals.” In Contested Objects: Material Memories of the 
Great War, edited by Nicholas J. Saunders and Paul Cornish, 104-118. Oxon: 
Routledge, 2014. 
Richter, Andrei G. “The Russian Press after Perestroika.” Canadian Journal of 
Communication 20, No. 1 (1995):  7-23. 
Richters, Katya. The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and 
Greater Russia. Oxon: Routledge, 2012. 
Rigby, Andrew A. “Peace Symbol’s Origins.” Peace Review 10, No. 3 (1998): 475-
479. 
Ripsberger, Joseph T., Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Kerry G. Herron. “How Cultural 
Orientations Create Shifting National Security Coalitions on Nuclear Weapons and 
Terrorist Threats in the American Public.” PS: Political Science and Politics 44, No. 
4 (2011): 715-719. 
Rivera, Sharon Werning and David W. Rivera, “The Russian Elite under Putin: 
Militocratic or Bourgeois?” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2006), 125-144. 
Rivera, Sharon Werning and David W. Rivera. “Is Russia a militocracy? Conceptual 
Issues and extant findings regarding elite militarisation.” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, No. 
1 (2014): 27-50. 
 346 
Robertson, Emily. “Propaganda and ‘Manufactured Hatred:’ An Appraisal of the 
ethics of First World War British and Australian Atrocity Propaganda.” Public 
Relations Enquiry 3, No. 2 (2014): 245-266. 
Rosenblum, Nancy. “Romantic Militarism.” Journal of the History of Ideas 43, No. 
2 (1982): 249-268. 
Ross, Andrew L. “The Dimensions of Militarisation in the Third World.” Armed 
Forces and Society 13, No. 4 (1987): 561-578. 
Rowlands, Michael. “Trauma, Memory and Memorials.” British Journal of 
Psychology 15, No. 1 (1998): 54-64. 
Sakwa, Richard. Russian Politics and Society. 2nd edition. New York and London: 
Routledge, 1996. 
Santino, Jack. “Performative commemoratives, the personal, and the public: 
Spontaneous shrines, Emergent Rituals, and the field of Folklore.” Journal of 
American Folklore 117, No. 466 (2004): 363-372. 
Sarotte, Mary Elise. “One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, 
and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990.” 
Diplomatic History 34, No. 1 (2010): 119-140. 
Scheufele, Dietram, A. “Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another 
Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication.” Mass Communication and 
Society 3, No. 2-3 (2000): 297-316. 
Schleifman, Nurit. “Moscow’s Victory Park: A Monumental Change.” History and 
Memory 13, No. 2 (2001): 5-34. 
Schreier, Margrit. “Qualitative Content Analysis.” In The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Data Analysis, edited by Uwe Flick, 170-183. London: SAGE 
publications, 2013. 
Schulte-Sasse, Jochen, and Linda Shulte-Sasse, “War, Otherness, and Illusionary 
Identifications with the state,” Cultural Critique, No. 19 (1991): 67-95. 
Seierstad, Asne. Angel of Grozny: Life Inside Chechnya. London: Virago, 2007. 
Service, Robert. The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the 
Twenty-First Century. 4th edition. London: Penguin, 2015. 
Shambaugh, David. “The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System 
in the People’s Liberation Army.” China Quarterly, No. 127 (1991): 527-568. 
 347 
Shaw, Denis. “‘A strong and prosperous condition’: The Geography of state building 
and social reform in Peter the Great’s Russia.” Political Geography 18, No. 8 (1999): 
991-1015. 
Shaw, Martin. “Twenty-First Century Militarism: A historical-sociological 
framework.” In Militarism and International Relations: Political economy, security 
and theory, edited by Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, 19-32. New York: Routledge, 
2002. 
Sherman, Daniel J. “Commemoration.” In The French Republic: History, Values, 
Debate, edited by Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert and Christopher Prochasson, 
324-333. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011. 
Shnirelman, Victor. “Stigmatised by history or by historians? The people’s Russia in 
School history textbooks.” History and Memory 21, No. 2 (2009): 110-149. 
Sieca-Kozlowski, Elisabeth. “From Controlling Military Information to Controlling 
Society: Political Interests Involved in the Transformation of the Military Media 
Under Putin.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, Vol. 2 (2009): 300-318. 
Sieca-Kozlowski, Elisabeth. “Russian Military Patriotic Education: A control tool 
against the arbitrariness of veterans.” The journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 38, 
No. 1 (2010): 73-85. 
Simes, Dimitri. “The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society” International 
Security 6, No. 3 (1981-1982): 123-143. 
Singh, Anil Kamar. Military and Media. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2006. 
Sinitsina, Irina. “Experience of Implementing Social benefits Monetization Reform 
in Russia. Literature Review.” SSPRN Electronic Journal. (2009): 1-65. 
10.2139/ssrn.1436409. 
Siren, Pontis. “The Battle of Grozny: The Russian Invasion of Chechnya, December 
1994-1996.” In Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis: Essays on Russo-
Chechen Relations, edited by Ben Fowkes, 87-169. London: Springer Links, 2016. 
Skocpol, Theda. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1995. 
Smith Julianne. The NATO-Russia Relationship: Defining Moment or Déjà vu? 
Europe, Russia and the United States: Finding a New Balance. Washington DC: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers/ Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2008. 
 348 
Smith, Kevin B. The Ideology of Education: The Commonwealth, the Market, 
America’s Schools. Albany: SUNY Press, 2003. 
Smith, Mark B. “Social Rights in the Soviet Dictatorship: The constitutional Right to 
Welfare from Stalin to Brezhnev.” Humanity: An International Journal of Human 
Rights, Humanitarianism and Development 3, No. 3 (2012): 385-406. 
Smith, Martin A., and Graham Timmins. “Russia, NATO and the EU in an Era of 
Enlargement: Vulnerability or Opportunity?” Geopolitics 6, No. 1 (2001): 69-90. 
Solovenko, I. S. “‘Rel’sovye Voiny’ v Rossii v 1998 g.: K Postanovke Problemy.” 
Istoriia 63.3(2), No. 6-3 (2010): 206-210. 
Speck, Catherine. “Women’s War Memorials and Citizenship.” Australian Feminist 
Studies 11, No. 23 (1996): 129-145. 
Spivak, Andrew L., and William Alex Pridemore. “Conscription and Reform in the 
Russian Army.” Problems of Post-Communism 51, No. 6 (2004): 33-43. 
Stahl, Roger. Militainment, Inc War, Media and Popular Culture. New York: 
Routledge, 2010. 
Starovoitova, Galina. “Democratisation and Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Society.” 
In Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, 1st edn.  
edited by Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoeller, Catherine McArdle Kelleher and 
Lee Walker, 149-156. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998. 
Stavrianakis, Anna and Jan Selby. “Militarism and international relations in the 
twenty-first century.” In Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, 
Security and Theory, edited by Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, 3-18. New York: 
Routledge, 2002. 
Stemler, Steve. “An Overview of Content Analysis.” Practical Assessment, Research 
and Evaluation 7, No. 17 (2000): 1-7. 
Stockdale, Melissa. “The Russian Experience of the First World War.” In A 
Companion of Russian History, edited by Abbott Gleason, 311-314. UK: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009. 
Stone, David R. A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the war in 
Chechnya. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006. 
Stone, David R. Hammer and Rifle: The Militarisation of the Soviet Union, 1926-
1933. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000. 
Sturken, Marita. Tangled Memories, The Vietnam War, The Aids Epidemic, And the 
Politics of Remembering. Berkley: University California Press, 1997. 
 349 
Sushentov, Andrey A., and William C. Wohlforth. “The Tragedy of US-Russia 
Relations: NATO centrality and the revisionists’ spiral.” International Politics 57, 
(2020), 427-450. 
Sutherland, Robert. “Hidden Persuaders: Political Ideologies in Literature for 
Children.” Children’s Literature in Education 16, No. 3 (1985): 143-157. 
Suvorov, Viktor. Ledokol: Kto nachal Vtoruyu Mirovuyu Voyna? Russia: Dobraya 
Uniga, 1987. 
Tally, Robert T. “Demonizing the Enemy, Literally: Tolkien, Orcs, and the Sense of 
the World Wars.” Humanities 8, No. 54 (2019): 95-104. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/h8010054. 
Taylor, Brian D. Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Tolz, Vera. “The War in Chechnya.” Current History 95, No. 603 (1996): 316-321. 
Trenin, Dmitri. “The Revival of the Russian Military.” Foreign Affairs 95, No. 3 
(2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-
russian-military.  
Trigg, Jonathan. “Memory and Memorial: A Study of Official and Military 
Commemoration of the Dead, and Family and Community Memory in Essex and East 
London.” Journal of Conflict Archaeology 3, No. 1 (2007): 295-315. 
Tumarkin, Nina. “The Great Patriotic War as myth and memory.” European Review 
11, No. 4 (2003): 595-611. 
Unwin, T., and V. Hewitt. “Banknotes and national Identity in Central and Eastern 
Europe.” Political Geography 20, No. 8 (2001): 1005-1028. 
Urip Sulistiyo, Supiani, Ahmad Kailiani and Rani Puspitasari Dewi Lestariyana. 
“Infusing moral content into Primary School English Textbooks: A Critical Discourse 
Analysis.” Indonesian Journal of Applied Linguistics 10, No. 1 (2020): 251-260. 
Vagts, Alfred. The History of Militarism: Civilian and Military. New York: The Free 
Press, 1959. 
Vallance, Brenda. “The Rule of Law and Russian Military Reform: The Role of 
Soldiers’ Mothers in Russian Society.” The Carl Beck Papers in Center of Russian 
and East European Studies, No. 1407 (2000): 1-33.  
Valliant, Janet G. “Civic Education in Changing Russia” In Educational Reform in 
Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects, edited by Ben Eklof, Larry E. Holmes 
and Vera Kaplan, 221-246. Oxon: Frank Cass, 2005. 
 350 
Van Dijk, Teun A.  “What is political discourse analysis?” In Political linguistics, 
edited by Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcuen, 11-52. Amsterdam: Benjamins 
Publishers, 1998. 
Van Dijk, Teun A. “Discourse, Power and Access.” In Text and Practices: Readings 
in Critical Discourse Analysis, edited by Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and 
Malcolm Coulthard, 84-104. London: Routledge, 2015. 
Varin, Caroline. Mercenaries, Hybrid Armies and National Security: Private Soldiers 
and the state in the 21st Century. Oxon: Routledge, 2014. 
Vartanova, Elena. “The Russian Media Model in the Context of Post-Soviet 
Dynamics.” In Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World, edited by 
Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini, 119-142. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011. 
Vetter, Eva. “Hegemonic Discourse in the Habsburg Empire: The case of education. 
A Critical Discourse Analysis of two mid-19th century government documents.” In 
Diglossia and Power: Language policies and practice in the 19th century Habsburg 
Empire, edited by Rosita Rindler Schjerve, 271-309. Berlin: Mounton De Gruyter, 
2003. 
Viggo Jakobsen, Peter. “Focus on the CNN Effect misses the point: The Real Media 
Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Direct.” Journal of Peace Research 
37, No. 2 (2000): 205-215. 
Virilio, Paul. War and Cinema: The Logistic of Perception. London and New York: 
Verso, 1989.  
Vogel, Jacob. “Military, Folklore, Eigensinn: Folkloric Militarism in Germany and 
France, 1871-1914.” Central European History 33, No. 4 (2000): 487-504. 
Volodina, Tatyana. “Teaching History in Russia after the collapse of the USSR.” The 
History Teacher 38, No. 2 (2005): 179-188. 
Voltmer, Katrin. “Constructing the Political Reality in Russia. Izvestiya – Between 
Old and New Journalistic Practices.” European Journal of Communication 15, No. 4 
(2000): 469-500. 
Waley-Cohen, Joanna. “Militarisation of Culture in Eighteenth-Century China.” In 
Military Culture in Imperial China, edited by Robin D. S. Yates and Ralph D. Sawyer, 
278-295. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Walker, Shaun. The Long Hangover: Putin’s New Russia and the Ghosts of the Past. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
 351 
Wang, Jiayu. “A New Political Communication Agenda for Political Discourse 
Analysis: Critical Reflections on Critical Discourse Analysis and Political Discourse 
Analysis.” International Journal of Communications, 10 (2016): 2766 - 2784. 
Wang, Zheng. “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of 
Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China.” International Studies 
Association 52, No. 4 (2008): 783-806. 
Weatherford, Doris. American Women During World War II: An Encyclopaedia. New 
York: Routledge, 2010. 
Webber, Stephen L. “Introduction: The Society-Military Interface in Russia.” In 
Military and Society in post-Soviet Russia, edited by Stephen L. Webber and Jennifer 
G Mathers, 1-36. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006. 
Weiner, Amir. “In the Long Shadow of War: The Second World War and the Soviet 
and Post-Soviet World.” Diplomatic History 25, No. 3 (2001): 443-456. 
Wertsch, James V.  “Narratives as cultural tools in sociocultural analysis: Official 
History in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia” Ethos 28, No. 4 (2001): 511-533. 
Wesson, Robert G. “The Military in Soviet Society.” The Russian Review 30, No. 2 
(April 1971): 139-145. 
White, Stephen: Russia’s New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Whitehood, Peter. “The Purge of the Red Army and the Soviet Mass Operations, 
1937-1938.” The Slavonic and East European Review 93, No. 2 (2015): 286-314. 
Wiktorow, Aleksandra. “Soviet Union.” In Social Welfare in Socialist Countries, 
edited by John Dixon and David Macarov, 184-207. Oxon: Routledge, 2016. 
Williams, Brian Glyn. “Commemorating “the Deportation in Post-Soviet Chechnya: 
The Role of Memorialisation and Collective Memory in the 1994-1996 and 1999-
2000 Russo-Chechen Wars.” History and Memory 12, No. 1 (2000): 101-134. 
Wirtschafter, Elise Kimerling. From Serf to Russian Soldier. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990. 
Wodak, Ruth and Rudolf De Cillia. “Commemorating the Past: The Discursive 
Construction of Official Narratives about the ‘Rebirth of the Second Austrian 
Republic.’” Discourse and Communication 1, No. 3 (2007): 149-173. 
Wodak, Ruth. “Critical Discourse Analysis at the End of the 20th Century.” Research 
on Language and Social Interaction 32, No. 1-2 (1999): 185-193. 
 352 
Wodak, Ruth. “The Discourse-Historical Approach.” In Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 63-95. London: 
SAGE, 2001. 
Woodside-Jiron, Haley. “Language, Power and Participation: Using Critical 
Discourse Analysis to Make Sense of Public Policy.” In An Introduction to Critical 
Discourse Analysis in Education, edited by Rebecca Rogers, 173-206. London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2004. 
Yeltsin, Boris. Midnight Diaries. Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000. 
Zajda, Joseph. “Globalisation, Ideology and History School Textbooks: The Russian 
Federation.” In Nation-building and history education in a global culture, edited by 
Joseph Zajda, 29-50. New York: Springer, 2015. 
Zajda, Joseph. “Russian History Textbooks: An Analysis of Historical Narratives 
depicting key events.” Curriculum and Teaching 28, No. 2 (2013): 73-100. 
Zamponi, Lorenzo. Social Movements, Memory and Media: Narrative in Action in 
the Italian and Spanish Student Movements. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 
Zassoursky, Ivan Ivanovich. Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. Oxon: 
Routledge, 2016. 
Zawilski, Valeria. “Saving Russia’s Sons: The Soldiers’ Mothers and the Russian-
Chechen Wars.” In Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia, edited by Stephen 
Webber and Jennifer G. Mathers, 228-240. Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2005. 
Zorin, Andrei. By Fables Alone: Literature and State ideology in late eighteenth - 




Abousnnouga, Gillian N. “Visual and Written Discourse of British Commemorative 
War Monuments.” PhD diss. Cardiff University, 2012.  
Cling, Paul. “‘Militainment’ In Post 9/11 American War Movies.” PhD diss. 
University of Leiden, 2018.  
Evans, Dean. “How Far were the Lines between the Frontline and the Homefront 
blurred in East Kent (Canterbury).” Masters diss. University of Kent, 2016. 
 353 
Juskevits, Svetlana. “Professional Roles of Russian Journalists at the End of the 
1990s: A Case Study of St. Petersburg Media.” Licentiates diss. University of 
Tampere, 2002. 
Koenig, Christop. “Loose-Cannons – War Veterans and the Erosion of Democracy in 
Weimar Republic.” Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (2015) 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2015/twerp_1079
_koenig.pdf  
Maltseva, Elena. “Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: A Comparison of Social 
Benefits Reform in Russia and Kazakhstan,” PhD diss. University of Toronto, 2012. 
Nemtsev, Mikhail.  “Life of a devoted militant out of a battlefield: Variations of 
everyday militarism in Russian Communities.” Workshop, Militarisation of Everyday 
Life in Europe: Past Practices and Future Challenges, Swansea University, Swansea, 
November 2017. 
Simons, Gregory J. “The Impact of Political and Business Interests of the 
Contemporary Russian Media,” Masters diss. University of Canterbury, 2001. 
 
